Alker v. United States

Second Circuit

Alker v. United States

47 F.2d 229, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 903, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3448, 1931 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9046, 9 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 903

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJanuary 5, 1931

DocketNo. 114

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 47 F.2d 229 (Alker v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Alker v. United States, 47 F.2d 229, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 903, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3448, 1931 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9046, 9 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 903 (2d Cir. 1931).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case presents-a point which has. been already ruled a number of times, always against the taxpayer, with one exception. Wilmington Trust Co. v. U. S., 28 F.(2d) 205 (D. C. Md.). The plaintiffs’ position is -that the repeal by section 1400 of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 320) of title 4 of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1096) did not preserve taxes upon the estates of those who died within a year of the date when the Act of 1921 took effect. This is because the tax was not due for a year and did not therefore “accrue” until after the repeal, which saved only “accrued” taxes.

The argument presupposes that the word . “accrued” has a far more rigid content than we ean gather from the decisions of the Supreme Court on which the appellants rely, and the consequences of the construction they invoke are so- extravagant that it seems to us impossible to ascribe any such purpose to Congress, in the absence of the plainest necessity. We of course recognize that a taxing statute must carry its own warrant on its face in the clearest terms (Crooks v. Harrelson [Nov. 24, 1930] 51 S. Ct. 49), and there would be no escape here, if the language were immutable, whatever the context. We are satisfied that this is not true, and, in view of the consensus of authority in the lower courts upon the point, it seems to us unnecessary to analyze -the decisions of the Supreme Court, or give our reasons for thinking that they do not require any such conclusion. We affirm the judgment on the authority of Hanna v. U. S., 68 Ct. Cl. 45; Flannery v. Willcuts, 25 F.(2d) 951 (C. C. A. 8); Hodgkins v. Com’r of Int. Rev., 44 F.(2d) 43 (C. C. A. 7); Ewbank v. U. S. (D. C.) 37 F.(2d) 383; and O’Brien v. Sturgess, 39 F.(2d) 950 (D. C. N. J.). Substantially the same ruling is to be found in Page v. Skinner, 298 F. 731 (C. C. A. 8), and Mulvane v. U. S., 61 Ct. Cl. 165.

Judgment affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This case presents-a point which has. been already ruled a number of times, always against the taxpayer, with one exception. Wilmington Trust Co. v. U. S., 28 F.(2d) 205 (D. C. Md.). The plaintiffs’ position is -that the repeal by section 1400 of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 320) of title 4 of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1096) did not preserve taxes upon the estates of those who died within a year of the date when the Act of 1921 took effect. This is because the tax was not due for a year and did not therefore “accrue” until after the repeal, which saved only “accrued” taxes.

The argument presupposes that the word . “accrued” has a far more rigid content than we ean gather from the decisions of the Supreme Court on which the appellants rely, and the consequences of the construction they invoke are so- extravagant that it seems to us impossible to ascribe any such purpose to Congress, in the absence of the plainest necessity. We of course recognize that a taxing statute must carry its own warrant on its face in the clearest terms (Crooks v. Harrelson [Nov. 24, 1930] 51 S. Ct. 49), and there would be no escape here, if the language were immutable, whatever the context. We are satisfied that this is not true, and, in view of the consensus of authority in the lower courts upon the point, it seems to us unnecessary to analyze -the decisions of the Supreme Court, or give our reasons for thinking that they do not require any such conclusion. We affirm the judgment on the authority of Hanna v. U. S., 68 Ct. Cl. 45; Flannery v. Willcuts, 25 F.(2d) 951 (C. C. A. 8); Hodgkins v. Com’r of Int. Rev., 44 F.(2d) 43 (C. C. A. 7); Ewbank v. U. S. (D. C.) 37 F.(2d) 383; and O’Brien v. Sturgess, 39 F.(2d) 950 (D. C. N. J.). Substantially the same ruling is to be found in Page v. Skinner, 298 F. 731 (C. C. A. 8), and Mulvane v. U. S., 61 Ct. Cl. 165.

Judgment affirmed.

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47 F.2d 229, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 903, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3448, 1931 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9046, 9 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 903, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alker-v-united-states-ca2-1931.

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