Almonte v. Karth

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 7, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-06062·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JUAN CARLOS ALMONTE, Plaintiff, -against- BRIAN KARTH, Deputy Clerk; JAMES K. 21-CV-6062 (LTS) SINGLETON, Senior U.S. District Judge; ORDER TO AMEND L.M.H. COURT STAFF; FRANK GERACI, Chief Judge; JESSICA J. LYUBAWOVITS; Deputy Clerk; RICHARD MILDENBERGER, Deputy Clerk, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated July 30, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Because Plaintiff’s handwritten complaint is difficult to decipher, it does not clearly present the events giving rise to this complaint or the relief he seeks. Plaintiff names as defendants judges and court clerks from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, and the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, where Plaintiff filed cases. See Almonte v. U.S. Clerk Offices Employee, No. 21-CV-151 (D. Alaska Aug. 9, 2021) (dismissed without prejudice); Almonte v. Geraci, No. 21-CV-6489 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021) (same).2 (ECF 1.) Attached to the complaint is a “Change of Religious Designation Form” from

the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), and what appears to be a list of religions that DOCCS recognizes. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff does not explain why he attached those documents to his complaint. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). To state a claim under section 1983 against a defendant in an individual capacity, a

plaintiff must also allege facts showing the defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2 Plaintiff does not allege when he gave this complaint to prison officials for mailing, but he signed it on July 3, 2021, and the Court received it on July 13, 2021. See Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (Under the “mailbox rule,” pro se prisoner filings are deemed “filed” on the date they are delivered to prison officials). Plaintiff’s cases in other districts were pending when he filed this complaint. A defendant may not be held liable under section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official

liable under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). B. Claims suggested by attachments to the pleading Plaintiff may be alleging a violation of his right to freely practice his religion. Such claims may potentially arise under the Free-Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).

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