UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALIGNMENT HEALTHCARE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-74 (CRC)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
This is a dispute over star ratings issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”) to three Medicare Advantage plans offered by Plaintiff Alignment Healthcare,
Inc. Alignment challenges the star ratings on a variety of grounds under the Administrative
Procedure Act and has sought summary judgment on an expedited timeline. The Court will
largely deny its motion for summary judgment and grant summary judgment to the government.
The Court will, however, vacate Alignment’s 2025 star ratings as to plan H3443 because CMS’s
inclusion of two appeals in those ratings was arbitrary and capricious.
I. Background
Given the expedited timeline for this decision, the Court writes primarily for the parties
and presumes that other readers are generally familiar with the relevant legal landscape. The
Court thus provides only a cursory overview of the background for this case.
The Medicare Act establishes a five-star rating system for Medicare Advantage plans on
a scale of one to five stars. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23(o)(4)(A). Alignment Healthcare provides
six Medicare Advantage plans and received its star ratings for 2025 last fall. It now challenges
the ratings issued to three of its plans, claiming that CMS’s methodology for calculating these ratings was flawed or underexplained. Alignment also asked, with the government’s consent, to
expedite this case so that any changes to its plans’ star ratings could be included in its bid
proposals for the 2026 plan year. See ECF 9. Following an accelerated summary-judgment
briefing schedule, the Court heard argument on the parties’ cross motions on June 3, 2025.
II. Standard of Review
At summary judgment, the Court must determine whether the challenged agency action
complies with the APA and is supported by the administrative record. Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d
1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Under the APA, “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Arbitrary and
capricious review is “narrow,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971), and precludes the Court from “substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the
agency,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983). Rather, the Court must determine whether the agency “examine[d] the relevant data
and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the agency
did not fully explain its decision, the Court may uphold it “if the agency’s path may reasonably
be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974). The Court’s review is limited to the administrative record, Holy Land Found. for Relief
& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and the party challenging an agency’s
action bears the burden of proof, City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
2 III. Analysis
Alignment raises seven objections to CMS’s calculations for its 2025 star ratings: (1)
CMS’s use of the Tukey Outlier Rule is arbitrary and capricious; (2) CMS arbitrarily included
low-reliability enrollee survey data; (3) CMS arbitrarily ignored survey data problems stemming
from Spanish-speaking plan participants allegedly receiving English-language surveys; (4)
CMS’s permitting of oversampling plan enrollees unfairly benefits large plans; (5) and (6) two
appeals were erroneously factored into CMS’s rating for Plan H3443; and (7) CMS’s reliance on
a private entity to handle appeals from plan coverage denials violates the private nondelegation
doctrine. The Court will reject the first four claims and grant summary judgment to Alignment
as to the two erroneously included appeals. The Court need not reach Alignment’s private non-
delegation claim.
A. Tukey Outlier Rule
The Court rejects Alignment’s claim that the Tukey Outlier Rule is arbitrary and
capricious. As CMS adequately explained, the Tukey Outlier Rule, which underwent notice and
comment in 2023, serves an important purpose: reducing statistical noise by identifying and
removing outlier data points from certain star-rating measures. See A.R. 104; 88 Fed. Reg.
22120, 22120 (April 12, 2023). Before adoption of the rule, CMS found that outliers could
“have undue influence on cut points” that CMS uses to divide plans by star-level, potentially
“lead[ing] to a single contract having a major influence on cut point values[.]” A.R. 104. To
address that problem, CMS adopted an accepted method for identifying outliers and removing
them. The natural consequence of removing outliers is some amount of compression in the
remaining dataset and therefore the cut points. But to the extent that such compression results,
3 CMS adequately explained that it is appropriate because it more accurately reflects plan
performance among representative plans. Id.
Alignment urges that the Tukey Outlier Rule should be limited to circumstances where
plans have a sufficiently large denominator of data points to obtain each of the five possible star
ratings. But CMS has justified why it rejected Alignment’s preferred approach. CMS explained
that the situation Alignment posits is relatively rare, as the Tukey Outlier Rule typically does not
result in significant changes to cut points. A.R. 103–04; see 88 Fed. Reg. at 22296. To the
extent it occurs, CMS adequately explained why compression of cut points is nonetheless
appropriate in light of the data reliability concerns the agency was trying to address. So in
CMS’s view, the relatively uncommon circumstance posited by Alignment did not outweigh the
benefits CMS saw in eliminating outliers from the underlying data.
CMS’s adoption of the Tukey Outlier Rule was reasonable and reasonably explained.
The Court will not second-guess it and therefore grants summary judgment to the government
and denies it to Alignment on this issue.
B. Low-Reliability Survey Data
Next, the Court rejects Alignment’s challenge to CMS’s inclusion of low-reliability
survey-response data in composite star-rating measures. As CMS explained, the agency polices
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALIGNMENT HEALTHCARE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-74 (CRC)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
This is a dispute over star ratings issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”) to three Medicare Advantage plans offered by Plaintiff Alignment Healthcare,
Inc. Alignment challenges the star ratings on a variety of grounds under the Administrative
Procedure Act and has sought summary judgment on an expedited timeline. The Court will
largely deny its motion for summary judgment and grant summary judgment to the government.
The Court will, however, vacate Alignment’s 2025 star ratings as to plan H3443 because CMS’s
inclusion of two appeals in those ratings was arbitrary and capricious.
I. Background
Given the expedited timeline for this decision, the Court writes primarily for the parties
and presumes that other readers are generally familiar with the relevant legal landscape. The
Court thus provides only a cursory overview of the background for this case.
The Medicare Act establishes a five-star rating system for Medicare Advantage plans on
a scale of one to five stars. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23(o)(4)(A). Alignment Healthcare provides
six Medicare Advantage plans and received its star ratings for 2025 last fall. It now challenges
the ratings issued to three of its plans, claiming that CMS’s methodology for calculating these ratings was flawed or underexplained. Alignment also asked, with the government’s consent, to
expedite this case so that any changes to its plans’ star ratings could be included in its bid
proposals for the 2026 plan year. See ECF 9. Following an accelerated summary-judgment
briefing schedule, the Court heard argument on the parties’ cross motions on June 3, 2025.
II. Standard of Review
At summary judgment, the Court must determine whether the challenged agency action
complies with the APA and is supported by the administrative record. Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d
1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Under the APA, “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Arbitrary and
capricious review is “narrow,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971), and precludes the Court from “substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the
agency,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983). Rather, the Court must determine whether the agency “examine[d] the relevant data
and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the agency
did not fully explain its decision, the Court may uphold it “if the agency’s path may reasonably
be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974). The Court’s review is limited to the administrative record, Holy Land Found. for Relief
& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and the party challenging an agency’s
action bears the burden of proof, City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
2 III. Analysis
Alignment raises seven objections to CMS’s calculations for its 2025 star ratings: (1)
CMS’s use of the Tukey Outlier Rule is arbitrary and capricious; (2) CMS arbitrarily included
low-reliability enrollee survey data; (3) CMS arbitrarily ignored survey data problems stemming
from Spanish-speaking plan participants allegedly receiving English-language surveys; (4)
CMS’s permitting of oversampling plan enrollees unfairly benefits large plans; (5) and (6) two
appeals were erroneously factored into CMS’s rating for Plan H3443; and (7) CMS’s reliance on
a private entity to handle appeals from plan coverage denials violates the private nondelegation
doctrine. The Court will reject the first four claims and grant summary judgment to Alignment
as to the two erroneously included appeals. The Court need not reach Alignment’s private non-
delegation claim.
A. Tukey Outlier Rule
The Court rejects Alignment’s claim that the Tukey Outlier Rule is arbitrary and
capricious. As CMS adequately explained, the Tukey Outlier Rule, which underwent notice and
comment in 2023, serves an important purpose: reducing statistical noise by identifying and
removing outlier data points from certain star-rating measures. See A.R. 104; 88 Fed. Reg.
22120, 22120 (April 12, 2023). Before adoption of the rule, CMS found that outliers could
“have undue influence on cut points” that CMS uses to divide plans by star-level, potentially
“lead[ing] to a single contract having a major influence on cut point values[.]” A.R. 104. To
address that problem, CMS adopted an accepted method for identifying outliers and removing
them. The natural consequence of removing outliers is some amount of compression in the
remaining dataset and therefore the cut points. But to the extent that such compression results,
3 CMS adequately explained that it is appropriate because it more accurately reflects plan
performance among representative plans. Id.
Alignment urges that the Tukey Outlier Rule should be limited to circumstances where
plans have a sufficiently large denominator of data points to obtain each of the five possible star
ratings. But CMS has justified why it rejected Alignment’s preferred approach. CMS explained
that the situation Alignment posits is relatively rare, as the Tukey Outlier Rule typically does not
result in significant changes to cut points. A.R. 103–04; see 88 Fed. Reg. at 22296. To the
extent it occurs, CMS adequately explained why compression of cut points is nonetheless
appropriate in light of the data reliability concerns the agency was trying to address. So in
CMS’s view, the relatively uncommon circumstance posited by Alignment did not outweigh the
benefits CMS saw in eliminating outliers from the underlying data.
CMS’s adoption of the Tukey Outlier Rule was reasonable and reasonably explained.
The Court will not second-guess it and therefore grants summary judgment to the government
and denies it to Alignment on this issue.
B. Low-Reliability Survey Data
Next, the Court rejects Alignment’s challenge to CMS’s inclusion of low-reliability
survey-response data in composite star-rating measures. As CMS explained, the agency polices
statistical reliability at the measure level by not calculating a star rating for unreliable measures.
See 42 C.F.R. § 422.166(a)(3). Doing so ensures that plans get star ratings only for those
measures that reliably reflect plan performance.
Alignment responds that CMS’s decision not to consider reliability at the survey-question
level is arbitrary because unreliable survey response data will necessarily produce an unreliable
composite measure. But as CMS points out, aggregating survey responses that measure or
4 observe a similar subject can result in an overall measure that is more reliable than its constituent
parts. See Gov’t MSJ at 26–27; Health Servs. Advisory Grp., Frequently Asked Questions –
Contracts (Dec. 23, 2024), https://perma.cc/QLJ2-SXZ9. Here, CMS has designed the CAHPS
survey so as to include overlapping questions that can be aggregated to get a more reliable
picture of plan performance. For example, CMS asks multiple questions aimed at assessing the
timeliness of patient appointment scheduling and quality of doctor-patient communication. See
A.R. 399. Finally, CMS does not report question-level response data for composite measures
and uses such data only to inform the ratings it calculates for those measures, so CMS is not
disclosing unreliable information to plan enrollees. See Frequently Asked Questions –
Contracts, supra.
C. Spanish Speakers
The Court also finds that CMS reasonably addressed potential errors in survey
administration that may have caused Spanish-speaking enrollees in Plans H3443 and H3815 to
receive English-language surveys. To begin, Alignment has not shown that the survey was
administered erroneously. CMS survey procedures require that Spanish-language surveys be
“made available to all Spanish-speaking enrollees[.]” A.R. 172. Here, that requirement was
satisfied because, even if Spanish speakers received English-language surveys initially, they
would have been informed in Spanish, either on the survey itself or separately, that Spanish
versions were available upon request. A.R. 172–73; Rough Oral Arg. Tr. 36:18–38:25
(discussing alternative ways of notifying Spanish speakers that Spanish surveys were available);
see A.R. 403–50 (sample notification letters offering Spanish surveys). Alignment points to no
evidence in the record that the requirements were not followed here.
5 Nor did CMS arbitrarily ignore Alignment’s concerns. CMS responded first by ensuring
that DataStat, Alignment’s chosen (and CMS-approved) survey vendor, followed CMS protocols
when matching language-preference data to the samples that CMS drew from Alignment’s
enrollees. A.R. 53. CMS also verified that it sampled Alignment’s plans correctly and that the
samples were consistent with the broader population from which they were drawn. A.R. 48.
And it checked survey response patterns among predicted Spanish speakers and concluded that
they were in line with expected responses. A.R. 61–62. By undertaking this review, CMS took
Alignment’s concerns seriously and responded reasonably. Nothing more was required. See
Petal Gas Storage, LLC v. FERC, 496 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (An agency “is not
required to choose the best solution, only a reasonable one.”).
D. Oversampling
The Court rejects, for two independent reasons, Alignment’s as-applied challenge to
CMS’s policy of permitting large plans to oversample. First, Alignment’s claim, as presented in
its motion for summary judgment, is an impermissible attempt to amend its complaint by brief.
“It is well settled that a party cannot amend [its] complaint through motions briefing.” Sinha v.
Blinken, No. 20-cv-2814 (DLF), 2021 WL 4476749, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021) (citing
Durand v. District of Columbia, 38 F. Supp. 3d 119, 129 (D.D.C. 2014)). Originally,
Alignment’s complaint alleged that permitting oversampling is “irrationally biased against
smaller plans with fewer enrollees” that cannot oversample and that the practice resulted in a
lower rating for Alignment’s H3815 plan. Compl. ¶¶ 153–54. Alignment’s complaint did not
raise this issue as to any of Alignment’s other plans. See id. But Plan H3815 is not a small one.
It has over 91,000 enrollees and was therefore eligible for oversampling, which Alignment chose
not to do. Perhaps realizing this contradiction, Alignment now argues that Plan H3815 was
6 disadvantaged not because of its size, but because oversampling irrationally benefits plans that
choose to do it in a way that “does not indicate higher quality.” Alignment MSJ at 40. That
pivot in Alignment’s claim is a significant one and Alignment should have sought leave to
amend its complaint to make it. Having failed to do so, Alignment cannot now try to shoehorn a
new claim into this case.
Second, and in any event, Alignment’s amended claim falls short on the merits.
Oversampling does not guarantee a higher rating, as taking a larger sample of plan enrollees can
confirm a poor rating as much as it can a strong one. To the extent it results in a higher star
rating for certain plans over plans that did not oversample, it does so by increasing the reliability
of the plan’s raw score. Alignment has not shown that it is irrational for HHS to award a higher
star rating to a plan with a more reliable raw score compared to a plan with a less reliable one.
E. Appeals
Finally, the Court agrees with Alignment that CMS failed to adequately explain why it
included adverse determinations in two coverage-denial appeals in Plan H3443’s star rating.
First, CMS’s inclusion of Case 1-13226962526 is irrational. Agency action is arbitrary
and capricious where “there has been a clear error in judgment,” such as when the agency’s
rationale “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Here, Alignment erroneously (and belatedly) referred to Maximus an
appeal that Alignment had dismissed rather than denied on the merits. Maximus treated the
appeal as denied, however, and the belated referral therefore negatively affected Alignment’s star
rating. When Alignment objected, CMS declined to reverse the adverse finding on the grounds
that any mistake by Maximus was of Alignment’s own making. See A.R. 1 (“[Y]our contract
7 failed to process this case appropriately[.]”). That rationale, however, makes little sense given
that the government has conceded that “CMS regulations and guidance make clear that plans
should not send dismissed requests to the Independent Review Entity.” Gov’t MSJ at 41. So
Alignment was not required to forward the dismissal to Maximus. If Alignment was not required
to forward the dismissal, then there was no deadline for it to do so. And it is therefore
impossible for Alignment to have forwarded the dismissal to Maximus “late.” That Alignment
nonetheless forwarded the dismissal does not create a deadline that never existed or change the
dismissal into a ruling on the merits.
Second, CMS has abandoned the only reason it gave at the time for including an adverse
determination concerning Case 1-12757246876, an appeal about coordinating care, in
Alignment’s rating. CMS’s sole reason for including this appeal in Alignment’s star rating was
that Alignment failed to seek reopening of this decision before Maximus. A.R. 1. CMS did not
state that it agreed with Maximus’s substantive reasoning, or otherwise express any view on the
merits. See id. Before this Court, the government’s motion for summary judgment reiterated
that Alignment failed to seek reopening. Gov’t MSJ at 44. But Alignment then argued in its
reply brief that nothing in CMS’s regulations require a plan provider to seek reopening before
asking CMS to exclude a Maximus decision from its star rating. Alignment Reply at 25. The
government then did not respond to Alignment’s argument in its own reply brief or raise the
issue at oral argument. See Gov’t Reply at 23–24. In doing so, the government has abandoned
the only reason given by CMS for the action it took. See Queen v. Schultz, 310 F.R.D. 10, 22
(D.D.C. 2015) (holding that because the plaintiff’s reply failed to “make a reference” to an
argument in his opening brief, “the plaintiff has abandoned this argument[,] and the Court need
not consider it.”); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d 130, 152 n.2 (D.D.C. 2012)
8 (“The Court, however, need not address [Plaintiffs’] argument [because] Plaintiffs’ Reply
appears to abandon [it.]”).
“It is a foundational principle of administrative law that judicial review of agency action
is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.” Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 591 U.S. 1, 20 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). Having
abandoned CMS’s only contemporaneous rationale for including this second appeal in
Alignment’s star rating, the government leaves the Court with “no explanation at all” for CMS’s
actions. CREW v. FEC, No. 22-cv-35 (CRC), 2025 WL 833075, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2025);
see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50 (“[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc
rationalizations for agency action.”). The Court therefore agrees with Alignment that CMS’s
inclusion of this second appeal in Plan H3443’s star rating was arbitrary and capricious for
failure to supply an adequate explanation. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (Courts “may not
supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”).1
In light of the above, the Court expresses no view on Alignment’s claim that CMS’s use
of Maximus to handle appeals is unconstitutional under the private nondelegation doctrine. The
only appeals Alignment takes issue with are the two discussed above; it does not claim that any
other appeals were wrongly decided or should not have been adversely considered in its star
ratings. See Compl. ¶ 151 (seeking remand only as to Plan H3443 on private non-delegation
claim). Accordingly, the Court has no need to address this constitutional claim at this time. See
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (“[A] longstanding principle of judicial restraint
1 Alignment argues that this second appeal decision is not supported by substantial evidence under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). That section, however, applies “only to formal proceedings, not informal adjudications.” Phoenix Herpetological Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 998 F.3d 999, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
9 requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of
deciding them.” (quotation marks omitted)).
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both parties’ motions for
summary judgment. The Court will remand to CMS for recalculation of Plan H3443’s star
ratings without the adverse determinations stemming from the two challenged appeals. A
separate Order follows.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: June 9, 2025