UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DlSTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT C. ALLAN, et al. ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Case No. 17-338 (RJL) ) ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ) _ _ ) § § i.. § §§ ) 3339 ’3 3 333 Defendant. ) M"` L 5 mng CE:~:-.r'k. |_}.S, DBst,'ict & Rankru;;)tcy Czi‘i.=."iz 3 the Dé.»"=-‘.:‘Sct of Cn!u:'nb§a MEMORX§DUM OPINION
(March _2_5, 2019) [Dkt. ## 27, 55]
Plaintiffs are survivors of the terrorist hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens, Greece on June 14, 1985, as Well as immediate family members and estate representatives Plaintiffs seek money damages against Iran for injuries and trauma caused by lran’s provision of material support to the hijackers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Having considered all of the record evidence, I find that plaintiffs have established grounds for default I therefore, for the following reasons, GRANT plaintiffs’ motion for default on liability, see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment on Liability (“Pls.’ Mot. on Liability”) [Dkt. # 27], and also GRANT plaintiffs’ motion for relief totaling $353 million dollars, consistent with the findings of the appointed Special Master as to damages See Plaintiffs’Motion for Default
Judgment on Damages (“Pls.’ Mot. on Damages”) [Dkt. # 55].
BACKGROUND
On June 14, 1985, two Hezbollah hijackers boarded TWA Flight 847 leaving Athens, Greece headed for Rome, Italy. Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. # ll] 13 18. There were 143 passengers and 8 crewmembers on board at the time, 69 of whom are passenger plaintiffs in this case. Id. Shortly after takeoff, the two hijackers ran up the aisle towards the cockpit waving guns and hand grenades, shouting: “Americans come to die!” Id. 1 19; see also Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 4-5 (citing evidence relied on in Stethem v. Islamic Republic oflran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2002)).l They held the three pilots at gunpoint and ordered them to fly to Iran or Algeria. Compl. 1 20; see also Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 2 (Stethem Transcript, Testimony of Christian Zimmerman) (“Zimmerman Testimony”)), at 123:14-124:19. When informed that the plane did not have enough fuel to fly to either location, the hijackers instructed the pilots to land in Beirut, Lebanon. Compl. il 20.
What ensued was dramatic and terrifying. The hijackers forced some passengers into the First Class cabin and beat them repeatedly. Compl. ‘H 21; Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 5. They began to single out passengers who they suspected of being U.S. Military or Jewish. Compl. 11 16, 26; Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 2 (Stethem Transcript, Testimony of
Clinton Suggs) (“Suggs Testimony”)), at 87:1_90:23. They interrogated passengers about
l For the reasons explained below, infra at 5-6, this Court will consider the factual findings and evidence presented in Sz‘ethem, which covered the same incident, and will reference testimony and declarations submitted in that case, where necessary.
their religions Ia’. 11 16. All seated passengers were forced to sit in a crash-landing position for hours at a time, and were forbidden from going to the bathroom. Ia’. 11 21. The terrorists landed the plane in Beirut for the first time three hours later on June l4th. Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 6; see also id., Ex. 28 (Zimmerman Timeline) at l24. They demanded the release of nearly 800 prisoners in Israel and Kuwait. Compl. 1111 22-24. In exchange for fuel, they released several women and children. Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 28 (Zimmerman Timeline) at 124.
The hijackers then ordered the pilots to fly the plane to Algiers, Algeria. Compl. 11 23. After refueling again, they ordered the pilots to return to Beirut. Id. 11 23-24. The airport authorities ordered the plane not to land, and placed obstacles on the runway to enforce the order. Ia’. 11 24. Despite the dangerous conditions the pilots were able to safely land on the runway. Ia’. On the ground in Beirut for a second time, the hij ackers demanded that additional terrorists be allowed to board. Ia’. 11 25. They executed one passenger_a navy diver named Robert Stethem-and tossed his body onto the tarmac. Ia’. Later that day, ten additional militiamen from the Amal group and one Hezbollah spokesman boarded the plane. [a'.; Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 28 (Zimmerman Timeline) at 126. The plane then headed back to Algeria for a second time. Ia’. 11 27. During this period, the hijackers began ramping up their harassment and abuse_threatening passengers with execution, beating them, and robbing them of all their belongings Ia'. 11 26_27; Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 4 tPls.’ Decls) at 6-7, 84, 441, 452. On the ground in Algeria, the terrorists released
another swatch of passengers in exchange for an additional hij acker being allowed to board.
Compl. 11 28.
On the morning of June 16, the hij ackers ordered the plane back to Beirut for a third time, Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 28 (Zimmerman Timeline) at 129. At that point, the passengers still on board had endured 36 hours on the aircraft with inadequate food, water, access to bathroom facilities or sleep. Ia'. The plane sat on the tarmac until the next morning, when 23 men were forced off the plane at gunpoint and taken into Beirut. Id. at 130; Compl. 1111 28-29. For the next two weeks, the men were beaten, threatened, given inadequate food and water, and forced to watch propaganda. Compl. 11 28. The terrorists finally released the Beirut hostages to Syrian military personnel on June 30, 1985. Ia'. 11 29. The hijackers were indicted for their roles in the hijacking, but never taken into United States custody. See Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 10. They remain on the FBI’s most wanted list. Ia'. at ll n. ll.
Plaintiffs filed this action on February 24, 2017, seeking default judgment on liability and damages On May 23, 2017, plaintiffs served Iran via diplomatic channels Iran never accepted service, so the Clerk entered default on July 26, 2017. On February 2, 2018, plaintiffs moved to appoint a special master to review their claims for damages See Motion for Order Appointing a Special Master for Damages [Dkt. # 24]. l appointed Special Master Alan Balaran to make findings on plaintiffs motion for default as to damages See 2/12/18 Order [Dkt. # 25]. After reviewing testimonial and documentary evidence, he issued a Report and Recommendation awarding compensatory damages on
August 28, 2018. See Special Master Report Filed Under Seal [Dkt. # 54].
ANALYSIS I. Iran is Liable Under the FSIA’s Terrorism Exception-28 U.S.C. § 1605A
Plaintiffs argue that Iran should be held liable under the FSIA’s terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § l605A, for providing material support to the terrorist groups that perpetrated the 1985 hijacking incident aboard TWA F light 847. l begin by noting that this is not the first time the events at issue have been the subject of suit under the FSIA. In 2002, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson granted default judgment in two consolidated cases involving the same 1985 hijacking incident under an older provision of the FSIA, § l605(a)(7). See Stethem v. Islamz`c Republz`c oflran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2002). The two consolidated cases before Judge Jackson included the individual who was killed on the plane, Robert Stethem, as well as his surviving family members2 Keeping in mind that “the FSIA does not require this Court to relitigate issues that have already been settled,” l find that there are grounds to take judicial notice of these “related proceedings and records in cases before the same court.” Brewer v. lslamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Estate ofHez'ser v. Islamz`c Republic oflran, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 229, 263 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Valore v. lslaml`c Republl`c of[ran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 60 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[T]he Court may review evidence considered in an opinion that is judicially noticed, without necessitating the re-presentment
of such evidence.”).
2 None of the Stethem plaintiffs are plaintiffs in the instant case,
l will therefore grant plaintiffs request to take judicial notice of Judge Jackson’s findings of fact, Ex. l, and to consider the expert and witness testimony, Ex. 2, and relevant documentary evidence, Ex. ll-28, presented in Stethem. Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 34-35. l will also consider the updated expert report submitted by Dr. Clawson, the expert who previously submitted testimony on which Judge Jackson relied. Ex. 3; Stez‘hem, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 92.3
To find default judgment for the plaintiffs I must first determine whether I have jurisdiction under the FSIA. Section §1605A(a)( l) imposes three requirements to establish subject matter jurisdiction: l) that the claims be against a foreign state that was designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the acts occurred, § l605A(a)(2)(A)(i); 2) that plaintiffs be U.S. nationals at the time the acts occurred, § l605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); and 3) that plaintiffs be seeking money damages for personal injury or death caused by the foreign state’s acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking, or by the foreign state’s provision of material support or resources for such acts. § 1605A(a)(l); see also 0wens v. Republz'c ofSua’an, 864 F.3d 751, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Having considered the record evidence, l find that plaintiffs satisfy each of these requirements in the instant
CaS€.
3 Dr. Clawson is apparently an expert on Iran and has studied its sponsorhip of terrorism, among other things, as Director of Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 3 n. 6.
A. Iran Was a State Sponsor of Terrorism at the Time of the Hijacking
First, as plaintiffs argue, Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism on January 19, 1984, and remained a designated state sponsor of Hezbollah at the time of the hijacking. See Pls’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 11 (Statement of U.S. Secretary of State, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02); Stethem, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (relying on evidence that lran is the “patron state” of Hezbollah); Pls.’ Motion on Liability, Ex. 3 (Clawson Expert Report) at 1111 23, 38_39, 51 (lran committed substantial support to fund Hezbollah’s acts of “terrorism as an official means of forwarding foreign policy” in the early 19805).4
B. Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements of U.S. Citizenship
Second, the record shows that all of the passenger plaintiffs were U.S. citizens at the time of the hijacking, and all but one of the family member plaintiffs were U.S. Citizens
at the time ofthe hijacking. See Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 4 (Pls’ Decls) (attaching birth
4 Plaintiffs have submitted numerous other contemporaneous US government documents noting lran’s contribution to Hezbollah’s terrorist operations see Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 10-14, but l do not believe it necessary to rely on those public documents here. Suffice it to say that Iran’s role in funding Hezbollah’s terrorist activities at the time was well- documented and has been found by courts in this district to be beyond dispute. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Islamz`c Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d l, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[lran’s] connections to Hizbollah have been explored at length in this jurisdiction, and it has uniformly been agreed that, in the relevant time period, Hizbollah received substantial funds and support from lran via its Ministry of Information and Security and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps,” thus finding that “defendants provided ‘material support and resources’ to Hizbollah in carrying out both the [April 1983 and September 1984] attacks on the U.S. Embassy and Embassy Annex in Beirut, Lebanon.”); Levz`n v. Islamz`c Repabll'c oflran, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2007) (“It has been well established within the intelligence, academic, and legal communities that lran, the MOIS, and the IRGC were providing material support and resources to Hizbollah in the early l980’s . . . .”).
certificates U.S. passports, and naturalization papers). The family member that was not a citizen herself was married to a U.S. Citizen at the time of the hijacking, and is therefore a claimant whose injuries derive from her citizen husband. See Leibovz`tch v. Islamic Republic of[ran, 697 F.3d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2012) (“the plain text and plain meaning of § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) extends jurisdiction to cases where either ‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the [terrorist] act’ a United States citizen. The claimant and victim need not both be American citizens”).
C. Iran Provided Material Support to the Terrorist-Hijackers
Finally, plaintiffs are seeking “money damages against [lran] for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture . . . aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act . . . .” FSIA § 1605A(a)(1). In Stethem, Judge Jackson determined that Iran had indeed provided “material support” to Hezbollah and Amal for the hijacking and hostage taking, including funding, training, logistical and weapons support, and professional guidance and tactical expertise. 201 F. Supp. 2d at 87 (“[A]s the Court has previously found in so many similar cases before it, the evidence conclusively establishes that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its MOIS provided ‘material support or resources’ to Hizballah, and Hizballah and its co-conspirator Amal were the perpetrators of these heinous acts of terrorism.”). Because the FSIA did not provide an independent federal cause of action at the time of Stethem, plaintiffs had to prove that they met the elements of their D.C. state law claims (in that case, wrongful death
and survival claims), and additionally had to prove that the court had jurisdiction under the
FSIA. Ia'. at 87-88.
In 2008, however, Congress replaced § 1605(a) with § 1605A and created a private, federal cause of action against foreign governments in § 1605A(c) so that plaintiffs are no longer required to prove state law claims to secure relief. See Owens, 864 F.3d at 765. However, the causation requirement_that plaintiffs injury result from material support of acts of terrorism_has not changed, and the language in § 1605A(a)(2) largely mirrors the prior language in § 1605(a)(7). 0werzs, 864 F.3d at 796-99. Most courts have interpreted this so-called “jurisdictional causation” requirement loosely, finding that where a foreign government’s support of terrorist activities could be shown generally, plaintiffs need not prove whether the government had “provided material support and resources that caused this particular act.” See Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 12-cv-508, 2017 WL 2399454, at *10, 16-17 (D.D.C. June 1, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); Owens, 864 F.3d at 794-99 (finding jurisdictional causation where defendant-Sudan provided safe harbor and preferential tax treatment to al Qaeda, despite Sudan’s ignorance of al Qaeda’s specific plans to launch attacks on US embassies in Africa). Having considered the record evidence in this case, I find, consistent with Judge Jackson’s opinion in Stethem, that Iran provided “material support” to terrorist groups Hezbollah and Amal sufficient to meet the requirements of§ 1605A(a)(1).
D. Plaintiffs Suffered Personal Injuries as a Result of the Hijacking
It still remains for me to consider whether the 69 passengers and their families who
bring this lawsuit have adequately met the statutory requirement of personal injury in the
instant case. § 1605A(a)(1). Having considered the record evidence, l find that they do. As is clear from plaintiffs’ declarations they have all undoubtedly established valid theories of recovery for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress And even more clear is the fact that “plaintiffs’ personal injuries arise from their having been taken hostage and tortured by agents of the defendant[ ].” Stethem, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n. 20.
Plaintiffs’ declarations paint a harrowing tale of the events that transpired aboard TWA Flight 847, as well as the conditions of captivity for some passengers for two weeks afterwards in Beirut, Even those only on the aircraft for the first day of the siege were forced to sit for prolonged periods in a crash-landing position; refused access to food and water; prevented from using lavatories; and either subjected to or witness to abuse by their captors. See Pls.’ Mot. on Liability, Ex. 2 (Stethem Transcript (Zimmerman Testimony)), at 127:4-10; z`a’., Ex. 4 (Pls.’ Decls.), at 6-7, 84-85, 126, 337, 452. This included being “punched, kicked, pistol whipped, sexually assaulted, poked with gun barrels frisked and robbed, pushed, and/or slapped.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 4 (“Pls.’ Decls), at 43, 84, 222, 231, 275, 441, 497). Some passengers were also questioned about race, religion, and occupation for the purpose of being singled out for potential execution. Ia’., Ex. 2 (Stethem Transcript, Suggs Testimony), at 88:1_8, 91 :4_6. In many cases moreover, passengers travelling with family members faced the additional terror of watching close family be subjected to such abuse. Ia’., Ex. 4 (Pls’ Decls) at 67-68, 194, 242, 418. And, of course, for about a third
of the passengers the terror did not end with the plane made its final stop in Beirut.
Twenty-three male passengers endured an additional two weeks of captivity in Beirut, during which they were subjected to mock executions threatened, beaten, and held captive in apartments garages and basement prisons Ia’., Ex. 4 (Pls.’ Decls) at 44, 85, 164, 453, 468, 526.
As for the family member “spouse[s], parents siblings and children,” Hez'ser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 28, their declarations “alleging emotional distress arising from a terrorist attack that killed or injured a family member,” clearly satisfy Section 1605A’s jurisdictional injury requirement, even though many were not present at the scene. 0wens, 864 F.3d at 812 (certifying question of presence requirement for IIED claims to D.C. Court oprpeals); Republic ofSuclan v. Owerzs, 194 A.3d 38, 45 (D.C. 2018) (“We see little need to enforce the presence requirement in IIED cases where the jurisdictional elements of § 1605A are satisfied and the plaintiffs severe distress arises from a terrorist attack that killed or injured a member of his or her immediate family.”). Indeed, the “‘intent to create maximum emotional impact,’ particularly on third parties is terrorism’s raison a”étre.” Hez`ser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27 (quoting Ez'senfela’ v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000)); Stansell v. Republic ofCuba, 217 F. Supp. 3d 320, 344 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Claims for solatium under the FSIA are nearly indistinguishable from claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
ll
Plaintiffs have therefore established all of the jurisdictional requirements laid out by Section 1605A(a).5 What remains for me to consider is whether plaintiffs have met Section 1605A(c)’s requirement to state a “theory of liability” on which defendants can be held liable for plaintiffs injuries
As stated above, plaintiffs here have submitted voluminous declarations alleging
tort claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the intentional infliction of
5 Though plaintiffs have not raised it, the FSIA terrorism exception contains a limitation period, which provides that an action must be brought not later than the latter of (1) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or (2) 10 years after the date on which the cause of action arose unless plaintiffs have timely commenced a “related” or “prior action” under the old § l605(a)(7). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b). Under this limitations provision, the last day to file a new action under § 1605A was April 24, 2006. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit has unequivocally stated that the limitations provision in the FSIA’s terrorism exception is non- jurisdictional Owens, 864 F.3d at 802 (“[n]othing in § 1605A(a) ‘conditions its jurisdictional grant on compliance with [the] statute of limitations’ in § 1605A(b)”) (quoting Musacchio v. Uniiea’ States 136 S.Ct. 709, 717 (2016)). Therefore, where defendants do not raise it as an affirmative defense, it is considered wavied unless courts exercise their discretionary authority to raise the limitation as a defense sua sponte. See Worley v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 331 (D.D.C. 2014) (“declin[ing] whatever discretionary authority [the Court] may have to raise the defense of limitations on lran’s behalf’); cf. Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 306 F. Supp. 3d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Considering the timeliness of an FSIA claim sua sponte is a discretionary determination.”). Recognizing that the FSIA strikes a “careful balance” between comity and accountability, see Rubin v. Islamic Republic of[ran, 138 S.Ct. 816, 822 (2018), l decline to exercise my discretion to raise the timeliness defense here for several reasons First, defendants have, so far, chosen not to appear in this litigation and raise the limitations defense. There is little argument for comity, as Iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism, and no friend of the United States And plaintiffs raise claims related to the very factual circumstances under which Judge Jackson previously granted relief to the passenger who was killed during the hijacking. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s overview of the textual history of the limitations provision in Owens clearly demonstrates that Congress did not intend for courts to consider the limitation as a bar to jurisdiction, but rather to consider the timeliness issue on a case-by-case basis 864 F.3d at 802-04.
emotional distress., all “well-established principles of law, such as those found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts...” Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 335. While the FSIA technically requires plaintiffs “to prove a theory of liability” separate and apart from establishing the elements of subject matter jurisdiction, Owens, 864 F.3d at 807 (“[T]he question whether a statute withdraws sovereign immunity is analytically distinct from whether a plaintiff has a cause of action.”) (internal citation omitted), most courts conduct the analysis together, since evidence sufficient to establish jurisdictional causation will almost always establish a theory of “personal injury” necessary to prevail under §1605A(c). See, e.g., Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 205 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Section 1605A(c) after proving Section 1605A(a)’s jurisdictional requirements because of the “the overlap between the elements of this cause of action and the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity”); Kilburn v. Islamic Republic oflran, 699 F. Supp. 2d 136, 155 (D.D.C. 2010) (summarily concluding that Section 1605A(c)’s cause of action requirement is satisfied when Section 1605A(a) jurisdiction is found). Because “plaintiffs’ personal injuries arise from their having been taken hostage and tortured by agents of the defendants[,]” l need not “belabor the issue of liability by addressing the independent elements of each separate tort claim advanced by [each of] the plaintiffs” Stethem, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n. 20.
II. Compensatory Damages Should be Awarded Consistent with the Special Master’s Recommendation
Plaintiffs also seek an order awarding compensatory damages See generally Pls.’
Mot. on Damages A party seeking default damages under the FSIA “must prove damages ‘in the same manner and to the same extent as any other default winner.”’ Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 243 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Wachsrnan v. Islamic Republic oflran, 603 F. Supp. 2d 148, 160 (D.D.C. 2009)). Plaintiffs may meet this burden of proof by submitting “affidavits or declarations rather than through live witnesses testifying in open court,” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2009), which the Court “may accept...as true.” Lanny J. Davis & Associates LLC v. Republic oquuatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163 (D.D.C. 2013).
While putting a price tag on the pain and suffering of passengers and their families is challenging, Hekmati v. Islamic Republic oflran, 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 163 (D.D.C. 2017) (recognizing the “challenge aris[ing] in assigning a dollar value to such pain and suffering”), there are, fortunately, a plethora of prior decisions in this Circuit awarding damages for pain and suffering to victims of terrorist attacks The Special Master here diligently considered these decisions and devised a framework by which to group plaintiffs’ injuries in a way that is both consistent with prior practice and internally consistent between plaintiffs See Pls.’ Mot. on Damages Addendum A - Recommended Damages at 6-13. Namely, he considered the severity of the pain immediately following the injury, the lasting and severe psychological problems resulting from the injuries and the overall length and severity of captivity.
Starting with “the baseline assumption that persons suffering [physical] injuries in
terrorist attacks are entitled to $5 million in compensatory damages Davis v. Islamic
Republic oflran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2012), and that those who suffer emotional, but no physical injury are typically awarded $1.5 million in damages see, e.g., Relvas v. Islamic Republic oflran, Case No. 14-01752, 2018 WL 1092445, *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2018), the Special Master divided plaintiffs according to the “gravity of harm” as revealed by their “shared experiences.” Special Master Report Filed Under Seal [Dkt. # 54] at 9.6 For passenger plaintiffs the Special Master recommended relief under three sub- categories: For the 15 passengers (“Group l”) who were “forced to sit for prolonged periods in cramped and painful positions; refused access to the lavatories; subjected to unsanitary conditions denied food and water; and were subjected to or forced to watch mock executions” but were ultimately released within the first day of the hijacking, he awarded $1,000,000. Ia'. at 9-1 1. For the 27 passengers (“Group ll”) who were “subjected to 35 additional hours of the same abuse,” and also “faced a possible crash-landing; heard the gunshot that killed a fellow passenger; listened while other passengers were brutally beaten; saw the swollen and bloodied bodies of the terrorists’ victims; capitulated to the demands of heavily-armed Amal militia; [were] robbed of their valuables; and watched helplessly as their captors wired the aircraft with plastic explosives” the Special Master
awarded $2,000,000. Ia'. And for the 23 passengers (“Group lll”) who were held captive
6 The Special Master varied upwards from his established baseline amounts in a few limited instances for passenger plaintiffs Simon Grossmayer, Jane Synnestvedt, Estate of John Testrake, Arthur Toga, Debbie Toga, and Estate of Frank Walsh. Without revealing confidential information regarding these plaintiffs suffice it to say that l agree with his decisions to deviate from the baseline for these individuals
in Beirut for an extra two weeks and suffered additional abuse, including being “lined up against a wall_‘execution-style’; repeatedly threatened with death; tormented with false promises of release; housed in locations surrounded by exploding shells and mortar fire; confined to rooms with no beds working toilets or sanitary facilities supplied with tainted food and water; and bombarded with anti-American propaganda,” he awarded $5,000,000. Ia'.
The Special Master conducted a separate analysis to determine the appropriate baseline loss of solatium for family members whose loved ones “survived a terrorist attack.” Oveissi v. Islamic Republic oflran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 26 n. 10 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Wyatt, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (finding loss of solatium framework applied to “cases in which the victim survived a terrorist attack or hostage-taking”). Keeping in mind the principle that family members should not be awarded more than the victim, Special Master Report Filed Under Seal at 13-14, and considering analogous cases in our Circuit, see ia’. at 14_15, the Special Master recommended solatium awards for family members of victims commensurate with the groups above_for Group l, $660,000 for spouses $560,000 for parents $495,000 for children, and $330,000 for siblings; for Group II, $1,330,000 for spouses $1,112,000 for parents $990,000 for children, and $660,000 for siblings; and for Group lIl, $4,000,000 for spouses $2,500,000 for parents $1,500,000 for
children, and $1,250,000 for siblings Id. at 15.
Under these circumstances plaintiffs are thus entitled to compensatory damages in the amounts listed above.7 Moreover, l find that the relief outlined in the Special Master’s report is consistent with that awarded in other cases l therefore grant plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment as to damages consistent with these amounts as set forth in detail in
the attached Appendix A-Damages, and totaling $353 million dollars
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default judgment as to liability [Dkt. # 27], and GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default according to the Special Master’s recommendations on damages [Dkt. # 55]. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Mw\l RiCHARD MON United States District Judge
7 Notably, the Special Master’s recommended awards are within the range granted by Judge Jackson in Stethem. 201 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (awarding $5,000,000 each to the Stethem and his wife, and a range of $200,000 to $3,000,000 to other family members).
APPENDIX A-DAMAGES
N.th R§L§Mn§.hm N$L §Bff§.l`.m£§ Victor 0054-1 Beirut Hostage lll $5,000,000 $4,000,000 $9,000,000 Amburgy Jerome 0054-1 Beirut Hostage lll $5,000,000 80 $5,000,000 Barczak Judy C°x 0054-1 Plane Hostage ii s2,000,000 so s2,000,000 Barkley Judith 0054-1 Plane Hostage l $l,000,000 $0 $1,000,000 Chudigian Cheryl Clancy 0054-1 Daughter of Plane N/A $0 $495,000 $495,000 Hostage
Stuart Darsch 0054-1 Beirut Hostage lll $5,000,000 $0 $5,000,000 Rev' Th°mas 0054-1 Beirut Hostage iii $5,000,000 so $5,000,000 Dempsey Jane Doe 0054-1 Intentionally Blank $3,500,000 l\/lartha Doris 0054-1 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $990,000 $2,990,000 S“e Enen 0054-2 Plane Hostage ii 32,000,000 s4,000,000 s6,000,000 Herzberg Hazel Hesp 0054-2 Plane Hostage II $2,000,000 $0 $2,000,000 Ehzabeth 0054-2 Plane Hostage ii $2,000,000 $0 $2,000,000 Howes Kenneth
0054-2 Plane Hostage II $2,000,000 $0 $2,000,000 Lanham Rev' Wllham 0054_2 Plane Hostage ii 32,000,000 so s2,000,000 McDonnell Mary Palesse 0054-3 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $0 $2,000,000
N.Q.¢ B£l£ligl!§hill N.th §.Llff££mg§ Ma“r‘ 0054-3 Plane Hostage ii sz,000,000 so 32,000,000 Schwartz Sara Summers 0054-3 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $0 $2,000,000 Ralf Traugott 0054-3 Beirut Hostage lll $5,000,000 $0 $5,000,000 Judith Ditchkus 0054-1 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $4,000,000 $6,000,000 Brown Mi°hael 0054-1 Beirut Hostage iii $5,000,000 si ,330,000 $6,330,000 Bradley Brown Robert G°rd°“ 0054-1 Beirut Hostage iii $5,000,000 $0 $5,000,000 Brown Estate of R G Brown Donna Jill 0054-1 '. ` N/A $0 $4,000,000 $4,000,000
(wife)
Brown Melissa R.G. Brown Gibson 0054-1 (daughter) N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 Carolyn Byron 0054-1 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $4,000,000 $6,000,000 Pam Byron 0054-1 Plane Hostage II $2,000,000 $1,500,000 $3,500,000 Leo Byron 0054-1 Beirut Hostage lII $5,000,000 $1,330,000 $6,330,000 Allyn Conwell 0054-1 Beirut Hostage I $5,000,000 $0 $5,000,000 Alexa“der 0054-1 conweii (son) N/A so si,500,000 si,500,000 Conwell - Olga Conwell 0054-1 Conwell (wife) N/A $0 $4,000,000 $4,000,000 Gisela Delgado 0054-1 Plane Hostage l $l,000,000 $1,330,000 $2,330,000 Damel 0054-1 Deigado (son) N/A $0 $990,000 $990,000 Delgado Ralph Delgado 0054-1 Delgado (son) N/A $0 $990,000 $990,000 Grant Elliott 0054-1 Beirut Hostage III $5,000,000 $0 $5,000,000
P i iff EQL Hostagel glass Rain_§i §Qlat.iiim IQLal Shirley Elliott 0054-1 Elliott (mother) N/A $0 $2,500,000 $2,500,000 Barbara Guse 0054-1 Elliott (sibling) N/A $0 $1,250,000 $1,250,000 Sherry Zenk 0054-1 Elliott (sibling) N/A $0 $1,250,000 $1,250,000 Slmon 0054-1 Beirut Hostage iii s5,500,000 s660,000 s6,i60,000 Grossmayer Estate of Elaine 0054-1 Plane Hostage l $1,000,000 84,000,000 $5,000,000 Grossmayer Debra Ann Simon and Elaine Byrne 0054-1 Grossmayer’s N/A $0 $l,500,000 $1,500,000 (daughter)
J ames Simon and Elaine
Grossmayer 0054-1 Grossmayer’s N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 (son)
Simon Simon and Elaine
Grossmayer Jr. 0054-1 Grossmayer’s N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 (son)
Nora J an 3 Simon and Elaine
Mangano 0054-1 Grossmayer’s N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 (daughter)
Maria Renee Simon and Elaine
Olsen 0054-1 Grossmayer’s N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000 (daughter)
§Si;?te °f Peter 0054-2 Beirut Hostage iii s5,000,000 s5,000,000
Nina Hill 0054-2 Hill (daughter) N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000
Paul Hill 0054-2 Hill (son) N/A $0 $l,500,000 $1,500,000
Roxanne Hiii 0054_2 Hiii (daughrer) N/A so si ,500,000 si,500,000
J"‘mes W' 0054-2 Beir 3H st iii ss 000 000 so ss 000 000
Hoskins, Jr. u 0 age ’ ’ ’ ’
klade ECL lhslaael Lunro .l.’_ain_& Ma.ti_'um mal N£L 1 i i M m
K"“hr.yn 0054-2 PlfneH°Stage ii s2,000,000 so s2,000,000
Hoskins (wife)
Deanfa 0054-2 H°SkmS(JameSS N/A so s2,500,000 s2,500,000
Hoskins mother)
Estate Of James Hoskins (James’s
W. Hoskins 0054-2 III $0 $2,500,000 $2,500,000
Sr father)
mm . 0054-2 Hos.kms(]amess N/A so si,250,000 si,250,000
Rhinesmith sibling)
Ta“ya 0054-2 H°‘°'.klns(]amess N/A s0 si,250,000 si,250,000
Vanderpool sibling)
Analie Hoskins
Townsend 0054-2 (Kathryn’s N/A $0 $1,112,000 $1,112,000 mother)
Susan Hudson Hoskins
0054-2 (Kathryn’S N/A $0 $660,000 $660,000
sibling)
Estate of
Raymond 0054-2 Beirut Hostage III $5,000,000 $660,000 $5,660,000
Johnson
l\/largaret 0054-2 Plane Hostage l $l,000,000 $4,000,000 $5,000,000
Alfred Johnson 0054-2 Johnson (son) N/A $0 $l,500,000 $l,500,000
Mary Brown 0054-2 Johnson N/A so si,500,000 si,500,000 (daughter)
Kathleen Johnson
Flanagan 0054-2 (daughter) N/A $0 $l,500,000 81,500,000
Joseph 0054-2 Johnson(gon) N/A so si,500,000 si,500,000
Barba.raj' 0054-2 Johnson N/A s0 si,500,000 si,500,000 Lamping (daughter) Ge°rge 0054-2 BeirutHosiage iii s5,000,000 si,330,000 s6,330,000 Lazansky J°A’m 0054-2 PlaneHostage ii s2,000,000 s4,000,000 s6,000,000 Lazansky Rev.James W. .
. 0054-2 Beiruruosrage iii s5,000,000 s495,000 s5,495,000 McLoughlin Estate of Loretta 0054-2 Plane Hostage l $l,000,000 $2,500,000 $3,500,000 l\/choughlin §;t:;:°fEd 0054-2 Plane Hostage ii s2,000,000 s660,000 s2,660,000 Estate°f]anet 0054-2 Plane Hostage i si,000,000 si,330,000 s2,330,000 Novak Richard Novak 0054-2 Novak (son) N/A $0 $990,000 $990,000 Delores 0054-2 Pianeiiosrage ii s2,000,000 s0 s2,000,000 Kowalczyk Edward Kowalczyk Kowalczyk 0054-2 (husband) N/A $0 si,330,000 si,330,000 Estate°f 0054-3 Plane Hostage i si,000,000 s2,500,000 s3,500,000 Esther Peel Kristine Peel 0054-3 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $4,000,000 $6,000,000 Estate of Robert Henry 0054-3 Plane Hostage ii s2,000,000 s2,500,000 s4,500,000 Peel §§§e"]ames 0054-3 Beirutiiosiage iii s5,000,000 si,330,000 s6,330,000
1323 Mali£n§.h.m N.th §Lff££m£§ Estate of Genevieve 0054-3 Plane Hostage l $I,OO0,000 $1,330,000 $2,3303000 Porter Estate Of 0054-3 Plane Hostage ll $2,000,000 $660»000 $2’660’000 Douglas Porter John Porter 0054-3 Porter (son) N/A $0 $990,000 $990,000 §:;li’ara Porter 0054-3 Porter (daughter) N/A so s990,000 s990,000 D°r‘.’thy 0054_3 Piane Hostage i si,000,000 so si,000,000 Sullivan §?l:;rt C' 0054-3 Sullivan (son) N/A $0 $495,000 $495,000 Deborah 0054_3 Sullivan N/A $() $495,000 $495,000 Jorgensen (daughter) Blake Synnestvedt 0054-3 Plane Hostage III $5,000,000 $1,330>000 $6’330,()00 Jane Synnestvedt 0054-3 Plane Hostage ll 810,000,00 $4,000,000 $14’000’000 Estate Of John 0054-3 Beirut Hostage lIl $7,000,000 $0 $7>000>000 Testrake Phyllis Lyon 0054-3 Testrake (wife) N/A $0 $4,000,000 $4,000,000 Debra Barnes 0054_3 Testrake N/A $() $1,500,000 $1,500,000 (daughter) Diane Smith 0054_3 Testrake N/A $0 $1,500,000 $l,500,000 (daughter) Christine Cooke 0054-1 Plane Hostage II $2,000,000 $660,000 $2,660,000 Estate Of 0054-3 Plane Hostage ii s2,000,000 $660,000 $2,6603000
Arlene Turner
ELL R.dl¢l$m§.hi£ §23 §Lff£!‘.ln£§ David Matanes 0054-3 Turner (son) N/A $0 $990,000 $990,000 Arthur Toga 0054-3 Beirut Hostage 111 $6,000,000 $660,000 $6,660,000 Debbie TOga 0054-3 Plane Hostage 1 $1,250,000 $4,000,000 $5,250,000 Robert 0054-3 Beirut Hostage iii s5,000,000 s660,000 s5,660,000 Trautmann Irma 0054-3 Plane Hostage 1 si,000,000 s4,000,000 s5,000,000 Trautmann Ashley Trautmann 0054-3 Plane Hostage 1 $1,000,000 $1,500,000 $2,500,000 Longoria Katherine Trautmann 0054-3 Plane Hostage 1 $l,000,000 $1,500,000 $2,500,000 Edlund Ch“$t°$. . 0054-3 Plane Hostage ii s2,000,000 so s2,000,000 Varelogiannis Helen Varelogiannis Koufogazos 0054-3 (daughter) N/A $O $990,000 $990,000 \E;;"ll;; °f Frank 0054-3 Plane Hostage ii s3,000,000 si ,330,000 s4,330,000 I\§,a;ll;l;e“ 0054-3 Plane Hostage ii s2,000,000 s1,330,000 s3,330,000 Estate of Claude 0054-3 Beirut Hostage 111 $5,000,000 $0 $5,000,000 Whitmoyer Judy Cox 0054-3 Whitmoyer (wife) N/A $0 $4,000,000 $4,000,000 Tra°y . 0054-3 Wh“m°yer N/A so si,500,000 si,500,000 Camponeschi (daughter) Daniel . Whitmoyer 0054-3 Whitmoyer (son) N/A $0 $1,500,000 $1,500,000
_BJD_LL.Pl ' 'ff EQE= LLO§.E£§Z §L_!RFO R&HL& §.Ql_a_li!m md ML _¢_B.LL… l i II hi M Mf£i£lg Stevens 0054-3 Beirut Hostage 111 $5,000,000 $1,112,000 $6,1 12,000 Willett Marsha 0054-3 Plane Hostage l $1,000,000 $4,000,000 $5,000,000 Willett Christopher 0054-3 Plane Hostage 11 $2,000,000 81,500,000 $3,500,000 Willett Joshua 0054-3 Plane Hostage l $l,000,000 $1,500,000 $2,500,000 Willett 25