Arterburn, C. J.
The appellant was convicted upon a trial by jury on two counts charging the misdemeanor of disorderly person while using the telephone under Acts 1957, ch. 61, §1, p. 114, being §10-1511, Burns’ 1956 Replacement. The indictment in two counts was as follows:
“The Grand Jury for the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, upon their oath do present that------WILLIAM JOHN ALLISON alias WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON-on or about the 16th day of May, A.D. 1957 at and in the County of Marion and in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully telephone another person, to-wit: BERNARD W. WYNN, and addressed to the said BERNARD W. WYNN lewd, lascivious and indecent words or language, the exact description of which words and language are too lewd, lascivious and indecent to be set out herein or to encumber the records of this Court, then and there being contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
/s/ John G. Tinder
Prosecuting- Attorney .Nineteenth Judicial Circuit
“Count Two:
“The Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further say and charge that WILLIAM JOHN ALLISON alias WILLIAM THOMAS [560]*560ALLISON on or about the 16th day of May, A.D. 1957, at and in the County of Marion and in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully telephone another person, to-wit: BERNARD W. WYNN, repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting and harassing the said BERNARD W. WYNN or his family, then and there being . . . .......contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
/s/ John G. Tinder
Prosecuting Attorney Nineteenth Judicial Circuit”
A motion to quash was directed to both counts. It is urged upon us that the first count of the indictment is bad for the reason that it does not set out verbatim the lewd and indecent words and language used over the telephone and that the language of the statute is not sufficiently specific. The general rule is that a charge is sufficiently specific if it follows the wording of the statute. The appellant contends that this is one of the exceptions thereto where the statute does set out the specific acts. With this contention we cannot agree. The offense charged here is of such lewd and indecent character that the rules of the pleading with reference thereto are analogous to that in sodomy and such like crimes.
It is generally held in Indiana and other jurisdictions that a detailed description in words of acts of such lewdness and indecency is too revolting to require that the pleadings before a court be so defiled. This Court has said:
“But by reason of the vile and degrading nature of this crime it has always been an exception to the strict rules requiring- great particularity and nice certainty in criminal pleading, both at common law and where crimes are wholly [561]*561statutory. It has never been the usual practice to describe the particular manner or the details of the commission of the act and where the offense is statutory a statement of it in the language of the statute, or so plainly that its nature may be easily understood, is all that is required.” Glover v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 459, 461, 462, 101 N. E. 629, 45 L. R. A., N. S. 473.
Following the above quotation is a long list of citations from other jurisdictions, going back to the time of Lord Coke in the support of such a principle.
In Connell v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 318, 19 N. E. 2d 267, the principle was again reiterated in this State.
In Sunderman v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 705, 151 N. E. 829, where a defendant was convicted of selling obscene literature, the affidavit followed the words of the statute and the obscene matter was sufficiently described as “obscene, lewd, lascivious and licentious.” The court there said it was sufficient to use the language of the statute and then allege “that the obscene matter is too gross and obscene to be spread upon the records of the court.”
In the case before us the indictment also says “the exact description of which words and language are too lewd, lascivious and indecent to be set out herein or to encumber the records of this Court.”
There is no showing the appellant was in any way misled as to the offense charged.
The motion to quash count one of the indictment was properly overruled.
The motion to quash the second count of the indictment centers primarily about the use of the word “repeatedly” as being too indefinite and the use of the word “or” instead of the word “and” in the portion of the charge which states “that the appellant unlawfully telephoned another person, to-wit: BER[562]*562NARD W. WYNN repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting and harassing the said BERNARD W. WYNN or his family.” (Our italics.) We are not impressed with the argument that the word “repeatedly” is uncertain. Burns’ §9-1125 required that “the words used in an indictment or affidavit must be construed in their usual acceptation, in common language, except words and phrases defined by law, which are to be construed according to their legal meaning.”
Burns’ §9-1126 states that an indictment shall be sufficient if the offense is clearly set forth “in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition.”
Burns’ §9-1127 states that no indictment shall be quashed “For any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Nothing is pointed out in this case whereby the defendant was prejudiced in any fashion by following the words of the statute in the indictment, namely, “repeatedly” or the disjunctive “or.”
Normally, acts constituting more than one offense are connected in a statute by the disjunctive “or”; all of such offenses may be charged in the same count by using the conjunctive “and.” The proof of any one of the alleged acts is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Marshall v. The State (1890), 123 Ind. 128, 23 N. E. 1141; McGreyor v. The State (1860), 16 Ind. 9.
In this case two separate offenses are charged and are joined by the disjunctive “or” namely, using lewd and indecent language over the telephone or annoying a person or his family by repeated telephone calls. These two offenses have been stated in separate counts. However, the disjunctive “or” in question here occurs in [563]*563the second and latter portion of the statute which constitutes a separate offense. (Count 2.)
The indictment in this case charges specifically .that the appellant telephoned another person, “to-wit: BERNARD W. WYNN” and thereafter states in the words of the statute, “for the purpose of annoying, molesting and harassing, the said BERNARD W. WYNN or his family.” The act of telephoning Bernard W. Wynn alone for the purpose alleged, defines and limits specifically the acts.
In The State v. Callahan (1890), 124 Ind. 364, 24 N. E.
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Arterburn, C. J.
The appellant was convicted upon a trial by jury on two counts charging the misdemeanor of disorderly person while using the telephone under Acts 1957, ch. 61, §1, p. 114, being §10-1511, Burns’ 1956 Replacement. The indictment in two counts was as follows:
“The Grand Jury for the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, upon their oath do present that------WILLIAM JOHN ALLISON alias WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON-on or about the 16th day of May, A.D. 1957 at and in the County of Marion and in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully telephone another person, to-wit: BERNARD W. WYNN, and addressed to the said BERNARD W. WYNN lewd, lascivious and indecent words or language, the exact description of which words and language are too lewd, lascivious and indecent to be set out herein or to encumber the records of this Court, then and there being contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
/s/ John G. Tinder
Prosecuting- Attorney .Nineteenth Judicial Circuit
“Count Two:
“The Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further say and charge that WILLIAM JOHN ALLISON alias WILLIAM THOMAS [560]*560ALLISON on or about the 16th day of May, A.D. 1957, at and in the County of Marion and in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully telephone another person, to-wit: BERNARD W. WYNN, repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting and harassing the said BERNARD W. WYNN or his family, then and there being . . . .......contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
/s/ John G. Tinder
Prosecuting Attorney Nineteenth Judicial Circuit”
A motion to quash was directed to both counts. It is urged upon us that the first count of the indictment is bad for the reason that it does not set out verbatim the lewd and indecent words and language used over the telephone and that the language of the statute is not sufficiently specific. The general rule is that a charge is sufficiently specific if it follows the wording of the statute. The appellant contends that this is one of the exceptions thereto where the statute does set out the specific acts. With this contention we cannot agree. The offense charged here is of such lewd and indecent character that the rules of the pleading with reference thereto are analogous to that in sodomy and such like crimes.
It is generally held in Indiana and other jurisdictions that a detailed description in words of acts of such lewdness and indecency is too revolting to require that the pleadings before a court be so defiled. This Court has said:
“But by reason of the vile and degrading nature of this crime it has always been an exception to the strict rules requiring- great particularity and nice certainty in criminal pleading, both at common law and where crimes are wholly [561]*561statutory. It has never been the usual practice to describe the particular manner or the details of the commission of the act and where the offense is statutory a statement of it in the language of the statute, or so plainly that its nature may be easily understood, is all that is required.” Glover v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 459, 461, 462, 101 N. E. 629, 45 L. R. A., N. S. 473.
Following the above quotation is a long list of citations from other jurisdictions, going back to the time of Lord Coke in the support of such a principle.
In Connell v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 318, 19 N. E. 2d 267, the principle was again reiterated in this State.
In Sunderman v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 705, 151 N. E. 829, where a defendant was convicted of selling obscene literature, the affidavit followed the words of the statute and the obscene matter was sufficiently described as “obscene, lewd, lascivious and licentious.” The court there said it was sufficient to use the language of the statute and then allege “that the obscene matter is too gross and obscene to be spread upon the records of the court.”
In the case before us the indictment also says “the exact description of which words and language are too lewd, lascivious and indecent to be set out herein or to encumber the records of this Court.”
There is no showing the appellant was in any way misled as to the offense charged.
The motion to quash count one of the indictment was properly overruled.
The motion to quash the second count of the indictment centers primarily about the use of the word “repeatedly” as being too indefinite and the use of the word “or” instead of the word “and” in the portion of the charge which states “that the appellant unlawfully telephoned another person, to-wit: BER[562]*562NARD W. WYNN repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting and harassing the said BERNARD W. WYNN or his family.” (Our italics.) We are not impressed with the argument that the word “repeatedly” is uncertain. Burns’ §9-1125 required that “the words used in an indictment or affidavit must be construed in their usual acceptation, in common language, except words and phrases defined by law, which are to be construed according to their legal meaning.”
Burns’ §9-1126 states that an indictment shall be sufficient if the offense is clearly set forth “in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition.”
Burns’ §9-1127 states that no indictment shall be quashed “For any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Nothing is pointed out in this case whereby the defendant was prejudiced in any fashion by following the words of the statute in the indictment, namely, “repeatedly” or the disjunctive “or.”
Normally, acts constituting more than one offense are connected in a statute by the disjunctive “or”; all of such offenses may be charged in the same count by using the conjunctive “and.” The proof of any one of the alleged acts is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Marshall v. The State (1890), 123 Ind. 128, 23 N. E. 1141; McGreyor v. The State (1860), 16 Ind. 9.
In this case two separate offenses are charged and are joined by the disjunctive “or” namely, using lewd and indecent language over the telephone or annoying a person or his family by repeated telephone calls. These two offenses have been stated in separate counts. However, the disjunctive “or” in question here occurs in [563]*563the second and latter portion of the statute which constitutes a separate offense. (Count 2.)
The indictment in this case charges specifically .that the appellant telephoned another person, “to-wit: BERNARD W. WYNN” and thereafter states in the words of the statute, “for the purpose of annoying, molesting and harassing, the said BERNARD W. WYNN or his family.” The act of telephoning Bernard W. Wynn alone for the purpose alleged, defines and limits specifically the acts.
In The State v. Callahan (1890), 124 Ind. 364, 24 N. E. 732, a similar attack was made upon an indictment which charged forgery and which alleged that the note was either destroyed “or” in the possession of another person unknown to the grand jurors. This Court held the indictment sufficiently definite and certain. McGregor v. The State (1860), 16 Ind. 9.
In Robinson v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 396, 398, 112 N. E. 2d 861 we said:
“The names of third persons who are only incidentally or collaterally connected with the offense charged against an accused need not be stated in an affidavit or indictment.”
If such be the law, then to say the telephone calls were made to Bernard W. Wynn for the purpose of annoying him “or his family” is sufficiently definite.
If one telephones another person who is specifically described by name, as in this case, for any one of the purposes set out in the latter portion of the statute in question, proof of any one of those purposes is sufficient to constitute the crime. Super-technicalities should not be indulged in where the rights of the defendant are not prejudiced thereby and he is [564]*564in no way misled. Under the statutes of this State we are compelled to ignore such technical objections “which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.”
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to quash to the second count.
In a number of instances which can be grouped together appellant contends that the court erred in permitting certain witnesses to testify as to telephone conversations over the objection that they did not sufficiently identify the appellant. We have read this testimony and we find the witnesses stated that they recognized the appellant from his voice, with which they were familiar, and also from the fact that he stated his name. In addition, some of the witnesses stated that they either knew him prior to such telephone conversations or subsequently met him and identified the voice. The testimony of witnesses as to the identity of the appellant goes to the weight rather than to its relevancy.
The appellant further contends that the court erred in permitting some of the witnesses to testify as to telephone conversations which the appellant made to them during the year prior to the effective date of the act creating the offense (April 1, 1957). Insofar as such testimony was admitted for the purpose of identifying the voice and the appellant, it was entirely competent. The appellant, however, contends that some of such testimony was not for the purpose of identification. The State, nevertheless, contends that such testimony was competent and relevant for the purpose of showing the intent and the pattern of appellant’s conduct, even though at the time such conduct was not criminal in nature.
In Booher v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 315, 153 N. E. [565]*565497, this Court held contrary to the contention of the appellant. In that case this Court stated that in a prosecution for the violation of the liquor laws of this State, prior and similar acts are competent to show an intent and the pattern of the appellant’s operations, even though at the time such acts and transactions did not constitute a violation of the law. Authorities are set forth in that case amply supporting the principle stated therein.
It occurs to us that where acts of the nature involved in this case, namely, the use of lewd and indecent language over the telephone are made a crime, prior conduct of that nature which is inherently immoral and improper, even though at the time not a crime, is relevant to show a course of conduct with which the appellant is charged.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Landis and Achor, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.
Bobbitt, J., not participating.