Ali Partovi v. Pamela Bondi, et al.

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:25-cv-02283-JAD-DJA Ali Partovi, 4 Petitioner Order Granting Preliminary Injunction 5 v. and Directing Release of Detainee

6 Pamela Bondi, et al., [ECF No. 11]

7 Respondents

8 Petitioner Ali Partovi is an Iranian citizen who arrived in the United States in 2001 and 9 was ordered removed in 2002. But the United States could not secure his removal to Iran, so at 10 one point he was released from ICE custody under a supervision order. In June 2025, ICE 11 arrested Partovi, and he has been detained at the Nevada Southern Detention Center ever since. 12 In December 2025, Partovi filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his 13 release from custody. I appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent him, and the FPD 14 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking his immediate release pending a 15 decision on the habeas petition. Partovi contends that his prolonged detention exceeds the 16 government’s authority because he is likely to be removed to Iran in the foreseeable future. He 17 also contends that the government has deprived him of his due-process rights by failing to give 18 him notice and an opportunity to be heard before pursuing removal to a third country—the 19 government’s only removal option, according to Partovi, since removal to Iran is exceedingly 20 unlikely. This court held a hearing on Partovi’s TRO motion on Friday, January 9, 2026. 21 I convert Partovi’s motion to one for a preliminary injunction, and I grant it in part. 22 Partovi has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his prolonged detention 23 exceeds the government’s statutory authority under the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 1 Zadvydas v. Davis1 and that he will suffer continued irreparable harm if he is not released. So I 2 direct the respondents to secure his immediate release under reasonable conditions of supervision 3 set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). But Partovi has not shown a likelihood of success on his 4 third-country-removal claim because it appears that any such claim is not yet ripe, so at this time 5 I do not impose the requested relief that ICE be prohibited from removing Partovi to a third

6 country. 7 Background

8 In 2001, petitioner Ali Partovi attempted to enter the United States using a false 9 passport.2 He sought asylum and protections under the United Nations Convention Against 10 Torture, but those applications were denied and he was ordered removed to Iran in 2002.3 He 11 also pled guilty to the offense of using a false passport, and was held in some combination of 12 criminal and immigration custody until 2011.4 He was released on an order of supervision and 13 remained in this country and at liberty until he was again arrested in June 24, 2025.5 He has 14 been in ICE custody ever since. 15 16 17 18 19

20 1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 2 ECF NO. 15-1 at 2 (order in Partovi’s asylum proceedings). 21 3 Id. 22 4 ECF No. 15 at 2. At the hearing, government counsel confirmed that he was unaware of how long Partovi had been in ICE custody awaiting removal during that time, as opposed to being in 23 custody for his passport-related offense. 5 ECF No. 1-1 at 2; ECF No. 11 at 2. 1 Discussion

2 A. This court has jurisdiction to order relief related to Partovi’s habeas petition.

3 The constitution provides that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 4 detained in the United States.”6 That writ permits a person who is in custody to challenge the 5 legality of his detention, and the court has the authority to release the petitioner if it determines 6 that the petitioner is illegally detained. The court’s habeas jurisdiction encompasses a 7 noncitizen’s challenge to his detention under the United States’s immigration laws.7 8 B. This nation’s immigration laws permit a noncitizen’s detention pending removal, 9 but that detention period should not exceed six months without a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 10 1. The government has authority to detain noncitizens after they have been 11 ordered removed.

12 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations establish a 13 complex set of rules governing the government’s authority to arrest, detain, order removed, and 14 deport noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the detention of noncitizens who have been 15 ordered removed. It establishes a 90-day “removal period” that begins on “(i) the date the order 16 of removal becomes administratively final, (ii) if the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a 17 court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order,” or the date the 18 noncitizen is released from non-immigration detention.8 During that 90-day period, detention is 19 mandatory.9 The statute gives the government the ability to detain a noncitizen beyond that 20 removal period under § 1231(a)(6) if he is inadmissible, removable “as a result of violations of 21 6 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const. art 1, § 9, cl. 2). 22 7 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 23 8 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 9 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). 1 status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of security or 2 foreign policy,”10 or has been determined “to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply 3 with the order of removal.”11 If those conditions aren’t met, the government may release the 4 noncitizen “subject to certain terms of supervision.”12 5 2. The due-process clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from 6 indefinitely detaining noncitizens pending removal.

7 Section 1231(a)(6) does not limit the length of time that a noncitizen may be held post- 8 removal period. But in Zadvydas v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 9 government’s contention that noncitizens can be held indefinitely under § 1231(a)(6) because 10 that interpretation “would raise a serious constitutional problem” under the Fifth Amendment’s 11 due-process clause.13 To avoid its constitutional concerns, the High Court interpreted the statute 12 to permit continued detention only if a noncitizen’s removal is “reasonably foreseeable.”14 It 13 determined that six months of post-removal-period detention is presumptively reasonable.15 But 14 after six months, the noncitizen must “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no 15 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” to show that his prolonged 16 detention exceeds the government’s statutory authority and that he should be released from ICE 17 custody.16 If the noncitizen meets that burden, “the government must respond with evidence 18 19 10 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. 20 11 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 21 12 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)) (cleaned up). 13 Id. at 690. 22 14 Id. at 699. 23 15 Id. at 701. 16 Id. 1 sufficient to rebut that showing.”17 And as “the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, 2 what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.”18 3 C. TROs and preliminary injunctions require a showing that the petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims and will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not 4 granted.

5 A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary” remedy 6 “never awarded as of right.”19 The Supreme Court clarified in Winter v. Natural Resources 7 Defense Council, Inc. that, to obtain an injunction, plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely 8 to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of 9 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the 10 public interest.”20 The Ninth Circuit recognizes an additional standard: if “plaintiff[s] can only 11 show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of 12 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships 13 tips sharply in the plaintiffs’ favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.”21 Under 14 either approach, the starting point is a merits analysis. 15 The respondents were given notice of Partovi’s TRO motion, as well as an opportunity to 16 respond and to be heard at an in-person hearing. I thus sua sponte convert the motion into one 17 for a preliminary injunction.22 The standard for both forms of relief is the same, the parties were 18

19 17 Id. 20 18 Id. (cleaned up). 19 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 21 20 Id. at 20. 22 21 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). 23 22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (distinguishing between a temporary-restraining order and a preliminary injunction based on notice and the responding party’s ability to be heard). 1 given notice and a hearing, and the nature of the relief granted by this case is more properly 2 addressed by a preliminary injunction. 3 D. Partovi has shown that he is likely to succeed on his prolonged-detention claim, but 4 not his third-country-removal claim.

5 1. Partovi is likely to succeed on the merits of his prolonged-detention claim. 6 Partovi has shown a likelihood of success on his prolonged-detention claim. The parties 7 agree that Partovi has been detained for longer than six months, taking this case out of the 8 presumptively reasonable period of detention established by Zadvydas.23 So Partovi bears the 9 initial burden of showing that there are “good reasons to believe that that there is no significant 10 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”24 His removal was ordered in 2002, 11 and ICE was unable to obtain travel documents to Iran in the intervening 24 years. Given the 12 fact that Partovi has been subject to removal for almost a quarter of a century with no indication 13 that he could be returned to Iran, I find that he has met his burden to provide good reasons why 14 he believes that he will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. 15

16 23 The parties disagree over whether Partovi’s post-removal detention periods, if any, between 2002 and 2011 should count toward the Zadvydas calculus. Many courts have found that prior 17 detention periods must be considered; otherwise, the government could detain, release, and re- detain noncitizens ad nauseam without technically violating Zadvydas. See, e.g., Shalala v. 18 Mattos, 2025 WL 3568234, at * 6 (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 2025) (considering the “full amount of time that Petitioner has spent in immigration detention since he was ordered removed” because 19 “[o]therwise, the government could simply circumvent the INA by releasing and re-detaining citizens such that they never reach six months of continuous detention”); Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. 20 Supp. 703, 722 (W.D. Was. 2025) (noting that, “under the reasoning of Zadvydas, a series of releases and re-detentions by the government . . . in essence results in an indefinite period of 21 detention, albeit executed in successive six-month intervals”). Because Partovi’s current detention exceeds the six-month threshold and I find that the government has not shown that he 22 will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future even when considering that his detention has not yet extended too far beyond that presumptively reasonable period, I need not and do not 23 address this issue here. 24 Id. at 701. 1 The government fails to meet its shifted burden to provide evidence showing that there is 2 a significant likelihood of his reasonably foreseeable removal. It merely states without 3 evidentiary support that “ICE is actively in the process to obtain the necessary travel documents 4 from Iran to remove” Partovi.25 That bald assertion is plainly insufficient to carry its burden. So 5 I find that Partovi is likely to succeed on the merits of his prolonged-detention claim, and I order

6 his immediate release. 7 2. Partovi has not shown that he is likely to succeed on his third-country-removal 8 claim.

9 Partovi also contends that, because he cannot be removed to Iran, the government may try 10 to remove him to an unidentified third country. And he seeks an injunction prohibiting the 11 government from removing him to a third country without first “giving him the opportunity to 12 reopen” removal proceedings with an immigration judge.26 If the government cannot remove the 13 noncitizen to the country listed on his removal order, it may still remove the noncitizen to any 14 “country whose government will accept” him.27 This catchall provision is generally referred to 15 16 17 25 ECF No. 15 at 7. At the hearing, respondents’ counsel relied on a BBC article that was 18 submitted in another case. That article does not constitute competent evidence. It reports that Tehran officials confirmed that “a chartered plane carrying more than 50 Iranians” departed from 19 the United States to Iran. Khashayar Joneidi, US deports second group of Iranian nationals, officials say, BBC (Dec. 8, 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c23e77ln3d1o. But it also 20 says that “US immigrations officials could not ‘confirm or deny a flight’ for security reasons.” Id. And even if I accept that this flight occurred, nothing in this article provides me with 21 evidence that Iran and the United States have “reopened diplomatic relations” as the government suggested at the hearing. Nor does it provide support for the implied argument that, because Iran 22 accepted 50 deportees, it will accept even more, and one of those future deportees will be Partovi. 23 26 ECF No. 11 at 2. 27 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)((2)(E)(vii). 1 as “third-country removal.” But the government cannot remove a noncitizen to a third country if 2 he credibly fears persecution or torture in that country.28 3 Partovi alleges that in July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 4 implemented a policy that permits third-country removal without notice or an opportunity to be 5 heard if the third country gave DHS credible assurances that noncitizens removed from the

6 United States will not be persecuted or tortured.29 And if those assurances are not given, ICE 7 may still remove a noncitizen to a third country with only 6–24 hours’ notice.30 Partovi contends 8 that the policy violates the Fifth Amendment’s due-process clause and existing law requiring that 9 a noncitizen have the opportunity to be heard on fear-based claims before being removed to a 10 third country.31 11 The problem with Partovi’s argument is that the government has not indicated any 12 intention of seeking his removal to a third country. It rather states (albeit without evidentiary 13 support) that it remains focused on effectuating his deportation to Iran. And though it appears 14 that removal to Iran is unlikely, the record does not support the inference that it is entirely

15 impossible or that the government has given up on its attempts to effectuate Partovi’s removal to 16 the country listed on his removal order. Without more, I cannot conclude that an active 17 controversy exists with respect to Partovi’s third-country-removal risk. So I decline to issue an 18 order prohibiting the government from removing Partovi to a third country. 19

21 28 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 200.1, 208.16. 22 29 See ECF No. 11 at 8–9. 23 30 Id. at 9. 31 Id. at 6–9. 1 E. Partovi has established irreparable harm.

2 “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably 3 constitutes irreparable injury.’”32 The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that “unlawful detention 4 certainly constitutes extreme or very serious” injury that “is not compensable in damages.”33 5 The government doesn’t meaningfully address this factor, arguing only that “showing a 6 possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient: and that his harm “is essentially inherent in 7 detention.”34 Neither of these arguments makes any sense. Partovi has not shown the mere 8 “possibility of harm”—he is currently suffering irreparable harm by the fact of his continued, 9 likely unlawful detention. And the harm of unlawful detention is not “essentially inherent” in 10 detention. I find that Partovi’s continued and likely unlawful deprivation of liberty establishes 11 that he will continue to suffer irreparable harm if he is not released from custody. 12 F. The balance of equities and public interest tip sharply in Partovi’s favor.

13 The last two Winter factors merge when the government is the opposing party.35 Partovi 14 has shown that the harm of his continued deprivation sharply outweighs the government’s 15 minimal hardship caused by releasing him under conditions of supervision like those that he has 16 been subject to for years. The government’s interest in enforcing immigration laws does not tip 17 18 19 20 32 Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 21 347, 373 (1976)). 22 33 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 34 ECF No. 15 at 4. 23 35 Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). 1 the scales for the government, especially when Partovi has shown that his immigration detention 2 is likely unlawful.36 3 G. The court declines to impose a bond requirement.

4 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant preliminary injunctive 5 relief ‘only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the 6 costs and damages sustained by the party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 7 restrained.”37 “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, Rule 65(c) invests the district court 8 with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any.”38 Because the government does not 9 provide any argument concerning costs and damages it might sustain and I am convinced that it 10 will not incur any such damages if it was wrongfully enjoined, I join the growing number of 11 courts that decline to require bond in cases like this.39 12 Conclusion 13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner Ali Patrovi’s motion for a temporary 14 restraining order [ECF No. 11] is converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction and is

15 GRANTED in part. Petitioner Ali Patrovi must be released from detention immediately 16 under reasonable terms of supervision set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). Determining 17 reasonable terms of supervision must not impede the immediate release of the petitioner. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents must file and serve on defense counsel: 19 20 36 See Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 832 (9th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “neither equity nor 21 the public’s interest are furthered by allowing violations of federal law to continue”). 22 37 Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)). 38 Id. (cleaned up). 23 39 See Bunnell v. Noem, 2025 WL 3707588, at *9 (D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2025) (collecting cases in which “[c]ourts regularly waive security in cases like this one”). 1 (1) notice of the date, time, and location of Partovi’s release at least 24 hours before the 2\| release is set to occur so that arrangements for his travel can be made. 3 (2) notice that Partovi’s release was effectuated within three days of this order. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this injunction will remain in effect, absent a 5|| successful motion to modify or dissolve it, until this court issues a final decision on Partovi’s habeas petition. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for respondents are directed to immediately 8|| provide notice of this order to the restrained parties they represent. 9 The Clerk of Court is directed to SEND a copy of this order to the Warden of Nevada Southern Detention Center in Pahrump, Nevada. 11

USS. District > Jennifer(A. Dorsey 13 January. 2026 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23