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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 't . . f. r*J .: 35 1 1 I ,,_ ¥ I .)
2 CIVIL CASE NO. CV191-09 CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, 3
4 Plaintiff, 1 ) DECISION & ORDER vs. ) 5 ) ) 6 IAN C. RICHARDSON and JOHN ) YOUNG, ) 7 ) ) Defendants. 8 ) ) 9 )
10 This matter came before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on October 5,2011 on 11 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney Kenneth Orcutt represented Defendants 12 Plaintiff represented himself pro se. The Court took the motion under advisement. After having 13 heard the Parties' arguments, considering the Parties' pleadings and the record, the Court now 14 issues the following Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 This case arises out of an alleged confrontation between the Plaintiff Christopher Aller! 17 (hereinafter "Plaintiff') and Defendant Ian Richardson and Defendant John Young. Plaintifl 18 acting without counsel, brought this action after he appeared at Guam Memorial Hospital 19 (hereinafter "GMH") to serve one of the Defendants a summons. The Defendants' response tc 20 the summons and.subsequent actions are the subject matter of this lawsuit. Pending motions in 21 this matter include: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 22 or for Access to Expunged Records, Plaintiff s Motion to Disqualify Attorney General and Three 23 Requests for Judicial Notice filed by Plaintiff, Defendants' Motion for Sanctions, Defendants 24 Motion for Discovery and Defendants' Motion to Strike. As this Court received this case more 25 than two years after its inception and one Party has come forth without counsel, the Court will do 26 its best to ensure all informal motions made at hearing have and will be addressed. 27 28
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 1 of8- 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Motion for Summary Judgment 3 Summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 4 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. A genuine issue exists when 5 there is sufficient evidence establishing a factual dispute requiring resolution by a fact-finder. 6 Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 1997 Guam 10 , 7; T W. Elect. Serv Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 7 Contractors Ass'n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The factual dispute must concern 8 material fact. Id. Whether a fact is material is determined by the governing substantive law; i 9 the fact may affect the outcome, it is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 10 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Edwards Co. v. Kawasho Int'I Inc., 2000 Guam 2 11 ,7. 12 Inferences must be drawn, and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 13 non-moving party, and the moving party carries the burden of showing the court those portio 14 of the relevant documents which it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. 15 Edwards Co . v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 2000 Guam 27 ,. 7. The moving party is not required t 16 negate each element of the non-moving party's case. Rather, the moving party satisfies an 17 discharges its burden by establishing the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party' 18 case. Kim v. Hong, CVA97-007, 3 (1997). If a lack of evidence is established by the movin 19 party, the non-moving party must present specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial 20 The non-moving party may not merely rely on conc1usory allegations contained in the pleadings 21 but must present some significant probative evidence tending to support his assertion. Id. If th 22 non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elemen 23 essential to that party's case, for which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial, then Rul 24 56(c) requires entry of summary judgment against the non-moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. 25 Catrett, 477 U.S. 31(1986).
26 Count 1 27 The facts in this case are heavily contested and there are many material facts at issu 28 presently. The Court, simply, does not have enough infonnation to determine that Defendan
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 2 of 8 - 1 are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff s claim of assault and battery. In thei 2 request for summary judgment, Defendants allege that they were justified in asserting physica 3 contact and potential control over the Plaintiff as he was trespassing. Defendants' Motion fo 4 Summary Judgment at 6-7. Defendants also claim that they were in fear of the Plaintiff. Id. 5 Plaintiff claims that he was accosted after serving one of the Defendants with process an 6 Defendants were angry about the service, thus, not justified. Plaintiff contends Defendants acte 7 out of anger and not out of some misled belief of justification. As to the claim of justifie 8 actions, the Court has seen testimony through deposition that Plaintiff was granted access int 9 the hospital and directed to the Defendants' location. If proven, that fact alone could potentiall 10 defeat a justification defense. The Court fmds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence tha 11 there exist genuine issues of facts that could meet the required elements of his cause of actio 12 claimed in Count 1. The elements required for assault and battery have not been disproved b 13 the present state of the evidence that would allow this Court to grant summary judgment. Thi 14 matter will be reserved for trial as this Court would like to see additional evidence to that regard. 15 Counts 2 and 3 16 Defendants argue that Counts 2 and 3 are based on criminal statutes and should b 17 summarily dismissed. l The Court is in agreement and does not find similar civil causes of actio 18 under Guam law. As such, Plaintiffs Counts 2 and 3 could not be proven with additiona 19 evidence and as a result this Court finds no genuine issue of material fact. Felonious Restraint i 20 a felony as explained in statute and Unlawful Restraint is merely a lesser included offense 0 21 Felonious Restraint that may apply if the victim is in little risk of serious bodily injury. See 22 GCA § 22.10. The Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 23 and 3. 24 Count 4 25 In Count 4, Plaintiff labels the cause of action as "unlawful detention" and the Court ha 26 found what it believes to be a similar cause of action in tort. Due to the fact that Plaintiff is pr 27 1 Felonious Restraint and Unlawful Restraint are codified in 9 GCA § 22.30 and 22.35 respectively. The Court is 28 unable to establish a viable civil cause of action based on Count 2 and 3.
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 3 of8- se this Court will deem Count 4 to be false imprisonment. The Court will be lenient wit 2 Plaintiff as a pro se Party and the facts appear to support a false imprisonment claim if Plaintiff 3 allegations are true. Defendants argue that Plaintiff s claim for false imprisonment cannot b
4 proven as an essential element has not be supported with sufficient evidence to withstan 5 summary judgment. Defendants contend that the time in which Plaintiff was prevented fro 6 leaving the hospital room was not long enough to constitute an appreciable length of time. 7 addition, Defendants argue that they were also justified in preventing Plaintiffs egress from th 8 room. The Court again finds that this issue is heavily contested by the parties and facts ar 9 insufficient as of yet, to convince the Court that Plaintiff could not prove Count 4.
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'- , .,"JRT I
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 't . . f. r*J .: 35 1 1 I ,,_ ¥ I .)
2 CIVIL CASE NO. CV191-09 CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, 3
4 Plaintiff, 1 ) DECISION & ORDER vs. ) 5 ) ) 6 IAN C. RICHARDSON and JOHN ) YOUNG, ) 7 ) ) Defendants. 8 ) ) 9 )
10 This matter came before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on October 5,2011 on 11 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney Kenneth Orcutt represented Defendants 12 Plaintiff represented himself pro se. The Court took the motion under advisement. After having 13 heard the Parties' arguments, considering the Parties' pleadings and the record, the Court now 14 issues the following Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 This case arises out of an alleged confrontation between the Plaintiff Christopher Aller! 17 (hereinafter "Plaintiff') and Defendant Ian Richardson and Defendant John Young. Plaintifl 18 acting without counsel, brought this action after he appeared at Guam Memorial Hospital 19 (hereinafter "GMH") to serve one of the Defendants a summons. The Defendants' response tc 20 the summons and.subsequent actions are the subject matter of this lawsuit. Pending motions in 21 this matter include: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 22 or for Access to Expunged Records, Plaintiff s Motion to Disqualify Attorney General and Three 23 Requests for Judicial Notice filed by Plaintiff, Defendants' Motion for Sanctions, Defendants 24 Motion for Discovery and Defendants' Motion to Strike. As this Court received this case more 25 than two years after its inception and one Party has come forth without counsel, the Court will do 26 its best to ensure all informal motions made at hearing have and will be addressed. 27 28
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 1 of8- 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Motion for Summary Judgment 3 Summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 4 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. A genuine issue exists when 5 there is sufficient evidence establishing a factual dispute requiring resolution by a fact-finder. 6 Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 1997 Guam 10 , 7; T W. Elect. Serv Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 7 Contractors Ass'n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The factual dispute must concern 8 material fact. Id. Whether a fact is material is determined by the governing substantive law; i 9 the fact may affect the outcome, it is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 10 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Edwards Co. v. Kawasho Int'I Inc., 2000 Guam 2 11 ,7. 12 Inferences must be drawn, and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 13 non-moving party, and the moving party carries the burden of showing the court those portio 14 of the relevant documents which it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. 15 Edwards Co . v. Kawasho Int'l Inc., 2000 Guam 27 ,. 7. The moving party is not required t 16 negate each element of the non-moving party's case. Rather, the moving party satisfies an 17 discharges its burden by establishing the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party' 18 case. Kim v. Hong, CVA97-007, 3 (1997). If a lack of evidence is established by the movin 19 party, the non-moving party must present specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial 20 The non-moving party may not merely rely on conc1usory allegations contained in the pleadings 21 but must present some significant probative evidence tending to support his assertion. Id. If th 22 non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elemen 23 essential to that party's case, for which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial, then Rul 24 56(c) requires entry of summary judgment against the non-moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. 25 Catrett, 477 U.S. 31(1986).
26 Count 1 27 The facts in this case are heavily contested and there are many material facts at issu 28 presently. The Court, simply, does not have enough infonnation to determine that Defendan
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 2 of 8 - 1 are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff s claim of assault and battery. In thei 2 request for summary judgment, Defendants allege that they were justified in asserting physica 3 contact and potential control over the Plaintiff as he was trespassing. Defendants' Motion fo 4 Summary Judgment at 6-7. Defendants also claim that they were in fear of the Plaintiff. Id. 5 Plaintiff claims that he was accosted after serving one of the Defendants with process an 6 Defendants were angry about the service, thus, not justified. Plaintiff contends Defendants acte 7 out of anger and not out of some misled belief of justification. As to the claim of justifie 8 actions, the Court has seen testimony through deposition that Plaintiff was granted access int 9 the hospital and directed to the Defendants' location. If proven, that fact alone could potentiall 10 defeat a justification defense. The Court fmds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence tha 11 there exist genuine issues of facts that could meet the required elements of his cause of actio 12 claimed in Count 1. The elements required for assault and battery have not been disproved b 13 the present state of the evidence that would allow this Court to grant summary judgment. Thi 14 matter will be reserved for trial as this Court would like to see additional evidence to that regard. 15 Counts 2 and 3 16 Defendants argue that Counts 2 and 3 are based on criminal statutes and should b 17 summarily dismissed. l The Court is in agreement and does not find similar civil causes of actio 18 under Guam law. As such, Plaintiffs Counts 2 and 3 could not be proven with additiona 19 evidence and as a result this Court finds no genuine issue of material fact. Felonious Restraint i 20 a felony as explained in statute and Unlawful Restraint is merely a lesser included offense 0 21 Felonious Restraint that may apply if the victim is in little risk of serious bodily injury. See 22 GCA § 22.10. The Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 23 and 3. 24 Count 4 25 In Count 4, Plaintiff labels the cause of action as "unlawful detention" and the Court ha 26 found what it believes to be a similar cause of action in tort. Due to the fact that Plaintiff is pr 27 1 Felonious Restraint and Unlawful Restraint are codified in 9 GCA § 22.30 and 22.35 respectively. The Court is 28 unable to establish a viable civil cause of action based on Count 2 and 3.
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 3 of8- se this Court will deem Count 4 to be false imprisonment. The Court will be lenient wit 2 Plaintiff as a pro se Party and the facts appear to support a false imprisonment claim if Plaintiff 3 allegations are true. Defendants argue that Plaintiff s claim for false imprisonment cannot b
4 proven as an essential element has not be supported with sufficient evidence to withstan 5 summary judgment. Defendants contend that the time in which Plaintiff was prevented fro 6 leaving the hospital room was not long enough to constitute an appreciable length of time. 7 addition, Defendants argue that they were also justified in preventing Plaintiffs egress from th 8 room. The Court again finds that this issue is heavily contested by the parties and facts ar 9 insufficient as of yet, to convince the Court that Plaintiff could not prove Count 4. The Cou 10 appreciates the case law cited by Defendant regarding the appreciable length of time element 0
11 false imprisonment, but the Court is not satisfied that one, 90 seconds is too short a time an 12 two, that 90 seconds was actually the time that Defendant was kept from leaving the hospital. Se 13 Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc., 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 915 4th 990 (Cal App. 1996). The Co 14 understands that 90 seconds could be the time that Plaintiff was actually prohibited from freel 15 leaving, yet additional facts brought at trial could clarify the issue for the Court. Count 4 0 16 Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is grounded in facts that could allow recovery if furthe 17 supported at trial. The Court will not grant summary judgment as to Count 4. 18 II. Motion to Dismiss or Access Sealed Records 19 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint or in th 20 Alternative for Access to Expunged Records Contained in People v. Allen Criminal Case NO. 21 CF0375-07; GPD Report 07-03405 (hereinafter "Motion to Dismiss"), will not be grante 22 whether or not this Court decides to allow access to the sealed records because the Motion t 23 Dismiss is not based on any legally sufficient argument that the Court finds applicable. Denia 24 of Defendants' Motion to grant access would not warrant dismissal under any reasoning and thi 25 Court is considering summary judgment which overtakes consideration of dismissal.
26 As to the subject of the sealed records, Defendants should have access to all discoverabl 27 evidence relevant to the disposition of this case. Yet, the criminal case referenced has bee 28 rightly sealed in order to protect the Plaintiff and those similarly acquitted of alleged crimes.
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 4 of 8 - 1 always the case, there must be a balance of the needs of discovery against the needs 0 2 confidentiality. Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9 th Cir. 2006) 3 Here, Plaintiff has used evidence of acquittal to his benefit and appears to impliedly allo 4 consideration of the sealed and expunged criminal case. 2 The Court finds that Defendants shoul 5 be equally allowed access to essential information and its use at trial. The law favors the use 0 6 all relevant and probative evidence as long as not in violation of any evidence code statute. 7 Here, no statute would prohibit the use of the sealed documents and the Court finds good caus 8 exists as information contained in the sealed documents is highly probative of the issues thi 9 present case is based on. This Court will order that the records be temporarily and partiall 10 opened to the parties of this matter for the sole purpose of preparation for trial and proceeding 11 of this case. 12 III. Other Motions 13 Motion for Sanctions 14 Defendants' request sanctions be assessed to Plaintiff for a failure to comply WI 15 deposition. The Court finds that sanctions will not be appropriate as Plaintiff is representin 16 himself pro se and claims he believed the deposition request to be in violation of the rules. 17 addition, the Court would like to point out that since the Defendants' request for sanctions 18 Plaintiff has complied and been deposed. The Court will not assess sanctions on Plaintiff fo 19 refusing and delaying deposition in accordance with the new focus courts place 20 inequalities faced by parties without counsel and out of this Court's power of discretion. 21 Motion for Discovery
22 Under the same analysis above, Defendants request to compel discovery is now moot a 23 Plaintiff has been deposed. Yet, Defendants also request that Plaintiff allow discovery 0 24 documents in his possession relating to the criminal case through a separate motion. This Cou 25 addressed Defendants request for access to sealed documents above. 26 27 2 Plaintiff has referenced his acquittal several times in an effort to discredit Defendants' arguments and even Defendants' request to the Governor of Guam to allow the Office of the Attorney General to represent the 28 Defendants.
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CVO 191-09 - Page 5 of 8 - 1 2 Judicial Notice and Motion to Dis 3 Judicata and Double Jeopardy
4 At hearing and in Plaintiff's motion papers, Plaintiff has made claims that this Cou 5 should make judicial notice of the representation by the Attorney General as inappropriate 6 Plaintiff's argument that the Attorney General should be disqualified include contentions tha 7 Collateral Estoppel, Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy apply. The Court finds that all thre 8 arguments fail to apply in this matter as Plaintiff brought the current claim in a civil action, whil 9 the case that Plaintiff claims precludes the Attorney General's representation is a criminal case 10 Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata cannot apply without the same issues being tried in 11 previous case, which in the present matter there exists no previous civil case. Double Jeopard 12 cannot apply without a subsequent criminal charge of the same crime, which is not present here. 13 In any event, if the above arguments did apply, this Court is not sure the result would disquali
14 the Office of the Attorney General as counsel. As explained at hearing, the Court finds that th 15 Attorney General is appropriately substituted as counsel for the Defendants as they acted whil 16 employed with a Government of Guam line agency, while at work at a Government of Gua 17 facility. The issue brought up at trial was that Plaintiff argues that the Defendants acted beyon 18 the scope of employment in committing intentional torts on Plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff is suin 19 Defendants in their personal capacity outside of the Government Claims Act. The Court will no 20 make judicial notice that the representation of the Office of the Attorney General is inappropriat 21 as Defendants' counsel has fulfilled all of the steps that make representation appropriate. 3 22 Motion to Strike 23 In filing Defendants' Reply Memorandum, Defendants request that the Court strik 24 evidence of prior bad acts and evidence of acquittal in a previous criminal case used by Plaintif 25 in his opposition memorandum. 26 27 3 The Office of the Attorney General gained approval to represent Defendants through a request of the Governor of 28 Guam.
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 6 of 8 - 2 Prior Bad Acts 3 Nonnally, the Court would agree with Defendants that evidence of prior bad acts i 4 inadmissible to show confonnity. 6 GCA §608(b). Yet, here Defendants have alleged that al 5 force placed upon Plaintiff in the events leading up to this lawsuit was justified. The previou 6 specific instances of Defendants bad conduct could be used to show non-character evidence 0 7 motive or knowledge. See United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999). In allegin 8 evidence of Defendant Richardson's prior bad actions, if true, could show that the Defendant 9 were not justified in assuming that Plaintiff was dangerous or trespassing. In fact, those prio 10 acts if shown to be true could show that Defendants knew exactly why Plaintiff was in th 11 hospital looking for the Defendants. Therefore, the Court fmds that Defendants' Motion t 12 Strike should be denied as the evidence of prior bad acts submitted by Plaintiff does not go t 13 show confonnity, but goes to show motive or knowledge that Defendants were not justified i 14 their handling of Plaintiff. The evidence submitted goes to show that Defendant Richardso 15 knows about the job that process servers do and that process servers repeatedly gain lawfu 16 entrance onto GMH grounds. The Court will not make judgment as to the extent of knowledg 17 Defendants had at the time of the alleged torts nor will this Court prescribe how such evidence i 18 to be used at trial. 19 Acquittal 20 Defendants argue that evidence of the acquittal should be stricken as it does not constitut 21 evidence of innocence. The Court agrees with the Defendants that an acquittal does no 22 constitute innocence in a civil matter due to the lesser burden of proof. However, this Cou 23 would like to point out that the Defendant in the criminal acquittal is now the Plaintiff. Mos 24 jurisdictions recognize the tort of malicious prosecution. In a claim of malicious prosecution 25 evidence of an acquittal would be highly'rerevant, evidence and necessary zso. to the •case. Evidenc 26 of acquittal in a criminal case could be relevant evidence in a civil matter dep~nding on the us l' , ;~ t ~~ ~
27 of the evidence. The ~vidence of acquittal will receive the usual test t,? dete111Wle r~le\r~ an , ;
28 probative value versus prejudicial value under 6 GCA §§ 401 and 403. , Guam - v. -Castro, 200
Christopher Allen v. John Young and Ian Richardson, Decision and Order Civil Case No. CV0191-09 - Page 7 of 8 - , '.
1 Guam 23 at 9. Here, the evidence is not highly probative of total innocence on behalf of th 2 Plaintiff but it also has little prejudicial value as Defendants were not on trial in the crimina 3 matter. The Court finds that the acquittal is admissible evidence because the acquittal is als 4 relevant in the civil matter at hand. According to Plaintiff, the Attorney General misrepresente 5 to the Governor information about the criminal trial after the acquittal returned. If true, the Cou 6 could find the evidence is at least relevant as to Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Attorne 7 General. Yet, the Court has reviewed the Attorney General's letter to the Governor and find 8 that "our investigation indicates the Plaintiff assaulted Dr. Richardson" does not constitute 9 misrepresentation to the Governor as it only explains their opinion of the evidence. See Exhibit 10 attached to Plaintiffs Reply and Memorandum to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motio 11 to Disqualify Attorney General. Thus, the evidence may also be relevant to other issues. 12 The Court will return to the matter of the use of the acquittal at trial when the tim 13 comes. The Court would like to point out, that the courts generally do not allow evidence 0 14 acquittal to disprove facts used to prove the case that was acquitted. US v. Grant, 277 F.3d 339 15 352 (3rd Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court will be hesitant if any party attempts to use the acquittal 16 evidence at trial. For now, the Court finds it to be appropriate as used in Plaintiff's Opposition. 17 CONCLUSION 18 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in part in tha 19 Counts 2 and 3 will be dismissed and Denied in part in that Counts 1 and 4 will remain. 20 Additionally, the Court will open the sealed records regarding Plaintiff's criminal case in limite 21 fashion and GRANTS Defendants' request for access to the sealed records. Defendants'motion 22 for sanctions and discovery are also DENIED as they are now moot. The Court will no 23 disqualify the Office of the Attorney General and DENIES Plaintiff's requests for judicial notic 24 and any other informal requests for disqualification. Defendants' Motion to Strike is als 25 D.IiN~~Prc,,"lty 'fl.. tile f()ft~~ NOV 1 S 2011 If. r',1i I'~ and corket copy oflll!;o ORDERED this nay of Nov. em 26 orl!(lI,. Ie 10 til. offk~ of t"~ --(Jrugmat ~i derlt. tbe SUpl!rlor COllft 01 Gut. . HON 27 1 6 iOtf i -H~ON~~B~L~E~VE~RN~O~N~P~..!:P~ERE~ 28 "h-,,-+w-···llM-S:""'!.c.::""'2