Alliance Ins. Co. v. City Realty Co.

52 F.2d 271, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1633
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 1, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 52 F.2d 271 (Alliance Ins. Co. v. City Realty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alliance Ins. Co. v. City Realty Co., 52 F.2d 271, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1633 (M.D. Ga. 1931).

Opinion

DEAVER, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in this case are fire insurance companies, and defendant is a Georgia corporation having its principal office in Maeon and engaged in the business of real estate, loans, and fire insurance. For many years plaintiff companies were represented by defendant as agent in Macon and adjacent territory. There was no written contract of agency between any of plaintiffs and defendant,' except that each plaintiff company issued to defendant a certificate of authority substantially as follows: “- Hereby appoints and constitutes City Realty Company of Macon, County of Bibb, State of Georgia, Agent with authority to receive proposals for insurance, countersign, issue, renew, and consent in writing to the transfer of policies of insurance, when duly authenticated, and to receive moneys on behalf! of said company, in accordance with such instructions as may from time to time be given by the officers of the Company, Departmental Managers and or Field Representatives. This authority is subject to revocation at any time without previous notice.”

*272 Blank policies signed by the company were furnished to the agent by each of plaintiff companies and a policy became valid only when countersigned by the agent. The policy recited that in consideration of certain stipulations and a stated amount as premium, the company insured the person named against loss or damage by fire, not to exceed a specified sum, to described property.

The ag'ent made a daily report showing each policy issued, amount of liability, name of assured, rate of premium, amount of premium, property covered, and the expiration date. At the close of the month, the agent made a “monthly report” showing the policies issued by number, cancellations, net premiums due, the amount of the agent’s commissions, which was 20 per cent, of the net premiums, and the net amount to be remitted to the company, which was 80 per cent, of the net premiums; said amount to he remitted being known as the monthly “balance.” This “balance” was to be remitted sixty days from the end of the month for which the report was made.

A policy could be .surrendered by the insured at any time for cancellation, whereupon he became entitled to a refund of the unearned portion of the premium based upon the company’s short rate; and a policy could be canceled by the insurance company upon five days’ notice to the insured, whereupon the company retained the pro rata earned premium and returned to the insured the balance of the paid but unearned premium. The agent was authorized to make these cancellations and was required to report them to the insurance company, the resulting premium deductions being reflected in his monthly report.

When the agent issued a policy and .did not collect the premium, the agent was authorized to cancel it “flat” at any time within fifteen days from the end of the month in which the policy was'-written, without being accountable to the company for'the earned but unpaid portion of the premium; the result being that the company carried the risk without compensation from ■ the time the policy was issued until it was canceled.

At. the expiration of sixty days from the end of the month in which policies were written, the agent was required to remit to each insurance company the “balance” shown on the monthly report for the month during which the policies were written, whether or not the agent had collected the premiums. In other words, if the agent, after issuing a policy, did not cancel it within the time allowed for “flat” cancellation and did not collect the premium, but extended further credit to the insured, then the agent, regardless of whether he ever collected the premium or not, became liable to the insurance company for 80 per cent, of the premium) which 80 per cent, had been included in the “balance” reported at the end of the month in which the policy was written.

The insurance companies did not deal with the pdlieyholders except through the agent, and did not concern themselves with the method employed by the agent in keeping books of account, collecting premiums, or depositing in bank moneys collected. They simply required the agent to remit the “balances” regardless of collections.

The well-known disposition of policyholders to accept policies offered to them in renewal of, or in lieu of, expiring policies renders valuable the expiration data or “expirations” of an agency which ceases business.

' The defendant, representing several insurance companies, did not ordinarily solicit business for a particular company, but placed any policy with such company as it selected.

Defendant in operating its real estate and loan departments influenced persons dealing with them to place policies with its insurance agency. Over a long period defendant built up an insurance business with annual premiums in 1928 of approximately $30,000. Based on value of business, the “expirations” for that year were worth about $6,000.

Defendant extended credit to policyholders, who were considered as “customers” of its agency, and kept books showing accounts against such policyholders. Prior to April, 1929, it did not' attempt to segregate moneys collected as premiums from moneys derived from pther sources. Special agents of several insurance companies had notice that credit was extended and that insurance funds were not kept separately and as trust funds. . Local insurance agents in Macon generally do business the same way. “Balances” were paid by cheeks of defendant on its general fund in bank.

Defendant was frequently in arrears in remitting balances and was indulged by plaintiff companies for thirty, sixty, or ninety days after the date fixed for remittance. In some instances special agents *273 were informed that the delay was occasioned by poor collections.

Early in 1929 defendant’s financial situation became increasingly difficult, duo in part to a bank failure in Macon in November, 1928, but principally to the death, in December, of its president who for many years owned most of its stock and had general control of its business. In the spring of 1929 the insurance companies became very insistent for the payment of balances and in May revoked defendant’s authority as agent.

In a short time defendant was reinstated as agent in pursuance of a contract entered into by plaintiffs, defendant, and certain of defendant’s creditors.

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Bluebook (online)
52 F.2d 271, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1633, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alliance-ins-co-v-city-realty-co-gamd-1931.