ALHABASH v. O'MALLEY

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided November 8, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-00310·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HUSSAM MUHI EDDIN ALHABASH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-310-E ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) ) Defendant. ) )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., and finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153- 54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to properly evaluate the evidence showing his severe visual impairments and did not adequately review 1 the opinions of several medical experts, thereby creating an inaccurate residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Doc. No. 6). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly determined his RFC by failing to include non-exertional limitations incorporating his severe visual impairments resulting from his ocular melanocytosis, primary open angle glaucoma, amblyopia, and presbyopia. (Id. at 6-8). Additionally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not comply with the applicable regulations when evaluating the opinions of Drs. Paul Fox, M.D., and Justine Magurno, M.D. (Id. at 8-10). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds instead that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding and his ultimate determination that Plaintiff is not disabled.

In this matter, the ALJ evaluated all the evidence and limited Plaintiff to the following RFC:

[T]he claimant is limited to no more than occasional balancing, crawling, crouching, kneeling, stooping, and climbing of ramps and stairs only; the claimant is limited to no more than frequent overhead reaching and no more than frequent work above shoulder level with the dominant right upper extremity; the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to dusts, fumes, odors, gases, poorly ventilated environments, as well as extremes of temperature, wetness, humidity, and vibration; the claimant must avoid unprotected heights, dangerous moving machinery, commercial driving, and other workplace hazards; the claimant is limited to jobs involving no more than understanding, retaining, and following simple instructions, for example following one-to-two step tasks or instructions; the claimant is limited to jobs that are not performed in a production-rate environment such as assembly line work.

(R. 2221). While Plaintiff is correct that this RFC does not account for Plaintiff’s depth perception impairment, Plaintiff overlooks that the RFC precludes work around hazards. Nevertheless, the Court is not persuaded that this was harmful error.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is in error because it directly contradicts a statement within the ALJ’s decision. Specifically, the ALJ stated, “in light of the claimant’s visual deficits, the undersigned has precluded work around hazards as well as occupations requiring precise depth perception.” (R. 2227). Although Plaintiff is accurate in stating that this statement contradicts the RFC finding, which contains no preclusion of occupations requiring depth perception, the Court finds this is harmless error as the ALJ’s identified representative occupations do not require precise depth perception, as categorized by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”).

“An error is ‘harmless’ when, despite the technical correctness of an appellant’s legal contention, there is also ‘no set of facts’ upon which the appellant could recover.” 2 Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that remand is not necessary where the error would not affect the outcome of the case). While the Court is not required to order remand “in quest of a perfect opinion” the harmless error doctrine is one that the Court employs cautiously when reviewing the Commissioner’s final decisions. Hayes v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00648, 2018 WL 3596858, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 20, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-648, 2018 WL 3584698 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (citing Moua v. Colvin, 541 F. App’x 794, 798 (10th Cir. 2013)). Here, the ALJ’s error was harmless because the representative occupations he identified do not require depth perception. The ALJ identified the following as representative occupations that Plaintiff could perform given his RFC: (1) photocopy machine operator (DOT # 207.685-014); (2) folding machine operator (DOT # 208.685-014), and housekeeping cleaner (DOT # 323.687-014). (R. 2231). The DOT states that each of these occupations do not require depth perception. DOT ## 207.685-014, 208.685-014, 323.687-014 (stating depth perception is “[n]ot present – activity or condition does not exist”). In reply, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why he could not perform these occupations, instead reasserting that these were the products of a defective RFC. (Doc. No. 10 at 2-3). Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s error as to this point was harmless.

The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to accurately evaluate the opinions of Drs. Fox and Magurno. Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not adequately explain how these opinions were consistent with or supported by the record. (Doc. No. 6 at 8-10). Plaintiff is correct that these factors are important to the ALJ’s analysis of medical opinions; indeed, “the two most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also §§ 416.920c(b) and (c). One court has explained the distinction between supportability and consistency thus: “supportability relates to the extent to which a medical source has articulated support for the medical source’s own opinion, while consistency relates to the relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other evidence within the record.” Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-1197, 2021 WL 1565832, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2021).

Here, the ALJ adequately analyzed Dr. Fox’s opinion. Specifically, the ALJ stated as follows:

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ALHABASH v. O'MALLEY, (W.D. Pa. 2024).

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Related

Brown v. Astrue
649 F.3d 193 (Third Circuit, 2011)
Berry v. Sullivan
738 F. Supp. 942 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1990)
Moua v. Astrue
541 F. App'x 794 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Brown v. Bowen
845 F.2d 1211 (Third Circuit, 1988)