Allstate Insurance v. Handegard

688 P.2d 1387, 70 Or. App. 262
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedOctober 10, 1984
Docket82-484-J-3; CA A27762
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 688 P.2d 1387 (Allstate Insurance v. Handegard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allstate Insurance v. Handegard, 688 P.2d 1387, 70 Or. App. 262 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions

[264]*264WARREN, J.

Defendants Gregory, husband and wife, appeal from a summary judgment for plaintiff insurer in a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights of defendants under a policy of automobile insurance. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs policy insured defendant Handegard, whose vehicle collided with a vehicle in which the Gregorys were riding. Both Gregorys were injured in the occurrence. They sued Handegard. In the first claim, Mrs. Gregory asked for $750,000 general damages for her injuries and substantial special damages for medical expenses. In the first count of the second claim, Mr. Gregory asked for $150,000 for loss of his wife’s consortium. In his second claim, he asked for $125,000 general damages for his injuries and $400 special damages for medical expenses.

Plaintiff then brought this action. Plaintiff and the Gregorys moved for summary judgment, each asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The court denied the Gregorys’ motion but granted plaintiffs motion. The summary judgment, consistent with plaintiffs prayer, recites:

“The policy of insurance issued by plaintiff insuring * * * Theodore M. Handegard provides limits of liability of $50,000 in toto for the claims of defendants Shirley J. Gregory and Dale T. Gregory with respect to the loss of consortium claim as stated in the first count of the second cause of action and such policy does not provide separate levels of coverage of $50,000 for the claims of Shirley J. Gregory and the loss of consortium claim of defendant Dale T. Gregory as stated in the first count of the second cause of action * *

The policy’s “declarations page” states:

“BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
“$50,000 EACH PERSON - $100,000 EACH OCCURRENCE”

With respect to bodily injury coverage, the policy provides:

“Allstate will pay for all damages a person insured is legally obligated to pay — because of bodily injury * * * meaning:
“(1) Bodily injury, sickness, disease or death to any person, including loss of services; * * * (Emphasis supplied.) [265]*265“Limits of Liability.

[264]*264Part I also provides:

[265]*265“The limits shown on the declarations page are the maximum we will pay for any single auto accident. The limit stated for each person for bodily injury applies to all damages arising from bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death sustained by one person in any one occurrence. The occurrence limit is our total limit of liability for all legal damages for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one occurrence. For property damages, the limit applies to all legal damages arising from each occurrence.” (Emphasis in original.)

Plaintiff asserts that the $50,000 limit of liability for “each person” covers both the claim of Mrs. Gregory for her bodily injuries and of Mr. Gregory for loss of her consortium. It argues that, although Mr. Gregory’s claim for loss of consortium is for a “loss of services,”1 that loss does not come under the $100,000 “occurrence” limit, because “loss of services” is not, under the policy, a “bodily injury.” Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Gregory lost his wife’s consortium and suffered damages only because she sustained “bodily injury.”

The Gregorys argue that “loss of services” is a “bodily injury” under the policy and that Mr. Gregory suffered a “bodily injury” when he lost his wife’s consortium. Accordingly, they argue that, when Mrs. Gregory was physically injured and unable to provide services to Mr. Gregory, both suffered a “bodily injury.” The occurrence limit, therefore applies because two persons suffered bodily injury in one occurrence.

The only issue presented is whether any amounts husband may recover for loss of wife’s services must be recovered from the $50,000 limit of liability applicable to wife’s claim for her own injuries. Relying on the terms of this policy, we conclude that any amount Mr. Gregory may be entitled to recover for the loss of his wife’s services is recoverable from the separate “occurrence” limit not applicable to wife’s injury.

The terms of this policy define loss of services as a type of bodily injury. The policy says:

[266]*266“Allstate will pay for all damages a person insured is legally obligated to pay — because of bodily injury or property damage meaning:
“(1) Bodily injury, sickness, disease or death to any person, including loss of services; * * (Emphasis supplied.)

When a policy of insurance defines terms in a manner which differs from the ordinary understanding of those terms, the policy definition controls. Gowans v. N.W. Pac. Indem. Co., 260 Or 618, 489 P2d 947, 491 P2d 1178 (1971); Ausman v. Eagle Fire Ins., 250 Or 523, 444 P2d 18 (1968). This policy does just that when it defines loss of services as a form of bodily injury.

According to the policy, “bodily injury” means “bodily injury” to any person, including loss of services. Apart from the high probability of confusion arising from any attempt to define a term by restating the term sought to be defined, this policy does not expressly answer the question from whose liability limits a loss of services claim must be recovered.2

If “bodily injury * * * to any person” means physical injury and its consequences, e.g., mental suffering, clearly a loss of services claim does not belong to the same person who sustained the physical injury.

In our view, the relevant inquiry is which of these two people sustained the loss of services injury. All agree that loss of services means the loss of Mrs. Gregory’s services to Mr. Gregory. Mrs. Gregory does not suffer a loss of her own services. She recovers within her liability limits for her personal injuries. The loss of Mrs. Gregory’s services is an independent, separate injury suffered only by Mr. Gregory and any right to recover damages is vested solely in him. See Naber v. Thompson, 274 Or 309, 312, 546 P2d 467 (1976); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or App 853, 860, 631 P2d 1377 (1981), aff’d 293 Or 543, 652 P2d 318 [267]*267(1982). Because the loss of services was, by policy definition, a “bodily injury” sustained by Mr. Gregory, we conclude that the loss must come within the liability limit applicable to him.

The dissent finds support for its position in the policy paragraph entitled “Limits of Liability.” This paragraph purports to say that all injuries “arising from bodily injury * * * sustained by one person” should be within that person’s liability limit. Although we agree that Mr. Gregory’s loss of his wife’s services is a consequence arising from Mrs. Gregory’s injury, there is only confusion when applying the policy’s definition of bodily injury to the language in this section. Before the single limit will apply, the policy terms require that the “bodily injury” must be sustained by one person. Although the loss of services arises from Mrs. Gregory’s physical injury, under the express terms of this policy, the loss of Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
688 P.2d 1387, 70 Or. App. 262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allstate-insurance-v-handegard-orctapp-1984.