Alexander v. Diaz

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 22, 2022
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00100
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANAND JON ALEXANDER, Case No.: 20cv100-CAB-KSC

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

14 PATRICK COVELLO et al., [Doc. No. 47] 15 Defendants. 16 17 Anand Jon Alexander, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 18 Correctional Facility (“RJD”), and who is represented by counsel in this civil action, 19 alleges various state prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights and were 20 negligent when they failed to protect him from an attack by another inmate. Plaintiff 21 previously voluntarily dismissed several defendants, including any correctional officers 22 who were on duty at the time of the incident, and the remaining defendants now move for 23 summary judgment. The motion has been fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for 24 submission without oral argument. For the following reasons, the motion is granted. 25 I. Factual Background 26 In November 2008, Alexander was found guilty of sexual assault in a Los Angeles 27 County court and was subsequently sentenced to 14 years plus 45 years to life in prison. 28 [Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 18-19.] In 2014, Alexander was transferred to RJD as a Level III inmate 1 and placed in “D” yard, which is a sensitive needs yard (“SNY”). [Id. at ¶ 23.] On May 2 18, 2019, while he was still in the Level III “D” SNY yard, Alexander was assaulted by 3 another inmate named Dominic Rizzo, who had had arrived at RJD on November 30, 2018. 4 [Doc. No. 51 at 10; Doc. No. 47-2 at ¶ 8.] According to Alexander, “while waiting to use 5 the phone in his housing unit on D Yard, he felt sharp stabbing pains striking his head and 6 experienced excruciating pain that blinded him and caused a lack of consciousness.” [Doc. 7 No. 51 at 10.] Alexander suffered serious injuries in the attack, including: 8 multiple stab wounds to his face and right eye (requiring over a dozen stitches), five facial fractures, a lower orbital floor blowout, sinus and nasal 9 fractures, a deviated septum, a 50% abrasion of the right cornea, long term 10 impairment of his vision and respiration, serious nerve damage, seizures, PTSD, psychological collateral damage, ongoing therapy, work, and 11 education restriction. 12 [Id.] Shortly after the incident, Alexander signed a “compatibility chrono” stating that the 13 incident was a misunderstanding and that he could remain housed in the same unit as Rizzo 14 without further incident. [Doc. No. 47-7 at 6.] Alexander has no recollection of signing 15 this document. [Doc. No. 51-1 at ¶ 14.] Two days later, on May 20, 2019, Alexander 16 signed another statement acknowledging that in an interview that day with Sergeant N. 17 Scharr he had stated that he had no enemy concerns with Rizzo and wished to remain in 18 “D” yard. [Doc. No. 47-8 at 5.] Although the FAC includes numerous other allegations 19 concerning the aftermath of the incident, none of these allegations are relevant to the claims 20 against the remaining defendants, whose involvement and alleged liability stems solely 21 from their roles, if any, in the decision to place Rizzo in the same yard as Alexander. 22 II. Procedural History 23 Plaintiff, through counsel, filed the original complaint on January 14, 2020. The 24 original complaint named four defendants: (1) Ralph Diaz, alleged to be Secretary of the 25 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); (2) Marcus Pollard, 26 alleged to have been the warden at RJD at all relevant times; (3) Daniel Paramo, also 27 alleged to have been the warden at RJD at all relevant times; and (4) E. Ramirez, alleged 28 1 to have been on duty in “D” yard at RJD at the time of the incident. The original complaint 2 also named Does 1-70, who included (a) CDCR lieutenants and sergeants on duty at the 3 time of the incident, (b) CDCR correctional officers and other employees on duty “at 4 relevant times,” (c) individuals responsible for classification and housing of inmates and 5 made the decision to house Plaintiff and Rizzo together, and (d) individuals responsible for 6 providing medical care, including mental health treatment, to inmates at RJD. [Doc. No. 7 1 at ¶ 6.] The original complaint asserted six claims for relief: (1) failure to protect 8 Alexander from harm, against all defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) supervisory 9 liability, against Diaz, Pollard, “Parajo” (presumably meant to be Paramo), and the Doe 10 lieutenants and sergeants on duty at the time of the incident, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) 11 deliberate indifference to medical condition, against all defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 12 1983; (4) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, against all defendants; (5) negligence, 13 against all defendants; and (6) failure to summon or provide immediately necessary 14 medical care, against all defendants, under California Government Code § 845.6. 15 On May 29, 2020, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, noting that 16 Plaintiff had failed to allege that any defendant knew of a specific risk to Plaintiff’s safety 17 and therefore did not allege facts supporting a claim that the defendants were deliberately 18 indifferent to threats to Plaintiff’s safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 19 (1994). [Doc. No. 10 at 6-7.] The order also held that the original complaint did not state 20 a claim for supervisory liability because it did not allege that any of the supervisor 21 defendants personally engaged in or knew of the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights. 22 [Doc. No. 10 at 8.] Ultimately, the Court dismissed all claims and gave Plaintiff leave to 23 amend. 24 On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff file the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”). The 25 FAC expressly abandoned any claims against Diaz and Pollard, as well as the claims for 26 deliberate indifference to a medical condition, violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, 27 and violation of California Government Code § 845.6. [Doc. No. 11 at 1, n.1; Doc. No. 28 13.] Thus, the FAC names only Paramo and Ramirez, along with the various categories of 1 Doe defendants listed in the original complaint. Further, the FAC asserts only three claims: 2 (1) failure to protect Alexander from harm, against all defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3 (2) supervisory liability, against Paramo and the Doe lieutenants and sergeants on duty at 4 the time of the incident, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) negligence, against all defendants. 5 On July 14, 2020, Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him. [Doc. 6 No. 12.] On July 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his claims 7 against Ramirez, rendering the motion to dismiss moot. [Doc. Nos. 13, 18.] On February 8 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to: (1) dismiss Paramo and substitute in his 9 place Patrick Covello, the acting warden of RJD at the time of the incident; (2) add Karl E. 10 Greither, Corey Cross, and Lindsey Gervasoni, who were members of the classification 11 committee that authorized Rizzo’s transfer to RJD, as defendants; and (3) add Gabriel 12 Menchaca, who audited and authorized Rizzo’s transfer to RJD as a Level III inmate 13 suitable for housing in a Sensitive Needs Yard, as a defendant. [Doc. No. 28.] The Court 14 granted this motion on February 4, 2021. [Doc. No. 29.] 15 In sum, consistent with the foregoing procedural history, this case now consists of 16 three claims: (1) failure to protect Alexander from harm under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) 17 supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) negligence. The first and third claims 18 are asserted against five named defendants, consisting of the acting warden, the three 19 officials who recommended Rizzo as qualified for Level III SNY housing, and the official 20 who audited that recommendation and authorized Rizzo’s transfer to “D” yard at RJD. The 21 second claim is against Acting Warden Covello alone. The five named defendants now 22 move for summary judgment on all three claims. 23 III. Legal Standard 24 Rule 56(a) provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 25 that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 26 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary 27 judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 28 for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 1 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it 2 believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 3 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). If the moving party meets 4 its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond 5 the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. 6 To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party is “required to present 7 significant, probative evidence tending to support h[is] allegations,” Bias v. Moynihan, 8 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted), and “must point to some facts in 9 the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all reasonable 10 inferences made in the plaintiff[’s] favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the 11 plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) 12 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “The party opposing summary 13 judgment may not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing 14 that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). 15 When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences 16 drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 17 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To avoid 18 summary judgment, disputes must be both 1) material, meaning concerning facts that are 19 relevant and necessary and that might affect the outcome of the action under governing 20 law, and 2) genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable judge or jury 21 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 22 242, 248 (1986); see also Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) 23 (“Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all reasonable 24 inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are 25 no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 26 of law.”). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” 27 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors 28 1 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts 2 will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.”). 3 IV. Discussion 4 The details of Rizzo’s attack on Alexander, the extent of Alexander’s injuries, and 5 actions taken by prison officials after the incident are largely irrelevant to Alexander’s 6 claims against the remaining defendants. Although the FAC contains allegations 7 concerning how corrections officers and prison officials handled the aftermath of the 8 incident, none of the remaining defendants had any involvement in those actions. Rather, 9 Alexander’s case now stems solely from the decision to house Rizzo in the same yard as 10 Alexander. Thus, the only question before the Court is whether any of the remaining 11 defendants’ involvement in the decision to place Rizzo in the same yard as Alexander could 12 allow a jury to hold them liable. 13 A. Failure to Protect Under the Eighth Amendment 14 “‘[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of 15 other prisoners.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez- 16 Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). However, “a prison official cannot be found 17 liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of 18 confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 19 or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 20 that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 21 837. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 22 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). 23 “The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may 24 rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation when: (1) the deprivation is 25 ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ and (2) the prison officials had a ‘sufficiently culpable 26 state of mind,’ acting with deliberate indifference.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 27 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The first prong of this test is 28 objective, and “[f]or a claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the 1 inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 2 serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 3 726 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013). “The objective question of whether a prison officer’s 4 actions have exposed an inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm is a question of fact, 5 and as such must be decided by a jury if there is any room for doubt.” Lemire, 726 F.3d at 6 1075-76. 7 The second prong of this test, meanwhile, is subjective, and “the official must both 8 be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 9 harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 10 “‘Deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence but is satisfied by 11 something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with 12 knowledge that harm will result.’” Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 13 at 835) (internal alterations omitted)). “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk 14 that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under 15 [the Supreme Court’s] cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 16 U.S. at 838; see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (“If a prison official should have been 17 aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no 18 matter how severe the risk.”) (internal brackets and citation omitted). 19 Here, the remaining defendants fall into three categories: (1) the three members of 20 the classification committee that recommended that Rizzo could be transferred from High 21 Desert State Prison, where he was a Level IV inmate, to the Level III “D” SNY yard at 22 RJD; (2) the official that audited the classification committee’s recommendation and 23 approved Rizzo’s transfer to RJD’s “D” SNY yard; and (3) the acting warden at the time 24 of the incident. Notwithstanding Defendants’ varying levels of involvement in the decision 25 to transfer Rizzo to the same yard as Alexander, the record is equally devoid of any 26 evidence that any of them had any knowledge that Rizzo posed a threat to Alexander (or 27 any other inmate in “D” yard), or more generally, that Alexander faced a substantial risk 28 of serious harm merely by being housed in “D” yard. Lacking such evidence, Alexander 1 bases his case on (1) generalized threats he allegedly faced from inmates affiliated with 2 white supremacist gangs, and (2) an argument that Rizzo’s behavioral history in prison did 3 not justify placing him in the Level III “D” SNY yard where Alexander was also 4 imprisoned. To this end, Plaintiff’s opposition brief provides evidence and argues that 5 Alexander, who is of Indian descent, was at risk of harm from inmates affiliated with white 6 supremacist gangs, such as the Aryan Brotherhood, and that Rizzo had been affiliated with 7 these gangs in the past. This evidence, however, does not demonstrate that any of the 8 Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Alexander’s (or any other inmates’) risk of 9 harm either from being housed in the same yard as Rizzo, or from being housed in “D” 10 yard generally. 11 Indeed, none of the Defendants even knew who Alexander was before the attack by 12 Rizzo, let alone that Alexander was housed at in “D” yard at RJD. [Doc. No. 47-2 (Covello 13 Declaration); Doc. No. 47-3 (Menchaca Declaration at ¶ 15); Doc. No. 47-4 (Grether 14 Declaration at ¶ 14); Doc. No. 47-5 (Cross Declaration at ¶ 14); Doc. No. 47-6 (Gervasoni 15 Declaration at ¶ 14).] Alexander was not mentioned in the files considered by the 16 Classification Committee and Menchaca when deciding that Rizzo qualified to move to 17 “D” yard at RJD. [Doc. No. 47-3 (Menchaca Declaration at ¶ 10); Doc. No. 47-4 (Grether 18 Declaration at ¶ 10); Doc. No. 47-5 (Cross Declaration at ¶ 10); Doc. No. 47-6 (Gervasoni 19 Declaration at ¶ 10).] Moreover, acting warden Covello is the only defendant who even 20 worked at RJD when the incident occurred, and Alexander admits that “there is no specific 21 nexis [sic] with COVELLO to any decisions made at RJD before the incident.” [Doc. No. 22 51 at 30.] 23 In sum, even assuming that Alexander was vulnerable to an assault from inmates 24 affiliated with white-supremacist gangs, none of the Defendants knew of Alexander or of 25 this vulnerability, meaning that they could not have been deliberately indifferent to a risk 26 of harm to Alexander as a result of the placement of Rizzo in “D” yard at RJD. Likewise, 27 the evidence does not support Alexander’s attempt to characterize the decision to transfer 28 Rizzo from a Level IV unit to the Level III “D” yard at RJD as deliberately indifferent to 1 the safety of the residents of “D” yard generally. The Classification Committee reviewed 2 Rizzo’s file, including his past incidents, and decided that his recent behavior qualified him 3 for placement in a Level III unit. The opposition does not provide any evidence of fighting 4 or other disciplinary problems with Rizzo for more than three years before he was 5 transferred to RJD, or in the over five months he was housed on “D” yard with Alexander 6 before the incident. [Doc. No. 51 at 13-14.]1 Nor does the opposition present any evidence 7 of any connection between Rizzo and Alexander before the incident, let alone that any 8 Defendant was aware of such a connection. Thus, the opposition does not provide any 9 evidence of either facts from which the inference could be drawn that placing Rizzo in “D” 10 yard would create a substantial risk of serious harm to Alexander or any other inmate in 11 that yard, or that any Defendant in fact drew such an inference and disregarded it. Cf. 12 Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (holding that because the defendant did not believe that 13 treatment using a certain drug “presented a serious risk of harm to [the defendant], her 14 conduct cannot constitute deliberate indifference.”). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled 15 to summary judgment on the claim for failure to prevent harm. 16 B. Supervisory Liability Claim 17 “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 18 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 19 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). “A supervisor may be liable if there exists either (1) his 20 or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal 21 connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 22 Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection can 23 be established by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to 24 terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have 25

26 1 The opposition brief includes a chronology related to Rizzo that includes an incident described as 27 occurring on September 26, 2018. [Doc. No. 51 at 14.] Alexander’s counsel subsequently filed a notice of errata stating that the date of this incident was incorrect and that the incident actually occurred on 28 1 known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 2 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). There 3 is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; therefore a supervisor like Warden Covello 4 may be held liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates only if he 5 “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 6 prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 Here, there is no evidence that Covello had any knowledge that Rizzo posed a 8 substantial risk of serious harm to Alexander or anyone else on “D” yard, and Alexander 9 concedes that “there is no specific nexis [sic] with COVELLO to any decisions made at 10 RJD before the incident.” [Doc. No. 51 at 30.] There is no dispute that Covello did not 11 know Alexander before the incident and that he did not participate or direct any decisions 12 concerning placement of Rizzo in “D” yard. Accordingly, Covello is entitled to summary 13 judgment on this claim. 14 C. Negligence Claim 15 “Under California law, ‘[t]he elements of negligence are: (1) defendant’s obligation 16 to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable 17 risks (duty); (2) failure to conform to that standard (breach of the duty); (3) a reasonably 18 close connection between the defendant’s conduct and resulting injuries (proximate cause); 19 and (4) actual loss (damages).’” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009) 20 (quoting McGarry v. Sax, 158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 994 (2008)). “The most important of the 21 considerations in establishing duty is forseeability. As a general principle, a defendant 22 owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with 23 respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.” Giraldo v. Dep't of 24 Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 245 (2008). 25 Here, there is no evidence of any connection between Alexander and Rizzo, let alone 26 one that would support a finding that it was foreseeable that Rizzo would attack Alexander 27 if housed in the same yard or otherwise given the opportunity. Indeed, there is no evidence 28 that any of the defendants even knew of Alexander or that he and Rizzo would be housed 1 ||in the same yard. Nor is there evidence demonstrating that it was foreseeable that Rizzo 2 || would be a danger to “D” yard inmates generally. Therefore, none of the defendants 3 ||breached any duty to Alexander based on their involvement, if any, in the decisions 4 || resulting in Rizzo being transferred to “D” yard at RJD. Accordingly, summary judgment 5 ||is warranted on this claim as well. 6 V. Conclusion 7 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 1s 8 ||GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and 9 || CLOSE this case. 10 It is SO ORDERED. 11 ||Dated: February 22, 2022 € 12 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28