Alexis Everington and Richard White v. Timothy J. Riesen

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedDecember 11, 2025
Docket8:23-cv-02386
StatusUnknown

This text of Alexis Everington and Richard White v. Timothy J. Riesen (Alexis Everington and Richard White v. Timothy J. Riesen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexis Everington and Richard White v. Timothy J. Riesen, (M.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

ALEXIS EVERINGTON and RICHARD WHITE,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2386-JLB-NHA

TIMOTHY J. RIESEN,

Defendant. _______________________________________/

ORDER Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery Documents (Doc. 91) and Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and for Sanctions1 (Doc. 93). I grant each motion in part. I. Background This case concerns a dispute over the sale of a corporation, Madison Springfield, Inc. (“MSI”). Plaintiffs Alexis Everington and Richard White bring claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of agreements, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment against Defendant Timothy Riesen,

1 Defendant’s Motion also includes a request to re-open discovery for the purpose of conducting one additional deposition. Doc. 93, p. 11. In light of the Court’s subsequent order extending the discovery deadline to January 16, 2026 (Doc. 99), and Plaintiff’s statement that they do not oppose re-opening discovery for this purpose (Doc. 97, p. 11), that request is now moot. alleging that Defendant’s acts and omissions surrounding his sale of MSI violated oral partnership agreements and written stock option agreements

between Defendant and Plaintiffs. Amend. Compl., Doc. 82. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is liable to them for his failure to consult them prior to sale of MSI to Premise Data Corporation and for his refusal to allow Plaintiffs to exercise their alleged stock options following the sale. Id. ¶¶ 6-11.

Defendant brings counterclaims for declaratory relief that Plaintiffs had no enforceable interests in MSI or its proceeds, and, in the alternative, counterclaims for equitable accounting, unjust enrichment, and rescission. Answer, Doc. 85, pp. 68-77.

a. MSI’s Disputed Status and Sale Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s sale of MSI and retention of its proceeds amount to a usurpation of a joint venture. By their telling, Plaintiffs Everington and White established an informal joint venture with their friend

and colleague, Defendant Riesen, wherein the three men would secure and execute defense industry contracts through two companies: MSI, a US company founded and owned by Defendant, the sole American citizen among the three, and International Advisory Services (“IAS”) founded and managed

by Plaintiffs in the United Arab Emirates. Id. ¶¶ 20-23. Plaintiffs explain that they allowed Riesen to “formally own” MSI in its entirety to better position the company to secure US government contracts, but that the three men agreed to be and functioned as partners in MSI, always with an understanding that Plaintiffs would eventually be compensated as such. Id. ¶¶ 23-27. They claim

that IAS functioned as a vehicle through which Plaintiffs were paid to carry out contracts that MSI secured, but that Plaintiffs also obtained formal ownership interests in MSI through stock option agreements executed in 2013 and 2016, with the latter agreement granting Plaintiffs, collectively, a 50%

interest in MSI’s stock. Id. ¶¶ 31-36, 40. Plaintiffs also claim that they became official employees of MSI pursuant to offers of employment signed by both Plaintiffs, as well as language in the stock option agreements that identified them as such. Id. ¶¶ 38, 41.

In sharp contrast to Plaintiff’s characterizations of MSI’s status, Defendant claims that he alone owned and controlled MSI, and that IAS was merely one of several subcontractors with which MSI worked. Answer, Doc. 85 ¶ 31; Counterclaim, Doc. 85, ¶¶ 9-12. Defendant asserts that all employment

offers and stock option agreements with Plaintiffs were created for the purpose of, and conditioned upon, MSI securing certain government contracts which it never successfully secured.2 Counterclaim, Doc. 85, ¶¶ 9-12. Defendant also

2 Defendant explains that the contracts in question required MSI to perform at least 51% of the contracted services itself, and that the plans to hire Plaintiffs and MSI employees were made to allow Plaintiffs to substantially assist MSI in completing these contracts while allowing MSI to meet the threshold. Counterclaim, Doc. 85, ¶ 13. emphasizes that MSI and IAS executed a “Bonus Agreement” before MSI was sold, which he claims (1) allowed Plaintiffs to be (gratuitously) compensated

for MSI’s sale to the tune of $2 million, and (2) precludes Plaintiffs claims against him due to its release-of-claims clause applicable to IAS and its affiliates. Id. ¶ 27. Finally, Defendant alleges that, while he initially expected to personally earn $12 million from the MSI sale, he later discovered that the

stock he received in the transaction was “effectively worthless,” causing him to earn only $442,659.19 after closing the deal – substantially less than the $2 million received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Bonus Agreement. Id. 28-31. In short, Plaintiffs and Defendant agree that MSI and IAS worked

together frequently, that Defendant independently agreed to sell MSI without Plaintiffs’ input or consent, that Defendant did not allow Plaintiffs to exercise any alleged stock options when MSI was sold, and that Plaintiffs were nonetheless compensated when MSI was sold in the form of the $2 million

bonus. In recent filings, both parties have also acknowledged that Defendant sued MSI’s purchaser for securities fraud after the transaction was completed and that the case resulted in a settlement, though the parties dispute whether that lawsuit is relevant to this case. See Doc. 91, p. 10; Doc. 98 pp. 5-6.

The parties disagree as to whether Plaintiffs were partners and/or employees of MSI, and whether, in any case, Plaintiffs had enforceable stock options in MSI. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s characterization of the total compensation he received from the sale is inaccurate. See Counterclaim, Doc. 85, ¶¶ 35-36; Doc. 91, pp. 6, 10-11. Because Defendant claims that

Plaintiffs in fact received more from the sale than he did, he brings counter- claims for rescission, equitable accounting, and unjust enrichment, arguing that, if Plaintiffs are found to have an enforceable right to 50% of MSI’s value, then Defendant is entitled to damages to account for the amount they received

in bonuses and other compensation which allegedly exceeds that amount. Doc. 85, pp. 73-77. b. Procedural History and The Motions to Compel Although this case has been pending since 2023, Plaintiffs’ first amended

complaint was dismissed without prejudice on August 10, 2025. Doc. 79. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on August 26, 2025. Doc. 82. Defendant first brought counterclaims in his September 24, 2025 answer to the second amended complaint. Doc. 85. Both parties have sought additional

discovery from each other since filing their latest pleadings; and both parties assert that Defendant’s counterclaims expanded the scope of discovery. See Doc. 91, p. 2 (“Defendant’s counterclaims have expanded the litigation in this matter, requiring pertinent discovery to be had by Plaintiffs.”); Doc. 92, p. 2

(“The extended delay . . . inherently prohibited the Defendant from propounding any discovery related to his Counterclaim and the Plaintiffs’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses thereto.”) During the initial rounds of discovery, the Court entered a Stipulated Protective and Claw-Back Order (Doc. 77) (the “Protective Order”). The

Protective Order was drafted and agreed to by both parties (Doc. 91, p. 9) and requires (among other things) that all “confidential” discovery materials in this case be disclosed only to the parties and their counsel, the Court and its staff, mediators, experts, and litigation staff. Doc. 77, pp. 17-19.

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Alexis Everington and Richard White v. Timothy J. Riesen, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexis-everington-and-richard-white-v-timothy-j-riesen-flmd-2025.