307 Ga. 707 FINAL COPY
S19A1266. ALLEN v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Johnny Anthony Allen appeals his felony murder and
aggravated assault convictions for killing Robert Earl Patton.1 On
appeal, Allen argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence
of events that occurred after the shooting, and by admitting
photographs of the autopsy performed on Patton. Allen also argues
that the trial court erred and invaded the province of the jury by
instructing the jury that a firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter
of law. We vacate the sentence for aggravated assault, which merges
1 Allen was indicted by a Lee County grand jury on August 15, 2013, for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of Patton on October 19, 2012. A jury trial was held from December 9 to 11, 2013, and Allen was found guilty on both counts. Allen was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for felony murder and a consecutive term of ten years, serve two, for aggravated assault. Allen filed a motion for new trial on January 2, 2014, amended by appellate counsel on July 16, 2018. Following a July 18, 2018 hearing, the trial court denied Allen’s motion for new trial on April 11, 2019. Allen filed a timely notice of appeal on April 29, 2019. The case was docketed to this Court’s August 2019 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. with felony murder by operation of law, and otherwise affirm,
because Allen has shown no reversible error by the trial court in
admitting evidence or instructing the jury.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
trial evidence showed the following. On October 19, 2012, Allen and
his girlfriend, April Morgan, went to dinner with Patton and his
wife. Morgan saw a former co-worker at the restaurant and greeted
him with a hug, which upset Allen. Over the course of the two-hour
dinner, Allen drank three or four margaritas and took at least one
tequila shot. Allen grew more aggravated with Morgan because her
phone was ringing during dinner, and because she walked in front
of him after dinner.
After dinner, the group decided that Morgan and Allen would
go home to change clothes, then drive to the Pattons’ home before
continuing the night elsewhere. When they got home, Allen and
Morgan continued arguing. Morgan asked Allen for the car keys, but
he refused to give them to her, so she started walking down the
street; Allen followed her, yelling. During this time, the Pattons
2 called Morgan. Morgan told them that Allen was out of control, and
asked if the Pattons could come pick her up because she was walking
and still wanted to meet them.
The Pattons drove toward Morgan’s home and saw Morgan and
Allen in the street in front of their house. Morgan tried to get into
the Pattons’ car, but Allen pulled her away, shoved her against the
car, and threatened “you’re not going to f’ing leave me.” Patton got
out of the car and told Allen to calm down and let Morgan go; Patton
tried to pull Allen off of and away from Morgan. Allen replied, “I’ll
beat your a**,” and pushed Patton; the two men engaged in a brief
physical scuffle, and Allen fell to the ground. A few seconds later,
Patton’s wife saw Allen extend his arm and heard one gunshot.
Patton said he had been shot, got in the driver’s seat, and drove
away.
As the Pattons drove away, Patton’s wife called 911. She
noticed the car veering off the road, so she reached her leg across
Patton and stopped the car. An ambulance arrived, but Patton died
soon after. A medical examiner determined that Patton died as a
3 result of bleeding from one gunshot wound to the chest.
Pursuant to a search warrant, a .22-caliber Derringer pistol
and four .22-caliber bullets were recovered from Allen’s home — the
same caliber as a bullet found at the scene of the shooting. A
firearms examiner examined the gun, testified that nine pounds of
force was needed to pull the trigger, which is heavy for a single
action firearm like a pistol, and suggested the gun was not fired by
accidental discharge.
1. Allen does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in murder cases, we have
independently reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence
was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen was guilty of the crimes for
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Allen argues that the court erred by admitting evidence of
his behavior after the shooting in violation of OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
(“Rule 404 (b)”). The evidence at issue, introduced through Morgan’s
4 testimony, showed the following: Morgan and Allen walked home
after the shooting. Initially, Allen was not irate, but after entering
the house, he started “fussing” with Morgan’s brother. When police
arrived, Allen was aggressive, visibly intoxicated, and would not
comply with police demands until police aimed a Taser at him. The
trial court admitted the testimony, finding that it was intrinsic to
the charged offenses and thus outside the scope of Rule 404 (b). We
agree.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See Booth v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 682 (3) (801
SE2d 104) (2017). As we have explained before:
The limitations and prohibition on “other acts” evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) do not apply to “intrinsic evidence.” . . . Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d 350) (2017)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
5 Morgan’s testimony concerning Allen’s demeanor was
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense. The evidence, related to events immediately following the
shooting and prior to Allen’s arrest, was linked in time and
circumstances with the charged crime; the events in question
occurred within minutes of the shooting and in the immediate
location of the shooting. The evidence was relevant to show Allen’s
state of mind following the shooting, particularly because Allen
requested a jury charge on accident. Because Allen initially behaved
calmly, then continued to show signs of anger, rather than regret, a
reasonable juror could conclude that the evidence suggested that
Allen lacked remorse, and that he did not accidentally shoot the
victim.
Allen also argues that if the evidence was admissible under
Rule 404 (b), notice was required. But Rule 404 (b) does not require
notice when the evidence “is offered to prove the circumstances
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307 Ga. 707 FINAL COPY
S19A1266. ALLEN v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Johnny Anthony Allen appeals his felony murder and
aggravated assault convictions for killing Robert Earl Patton.1 On
appeal, Allen argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence
of events that occurred after the shooting, and by admitting
photographs of the autopsy performed on Patton. Allen also argues
that the trial court erred and invaded the province of the jury by
instructing the jury that a firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter
of law. We vacate the sentence for aggravated assault, which merges
1 Allen was indicted by a Lee County grand jury on August 15, 2013, for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of Patton on October 19, 2012. A jury trial was held from December 9 to 11, 2013, and Allen was found guilty on both counts. Allen was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for felony murder and a consecutive term of ten years, serve two, for aggravated assault. Allen filed a motion for new trial on January 2, 2014, amended by appellate counsel on July 16, 2018. Following a July 18, 2018 hearing, the trial court denied Allen’s motion for new trial on April 11, 2019. Allen filed a timely notice of appeal on April 29, 2019. The case was docketed to this Court’s August 2019 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. with felony murder by operation of law, and otherwise affirm,
because Allen has shown no reversible error by the trial court in
admitting evidence or instructing the jury.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
trial evidence showed the following. On October 19, 2012, Allen and
his girlfriend, April Morgan, went to dinner with Patton and his
wife. Morgan saw a former co-worker at the restaurant and greeted
him with a hug, which upset Allen. Over the course of the two-hour
dinner, Allen drank three or four margaritas and took at least one
tequila shot. Allen grew more aggravated with Morgan because her
phone was ringing during dinner, and because she walked in front
of him after dinner.
After dinner, the group decided that Morgan and Allen would
go home to change clothes, then drive to the Pattons’ home before
continuing the night elsewhere. When they got home, Allen and
Morgan continued arguing. Morgan asked Allen for the car keys, but
he refused to give them to her, so she started walking down the
street; Allen followed her, yelling. During this time, the Pattons
2 called Morgan. Morgan told them that Allen was out of control, and
asked if the Pattons could come pick her up because she was walking
and still wanted to meet them.
The Pattons drove toward Morgan’s home and saw Morgan and
Allen in the street in front of their house. Morgan tried to get into
the Pattons’ car, but Allen pulled her away, shoved her against the
car, and threatened “you’re not going to f’ing leave me.” Patton got
out of the car and told Allen to calm down and let Morgan go; Patton
tried to pull Allen off of and away from Morgan. Allen replied, “I’ll
beat your a**,” and pushed Patton; the two men engaged in a brief
physical scuffle, and Allen fell to the ground. A few seconds later,
Patton’s wife saw Allen extend his arm and heard one gunshot.
Patton said he had been shot, got in the driver’s seat, and drove
away.
As the Pattons drove away, Patton’s wife called 911. She
noticed the car veering off the road, so she reached her leg across
Patton and stopped the car. An ambulance arrived, but Patton died
soon after. A medical examiner determined that Patton died as a
3 result of bleeding from one gunshot wound to the chest.
Pursuant to a search warrant, a .22-caliber Derringer pistol
and four .22-caliber bullets were recovered from Allen’s home — the
same caliber as a bullet found at the scene of the shooting. A
firearms examiner examined the gun, testified that nine pounds of
force was needed to pull the trigger, which is heavy for a single
action firearm like a pistol, and suggested the gun was not fired by
accidental discharge.
1. Allen does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in murder cases, we have
independently reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence
was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen was guilty of the crimes for
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Allen argues that the court erred by admitting evidence of
his behavior after the shooting in violation of OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
(“Rule 404 (b)”). The evidence at issue, introduced through Morgan’s
4 testimony, showed the following: Morgan and Allen walked home
after the shooting. Initially, Allen was not irate, but after entering
the house, he started “fussing” with Morgan’s brother. When police
arrived, Allen was aggressive, visibly intoxicated, and would not
comply with police demands until police aimed a Taser at him. The
trial court admitted the testimony, finding that it was intrinsic to
the charged offenses and thus outside the scope of Rule 404 (b). We
agree.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See Booth v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 682 (3) (801
SE2d 104) (2017). As we have explained before:
The limitations and prohibition on “other acts” evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) do not apply to “intrinsic evidence.” . . . Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d 350) (2017)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
5 Morgan’s testimony concerning Allen’s demeanor was
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense. The evidence, related to events immediately following the
shooting and prior to Allen’s arrest, was linked in time and
circumstances with the charged crime; the events in question
occurred within minutes of the shooting and in the immediate
location of the shooting. The evidence was relevant to show Allen’s
state of mind following the shooting, particularly because Allen
requested a jury charge on accident. Because Allen initially behaved
calmly, then continued to show signs of anger, rather than regret, a
reasonable juror could conclude that the evidence suggested that
Allen lacked remorse, and that he did not accidentally shoot the
victim.
Allen also argues that if the evidence was admissible under
Rule 404 (b), notice was required. But Rule 404 (b) does not require
notice when the evidence “is offered to prove the circumstances
immediately surrounding the charged crime.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b).
“Because this evidence was intrinsic to the crimes charged, it was
6 neither barred by Rule 404 (b) nor subject to the Rule’s notice
requirement.” Williams, 302 Ga. at 487 (IV) (d). Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting Morgan’s testimony
concerning the events following the shooting.
3. Allen also argues that the trial court erred by admitting
autopsy photographs into evidence in violation of OCGA § 24-4-403
(“Rule 403”), because the cause of Patton’s death was not disputed,
and the photographs were likely to inflame the passions of the jury.
We disagree.
Allen cites Thomas v. State, 281 Ga. 550, 552 (2) (640 SE2d
255) (2007) for the proposition that post-autopsy photographs are
admissible only when they show a material fact that became
apparent solely because of the autopsy. That categorical rule was
abrogated by the current Evidence Code, which applies because
Allen’s trial occurred after January 1, 2013. See Venturino v. State,
306 Ga. 391, 395-396 (2) (b) (830 SE2d 110) (2019).
Under the current Evidence Code, excluding relevant evidence
under Rule 403 is “an extraordinary remedy that should be used
7 only sparingly.” Pike v. State, 302 Ga. 795, 799 (3) (809 SE2d 756)
(2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Autopsy photographs
may be relevant and probative to show the nature and location of a
victim’s injuries, even if the cause of death is not disputed. Id. at
799-800 (3); Dailey v. State, 297 Ga. 442, 444 (4) (774 SE2d 672)
(2015).
Here, one pre-autopsy photograph of Patton’s upper body was
admitted during the medical examiner’s testimony to show the jury
precisely where Patton was shot and to explain to the jury the effect
the bullet had in lacerating Patton’s lung and liver. The photograph
was not graphic and did not show any autopsy cuts. The trial court
did not err by admitting it.
4. During the final jury charge, the trial court gave a pattern
jury instruction on aggravated assault stating that “[a] firearm,
when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.”
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (2007),
§ 2.20.22. Allen argues that this jury instruction unconstitutionally
invaded the province of the jury by substituting the court’s judgment
8 for the jury’s.
The jury has the constitutional duty to determine whether the
State has proven all the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a). But it is well
established that
[a] firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. A firearm pointed at a victim and reasonably appearing to the assault victim to be loaded is a deadly weapon as a matter of law, regardless of whether it is loaded and, under such a circumstance, the trial court does not err when it takes the issue of “deadliness” from the jury.
State v. Nejad, 286 Ga. 695, 700 (2) (690 SE2d 846) (2010) (citations
omitted). A trial court therefore does not impose upon the jury’s
constitutional province by giving an instruction that a firearm, when
used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. The instruction
was properly given.
5. Although Allen does not raise the issue on appeal, we have
identified a merger error in his sentencing. “When the only murder
conviction is for felony murder and a defendant is convicted of both
felony murder and the predicate felony of the felony murder charge,
9 the conviction for the predicate felony merges into the felony murder
conviction.” Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 813, 816 (3) (809 SE2d 742)
(2018); OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1). Because the crime of aggravated
assault by shooting Patton with a gun was the underlying felony for
the felony murder conviction, it should have merged with the felony
murder conviction for sentencing purposes. Norris v. State, 302 Ga.
802, 805 (III) (809 SE2d 752) (2018). Accordingly, we vacate Allen’s
conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2020. Murder. Lee Superior Court. Before Judge Sizemore. Kevin Kwashnak, for appellant. Lewis R. Lamb, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr,
10 Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth H. Brock, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.