Allen v. National Manufacture & Stores Corporation

125 F.2d 239, 28 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1020, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4349
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 28, 1942
Docket9814
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 125 F.2d 239 (Allen v. National Manufacture & Stores Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. National Manufacture & Stores Corporation, 125 F.2d 239, 28 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1020, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4349 (5th Cir. 1942).

Opinions

McCORD, Circuit Judge.

Having pursued and exhausted its administrative remedies, National Manufacture & Stores Corporation filed suit against the Collector to recover an alleged overpayment of income tax for its fiscal year ending June 30, 1937. The case was tried without a jury, and the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for the taxpayer allowing a refund of $5,155.30.

The material facts are not disputed. The appellee is a Delaware corporation with its main office in Atlanta, Georgia. Prior to the year 1930 its officers determined that it would be to the best interest of the corporation to purchase and retire shares of its common stock “at such times as it was felt that the stock could be purchased at a price advantageous to the corporation.” In pursuance of this policy the corporation has purchased stock from time to time at a price lower than book value, and has retired it. In 1930 and 1931 National purchased 6,900 shares of its stock on the open market for $43,842.50. It was the intention of the company to retire this block of stock. The stock was purchased through Hayden-Stone Company, a brokerage house. The corporation was unable to pay the full purchase price of the stock, and Hayden-Stone Company agreed to accept a fifty per cent payment and keep possession of the stock and carry the balance of the indebtedness. The president of appellee, Mr. Fox, who had charge of the purchase and sale of the 6,900 shares of stock, testified that the stock was bought on “fifty per cent margin”.

With the coming on of the depression, National was unable to pay the balance due Hayden-Stone Company. The stock was not cancelled and retired as had been intended, but was held by Hayden-Stone Company and carried on the taxpayer’s books as treasury stock at a nominal value of $1 per share. In 1937 the taxpayer’s need for cash working capital had increased, and in the same year Hayden-Stone Company made demand for payment. The company thereupon determined to sell the 6,900 shares of common stock. On March 15, 1937, the block of stock was sold to a syndicate of Atlanta brokers for $10 per share, a price below the fair value of the shares and below the market price. From this sale, after deduction of tax and expenses, National realized $68,718.15, being an excess of $24,875.65 over the purchase price of the shares in 1930 and 1931. This excess amount was reported as profit in the corporation’s income tax return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, and income tax was paid accordingly. The taxpayer contends here as it did before the Collector and in the court below that this amount was erroneously included in income.

The sale of the stock having occurred during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, the Revenue Act of 1936 governs [241]*241the disposition of this case. Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 825, provides that “gross income” includes “gains, profits, and income derived from * * * sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; * * *.” Treasury Regulations 94, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1936, provides:

“Art. 22(a)-16. Acquisition or disposition by a corporation of its own capital stock.—

* * * * * * *

“But if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of another corporation, the resulting gain or loss is to be computed in the same manner as though the corporation were dealing in the shares of another. * * * ”

This provision was also contained in Article 22(a)-16 of Treasury Regulations 86, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1934.

From 1920 to 1934 the Treasury Regulations under the successive revenue acts provided that where a corporation purchased any of its stock and held it as treasury stock “the sale of such stock will be considered a capital transaction. * * * A corporation realizes no gain or loss from the purchase or sale of its own stock.” See Reg. 45, Arts. 542 an'd 563; Reg. 62, Arts. 543 and 563; Reg. 65, Art. 543 (1924); Reg. 69, Art. 543 (1926); Reg. 74, Art. 66 (1928) ; Reg. 77, Art. 66 (1932). The regulations were amended on May 2, 1934, by Treasury Decision 4430, XIII-1 Cumulative Bulletin 36, so as to eliminate the provision that “a corporation realizes no gain or loss from the purchase or sale of its own stock”, and included in its stead language substantially the same as that in the above quoted provision of Regulations 94, Art. 22(a)-16 (1936), and Regulations 86, Art. 22(a)-16 (1934).

In support of the conclusions and judgment of the court below, the appellee contends that the original Treasury Regulations had acquired the force and effect of law by virtue of the fact that Congress had repeatedly reenacted the revenue act without change in the definition of “gross income” contained in Section 22(a), and that the Treasury Department was without authority to amend or otherwise change the regulations. Cf. E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 98 F.2d 69. The Collector, on the other hand, points to the fact that there has been no substantial change in the regulations since 1934, and contends that the administrative practice disclosed by the regulations has been sufficiently long continued and uniform to justify an assumption that Congress has adopted their interpretation by reenacting the language construed by them.

In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Co., 306 U.S. 110, 59 S.Ct. 423, 427, 83 L.Ed. 536, the Supreme Court had under consideration the amendment and change in the Treasury Regulations adopted under the revenue acts through 1932. The court held that the amended regulations could not, under the facts there shown, be retroactively applied to cover a transaction consummated in the taxable year 1929. The court did not pass upon the validity of the regulation if prospectively applied. Without deciding the point, the court said, “It may be that by the passage of the Revenue Act of 1936 the Treasury was authorized thereafter to apply the regulation in its amended form.”

In the later case of Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100, 60 S.Ct. 18, 24, 84 L.Ed. 101, the Supreme Court held that a regulation interpreting one act does not become “frozen into another act merely by reenactment of that provision, so that that administrative interpretation cannot be changed prospectively through exercise of appropriate rule-making powers.” Also see Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 61 S.Ct. 971, 85 L.Ed. 1438, 134 A.L.R. 1155.

The case at bar does not present a question of retroactive application of regulations such as was condemned in Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Co., supra., or Commissioner v. Pan-American L. Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 111 F.2d 366. Article 22(a)-16 of Regulations 94 was in full force and effect when National sold its 6,900 shares of stock in 1937. The regulation does not attempt to enlarge, repeal, or modify the statute, and is a valid exercise of the Treasury Department’s rule-making power.

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Allen v. National Manufacture & Stores Corporation
125 F.2d 239 (Fifth Circuit, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
125 F.2d 239, 28 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1020, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-national-manufacture-stores-corporation-ca5-1942.