24-2589-cv Allen et al. v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of November, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, EUNICE C. LEE, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CLARENCE BOWEN ALLEN, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, BRENDA BERMAN, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, ANNETTE BIRDSONG, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, WILLIAM HENRY, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, JOSE JACOB, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, JACQUELINE KING, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, SUSAN LAMONICA, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, JEAN PHIPPS, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, ROSLYN PRESS, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, HERBERT RICHARDSON, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, VIRGINIA TUFARO, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-v- 24-2589-cv
CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees,
JACOBI MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.
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FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: ERICA T. HEALEY-KAGAN, Filippatos PLLC, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: RICHARD DEARING (Claude S. Patton, Geoffrey E. Curfman, on the brief), for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Furman, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, eleven former employees of a public hospital
operated by Defendants-Appellees New York City and the New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation (together, "H&H"), appeal from the district court's judgment
entered August 29, 2024 granting summary judgment to H&H on their claims of race
and age-based employment discrimination. Plaintiffs worked at Jacobi Medical Center 2 ("Jacobi"), an acute care facility managed by H&H. As part of an H&H-wide cost-
cutting program, Jacobi underwent two rounds of "Managerial Efficiency Improvement
Initiatives" ("MEIIs") in February and June 2017 that resulted in the elimination of a
combined 45 positions -- 25 of which were held by non-White employees, and 43 of
which were held by employees over the age of 40. Plaintiffs brought race- and age-
based disparate impact and treatment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the New York State Human Rights
Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; and the New York City Human Rights Law
("NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. The district court granted summary
judgment for H&H on the federal claims. It then exercised supplemental jurisdiction
over and dismissed on the merits the disparate impact claims under the NYSHRL and
NYCHRL, and the disparate treatment claim under the NYSHRL. It declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and instead dismissed the sole remaining
discrimination claim, disparate treatment under the NYCHRL, without prejudice to
refiling in state court. 1
On appeal, Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's summary
judgment rulings as to their federal claims. See Appellants' Br. 2-3. Indeed, they have
1 The district court also dismissed the breach of contract claim without prejudice, reasoning that there was no federal analog. 3 failed to address the federal claims in their briefing on appeal, and thus those claims
have been abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiffs instead challenge both the district court's decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over three of the four remaining state and city law claims, and its rulings on
the merits of those claims. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts,
the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We first address whether the district court abused its discretion in
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' disparate impact claims under the
NYSHRL and NYCHRL, and their disparate treatment claim under the NYSHRL.
Concluding that it did not, we proceed to discuss whether the district court erred in its
summary judgment rulings on the state and city disparate impact claims, followed by
its ruling on the state disparate treatment claim.
I. Supplemental Jurisdiction
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims, courts weigh the factors of "judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988),
abrogated on other grounds by Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 39-41
(2025).
4 "[W]hen all federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation,
the balance of factors generally favors declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
remaining state law claims . . . ." Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103
(2d Cir. 1998) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350). We have upheld a district court's exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction, however, when the federal claims were dismissed after
proceedings were well underway, and where the pendent claims involved only settled
legal principles, rather than novel state-law questions. See, e.g., Raucci v. Town of
Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1990). We review a district court's exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp.,
455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL disparate impact
claims and the NYSHRL disparate treatment claim. Because, as discussed below, the
NYSHRL and NYCHRL standards at issue either mirror or overlap with the standards
of their federal counterparts, the district court's adjudication of these state and city law
claims involved only well-settled principles of anti-discrimination law and did not raise
any substantial comity concerns. See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350; see also Nowak v. Ironworkers
Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1996). Moreover, the district court's
decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction served the interests of judicial economy,
because proceedings were well underway and discovery had already been completed in
5 what was then already a five-year-old litigation. See id.; Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over this set of NYSHRL and NYCHRL
claims after dismissing the federal claims at the summary judgment stage.
II. Disparate Impact
1. NYSHRL
Plaintiffs have abandoned their federal law claims on appeal, and we thus
do not decide the propriety of the district court's rulings on those claims. Because the
standards governing the federal and analogous state claims are parallel, however, we
will consider the district court's reasoning as to the federal claims for purposes of
reviewing its rulings on the state claims.
Disparate impact claims under Title VII and the ADEA are analyzed
under a three-part burden-shifting analysis. Plaintiffs must first make out a prima facie
case of discrimination by identifying a specific employment practice or policy,
demonstrating that a disparity exists, and establishing a causal relationship between the
two. Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (Title VII); Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (ADEA). Plaintiffs bear the burden of
"isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities." Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Tr.,
487 U.S. 977, 994 (1998). If step one is met, the burden shifts to the employer to
6 undermine the causal analysis or mount a business necessity defense. Id. at 997-98. If
the employer establishes that its actions served a business necessity, the burden shifts
back to Plaintiffs to show that other non-discriminatory methods exist to meet the
employer's legitimate business interest. Id. at 998.
The district court found that Plaintiffs had not raised triable issues of fact
as to their federal disparate impact claims because they had not isolated or identified a
specific employment practice responsible for the race- and age-based disparities. See
Chin, 685 F.3d at 154 (noting that, to sustain a disparate impact claim, Plaintiffs must
"identify a specific discriminatory employment practice"). The two MEIIs involved
different sets of Jacobi department heads independently identifying positions for
elimination, and the second MEII, unlike the first MEII, incorporated reduction targets
and standardized tables of reorganization provided by H&H. Whether we consider the
MEIIs together or in isolation, Plaintiffs have not specified which part of the MEII
decision-making process or criteria resulted in the disparate effects. See Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) ("[I]t is not enough to . . . point to a generalized policy
that leads to [disparate] impact."). Plaintiffs' argument that Jacobi had a practice of
excluding Group 12 employees from the layoffs also does not raise a factual dispute for
trial, because, as the district court recognized, Plaintiffs have not pointed to any expert
analysis or evidence that this distinction led to a disparate effect based on race or age.
See Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 460 F.3d 361, 382 (2d Cir. 2006).
7 Plaintiffs' disparate impact claim under the NYSHRL is subject to the
same federal standards, and so fails for the same reasons. Although the NYSHRL was
amended in 2019, 2 Plaintiffs' claims accrued in 2017 and are thus governed by the pre-
amendment standards. Alshami v. City Univ. of New York, 162 N.Y.S.3d 720, 720 n.1 (1st
Dep't 2022). Under the pre-amendment regime, this Court has repeatedly held that
discrimination claims under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same framework as
corresponding Title VII and ADEA claims. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.
2007) (Title VII); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001)
(ADEA).
We are not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that the legal standards
governing the NYSHRL and ADEA are different because the former protects employees
over the age of 18, while the latter only protects those over 40. The fact that two statutes
protect somewhat different categories of persons does not affect whether claims
brought under them are assessed under the same legal standard. See Abdu-Brisson, 239
F.3d at 466 ("Although there are differences between the [NYSHRL] . . . and the
2 In August 2019, the New York State Legislature passed an amendment to the NYSHRL stating, in part, that the law's provisions "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of [the NYSHRL] have been so construed." N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 (McKinney 2019). The 2019 amendment has been interpreted to align prospective constructions of the NYSHRL's standards with the more lenient standards of the NYCHRL. See Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 232 N.Y.S.3d 594, 595-96 (2d Dep't 2025). 8 [ADEA], age discrimination suits brought under the [NYSHRL] . . . are subject to the
same analysis as claims brought under the ADEA." (citation modified)). And the
mismatch in the categories of individuals protected by the respective laws does not
have any bearing on the pivotal issues in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' federal and
NYSHRL disparate impact claims rise and, in this case, fall together.
On the merits, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not raised any triable
issues of fact as to their prima facie case. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment for H&H on the NYSHRL disparate impact claim.
2. NYCHRL
The NYCHRL prohibits policies or practices that, individually or in
combination, "result[] in a disparate impact to the detriment of any group protected" by
the NYCHRL. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(17)(a)(1). NYCHRL claims must be
analyzed "separately and independently" from federal and state claims under a more
liberal standard. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109
(2d Cir. 2013). Under the NYCHRL, Plaintiffs must show that a "policy or practice" or
"group of policies or practices" of an employer "results in a disparate impact to the
detriment of any group protected." N.Y.C. Admin. Code, § 8-107(17)(a)(1). If the
plaintiff shows "that a group of policies or practices results in a disparate impact," the
plaintiff need not "demonstrate which specific policies or practices within the group
results in such disparate impact." Id. § 8-107(17)(a)(2). An employer may "plead and
9 prove as an affirmative defense that each such policy or practice bears a significant
relationship to a significant business objective" or "does not contribute to the disparate
impact." Id. Plaintiffs may rebut a business objective defense if they produce
"substantial evidence that an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact is
available" and when the employer fails to show that the alternative "would not serve [it]
as well." Id.
We need not decide whether the disparate impact under NYCHRL
mirrors the federal analysis outlined above, nor whether Plaintiffs have identified a
"policy or practice" or "group of policies or practices" that result in a disparate impact
for purposes of the NYCHRL, because we conclude that H&H has shown that the MEIIs
served a "significant business objective," and Plaintiffs have failed to produce
substantial evidence that an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact is
available. Id.
H&H undertook the MEIIs in response to a significant budget shortfall
and anticipated an estimated $1.8 billion operating loss for fiscal year 2020. In the fiscal
year of the layoffs, H&H sought to save $55 million through a workforce reduction of
approximately 1,000 full-time employees, and to do so by focusing its layoffs on
managerial positions that could be consolidated. H&H can thus show that it had a
significant business objective for the MEIIs.
10 We reject Plaintiffs' argument that H&H is precluded from asserting this
business necessity defense because the layoffs violated the state Civil Service Law.
Plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence that the jobs impacted by the layoffs were civil
service positions, and defendants put forward evidence indicating they were not. In
addition, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the requirements of the Civil
Service Law do "not apply to 'Group 11' or managerial employees" of New York City
Health and Hospital Corporation. Burns v. Quinones, 68 N.Y.2d 719, 721 (1986). So we
need not evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs' argument that non-compliance with
applicable civil service laws precludes H&H’s "significant business objective" defense,
because the premise of that argument -- that the layoffs violated civil service laws -- is
unsupported.
To rebut H&H's defense, Plaintiffs must "produce[] substantial evidence
that an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact is available." N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 8-107(a)(2). Plaintiffs have not done so. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment for H&H on Plaintiffs'
NYCHRL disparate impact claim.
III. Disparate Treatment
Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims brought under the NYSHRL are
subject to the same standard as analogous claims brought under Title VII or the ADEA.
See Patane, 508 F.3d at 113; Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 466. Both federal and NYSHRL
11 disparate treatment claims are governed at the summary judgment stage by the three-
part "burden-shifting analysis first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)." Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation
modified). Under that test, "a plaintiff first bears the minimal burden of setting out a
prima facie discrimination case, and is then aided by a presumption of discrimination
unless the defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, in which event, the presumption evaporates and the plaintiff must
prove that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination."
McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
The ages and races of those terminated could suggest disparate treatment.
However, Plaintiffs did not introduce evidence of the age or racial composition of any
similarly situated comparator groups for purposes of statistical analysis, nor did they
introduce any admissible statements raising an inference of discrimination. Plaintiffs
also fail to meaningfully engage with any part of the district court's analysis on appeal,
and instead only insist in conclusory fashion that we review the district court's decision
de novo. See Appellants' Br. at 13-15. Plaintiffs do not point to any concrete evidence of
discrimination other than the bare ages and racial composition of those whose positions
were eliminated. Moreover, Plaintiffs put forward no evidence to show that H&H’s
showing of their business need to cut positions for budgetary reasons is pretextual. See
Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 109-10 ("[S]ome evidence [of bias] is not sufficient to
12 withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment. . . ."), abrogated on other
grounds by Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for H&H on
the NYSHRL disparate treatment claim.
* * *
We have considered Plaintiffs' remaining arguments and conclude they
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk