Allen 470886 v. MDOC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: July 26, 2024
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00736
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

ERICK ROSEN ALLEN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-736

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

MDOC,

Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff’s complaint is not a model of clarity; however, the events about which he complains appear to have occurred at ICF and at the St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF) in St. Louis, Gratiot County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the MDOC, which he also identifies as “MDOC/Medical/Halal” later in the complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 2.) In Plaintiff’s complaint, he states:

I am suing MDOC because first and foremost when I was riding out from [SLF] they never packed up my 2 personal shoes, over 20 personal books, my green fleece, or my TV. I was in the process of going through my hearing tests due to me now officially being deaf in my left ear and now I am in a level 5 prison over my property, medical, and my religious meal preference. We here in MDOC pay for every “holiday meal” and now in 2024 they’re try[ing to] say just because I’m a Muslim (Sunni) that I can’t have any holiday meals when in all reality we Muslims eat everything except pork, which they . . . no longer serve in MDOC. I’ve filed a lawsuit before as you will see but it got dismissed so now I’m suing MDOC for . . . one million dollars under the Americans with Disabilities Act or any act that will help me win a settlement. (Id., PageID.3 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff presents no further facts or allegations in his complaint. (See generally id.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71

(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). In the body of Plaintiff’s complaint, he states that he is “suing [the] MDOC . . . under the Americans with Disabilities Act or any act that will help [him] win a settlement.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Further, Plaintiff filed his complaint on the Court’s form complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a civil action by a person in state custody. As such, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise claims under § 1983 and the ADA. A. Section 1983 Claims To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by

a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Here, Plaintiff names the MDOC, or “MDOC/Medical/Halal,” as the sole Defendant. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 2.) However, Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick

v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the MDOC are properly dismissed on grounds of immunity. Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771.

Likewise, “Medical” and “Halal” are not “persons” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Furthermore, although Plaintiff references “they” when setting forth his factual allegations, such references are insufficient to state a claim against any Defendant because “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or staff or “they”] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (“This Court has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008))). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the MDOC, or “MDOC/Medical/Halal,” fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against the MDOC or “MDOC/Medical/Halal,” are also properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

B. ADA Claims Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his rights under the ADA. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In the ADA, the term “disability” is defined as follows: “[1] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; [2] a record of such an impairment; or [3] being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(2). The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons and inmates,

Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210–12 (1998), and the proper defendant for Title II ADA claims is the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity. Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Tanney v. Boles, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1044 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff states that he sues the MDOC in its “personal” capacity (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2); however, for the purposes of this opinion, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiff has named the proper Defendant for a claim under the ADA. Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s ADA claims, Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that he was excluded from a service or program, denied accommodation, or discriminated against due to his disability. Although not specifically articulated by Plaintiff, it appears that his ADA claim relates to his testing for, and potential receipt of, hearing aids due to “being deaf in [his] right ear.” (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff claims that at ICF, he is not receiving testing that would lead to him receiving hearing aids. (See id.) However, whether Plaintiff is receiving adequate medical treatment for his hearing disability does not raise a viable ADA claim. As the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, “[w]here the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say . . . that a particular decision was ‘discriminatory.’” United States v. Univ. Hosp. 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, that distinction explains why the ADA is not an appropriate federal cause of action to challenge the sufficiency of medical treatment because “[t]he ADA is not violated by ‘a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners.’” Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., Baldridge-El v. Gundy, No. 99-2387, 2000 WL 1721014, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000) (“[N]either the RA nor the ADA provide a cause of action for medical malpractice.”); Centaurs v. Haslam, No. 14-5348, 2014 WL 12972238, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 2,

2014) (“Although [Plaintiff] may have a viable civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate medical care, he has failed to state a prima facie case under the parameters of the ADA.”); Powell v. Columbus Medical Enterprises, LLC, No. 21-3351, 2021 WL 8053886, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2021) (“This dissatisfaction necessarily sounds in medical malpractice, which, ‘by itself, does not state a claim under the ADA.’”). Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA, and his ADA claims will be dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).

Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: July 26, 2024 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge