ALISON RAY v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 28, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-03303
StatusUnknown

This text of ALISON RAY v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES LLC (ALISON RAY v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ALISON RAY v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES LLC, (E.D. Pa. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALISON RAY, : CIVIL ACTION Plaintiff, : : v. : : AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES, : LLC, : No. 18-3303 Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Timothy R. Rice December 28, 2020 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Alison Ray has sued Defendant AT&T Mobility Services, LLC for terminating her employment because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). AT&T seeks summary judgment. See S.J. Mot. (doc. 97). Because Ray has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that AT&T’s asserted business reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual, AT&T’s motion is denied. I. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The evidence and any inferences from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ray v. Warren, 626 F.2d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010). If reasonable minds could conclude that there are sufficient facts to support a plaintiff’s claims, summary judgment should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It should be granted if no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on the evidentiary record. Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010). The ADEA provides that it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, as in this case, I must apply the

three-step burden-shifting process set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). First, I must determine if Ray has established a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing: (1) she was at least 40 years-old; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought to retain; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) AT&T retained sufficiently younger and similarly situated employees to support an inference of age discrimination. See id.; Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). If Ray meets this burden, I must next decide whether AT&T has articulated “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its adverse employment action against Ray. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, if AT&T satisfies this minimal burden, I must determine whether Ray has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that AT&T’s articulated reason was a mere

pretext for discrimination. Id.; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). For this third step, Ray “cannot simply show that [AT&T’s] decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated [AT&T], not whether [AT&T was] wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. Ray “must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve [AT&T’s] articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of [AT&T’s] action.” Id. at 764. For example, Ray may “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [AT&T’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that AT&T did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. at 765 (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992), Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993)).

II. Facts Most Favorable to Ray Ray was born in 1968 and was 49 when AT&T terminated her in 2018 during a reduction in force. She had worked for AT&T for approximately 24 years in various positions. Ray Statement of Facts (“SOF”) (doc. 103-4) ¶ 1. From 1994–1999, Ray was a Director of Business Development. Id. ¶ 2. For the next 11 years, Ray worked as a Director of Marketing Management. Id. In 2010, Ray became a Director of Sales Operations (“DOS”) within AT&T’s Mobility Sales and Service organization. AT&T SOF (doc. 97-2) ¶ 3; Ray Resp. to AT&T SOF (doc. 103-3) ¶ 3. During her first year as a DOS, Ray was responsible for the back–office operations of AT&T company–owned retail stores in the Liberty States Market, which included Southern New Jersey, Delaware, and Philadelphia. Ray SOF ¶¶ 3-4.

The following year, Ray became responsible solely for indirect retail stores, such as Best Buy or local retail outlets authorized to sell AT&T products, within her sales territory of the Liberty States Market. Id. ¶ 7; AT&T SOF ¶ 12; Ray Resp. to AT&T SOF ¶ 12; 12/18/2019 Ray Dep. (doc. 105-4) at 19. She managed a team of approximately four or five people who helped the indirect retail stores “implement all the products and promotions and pricing, policies, training . . . that AT&T was executing.” 12/18/2019 Ray Dep. at 20-21. Five years later, in 2016, AT&T restructured the DOS position to make each DOS responsible for both the AT&T company–owned retail stores and the indirect retail stores located in their sales territory. AT&T SOF ¶¶ 21; Ray Resp. to AT&T SOF ¶¶ 21. Ray became responsible for managing Area Retail Sales Managers (“ARSMs”), who managed AT&T store managers, who managed AT&T retail employees. 12/18/2019 Ray Dep. at 55-56; see also Ray Ex. 23 (doc. 106-11) at DEF0000796 (DOSs are primarily responsible for directing teams led by ARSMs “to manage the Retail Stores in a defined territory. Responsible for successfully

achieving sales, revenue targets, and customer satisfaction . . . hiring, coaching and development within his/her territory.”). Ray had never previously managed, directly or indirectly, AT&T retail salespeople so she received training from AT&T. 12/18/2019 Ray Dep. at 55, 122-23; AT&T SOF ¶ 23; Ray Resp. to AT&T SOF ¶ 23. In November 2016, Ray’s sales territory became part of the Ohio/Pennsylvania Market (“OH/PA Market”), which later became part of the much broader “East Region.” RAY SOF ¶¶ 10, 11. Judy Cavalieri, a vice president who is one year older than Ray, supervised Ray and the other DOSs responsible for the Pennsylvania sales territories in the OH/PA Market. RAY SOF ¶¶ 8-9; AT&T SOF ¶ 6; Ray Resp. to AT&T SOF ¶ 6. Cavalieri also supervised Alyson Woodard, an assistant vice president (“AVP”) who was responsible for managing the DOSs in

the Ohio sales territories in the OH/PA Market. AT&T SOF ¶ 10; Ray Resp. to AT&T SOF ¶ 10. In February 2017, Cavalieri provided Ray with her 2016 annual performance evaluation. See Ray Ex. 8 (doc. 106-1) at DEF0000027.

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ALISON RAY v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alison-ray-v-att-mobility-services-llc-paed-2020.