1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALEJANDRRO ANDRES PEREZ, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-00358-CDB
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION 14 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., THERETO
15 Defendants. (Docs. 54, 75)
16 17 Pending before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Ashley Sinden, as the natural parent and 18 purported successor in interest of decedent minor Alejandro Andres Perez (“A.P.,” collective 19 “Plaintiffs”), for leave to file a first amended complaint, filed on November 11, 2025. (Doc. 54). 20 On November 25, 2025, Defendants County of Kern (“County”), Mario Martinez, Maria Frias, 21 Cynthia Alvarado, Vicki Mishel-Ghasghaie, Malia Reeves, and Andrea Cauette (collectively, 22 “Defendants” or “County Defendants”) filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc. 57). On 23 December 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. 58). Following a status conference before the 24 undersigned on January 26, 2026 (Doc. 71) and the Court’s orders on the parties’ stipulated 25 requests regarding Plaintiffs’ filing of a supplemental motion to amend (Docs. 69, 71, 73), Plaintiff 26 filed a supplemental motion for leave to amend on February 4, 2026. (Doc. 75). Defendants filed 27 an opposition to the supplemental motion on February 11, 2026, and Plaintiffs filed a reply thereto 28 on February 19, 2026. (Docs. 76, 78). The Court deemed the motions suitable for disposition 1 without hearing and oral argument and vacated the motion hearing set for December 18, 2025. 2 (Doc. 59) (citing Local Rule 230(g)). 3 I. Relevant Background 4 Plaintiffs initiated this action with the filing of a complaint on March 25, 2025. (Doc. 1). 5 Plaintiffs asserts causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law to recover damages for 6 Defendants’ actions and/or failures resulting in the wrongful death of A.P. while in and under the 7 care, custody, control, and supervision of Defendant County of Kern and numerous individually 8 named employees and agents. Id. ¶ 3-4. 9 On May 20, 2025, Defendants1 Cynthia Alvarado, Andrea Cauette, County of Kern, Maria 10 Frias, Mario Martinez, and Vicki Mishel-Ghasghaie filed an answer to the complaint. (Doc. 11). 11 Following the Court’s order on the parties’ stipulation granting Defendants leave to file a first 12 amended answer (Doc. 25), on July 11, 2025, the above-named Defendants including Defendant 13 Malia Reeves filed a first amended answer to the complaint. (Doc. 26). 14 On August 13, 2025, the Court entered the operative scheduling order setting forth 15 discovery, motion and pretrial and trial dates and deadlines, including, relevant here, the deadline 16 to amend pleadings by November 11, 2025.2 (Doc. 31). On January 20, 2026, for good cause 17 shown in the parties’ stipulation, the Court amended case management dates and deadlines of the 18 scheduling order. (Doc. 70). 19 On January 16, 2026, the parties filed a stipulated request to hold in abeyance briefing on 20 Plaintiffs’ motion to amend and for a status conference before the Court to discuss Plaintiffs’ 21 identification of “new” defendants to be added to its existing motion to amend. (Doc. 66). On 22
23 1 Following the Clerk’s entry of default as to Defendant Margaret Eichorst (Doc. 37), on September 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a pending motion for default judgment against Defendant 24 Eichorst. (Doc. 40). On October 24, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the motion for default judgment, admonished Defendant Eichorst for failing to timely respond to the complaint, and held 25 the motion in abeyance pending Defendant Eichorst’s filing of a responsive pleading no later than 26 November 23, 2025. (Doc. 50). The motion for default judgment remains pending before the undersigned and will be addressed in forthcoming findings and recommendation. 27 2 On August 15, 2025, in light of the reassignment of this action to the undersigned for all 28 purposes, the scheduling order was amended to reset all events for Bakersfield (CDB) before the 1 January 26, 2026, the parties convened for a status conference before the Court to discuss the 2 parties’ stipulated request, Plaintiffs’ pending motion to amend, and Plaintiffs’ desire o seek leave 3 to add additional defendants to an amended complaint. (Doc. 71). The Court ordered the parties 4 to meet and confer and set a briefing schedule on Plaintiffs’ anticipated supplemental motion for 5 leave to amend. Id. On February 2, 2026, the Court granted the parties’ stipulated request to 6 extend the deadline to February 4, 2026, for the parties to complete meet/confer efforts and for 7 Plaintiffs’ filing of the supplemental motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 73). 8 II. Governing Authority 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 permits a plaintiff to amend the complaint once as a 10 matter of course no later than 21 days after service of the complaint or 21 days after service of a 11 responsive pleading or motion to dismiss, whichever is earlier. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After 12 such time has passed or plaintiff has once amended their complaint, amendment may only be by 13 leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Rule 15(a) 14 is very liberal” and a court should freely give leave to amend when “justice so requires.” 15 AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006); see Chodos v. 16 W. Publ. Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it is generally our policy to permit amendment 17 with ‘extreme liberality’”) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 18 1079 (9th Cir.1990)). 19 Granting or denying leave to amend a complaint under Rule 15 is within the discretion of 20 the court. Swanson v. United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). “In exercising 21 this discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision 22 on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 23 979 (9th Cir, 1981); Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 24 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 25 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 26 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 27 faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 28 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 1 (9th Cir. 2004). The factors are not weighed equally. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th 2 Cir. 1995); see Atkins v. Astrue, No. C 10–0180 PJH, 2011 WL 1335607, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 3 2011) (the five factors “need not all be considered in each case”). Undue delay, “by itself … is 4 insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 5 1999). On the other hand, futility of amendment and prejudice to the opposing party can, by 6 themselves, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845; see Eminence 7 Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (the consideration of prejudice 8 to the opposing party carries the greatest weight). 9 In conducting this five-factor analysis, the court generally grants all inferences in favor of 10 permitting amendment. Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 11 Moreover, the court must be mindful that, for each of these factors, the party opposing amendment 12 has the burden of showing that amendment is not warranted. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 13 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 III. Parties’ Contentions 15 In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiffs seek to add allegations and six new 16 defendants—Judy Anne Cariaso, Lisette Villareal-Lopez, Allison Roberts, Michael Fabro, 17 Guadalupe Monreal, and [FNU] Craig. (Doc. 54); see (Doc. 54-2 ¶¶ 21-26). Plaintiffs contend 18 that on November 10, 2025—the day before the deadline to amend the pleadings under the then- 19 operative scheduling order— Plaintiffs received a production of documents from Defendant 20 County of Kern responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery demands which contained information that 21 necessitated Plaintiffs’ seeking to amend “to include new claims against new parties only recently 22 discovered.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs argue that it was not possible to review the “plethora of 23 documents” prior the deadline to amend pleadings and was “compelled” to meet the deadline by 24 “borrowing liberally” from portions of the complaint in the related E.P. case, No. 1:25-cv-01260- 25 JLT-CDB (“E.P.”), because counsel for Plaintiffs is personally aware that counsel for plaintiffs in 26 E.P., Mr. Wyatt Vespermann, “does in fact have a full production of the juvenile case file involving 27 this family and these children, A.P. and E.P.” Id. at 4-5. 28 Defendants contend that because Plaintiffs’ August 5, 2024, claim under the California 1 Government Claim Act (“CGCA”) was rejected on September 25, 2024, the six-month statute of 2 limitations to bring suit against a County employee lapsed in March 2025, and therefore Plaintiffs’ 3 California state law claims against the new defendants Plaintiffs seek to add in the proposed first 4 amended complaint are time-barred. (Doc. 57 at 3). Defendants argue that because amendment is 5 futile, the Court should deny leave. Id. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs unduly delayed in seeking 6 to amend with allegations against the newly proposed defendants given Plaintiffs were aware of 7 the operative facts since at least August 5, 2024. Id. at 3-4. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs 8 knew the identity of social workers Judy Anne Cariaso, Lisette Villareal-Lopez, and Allison 9 Roberts at least 15 months before Plaintiffs sought leave to amend, and at least seven months prior 10 to filing the initial complaint, “yet never included them in [Plaintiffs’] original complaint and failed 11 to seek leave to add them.” Id. at 4. Defendants contend that Sinden, as parent of the decedent 12 minor A.P., “had ample opportunity to inspect the [juvenile case] files, yet apparently never did, 13 and has presented no evidence to the contrary” such that the delay in naming the new social worker 14 defendants is “therefore substantial, unreasonable, and is grounds to deny leave to amend.” Id. 15 In reply, Plaintiffs argue that the “new” defendants proposed to be added in the first 16 amended complaint are “not all entirely ‘new,’ especially when it comes to the issue of ‘notice.’” 17 (Doc. 58 at 1). Plaintiffs contend that the purpose of the CGCA is to provide the public entity with 18 notice of the claim, and here, Plaintiffs’ timely filing of a Government Tort Claims Notice (“GTC”) 19 undermines any claim of prejudice by Defendants because notice provided by the GTC supports 20 “relation back” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the general preference for deciding 21 matters on the merits. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiffs relatedly accuse Defendants of purposefully failing to 22 include in Rule 26 initial disclosures names of counsel’s own clients, notwithstanding that every 23 single defendant is named in the E.P. case, and that Defendants caused further delay in producing 24 the juvenile case file here for five months. Id. at 2. 25 Plaintiffs seek to supplement its original motion for leave to amend by adding two 26 additional County of Kern “DHS employees identified in discovery received from the County[] on 27 the dates and/or times noted in the original [ m]otion.” (Doc. 75 at 1). Plaintiffs assert that 28 discovery materials from Defendants exceeded 8,000 pages, and as noted in the parties’ joint 1 discovery management report filed on February 3, 2026, see (Doc. 74), additional discovery 2 productions by Defendants are anticipated. Id. Plaintiffs assert that review of these documents, 3 following the filing of the initial motion for leave to amend, “led to the discovery of two more 4 Kern County DHS employees, both social worker supervisors, whom Plaintiffs believe … had 5 integral participation in events, circumstances, document review and preparation, and 6 communications with other Kern County DHS employees, all of which were related to the subject 7 injuries and death of [ ] A.P[.]” Id. (Doc. 75 at 2). Plaintiffs therefore seek to add as additional 8 defendants in Plaintiffs’ proposed first amended complaint Rachel Heard and Robin Ackling, both 9 social worker supervisors with KCDHS, and both involved in various approvals of Court 10 submissions and assessments of Defendant Eichorst as a relative placement for the minor children 11 A.P. and his brother E.P. Id.; see (Doc. 75-1, Exhibit A (“Ex. A”)) (proposed first amended 12 complaint). 13 Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion is improper as Defendants did not 14 stipulate to Plaintiffs’ filing of a supplemental motion as required by the Court’s January 26, 2026, 15 order. (Doc. 76 at 1). Defendants argue the supplemental motion is improper because it does not 16 satisfy Rule 15(c)’s relation-back requirements for changing or adding parties, including the notice 17 and mistake requirements that must be satisfied within Rule 4(m)’s 90-day service period. Id. at 18 2. Defendants further contend the state-law claims Plaintiffs seek to assert against Heard and 19 Ackling are untimely under the CGCA deadline triggered by the September 25, 2024, claim 20 rejection pleaded in the FAC. Id. 21 IV. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice 22 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of any facts “generally 23 known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction “or that “can be accurately and readily 24 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 25 201(b)(2). A court “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with 26 the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 27 Defendant County of Kern requests the Court judicially notice: (1) Plaintiffs’ August 6, 28 2024, CGCA claim form attached to Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to 1 amend; and (2) the Notice of Rejection of Plaintiffs’ CGCA claim. (Doc. 57-1 at 1); see (Doc. 57- 2 2 at 3-5 “Ex. A”) (CGCA Claim); see id. at 7-9 “Ex. B” (County of Kern Notice of Rejection). 3 The parties do not dispute the presentation of the claim. See id. at 3; (Docs. 1, 58, 75, 78). 4 Given Plaintiffs do not oppose the request, and the parties refer to Plaintiffs’ CGCA claim and 5 notice of rejection thereof throughout the filings, the Court finds good cause to judicially notice 6 Plaintiffs’ CGCA claim and the County of Kern’s notice of rejection, but the Court will not 7 judicially notice the contents of these documents to the extent facts asserted therein are disputed. 8 See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) (court “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is 9 supplied with the necessary information.”); cf. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 10 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record and 11 reversing district court’s judicial notice of disputed facts within said records), abrogated on other 12 grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., 13 Gaines v. Langurand, No. 2:21-cv-00808-KJM-JDP (PS), 2024 WL 557527, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14 12, 2024) (granting request to judicial notice CGCA claims); Bustos v. City of Fresno, No. 1:20- 15 cv-00066-DAD-BAM, 2020 WL 4748166, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2020) (same). 16 V. Discussion 17 The Court addresses the relevant Nunes factors below. 18 A. Bad Faith 19 A motion to amend is made in bad faith where there is “evidence in the record which would 20 indicate a wrongful motive” on the part of the litigant requesting leave to amend. DCD Programs, 21 833 F.2d at 187; Wizards of the Coast LLC v. Cryptozoic Entm’t LLC, 309 F.R.D. 645, 651 (W.D. 22 Wash. 2015) (“In the context of a motion for leave to amend, ‘bad faith’ means acting with intent 23 to deceive, harass, mislead, delay, or disrupt.”) (citing Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 24 (9th Cir. 2006)). 25 Here, there is no information before the Court suggesting bad faith on the part of Plaintiffs 26 in seeking leave to amend, and Defendants do not raise any arguments regarding bad faith in 27 opposing Plaintiffs’ motion. See (Docs. 57, 76). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 28 amendment. 1 B. Prior Amendments 2 The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” where a party has 3 previously amended the pleading. Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990). 4 Here, Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments would constitute the first amendment to the 5 pleadings. (Docs. 54, 75). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend. 6 C. Prejudice to Opposing Party 7 The most critical factor in determining whether to grant leave to amend is prejudice to the 8 opposing party. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. The burden of showing prejudice is on the 9 party opposing an amendment to the complaint. DCD Programs, Ltd., 833 F.2d at 187. There is 10 a presumption in favor of granting leave to amend where prejudice is not shown under Rule 15(a). 11 Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. 12 Here, Defendants do not raise any arguments that they would be prejudiced in their 13 briefing, and there is no information before the Court suggesting prejudice may result from 14 granting Plaintiff leave to amend. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of amendment. 15 D. Undue Delay 16 By itself, a showing of undue delay is insufficient to deny leave to amend pleadings. Howey 17 v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973); DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. However, 18 in combination with other factors, delay may be sufficient to deny amendment. Webb, 655 F.2d at 19 979-80; see Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) 20 (substantial delay, while not dispositive, is relevant to whether to permit amendment). In assessing 21 whether any delay is undue, a court shall consider if “the moving party knew or should have known 22 the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” Jackson v. Bank of 23 Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The mere fact that a party fails to 24 offer a reason for not moving to amend earlier does not in itself constitute an adequate basis for 25 denying leave to amend. Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190-91. Whether there has been “undue delay” 26 should be considered in the context of (1) the length of the delay measured from the time the moving 27 party obtained relevant facts; (2) whether discovery has closed; and (3) proximity to the trial date. 28 Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1991). 1 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs delayed seeking to add allegations against the proposed 2 individual Defendants given they were on notice of the facts since at least August 5, 2024. (Doc. 3 57 at 3-4). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs knew the identity of social workers Judy Anne Cariaso, 4 Lisette Villareal-Lopez, and Allison Roberts at least 15 months before Plaintiffs sought leave to 5 amend, and at least seven months prior to filing the initial complaint, yet never included them in 6 the complaint and failed to timely seek leave to add them. Id. at 4. Defendants argue that Plaintiff 7 Sinden, as A.P.’s parent, had ample opportunity to inspect the minor’s juvenile case files and “yet 8 apparently never did, and has presented no evidence to the contrary.” Id. 9 Plaintiffs assert that at the time of the filing of the motion for leave to amend, they “only 10 recently received” a production of documents from Defendants that contained information 11 necessitating amendment of the complaint to include new claims against “new parties only recently 12 discovered.” (Doc. 54 at 4). 13 Here, Plaintiffs timely moved for leave to amend on November 11, 2025, the last day 14 permitted to seek amendment of the pleadings under the operative scheduling order, three months 15 before the close of non-expert discovery, and nearly six months from the close of expert discovery. 16 See (Doc. 31). Plaintiffs’ motion was filed well before the close of discovery and a significant 17 amount of time before trial is expected to begin on March 23, 2027. Given Plaintiffs’ reasonable 18 explanation that their request for leave to amend was “necessitated” by their receipt from 19 Defendants of a production of documents that contained material information shortly before the 20 deadline to seek leave to amend, the Court finds that the length of delay from the time Plaintiffs 21 obtained relevant information to move for leave to amend does not arise to undue delay. Therefore, 22 this factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs leave to amend. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d at 798-99; 23 see, e.g., Nyarecha v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 20-04474-AB (MAAx), 2021 WL 4776008, 24 at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2021) (finding no undue delay where plaintiffs moved for leave to amend 25 two days after receiving defendants’ initial production of documents about a month before the 26 deadline to amend pleadings). 27 /// 28 /// 1 E. Futility of Amendment 2 A court may deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject 3 to dismissal. Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). An 4 amendment is futile if the complaint clearly could not be saved by amendment. United States v. 5 Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). “Ordinarily, ‘courts will defer 6 consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend 7 is granted and the amended pleading is filed.”’ Zurich Am. Ins. Co. of Illinois v. VForce Inc., No. 8 2:18-cv-02066-TLN-CKD, 2020 WL 2732046, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) (citing Netbula, 9 LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). 10 Defendants argue that amendments to the state law claims would be futile because the 11 proposed amendments do not comply with the CGCA. (Doc. 57 at 3). Defendants contend that the 12 County’s notice of rejection of Plaintiffs’ claim was deposited in the mail on September 25, 2024, 13 making the six-month statute of limitations to bring a suit against a County employee lapse in 14 March 2025, and therefore Plaintiffs’ proposed FAC seeking state law claims against the proposed 15 Defendants is time-barred and amendment is futile. Id. 16 Plaintiffs contend that because the complaint was timely filed on March 25, 2025, the state 17 law claims may properly be amended against the proposed individual Defendants because those 18 Defendants are not “new” and relate back under Rule 15. (Doc. 58 at 1-2). Plaintiffs argue 19 amendment is therefore not futile under the relation back doctrine. Id. at 3. 20 1. Governing Authority – Relation Back under Rule 15(c) 21 “In order for an amended complaint to relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), the following 22 conditions must be met: ‘(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the 23 original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such notice that it will not be 24 prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but for a 25 mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it.’” Butler v. Nat’l 26 Comm’y Renaissance of California, 766 F. 3d 1191, 1202 (9th Cir. 2014). The second and third 27 requirements must have been fulfilled within 90 days after the original complaint is filed under 28 1 Rule 4(m). Id.3 2 “Rule 15(c)(1) incorporates the relation back rules of the law of a state when that state’s 3 law provides the applicable statute of limitations and is more lenient. As a result, if an amendment 4 relates back under the state law that provides the applicable statute of limitations, that amendment 5 relates back under Rule 15(c)(1) even if the amendment would not otherwise relate back under the 6 federal rules.” Id. at 1200 (citing 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 7 1503 (2d ed. Supp. 2001)) (“[i]n 1991, Rule 15(c) was amended to clarify that relation back may 8 be permitted even if it does not meet the standards of the federal rule if it would be permitted under 9 the applicable limitations law”). 10 Under California law, amendments of pleadings are generally governed by Cal. Civ. P. 11 Code § 473(a)(1), which “does not contain any express provision for relation back of amendments, 12 and California courts have held that it ‘does not authorize the addition of a party for the first time 13 whom the plaintiff failed to name in the first instance.’” Id. (citing Kerr–McGee Chem. Corp. v. 14 Super. Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 594, 598 (1984)). 15 The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that “if there is a federal rule of 16 procedure covering a particular point of practice or pleading in dispute, such rule governs in a 17 federal diversity action even if resort to state law would lead to a different result.” Santana v. 18 Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 19 (1965)). “Hanna commands application of Rule 15(c) in the face of a contrary state rule[] and is 20 thus applicable in the present case.” Id. (citing cases). 21 2. Governing Authority - Exhaustion under CGCA 22 Under California law, a plaintiff asserting a tort claim against a public entity or public 23 employee must allege compliance with the claims presentation requirements of the CGCA. See 24 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 945.4, 950.2; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 25 (9th Cir. 1988); Fisher v. Pickens, 225 Cal. App. 3d 708, 718 (1990). “Compliance with the claims 26 statute is mandatory, and failure to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action.” Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. 27 3 Although the Butler court identified 120 days as the deadline, following the opinion’s 28 publication, Rule 4(m) was amended to provide for 90 days. 1 v. Cnty. of Riverside, 106 Cal. App. 3d 183, 188 (1980). The plaintiff bears the burden of ensuring 2 that a claim was properly presented to the appropriate public entity. Jefferson v. City of Fremont, 3 No. C-12-0926 EMC, 2013 WL 1747917, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (citing Life v. Cnty. of 4 Los Angeles, 227 Cal. App. 3d 894, 901 (1991)). 5 “Before a civil action may be brought against a public entity [or public employee], a claim 6 must first be presented to the public entity and rejected.” Ocean Servs. Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist., 7 15 Cal. App. 4th 1762, 1775 (1993), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 23, 1993); Cal. Gov’t 8 Code § 945.4 (generally barring suit “until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public 9 entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the 10 board”). Claims for “injury to person or to personal property” must be presented within six months 11 after accrual. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a); City of Stockton v. Super. Ct., 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 12 (2007). A claimant who misses the six-month limitations deadline may file a written application 13 with the public entity for leave to present the late claim within one year of the date of accrual of 14 the cause of action, stating the reason for the delay. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4. The claimant has 15 six months after a denial of the application to file a petition in the Superior Court for an order 16 relieving the claimant of section 945.4. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.6. 17 3. Analysis 18 It is undisputed that Plaintiffs presented a CGCA claim to the County of Kern on August 19 5, 2024, naming County of Kern employees Lisette Villareal-Lopez, Giselle Martin, Nastasha 20 Franklin, Judy Cariaso, and Allison Roberts. See (Doc. 57-2, Ex. A). In the claim, Plaintiffs allege 21 that on or around March 9, 2023, Plaintiffs’ minor child, A.P., was removed from Sinden’s custody 22 by Kern County sheriffs, and around March 14, 2023, Ms. Roberts placed A.P. with Defendant 23 Eichhorst where he was subjected to approximately nine months of neglect and physical abuse. 24 See id. “On 2/9/24, [A.P.] was killed by Eichhorst. From 3/14/23 through 2/9/24, [A.P.] was in 25 the care, supervision, and control of County with the duty to keep the child safe above all. Theories 26 of liability include, but are not limited to, Negligence, Breach of Mandatory Duties pursuant to 27 G.C. 815.6 Wrongful Death, Survival Rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983, [Fourth] & [Fourteenth] 28 Amendment violations, [Monell] liability.” Id. In the section of the form prompting identification 1 of the employees causing injury, damage, or loss, Sinden named the above-referenced employees 2 and alleged that she “is unaware of the names of any other Kern County employees (sheriff or 3 [social worker]) involved in the aforementioned events.” Id. On September 25, 2024, the County 4 of Kern sent Plaintiff a notice of rejection of the CGCA claim. See (Doc. 57-2, Ex. B). 5 “[T]he purpose of the [state] claims statutes ‘is to provide the public entity sufficient 6 information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without 7 the expense of litigation.’” Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 699, 705 (1989) (citation 8 omitted) (emphasis added). Because the claims statute is designed to give a public entity “notice 9 sufficient for it to investigate and evaluate the claim ... the statute should not be applied to snare 10 the unwary where its purpose is satisfied[.]” Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers 11 Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 446 (2004). 12 Plaintiffs’ timely-submitted CGCA claim sufficiently informed the County of the nature of 13 Plaintiffs’ claims, which are consistent with the claims as alleged in the original complaint and the 14 proposed FAC. The claim was timely rejected by the County. 15 Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs have shown that the proposed FAC is not futile 16 because it relates back under Rule 15(c). First, Plaintiffs’ FAC arises out of the same conduct as 17 set forth in the original complaint. Second, the proposed Defendants to be added have received 18 notice of the action such that they will not be prejudiced in maintaining their defense. Five of the 19 proposed Defendants—Villareal-Lopez, Roberts, Fabro, Monroe, and Craig—were named in 20 Plaintiffs’ CGCA form and were referenced in the original complaint, although not as named 21 Defendants. See (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 41, 43-46, 54, 72). Notwithstanding the other three proposed 22 Defendants—Cariaso, Heard, and Ackling—were not named in the original complaint, it is clear 23 that all eight Defendants proposed in the motion and supplemental motion “knew or shown have 24 known that, absent some mistake,4 the action would have been brought against [them].” Kruspi v.
25 4 Plaintiffs’ “mistake” here is counsel “did not feel comfortable” naming certain individuals 26 as defendants in the complaint “given the many ‘question marks’” about their roles arising in communications with Sinden and whether these individuals did anything “constitutionally 27 violative.” See (Doc. 58 at 4-5). Any such mistake does not foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has been satisfied here. See Kruspi, 560 U.S. at 540; see also Long v. Ingenio, Inc., 28 No. 10–cv–05761–RS, 2015 WL 4760377, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) (finding Rule 15(c) 1 Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 549 (2010). 2 In finding such, the Court applies the principle that a prospective defendant may receive 3 constructive notice of a suit where he has a “sufficient community of interest” with the named 4 defendants “to justify imputing knowledge of the action[,]” such as shared legal representation and 5 shared employment. See Mayshack v. Gonzales, 437 Fed. Appx. 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 6 G.F. Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., Ltd., 23 F.3d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994)); Jauregui v. 7 Huntington Beach Police Dep’t, No.: 2:11-cv-09182-AB (FFMx), 2019 WL 2879872, at *2-3 (C.D. 8 Cal. Apr. 9, 2019) (“Courts look to continued employment and shared legal representation to 9 determine whether the new defendants and named defendants have a community of interest.”). Like 10 the six individual social worker Defendants named in the original complaint, the eight proposed 11 Defendants all have worked for the same agency (KCDHS) as social workers at the relevant time 12 of Plaintiffs’ allegations, and many, if not all, were involved in the underlying juvenile dependency 13 case involving the death of minor A.P. See (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15-20); (Doc. 58 at 10 n.9); (Doc. 58-1 at 14 12-13, “Ex. A”); (Doc. 75 at 2); (Doc. 78 at 3). All of the currently-named social worker 15 Defendants in the original complaint share the same legal representation in this action. See Dkt. 16 Three of the proposed Defendants (Monreal, Villareal-Lopez, and Craig) are currently named 17 defendants in another case before the Court involving similar issues and allegations, No. 1:25-cv- 18 00295-CDB, and are represented by the same County Counsel as here.5 The Court finds that the 19 proposed Defendants had constructive notice of the action from its inception based on their 20 community of interest with the current-named social worker Defendants through their employment 21 with KCDHS and involvement in the underlying juvenile case. See Mayshack, 437 Fed. Appx. at 22 621; Jauregui, 2019 WL 2879872, at *3 (“Notice favors the Plaintiff.”); e.g., White v. City of Los 23 Angeles, No. cv-19-00243 DDP (RAOx), 2020 WL 9893054, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2020) (“the 24 newly named officers here have a community of interest with the named City defendant because 25 they have remained employed with the City of Los Angeles and share legal counsel with the named 26 applies where plaintiff was mistaken in the proper defendants’ identity). 27 5 The Court may take judicial notice of court records. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 28 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 1 | Defendants.”). 2 Plaintiff has shown that the proposed FAC relates back to the original complaint under Rule 3 | 15(c) such that the proposed FAC complies with the CGCA’s requirements. Butler, 766 F.3d. at 4 | 1202. Therefore, amendment is not futile, and this factor weighs in favor of amendment. 5 x x x x x 6 Because the Nunes factors all weigh in favor of permitting the proposed amendments, the 7 | Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion and supplemental motion for leave to file the proposed FAC. 8 | VI. Conclusion and Order 9 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 10 1. Plaintiffs’ motion and supplemental motion for leave to file a first amended complaint 11 (Docs. 54, 75) are GRANTED; 12 2. No later than five (5) days following entry of this order, Plaintiff SHALL FILE as a 13 stand-alone docket entry the first amended complaint proposed in the supplemental 14 motion (Doc. 75-1, Ex. A); and 15 3. Currently-named Defendants SHALL respond to the first amended complaint no later 16 than 21 days following its filing and service (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3)). 17 | ITIS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ February 27, 2026 | Wr bY 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15