Almonte v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Almonte v. City of New York

123 A.D.3d 1067, 2 N.Y.S.3d 131

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 31, 2014

Docket2013-04183

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 123 A.D.3d 1067 (Almonte v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Almonte v. City of New York, 123 A.D.3d 1067, 2 N.Y.S.3d 131 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

*1068 In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ash, J.), dated January 31, 2013, as, upon renewal, adhered to its original determination in an order dated June 15, 2012, granting that branch of the cross motion of the defendant New York City Transit Authority which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured while attempting to board a bus owned by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA). The plaintiff testified at his deposition that the bus had stopped two or three feet away from the curb at a bus shelter located in front of 166 Myrtle Avenue in Brooklyn. Several individuals who had been waiting for the bus at the bus shelter safely boarded the bus. However, the plaintiff, who had been approaching the bus from behind, stepped into a hole when he stepped from the sidewalk into the street. The hole was located to the left of the door to the bus.

“A transit company owes a duty to a prospective boarding passenger to provide him or her with a reasonably safe, direct means of entrance onto the vehicle, clear of any dangerous obstruction or defect which would impede that entrance” (Saidoff v New York City Tr. Auth., 105 AD3d 726, 727 [2013]; see Dobrowolski v City of New York, 29 AD3d 937 [2006]; Blye v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 124 AD2d 106, 111 [1987], affd 72 NY2d 888 [1988]).

Here, the NYCTA established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the bus had been stopped at a location where passengers could safely get on and off (see Francias v City of New York, 222 AD2d 215 [1995]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise any triable issues of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly adhered to its original determination granting that branch of the NYCTA’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

*1068 In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ash, J.), dated January 31, 2013, as, upon renewal, adhered to its original determination in an order dated June 15, 2012, granting that branch of the cross motion of the defendant New York City Transit Authority which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured while attempting to board a bus owned by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA). The plaintiff testified at his deposition that the bus had stopped two or three feet away from the curb at a bus shelter located in front of 166 Myrtle Avenue in Brooklyn. Several individuals who had been waiting for the bus at the bus shelter safely boarded the bus. However, the plaintiff, who had been approaching the bus from behind, stepped into a hole when he stepped from the sidewalk into the street. The hole was located to the left of the door to the bus.

“A transit company owes a duty to a prospective boarding passenger to provide him or her with a reasonably safe, direct means of entrance onto the vehicle, clear of any dangerous obstruction or defect which would impede that entrance” (Saidoff v New York City Tr. Auth., 105 AD3d 726, 727 [2013]; see Dobrowolski v City of New York, 29 AD3d 937 [2006]; Blye v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 124 AD2d 106, 111 [1987], affd 72 NY2d 888 [1988]).

Here, the NYCTA established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the bus had been stopped at a location where passengers could safely get on and off (see Francias v City of New York, 222 AD2d 215 [1995]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise any triable issues of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly adhered to its original determination granting that branch of the NYCTA’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

123 A.D.3d 1067, 2 N.Y.S.3d 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/almonte-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-2014.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack