Allstate Insurance v. Pena

591 N.E.2d 526, 227 Ill. App. 3d 348, 169 Ill. Dec. 353, 1992 Ill. App. LEXIS 665

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 29, 1992
• Docket: 2-91-0299
• Status: Published

Opinions

JUSTICE GEIGER

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Victor Pena, appeals from the trial court’s order striking his notice of rejection of an arbitration panel award favoring the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company (the company). We reverse and remand.

After the company filed a complaint against the defendant, the matter was set for an arbitration hearing. The defendant was served with a notice to produce and appear, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 237 (134 Ill. 2d R. 237). At the hearing, the defendant was represented by counsel, but did not appear personally. The arbitration panel found for the company and ordered the defendant to pay damages of $13,591.23.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 93 (134 Ill. 2d R. 93) the defendant filed his notice of rejection of the arbitration award with the trial court. The company moved to strike that notice of rejection. Following a hearing, the court found that because the defendant had not personally appeared at the arbitration hearing, he had waived his right to reject the arbitration award. It struck the notice of rejection and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant relies on Weisenburn v. Smith (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 160. That case considered whether the defendant had waived his right to reject an arbitration award because he had not appeared personally at an arbitration proceeding. The defendant offers no extended argument, but asserts that this case is essentially identical to the Weisenburn case and that on its strength we should reverse the court’s order that rejected the arbitration award and remand for trial. The company has filed no appellee brief, but we decide the case trader the authority of First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133.

The Weisenburn court thoroughly analyzed the interplay of Supreme Court Rules 86, 90, 91, 93, and 237. (134 Ill. 2d Rules 86, 90, 91, 93, 237.) It concluded that a party may be required to attend an arbitration proceeding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 237 and that sanctions may be imposed for his failure to attend. (Weisenburn, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 164.) However, particularly considering the dictates of Rules 91 and 93, it found that because the defendant’s counsel had appeared at the arbitration hearing, the defendant had preserved his right to reject the arbitration award. (214 Ill. App. 3d at 164.) It reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment on the arbitration award and remanded for further proceedings.

The essential facts here are identical to those in Weisenburn. Although the defendant did not attend the arbitration proceedings, he was represented there by counsel. We conclude, as did the court in Weisenburn, that the defendant did not waive his right to reject the arbitration award.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

UNVERZAGT, J., concurs.