Alessi v. Beracha

244 F. Supp. 2d 354, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 986, 2003 WL 186725
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJanuary 21, 2003
DocketCIV.A.02-1477 SLR
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 244 F. Supp. 2d 354 (Alessi v. Beracha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alessi v. Beracha, 244 F. Supp. 2d 354, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 986, 2003 WL 186725 (D. Del. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 6, 2001, plaintiff Margaret Ales-si, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, commenced a class action in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware against defendants alleging breaches of fiduciary duties. Defendants Barry H. Beracha, Jerry E. Ritter, James Iglesias, J. Joe Adorjan, Timothy P. Smucker, Peter F. Benoist, Maxine K. Clark, E. Byron Glore, Jr., William E. Stevens and the Earthgrains Company removed the case to this court pursuant the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2). Presently before the court is plaintiffs motion to remand the case back to Chancery Court. (D.I.3) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant the Earthgrains Company (“Earthgrains”) was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. (D.I. 1, Ex. 1 at 2) Earthgrains was a publicly traded company formed as a spin-off from the Anheu-ser-Busch Companies, Inc. in March 1996. (Id.) Earthgrains operated packaged fresh-bakery and refrigerated-dough businesses in the United States and Europe, and was the second largest packaged bread baker in the United States. (Id.) As a result of the spin-off from Anheuser-Busch, many stockholders of Earthgrains held fewer than 100 shares. (Id.) Defendant Barry H. Beracha (“Beracha”) was the CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Earthgrains during the period relevant to this action. The remaining named defendants were all members of the Board of Directors of Earthgrains during the period relevant to this action.

Plaintiff states that in April 2001, Bera-cha, as CEO of Earthgrains, entered into negotiations with executives from the Sara Lee Corporation (“Sara Lee”) to discuss the acquisition of Earthgrains by Sara Lee. (Id. at 6) Plaintiff contends that in order to reduce the number of small shareholders to facilitate an acquisition, Ear-thgrains announced a buyout program on May 18, 2001. (Id. at 5) The buyout program allowed stockholders who held less than 100 shares of Earthgrains as of May 4, 2001, to pay a $1.25 per share (up to $30) processing fee and, in return, they would receive a uniform market price per share. (Id.) The buyout program was administered by Georgeson Shareholder *356 Communications, Inc. and was set to expire on June 20, 2001. (Id. at 5-6)

Plaintiff asserts that on June 29, 2001, Earthgrains and Sara Lee entered into a merger agreement and on July 2, 2001, Sara Lee announced that it would purchase Earthgrains for approximately $1.7 billion, or $40.25 per share. (Id. at 6) On July 6, 2001, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Delaware Chancery Court against defendants alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties, including the duty of disclosure, to all stockholders who participated in the buyout program between May and June 2001. 1 (Id. at 7)

In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants’ failure to disclose the ongoing merger talks with Sara Lee to Earthgrains shareholders during the buyout program, was a violation of defendants’ fiduciary duties and deprived those stockholders who received between $25-$27 per share through the buyout, the higher price they would have received under the Sara Lee merger. (Id.) On October 30, 2001, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. On August 26, 2002, while the motion to dismiss was pending, the Court of Chancery sent a letter to the parties directing defendants to remove the case to federal district court for a determination of whether SLUSA preempted any of plaintiffs claims. A notice of removal was filed by defendants with this court on September 6, 2002. (D.I.l)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The exercise of removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The statute is strictly construed, requiring remand to state court if any doubt exists over whether removal was proper. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). A court will remand a removed case “if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking removal bears the burden to establish federal jurisdiction. Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div. Am. Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1006 (3d Cir.1987); Zoren v. Genesis Energy, L.P., 195 F.Supp.2d 598, 602 (D.Del.2002).

The existence of a federal question rests upon the allegations of a “well-pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). A plaintiff, therefore, is described as the “master of the complaint” and a defendant may not remove a state law claim, even on federal preemption grounds, if the plaintiff pleads only state law claims. Id. The doctrine of “complete preemption,” however, stands as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. It holds that “once an area of state law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. With these principles in mind, the court accepts as true all allegations in plaintiffs complaint to decide whether defendants have established that the case was properly removed and, therefore, is preempted under SLUSA.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Overview of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”)

In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“Reform Act”) in response to a perceived harm to markets from frivolous private securities *357 lawsuits. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995). The Reform Act sought to deter these “strike suits” by imposing more stringent procedural and substantive requirements for private securities actions in federal courts. See Gibson v. PS Group Holdings, Inc., 2000 WL 777818, *2-3 (S.D.Cal. March 8, 2000). In response, plaintiffs counsel recognized state laws required no such heightened standards and began filing record numbers of securities actions in state courts. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, p. 14-15 (1998); see also Lander v. Hartford Life,

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Bluebook (online)
244 F. Supp. 2d 354, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 986, 2003 WL 186725, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alessi-v-beracha-ded-2003.