Almeyda v. Wooster Motor Ways Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedJune 13, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-00085
StatusUnknown

This text of Almeyda v. Wooster Motor Ways Inc. (Almeyda v. Wooster Motor Ways Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Almeyda v. Wooster Motor Ways Inc., (W.D. Ky. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 3:25-CV-00085-RGJ-LLK

TIFFANY ALMEYDA and KENNETH FELT JR. PLAINTIFFS

v.

WOOSTER MOTOR WAYS, INC. and RICHARD PIPER DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Currently pending before the Court are separate motions to stay this action filed by Defendants. The first was filed on April 14, 2025, by Defendant Wooster Motor Ways, Inc. (“Wooster”) [DN 11], to which Plaintiffs Almeyda and Felt filed a Response in opposition [DN 12], and Defendant Wooster replied. [DN 14]. On May 1, 2025, pro se Defendant Richard Piper (“Piper”) filed a handwritten document requesting a stay/joining Defendant Wooster’s Motion to Stay and Asserting his Fifth Amendment rights [DN 13], which this Court deemed a Motion to Stay and asked Plaintiffs to file a separate Response [DN 17]. The Plaintiffs have now responded in opposition to Defendant Piper’s Motion to Stay [DN 18], and the issue is ripe for determination. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant Wooster’s Motion to Stay is DENIED. A stay of discovery as to Defendant Piper is GRANTED in order to protect his Fifth Amendment rights, as will be more fully discussed below. I. Factual Background Plaintiffs Almeyda and Felt filed this action against Defendants Wooster and Piper in Jefferson Circuit Court for injuries they sustained in an August 12, 2024, multi-vehicle collision on I-64 westbound in Jefferson County, Kentucky. [DN 1-2] at 2. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Piper was the employee/agent of Defendant Wooster and operating a tractor- trailer on Wooster’s behalf while intoxicated when he failed to slow for heavy traffic and rearended a vehicle resulting in the death of Colton Tanner, and the injuries of Plaintiffs Almeyda and Felt. Defendant Wooster filed a Notice of Removal to this Court on February 14, 2025. [DN 1]. Defendant Piper has since been indicted on multiple charges, including murder, assault, wanton

endangerment, and reckless driving. [DN 11-1] at 3. Notably, Defendant Piper’s involvement in this case thus far has been pro se. II. Motions to Stay Defendant Wooster moved to stay this litigation because: 1) its co-defendant Richard Piper is currently incarcerated and facing felony charges including murder in Jefferson County Circuit Court; 2) Defendant Piper’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is at risk in this civil litigation; and 3) the Estate of Tanner Colton is not currently a party to this proceeding and Wooster may incur duplicate defense costs if the Estate brings suit later. [DN 11]. Defendant Piper’s pro se filing essentially joined Wooster’s Motion and asserted his Fifth Amendment rights [DN 13].

Defendants ask this Court to utilize its inherent power to manage the litigation on its docket so that discovery in this civil case does not impair defenses in the related criminal case. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant Wooster’s Motion objects to any stay, noting recent decisions within this district and circuit declining to stay civil litigation because criminal proceedings are pending. Plaintiffs cite to this Court’s ruling in Embry v. Discount Motors, LLC, 4:23-CV-78-HBB, 2024 WL 558260 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2024)—denying a stay to an unindicted corporate defendant but granting a discovery stay as to its employee/indicted criminal defendant— as being analogous to this case. In Embry, claims were brought against corporate defendant Discount Motors and two of its employees, alleging that they were all civilly liable for the criminal actions of the two employees. The two employees were under state criminal indictment for the same behaviors that gave rise to the civil litigation, and both the corporation and one of the employees sought to stay all discovery in the civil case pending resolution of the criminal indictment. In declining to allow Discount Motors a stay, Magistrate Judge Brennenstuhl noted that there were no criminal charges pending against the corporation and that corporate entities are

not entitled to assert a privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment: “It has long been settled in federal jurisprudence that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is ‘essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.’ It ‘cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.’” George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs Almeyda and Felt further argue that their action need not wait on the Estate of Colton Tanner to proceed, as suggested by Defendant Wooster. Defendant Wooster posits that Colton Tanner’s family needs time to “physically, mentally, and emotionally prepare for litigation” [DN 14] at 6, to which Plaintiffs argue that “there is no law requiring all potential plaintiffs to file

an action before any potential Plaintiffs can proceed.” [DN 12] at 2. Plaintiffs note that the Estate of Colton Tanner is not an indispensable party to this litigation under FRCP 19, and that the estate remains free to join this suit, file suit separately, settle out of court without ever filing a claim, or never pursue a claim at all. Id. at 7-8. Finally, Plaintiffs Almeyda and Felt take issue with Wooster’s suggestion that the early filing of their own claims has somehow harmed Colton Tanner’s family. Id. In Response to Defendant Piper’s pro se Motion for Stay, Plaintiffs continue to argue that there is no Constitutional right to a stay of civil proceedings in the face of a pending criminal indictment. However, Plaintiffs concede that this Court may determine that a stay of discovery is appropriate in order to protect Defendant Piper’s Fifth Amendment rights. If so, Plaintiffs request that any stay be limited to Defendant Piper and not extend to Defendant Wooster. Citing Embry, Plaintiffs note that Judge Brennenstuhl held that a stay of discovery was appropriate as to the employee Defendant facing criminal charges, but not as to his employer, Discount Motors. III. Standard of Review

“The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes in its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel and for litigants, and the entry of such an order ordinarily rests within the sound discretion of the District Court. FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 626-27 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). District courts have “broad discretion in determining whether to stay a civil action while a criminal action is pending or impending.” Id. at 627 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997)). While the power to enter a stay rests with the district court, it “must tread carefully in granting a stay of proceedings, since a party has a right to a determination of its rights and liabilities without undue delay.” Ohio Environmental Council v. U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977).

Furthermore, “[a] stay of civil proceedings due to a pending criminal investigation is an extraordinary remedy,” and “nothing in the Constitution requires a civil action to be stayed in the face of a pending or impending criminal indictment.” Johnson, next friend of C.P.S. v. Hamilton City Gov’t, No. 1:19-cv-329, 2020 WL 6479558, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb.

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Bluebook (online)
Almeyda v. Wooster Motor Ways Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/almeyda-v-wooster-motor-ways-inc-kywd-2025.