Alfredo Felix v. Eric Arnold

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 21, 2025
• Docket: 23-55229
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALFREDO FELIX, No. 23-55229

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00439-JWH-SK v.

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 17, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, MENDOZA, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Alfredo Felix seeks review of the district court judgment denying a writ of

habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and we affirm.

A California jury found Felix guilty of first-degree murder and robbery with

felony-murder special circumstances. California’s felony-murder special

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). circumstances law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was a

“major participant” in the underlying felony who acted with “reckless indifference

to human life.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A), (d) (West 2000). Felix claims

that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find special circumstances.

When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we must ask “whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Here, Felix

failed to meet his burden under Jackson. At trial, the jury was presented with

evidence that Felix helped plan and carry out the armed robbery, knew his brother

had a gun, was present at the killing, and fled the scene when Hernandez was shot.

These facts alone are enough for a jury to find that Felix was a major participant

who showed reckless indifference to human life. See People v. Banks, 351 P.3d

330, 338–39 (Cal. 2015). A rational trier of fact, considering all evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the special circumstances

law applied.

Because Felix’s claim fails under de novo review, we need not determine

whether the state court decision reflected “an ‘unreasonable application of’

Jackson” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Maquiz

v. Hedgpeth, 907 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Juan H. v. Allen, 408

2 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005)); see Lucero v. Holland, 902 F.3d 979, 986

(9th Cir. 2018).

AFFIRMED.