GREENHILL, Justice.
This is an uninsured motorist case in which the insured has recovered below against his insurance company and the uninsured motorist. Allstate is the only Petitioner here. The case will be developed below; but to show the main problem [152]*152presented, the facts may be summarized as follows. The insured motorist, Hunt, was struck by Rose, an uninsured motorist. Allstate Insurance Company was required under its policy with Hunt to pay Hunt all sums which Hunt “shall be legally entitled to recover as damages” from the uninsured motorist, Rose, up to the policy limits. Also under the policy, Allstate was bound to furnish Hunt with counsel in any suit against Hunt; and Hunt was required to furnish, and did furnish, Allstate with information concerning the accident and the extent of his injuries.
After long and unfruitful arbitration between Hunt and Allstate, Hunt sued Rose. Allstate gave Hunt a letter, set out below, in which it consented to the suit and agreed, without qualification, to be bound by its outcome. Hunt then made Allstate a party defendant. Allstate moved that its identity be withheld from the jury or for a severance. In the motion, Allstate stipulated that it had agreed to be bound as to liability and damages by the outcome of Hunt v. Rose. The trial court granted Allstate a separate trial. Thus there were two trials: a tort suit against Rose and a contract action against Allstate.
Rose, the uninsured, had his own counsel. Nevertheless, when Hunt v. Rose came on for trial, counsel for Allstate, with the consent of Rose, came in as leading counsel for Rose. The trial court, having granted Allstate a separate trial, refused to let Allstate’s counsel participate in Rose’s separate trial and prohibited the use of Allstate’s files containing information it had gotten from Hunt. Allstate then attempted to withdraw its consent to be bound. The trial court stood firm, and counsel for Allstate left the courtroom with Allstate’s files; and the separate trial of Hunt v. Rose proceeded. Hunt recovered a judgment for $19,106.20 against Rose, an amount in excess of the uninsured motorist policy limits. In the separate trial against Allstate, the court held that it was undisputed that Rose was uninsured and that the liability of Rose had been established; and Hunt recovered from Allstate $10,000, the policy limits for uninsured motorist. Rose did not appeal, but Allstate did. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 450 S.W.2d 668.
A basic issue here presented is whether a co-defendant insurance company shall be permitted to defend an uninsured motorist against its own insured in an attempt to prevent or limit recovery by its insured after the insurance company has requested and been granted a separate trial. Allstate argues that notwithstanding the separate trial, it should also have been able, without the jury’s knowing it was in the case, to defend the uninsured motorist because it has given consent to the suit and would be bound by the determination of liability and amount of damages in the suit between Hunt and Rose; or it should have been permitted to withdraw its consent to the suit and its agreement to be bound if it were not permitted to defend the uninsured motorist.
The opinion of the court of civil appeals is an able one. The writ was granted because this is a case of first impression, and there was division among us as to the correctness of the court of civil appeals’ opinion. This court now agrees with that opinion, except as modified herein, and the judgment entered. That opinion sets out the divergence of holdings among the states which have entered this field and cites some of the various writings on the subject. That material need not be repeated here. It will be helpful, however, to look at the conflict of interest present in this case. The primary duty of the insurance company is to its insured. If suit is brought against him, the company is to defend him to the best of its ability. Having this duty, it has the right to call on its insured for cooperation and the disclosure of information. The insured is required to “bare his soul” to the company with regard to the accident and his own injuries.
When the insured is struck by an uninsured motorist, it is to the financial advan[153]*153tage of the company that it not be required to pay to its insured the damages alleged to be caused by the uninsured motorist. The company, of course, is justified in being careful in paying out its funds and in protecting itself. So the company examines closely the rights of both parties. If it decides to defend the uninsured motorist (already having a file on its insured motorist), it then assumes a fiduciary capacity with the uninsured motorist and gets a file on him and his position. If the uninsured motorist should later decide to bring a cross-action against the insured motorist, the company would find itself under a duty to defend both antagonists. In such event, a finding of negligence and contributory negligence would get the insurance company home relatively free.
The record in this case shows that Allstate had developed a file on Hunt which we assume was a collection of information provided under contractual terms of the policy. This Allstate policy is bulging with requirements that the insured must cooperate with the company in such ways as submitting to physical examinations by Allstate’s doctors, furnishing extensive information under oath, and being available at all times for the convenience of the insurance company. Although this record does not disclose what specific information the files include, the trial court has the discretion to say that such file creates a conflict. Allstate has not denied that the file contained confidential information and creates a conflict. Our conclusion is that it should be left to the discretion of the trial court to pass upon the disqualification or conflict of interest, with the burden being upon the insurance company to show no substantial conflict of interest. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case.
There may be other instances where the insured motorist is clearly at fault and the insurance company has not, in fact, obtained confidential information from its insured. The lack of substantial conflict of interest, and the right of the insurance company to protect itself, would weigh on the side of allowing it to participate in the trial on the side of the uninsured motorist.
We now turn to the problem as to whether Allstate should have been permitted to withdraw its consent and agreement to be bound by the outcome of Hunt v. Rose. Again we are of the opinion that this turns on the sound discretion of the trial judge; and under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion. It should be stated that we do not have before us a case in which the consent is withdrawn before any action or inaction has been taken with regard to it.
This record shows that Allstate’s consent to be bound was not conditioned on its right to defend Rose. The trial judge inquired if there was a subsequent agreement between Allstate and Hunt that Allstate could defend Rose. The answer was “no.” The policy does not provide that Allstate will have, as a condition to the giving of its consent, a right to defend the uninsured motorist. It was an unequivocal consent to be bound, and is, in effect, a waiver of the right to have the same issues determined again in separate trial. Stipulations that the result of one case will control another similar case will be upheld. Savage v.
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GREENHILL, Justice.
This is an uninsured motorist case in which the insured has recovered below against his insurance company and the uninsured motorist. Allstate is the only Petitioner here. The case will be developed below; but to show the main problem [152]*152presented, the facts may be summarized as follows. The insured motorist, Hunt, was struck by Rose, an uninsured motorist. Allstate Insurance Company was required under its policy with Hunt to pay Hunt all sums which Hunt “shall be legally entitled to recover as damages” from the uninsured motorist, Rose, up to the policy limits. Also under the policy, Allstate was bound to furnish Hunt with counsel in any suit against Hunt; and Hunt was required to furnish, and did furnish, Allstate with information concerning the accident and the extent of his injuries.
After long and unfruitful arbitration between Hunt and Allstate, Hunt sued Rose. Allstate gave Hunt a letter, set out below, in which it consented to the suit and agreed, without qualification, to be bound by its outcome. Hunt then made Allstate a party defendant. Allstate moved that its identity be withheld from the jury or for a severance. In the motion, Allstate stipulated that it had agreed to be bound as to liability and damages by the outcome of Hunt v. Rose. The trial court granted Allstate a separate trial. Thus there were two trials: a tort suit against Rose and a contract action against Allstate.
Rose, the uninsured, had his own counsel. Nevertheless, when Hunt v. Rose came on for trial, counsel for Allstate, with the consent of Rose, came in as leading counsel for Rose. The trial court, having granted Allstate a separate trial, refused to let Allstate’s counsel participate in Rose’s separate trial and prohibited the use of Allstate’s files containing information it had gotten from Hunt. Allstate then attempted to withdraw its consent to be bound. The trial court stood firm, and counsel for Allstate left the courtroom with Allstate’s files; and the separate trial of Hunt v. Rose proceeded. Hunt recovered a judgment for $19,106.20 against Rose, an amount in excess of the uninsured motorist policy limits. In the separate trial against Allstate, the court held that it was undisputed that Rose was uninsured and that the liability of Rose had been established; and Hunt recovered from Allstate $10,000, the policy limits for uninsured motorist. Rose did not appeal, but Allstate did. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 450 S.W.2d 668.
A basic issue here presented is whether a co-defendant insurance company shall be permitted to defend an uninsured motorist against its own insured in an attempt to prevent or limit recovery by its insured after the insurance company has requested and been granted a separate trial. Allstate argues that notwithstanding the separate trial, it should also have been able, without the jury’s knowing it was in the case, to defend the uninsured motorist because it has given consent to the suit and would be bound by the determination of liability and amount of damages in the suit between Hunt and Rose; or it should have been permitted to withdraw its consent to the suit and its agreement to be bound if it were not permitted to defend the uninsured motorist.
The opinion of the court of civil appeals is an able one. The writ was granted because this is a case of first impression, and there was division among us as to the correctness of the court of civil appeals’ opinion. This court now agrees with that opinion, except as modified herein, and the judgment entered. That opinion sets out the divergence of holdings among the states which have entered this field and cites some of the various writings on the subject. That material need not be repeated here. It will be helpful, however, to look at the conflict of interest present in this case. The primary duty of the insurance company is to its insured. If suit is brought against him, the company is to defend him to the best of its ability. Having this duty, it has the right to call on its insured for cooperation and the disclosure of information. The insured is required to “bare his soul” to the company with regard to the accident and his own injuries.
When the insured is struck by an uninsured motorist, it is to the financial advan[153]*153tage of the company that it not be required to pay to its insured the damages alleged to be caused by the uninsured motorist. The company, of course, is justified in being careful in paying out its funds and in protecting itself. So the company examines closely the rights of both parties. If it decides to defend the uninsured motorist (already having a file on its insured motorist), it then assumes a fiduciary capacity with the uninsured motorist and gets a file on him and his position. If the uninsured motorist should later decide to bring a cross-action against the insured motorist, the company would find itself under a duty to defend both antagonists. In such event, a finding of negligence and contributory negligence would get the insurance company home relatively free.
The record in this case shows that Allstate had developed a file on Hunt which we assume was a collection of information provided under contractual terms of the policy. This Allstate policy is bulging with requirements that the insured must cooperate with the company in such ways as submitting to physical examinations by Allstate’s doctors, furnishing extensive information under oath, and being available at all times for the convenience of the insurance company. Although this record does not disclose what specific information the files include, the trial court has the discretion to say that such file creates a conflict. Allstate has not denied that the file contained confidential information and creates a conflict. Our conclusion is that it should be left to the discretion of the trial court to pass upon the disqualification or conflict of interest, with the burden being upon the insurance company to show no substantial conflict of interest. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case.
There may be other instances where the insured motorist is clearly at fault and the insurance company has not, in fact, obtained confidential information from its insured. The lack of substantial conflict of interest, and the right of the insurance company to protect itself, would weigh on the side of allowing it to participate in the trial on the side of the uninsured motorist.
We now turn to the problem as to whether Allstate should have been permitted to withdraw its consent and agreement to be bound by the outcome of Hunt v. Rose. Again we are of the opinion that this turns on the sound discretion of the trial judge; and under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion. It should be stated that we do not have before us a case in which the consent is withdrawn before any action or inaction has been taken with regard to it.
This record shows that Allstate’s consent to be bound was not conditioned on its right to defend Rose. The trial judge inquired if there was a subsequent agreement between Allstate and Hunt that Allstate could defend Rose. The answer was “no.” The policy does not provide that Allstate will have, as a condition to the giving of its consent, a right to defend the uninsured motorist. It was an unequivocal consent to be bound, and is, in effect, a waiver of the right to have the same issues determined again in separate trial. Stipulations that the result of one case will control another similar case will be upheld. Savage v. Dorn, 60 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Civ.App.1933, writ refused).
Initially the company can protect itself from default judgments against the uninsured motorist and from insubstantial defense of the uninsured motorist by withholding its consent to the suit between its insured motorist and the uninsured motorist. Here, Hunt, the insured, and the company were engaged in arbitration proceedings until the statute of limitations was about to bar Hunt’s suit against Rose. Then Hunt filed suit, and the company gave him the following letter,
“Please take this as the necessary written consent of Allstate Insurance Company under the policy that the results of the litigation of the tort ques[154]*154tion, if any, and the amount of damages sustained by Mr. Hunt, if any, (subject to the applicable limits within the policy) shall be binding upon Allstate Insurance Company so that these matters will be taken as established with relation to any claim of Mr. Hunt under his uninsured motorist coverage with Allstate Insurance Company.”
After receiving the above letter, Hunt made Allstate a party defendant. Allstate wanted its identity withheld as a defendant; and since the policy covers uninsured but not necessarily insolvent motorists, there is something to be said on behalf of the uninsured motorist who might not want to have an insurance company as a co-defendant.
As an alternative to the above motion that its identity be withheld, the company asked for a severance from the case with Rose, the uninsured motorist. Its motion for severance made to the trial judge seven months after Allstate was joined as a co-defendant stated in part,
“Allstate Insurance Company by a letter dated October 5, 1967, * * * gave its written consent * * * that the results of the litigation of the tort question, if any, and the amount of damages sustained by Mr. Hunt, if any, (subject to the applicable limits within the policy) shall be binding upon Allstate Insurance Company so that these matters will be taken as established with relation to any claim of Mr. Hunt under his uninsured motorist coverage with Allstate Insurance Company.”
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
“The plaintiff herein does not even allege that it has been determined that plaintiff is legally entitled to recover damages from the defendant, but Allstate Insurance Company has agreed to be bound by the resultSj as to liability and damages, in the suit between Hunt and Rose/1
In its alternative request to have its name withheld from the jury, Allstate stated in part:
“Since Allstate Insurance Company has agreed to be bound by the tort verdict, per the above, withholding Allstate Insurance Company’s identity from the jury will not work a hardship on plaintiff and will not impose upon the courts any multiplicity of suits. Allstate Insurance Company here and now stipulates that any facts determinative of Allstate Insurance Company’s liability under their contract with Hunt may be decided by the trial court, as a trier of fact, in the instant [Hunt v. Rose] action.” [Emphasis added]
Based in part on Allstate’s agreement and stipulations to be bound by the outcome of the separate trial of Hunt v. Rose, the trial court granted Allstate the separate trial; and the case of Hunt v. Rose was set for trial. It was not until the day Hunt v. Rose was set for trial that Allstate attempted to withdraw its consent.
When the case was called for trial, the court heard from all counsel. Allstate’s counsel said that Rose had agreed for him to be his leading counsel; that Allstate waived its rights to subrogation; and repeated the stipulation to be bound. He conceded, “Of course, there is a conflict between Allstate and Hunt,” just as between any other plaintiff and defendant. He also conceded that there had been no agreement on Hunt’s part, when Allstate consented to be bound, that Allstate would defend Rose against Hunt. Counsel for Hunt recounted the disclosures Allstate had gotten from Hunt.
The court expressed concern over the conflict of interest. He concluded that Allstate had not been required to give its consent to be bound but, “Once you give your consent, you have got no business coming over here and trying to defeat your own policyholder’s rights in so far as Rose is concerned.” Counsel for Allstate then attempted to withdraw the consent.
[155]*155In view of the question of the conflict of interest and the above circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Allstate to withdraw its consent to the suit of Hunt v. Rose and its agreement to be bound thereby as to the liability of Rose and the amount of damages.
We see no conflict in this opinion and in the holding of this court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Matlock, 462 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.1970). If Hunt had sued Allstate directly, without filing a suit against Rose, he could recover against the insurer by proving his case. This, according to Matlock, would include proving that Rose is in fact uninsured.
Assuming, as we do, that in the tort action of Hunt v. Rose liability and damages were determined, there was little to be determined in the separate trial of Hunt v. Allstate. Allstate had repeatedly conceded that it had issued the insurance policy containing the uninsured motorist clause and that such a policy was in effect when the accident occurred. It had conceded that Rose was uninsured. Indeed it so states in its application for writ of error: “This is an uninsured motorist insurance coverage case. Hunt was the insured; Rose was the uninsured motorist, and Allstate was the insurer.”
The plaintiff introduced the very lengthy (16 pages, plus 16 pages of endorsements and amendments) “Allstate Crusader Automobile Policy.” It fails to state the amount of the coverage. The trial court took judicial notice that the minimum coverage applicable under the then existing statutes was $10,000. See Acts 58th Leg. 1963, Chapter 506, page 1320; and Article 6701h, Sec. 1(10), Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. and Insurance Code 5.-06-1, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes Annotated. V.A.T.S. This statute, together with the printed provisions of the policy, furnish the minimum coverage of $10,000 for Hunt.
The judgments of the trial court and the court of civil appeals are affirmed.
Dissenting opinion by POPE, J., in which WALKER, STEAKLEY and REAVLEY, JJ., join.