Alkutkar v. Bumble, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-6671
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HARSH ALKUTKAR, No. 24-6671 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:22-cv-00422-PJH v. MEMORANDUM* BUMBLE, INC.; BUMBLE HOLDING, LTD.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 7, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: NGUYEN and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, District Judge.**

Harsh Alkutkar sued Bumble for false advertising. Bumble moved to compel

arbitration, and the district court granted the motion. Alkutkar appeals, arguing that

Bumble failed to show that he assented to arbitration. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation. U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review the district court’s grant of a motion to compel arbitration de novo

and any underlying factual findings for clear error. See Rogers v. Royal Caribbean

Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.,

904 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2018). When considering whether an arbitration

agreement was formed, we apply the summary judgment standard. See Hansen v.

LMB Mortg. Servs., Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 670 (9th Cir. 2021). The party seeking to

compel arbitration bears the burden to “‘prove the existence of a valid agreement by

a preponderance of the evidence.’” Knapke v. PeopleConnect, Inc., 38 F.4th 824,

832 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., 944 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir.

2019)).

Bumble presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate Alkutkar’s assent to

arbitration by a preponderance of the evidence. Alkutkar created a Bumble account

in February 2016. Through its Wong and Chheena declarations, Bumble

demonstrated that users who had created a Bumble account before January 18,

2021—the effective date of Bumble’s arbitration agreement—and accessed the app

afterwards were presented with a “blocker card” that prevented use of the app until

they clicked an “I accept” button. The Blocker Card prominently stated that the

updated terms contained an arbitration clause. Bumble also demonstrated that in

March 2021, a user with Alkutkar’s unique login credentials and device ID signed

2 24-6671 in and used the app by swiping and making in-app purchases. These actions would

have been prevented by the blocker card absent acceptance of the agreement. Based

on this evidence, it was more likely than not that Alkutkar assented to arbitration by

clicking through the blocker card.

Alkutkar argues that this showing was insufficient because Bumble did not

have an actual record of Alkutkar’s click on the “I accept” button. But under

California law, which the parties agree governs here, such a record is not required,

as “[a]n electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was

the act of the person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.9(a). This act “may be shown in any

manner.” Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, California courts have held that electronic

signatures “can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.” Ruiz v. Moss Bros.

Auto Grp., 232 Cal. App. 4th 836, 843 (2014) (citing People v. Skiles, 253 P.3d 546,

552 (Cal. 2011)). Therefore, Bumble’s showing was sufficient under California law.

Alkutkar further argues that Bumble cannot sufficiently authenticate his

purported assent to arbitration because it failed to implement procedures to ensure

that only Alkutkar could have accepted the arbitration agreement. For instance, he

suggests that Bumble could require users to manually enter their unique login

credentials. But California law imposes no such requirement. Cf. Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1633.9(a) (“the act of the person . . . may be shown in any manner”). Here,

Bumble’s evidence demonstrated the use of unique login credentials, the

3 24-6671 demonstrable consequences of accepting the arbitration agreement through the

blocker card (namely, the ability to use the app and make purchases), and a timeline

of events indicating that the user swiped and made in-app purchases shortly after he

would have accepted the agreement. All of this together is sufficient to authenticate

the act of clicking through the blocker card as Alkutkar’s act.

Alkutkar attacks the admissibility of Bumble’s Wong and Chheena

declarations as lacking foundation, lacking personal knowledge, and hearsay, among

other things. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Domingo

ex rel. Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2002). Contrary to Alkutkar’s

arguments, Bumble’s declarations were sufficiently supported by personal

knowledge and foundation, as the declarants were familiar with the operation of the

blocker card and Bumble’s electronic user records. The district court did not abuse

its discretion by overruling Alkutkar’s other objections, particularly since they were

“boilerplate” and “duplicative of the summary judgment standard.” Sandoval v.

Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Finally, to rebut Bumble’s showing, Alkutkar submitted two declarations from

himself asserting that he never saw the blocker card. The first declaration also

suggests that some other person may have used the Bumble app and accepted the

agreement in Alkutkar’s place. However, neither declaration creates a genuine

4 24-6671 dispute of material fact, as we have “refused to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only

evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony.” Villiarimo v.

Aloha Island Air, 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kennedy v. Applause,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)). Alkutkar’s assertion that he did not see

the blocker card is conclusory and self-serving, and his assertion that some other

person may have accepted the agreement in his stead is uncorroborated.

Alkutkar also submitted five declarations from other Bumble users. Two of

the declarants simply assert that they could not remember viewing the blocker card.

The others say that when they opened the app in 2022—over a year after Alkutkar

allegedly assented to arbitration—they saw no blocker card. The former declarations

suffer from the same flaw as Alkutkar’s, as they are conclusory and uncorroborated.

And the latter are insufficiently probative, as they do not call into question Bumble’s

account of what Alkutkar would have seen in March 2021—particularly since

Bumble was never provided with the information necessary to identify these other

users and check their usage records to determine if their experiences were

comparable to Alkutkar’s. Therefore, these declarations from other users also fail to

create a genuine dispute of material fact.

AFFIRMED.

5 24-6671