Alexander v. Diaz

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 11, 2024
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00100
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANAND JON ALEXANDER, Case No.: 20-cv-100-CAB-KSC

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON 14 RALPH DIAZ, Secretary of CDCR, et al, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY [Doc. No. 15 Defendants. 75] 16 17 On November 17, 2023, Defendants G. Menchaca, K. Grether, C. Cross, and L. 18 Gervasoni (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified 19 immunity. [Doc. No. 75.] On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff Anand Jon Alexander 20 (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 78.] On January 30, 2024, Defendants filed a 21 reply. [Doc. No. 79.] On March 26, 2024, a hearing was held regarding the motion. 22 Keith Rutman, Esq., appeared for Plaintiff. Terrence Sheehy, Esq. and Anne Kammer, 23 Esq. appeared for Defendants. [Doc. No. 82.] For the reasons set forth below, the motion 24 is GRANTED. 25 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff, a California inmate, alleges Defendants were negligent and violated his 27 Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from being assaulted by Inmate Rizzo 28 at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD) on May 18, 2019. Defendants are 1 correctional staff who reviewed Inmate Rizzo’s file, and recommended and approved a 2 “behavioral override” which allowed Inmate Rizzo to be transferred to RJD. 3 Plaintiff, a convicted sex offender, claims he was at risk of harm from an inmate 4 like Rizzo because Rizzo allegedly targeted sex offenders. Rizzo attacked a sex offender 5 in 2003 and allegedly planned another attack in 2014. However, as of 2015, Rizzo had 6 lived peacefully at High Desert State Prison for years and programmed successfully on a 7 yard with sex offenders. He renounced his gang affiliation, and participated in multiple 8 rehabilitative classes before his transfer to RJD. Based on Inmate Rizzo’s exemplary 9 behavioral history and peaceful programing at High Desert State Prison in the three years 10 before his transfer, Defendants approved a behavioral override which allowed for 11 Plaintiff to ultimately be transferred to RJD. 12 PROCEDURAL BACKGOUND 13 This Court previously granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. [No. 14 55.] Plaintiff appealed the Order granting Summary Judgment as to Defendants on his 15 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety claim, and his state law negligence 16 claim. [Doc. No. 58.] The Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to 17 Defendant Warden Covello because there was no evidence that would allow a reasonable 18 jury to conclude he knew of, and disregarded, a substantial risk to Plaintiff. Alexander v. 19 Diaz, No. 22-55223, 2023 WL 3407082 (9th Cir. May 12, 2023) [Doc. No. 37-1 at 3, 5]. 20 The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the Defendants Menchaca, 21 Grether, Cross, and Gervasoni, who approved Rizzo’s behavioral override that allowed 22 Rizzo to be transfer to RJD. [Id. at 4-5.] The Ninth Circuit did not address the issue of 23 qualified immunity. [Id. at 5.] 24 LEGAL STANDARD 25 Rule 56(a) provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant 26 shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 27 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary 28 judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 1 for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 2 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it 3 believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 4 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). If the moving party 5 meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, 6 beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. 7 To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party is “required to present 8 significant, probative evidence tending to support h[is] allegations,” Bias v. Moynihan, 9 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted), and “must point to some facts in 10 the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all reasonable 11 inferences made in the plaintiff[’s] favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the 12 plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) 13 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “The party opposing summary 14 judgment may not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts 15 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th 16 Cir. 1986). 17 When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences 18 drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 19 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To avoid 20 summary judgment, disputes must be both 1) material, meaning concerning facts that are 21 relevant and necessary and that might affect the outcome of the action under governing 22 law, and 2) genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable judge or jury 23 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 24 242, 248 (1986); see also Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) 25 (“Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all reasonable 26 inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are 27 no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 28 of law.”). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” 1 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors 2 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts 3 will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.”). 4 DISCUSSION 5 A. Qualified Immunity. 6 Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have 7 been clear to reasonable correctional officers, knowing what each Defendant knew about 8 Inmate Rizzo, that transferring Rizzo to RJD posed such a substantial risk of harm to 9 Plaintiff that doing so would be constitutionally impermissible. [Doc. No. 75 at 19-28.] 10 Plaintiff argues that it is clearly established that liability exists for failing to prevent 11 inmate-on-inmate violence based on known assaultive tendencies or vulnerability. [Doc. 12 No. 78 at 15 -26.] 13 “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make 14 reasonable but mistaken judgments.... When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the 15 plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 16 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). In deciding 17 whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has 18 articulated a two-prong approach: first, whether the officer's conduct violated a 19 constitutional right1; and second, whether the officer's conduct violated “clearly 20 established law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 243-44 (2009) (“The 21 principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability when an officer 22 23 24 1 In reversing this Court’s previous order granting summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit found, based on 25 the evidence in the record, that a reasonable jury could conclude that, at the time of his transfer, Rizzo posed a substantial risk of serious harm to sex offenders, a group which includes Alexander. [Doc. No. 26 73-1 at 3-4.] The Ninth Circuit also found that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants knew of and disregarded the risk that Alexander faced from Rizzo in their decision to transfer Rizzo to 27 Alexander’s prison. [Id. at 4-5.] Accordingly, for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, there is a triable issue as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. 28 1 reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.”). “[J]udges of the 2 district courts ... [are] permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of 3 the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Id. at 236. 4 In the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference context, the Ninth Circuit has clarified 5 that “the qualified immunity inquiry is separate from the constitutional inquiry.” Estate of 6 Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002). To survive a motion for 7 summary judgment asserting qualified immunity on a “deliberate indifference claim,” a 8 prisoner plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that “a reasonable officer” in 9 defendants' position “would necessarily have perceived ... an excessive risk of serious 10 harm.” Id. at 1051 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). “[A] reasonable 11 prison official understanding that he cannot recklessly disregard a substantial risk of 12 serious harm, could know all of the facts yet mistakenly, but reasonably, perceive that the 13 exposure in any given situation was not that high,” in which case, “he would be entitled 14 to qualified immunity.” Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. 15 Generally, a prison official's housing decision does not violate the Eighth 16 Amendment merely because it increases the risk of harm to a prisoner; the decision is 17 unconstitutionally deliberately indifferent only if “the risk of harm from” the decision to 18 house an inmate with other dangerous inmates “changes from being a risk of some harm 19 to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1051. Further, a prison official is entitled to 20 qualified immunity for harm that arises from a housing decision if “a reasonable officer 21 in [the defendant's] position” would not have known that the decision “posed an 22 excessive or intolerable risk of serious injury.” Id. at 1052 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847 23 n.9). Finally, the determination of whether an officer’s conduct violated clearly 24 established law is “an objective examination of whether established case law would make 25 clear to every reasonable official that the defendant’s conduct was unlawful in the 26 situation he confronted.” Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 678 (9th Cir. 27 2021)(citations omitted)(emphasis in original). 28 1 Under these standards, each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from 2 liability unless a reasonable officer in his position with the information he had would 3 have perceived a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff from approving a transfer of Rizzo 4 to RJD. First, these particular Defendants, who were only involved in the behavioral 5 override approval and not in any immediate housing decisions at RJD, were not aware of 6 Plaintiff or his specific vulnerability. These Defendants were also not aware of any 7 recent evidence that inmate Rizzo had a propensity for violence. Plaintiff’s counsel 8 acknowledged at oral argument that he found no cases where a behavioral override 9 resulted in a constitutional violation. Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel could not point to any 10 policies or procedures that were violated by Defendants when approving the behavioral 11 override for Rizzo. Thus, there is nothing in the law that would have made it clear to a 12 reasonable officer, knowing what each Defendant knew (viewed in the light most 13 favorable to Plaintiff), that approving a behavioral override for Rizzo posed such a 14 substantial risk of serious harm that doing so would be constitutionally impermissible. 15 Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1053. Rather, Plaintiff relies on cases where the evidence 16 presented indicated that the correctional officials knew of the specific plaintiff-inmate’s 17 vulnerability or knew of the aggressor’s recent propensity for violence.2 Plaintiff also 18 cites to cases for the general proposition that violent inmates should not be housed with 19 vulnerable inmates. However, none of these cases would have put Defendants on notice 20 that approving a behavioral override for Rizzo, while following policies and procedures, 21 would violate the Eighth Amendment. 22 23 24 2 When asked for his “best case” that would have provided notice to Defendants, Plaintiff’s counsel 25 cited to Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2008). In Howard, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew that he had been sexually assaulted by members of a prison gang, and had failed to 26 protect him from future harm by the gang, despite reporting these concerns to them. Id. at 1229. Thus, Howard involved Defendants who allegedly knew of specific threats to the specific Plaintiff. Here, 27 Defendants had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s existence, much less specific threats of harm to him. Thus, Howard does not provide the specificity required by the Supreme Court to provide reasonable notice and 28 1 Moreover, a reasonable officer would not have clearly understood that risk of 2 serious harm was so high that transferring Rizzo to Donovan was impermissible under 3 the Eighth Amendment. Rizzo had been discipline-free for three years, did not show a 4 pattern of, or continued violent behavior, and was instead engaged in rehabilitative 5 efforts. [See generally, Doc. No. 75 at 25-27.] Based on the records they reviewed, and 6 the evidence available to them, reasonable officers in Defendants’ position would not 7 have believed that Rizzo would have posed a substantial threat of harm to inmates at 8 another institution. There was also nothing in Rizzo’s file to indicate Rizzo may be a 9 threat of harm specifically to Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 75 at 27.] Because it would not have 10 been obvious to reasonable officers in Defendants’ position that Plaintiff had a clearly 11 established right to be separated from Rizzo, or that Rizzo posed a known substantial risk 12 of danger to Plaintiff, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 13 A. Negligence/Supplemental Jurisdiction. 14 Having adjudicated Plaintiff’s sole federal claim, the Court’s “decision of whether 15 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims ‘is purely 16 discretionary.’” Couture v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-1096-IEG (CAB), 2011 17 WL 3489955, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, 18 Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)). The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is when all “federal 19 claims are dismissed before trial . . . pendant state claims also should be dismissed.” 20 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jones 21 v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1984)). 22 Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 23 remaining negligence claim, and that claim is DISMISSED without prejudice. 24 CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to 26 the Eighth Amendment claim based on qualified immunity is GRANTED. The Court 27 DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction as to the negligence claim and DISMISSES that 28 1 claim without prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and CLOSE the 2 || case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: April 11, 2024 € Z 5 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28