Allnutt v. United States

498 F. Supp. 832, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17684
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedOctober 7, 1980
Docket76-CV-153-C
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 498 F. Supp. 832 (Allnutt v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allnutt v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17684 (W.D. Mo. 1980).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

ELMO B. HUNTER, District Judge.

This is an action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs are Lula Mae Allnutt and her children. They are the survivors of Lloyd E. Allnutt, Jr., who was killed when the small airplane he was piloting struck power transmission lines over the Osage River in central Missouri. Plaintiffs are seeking approximately $500,000 in damages. Defendant is the United States. Federal jurisdiction is premised upon the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The complaint was timely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401.

Full trial of this matter was held in Kansas City, Missouri, from July 21, 1980 through July 23, 1980.

I.

In order to fully develop the issues presented in this complex action, it is necessary to explore the relevant factual posture of this case as revealed by the joint stipulation of facts, the testimony and the documentary evidence that compose the record before this Court.

On February 10, 1975, the decedent was hired to pilot a 1974 model Piper aircraft in the mid-Missouri region. His services had been retained by the “Eagle Project” which was an on-going study funded by the United States Government to research the ecology of eagles wintering in Missouri with an emphasis on eagle-waterfowl relationships. The Eagle Project was being carried out by a team composed of representatives from the University of Missouri, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife of the Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, and the Missouri State Conservation Commission. With decedent on February 10, 1975, was Ms. Judith Southern who was a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Missouri and Mr. Terry G. Wilson who was a temporary employee of the Missouri Conservation Commission.

The purpose for the flight was to track the movement of bald eagles which had previously been equipped with electronic transmitters. Prior to February 10, 1975, Ms. Southern had made three such flights with the decedent. On the morning of February 10, 1975, Ms. Southern, Mr. Wilson and the decedent flew from the municipal airport at Chillicothe, Missouri, to the E. W. “Cotton” Woods Memorial Airport at Columbia, Missouri. Next, the threesome flew to Memorial Airport at Jefferson City, Missouri. Following lunch, the three reboarded the airplane and flew to the Osage River. The pilot was conducting low level “contact” flying up the Osage at an altitude of approximately 100 feet at approximately 100 miles per hour. At mile 23.2 of the Osage River, the aircraft struck four power lines owned by the Three Rivers Electric Cooperative, Inc. (“Three Rivers power line”), that crossed the river at that point. 1 *835 The aircraft crashed into the water and all aboard were killed.

The evidence established that it was the decedent’s usual practice to review aeronautical charts prior to piloting an aircraft and to use such charts during flight. See test, of Lula Mae Allnutt and Mr. Blackie Reed, who was the operator of decedent’s employer-Reed Aviation-and a pilot. The chart that the decedent used on February 10,1975 was entitled “Kansas City Sectional Aeronautical Chart, Lambert Conformed Conic Projection, Standard Parallels 33° 20' and 38° 40' topographic date corrected to October 1974-13th Edition.” (“Chart 13”). See test, of Mr. Reed. The parties stipulated and the evidence clearly established that the Three Rivers power line that the decedent struck was not depicted on Chart 13.

Plaintiffs’ theory of liability in this case is relatively simple. They contend that the United States, acting through the Commerce Department, and its sub-agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Aeronautical Charting and Cartography, Aeronautical Chart Division (“ACD”), was negligent in failing to depict the power transmission line on Chart 13 thereby causing decedent to rely to his detriment on said chart.

The defendant argues that plaintiffs’ theory fails on a number of grounds. First, defendant contends that the acts of the officials of the ACD fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and are, therefore, immune from suit. Second, even if the discretionary function exception does not apply, defendant maintains that it was in complete conformity with the established specifications for inclusion of obstacles on sectional aeronautical charts, and as such, was not negligent in the preparation of Chart 13. Third, defendant asserts that its acts in omitting the power line were not the proximate cause of decedent’s accident because decedent could not have been relying on Chart 13 while flying at the 100 foot altitude. And fourth, even if defendant was negligent in failing to include the Three Rivers power line, decedent was contributorily negligent in operating the aircraft in a careless and negligent manner.

II.

THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

The threshold question that this action presents is whether the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act bars suit against the defendant. 2

There is a substantial body of case law interpreting the discretionary function exception. See, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir. 1974); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956); Reminga v. United States, 448 F.Supp. 445 (W.D.Mich.1978). The traditional inquiry for determining if the discretionary function exception applies is an analysis of whether the particular act of a government agent is one involving the formulation of government policy or whether the act in question occurs in implementing a policy at an “operational” level. See, e. g., Dahl *836 strom v. United States, supra, 228 F.2d at 822-23; and Downs v. United States, supra, 522 F.2d at 996-97. The judicial interpretations of this distinction provide no clear standards for determination of the applicability of the discretionary function exception. Rather, the judicial constructions of 28 U.S.C. § 2680

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Bluebook (online)
498 F. Supp. 832, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17684, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allnutt-v-united-states-mowd-1980.