Alejandre v. County of San Joaquin

Opinion

----oo0oo---- CINDY M. ALEJANDRE; and DAVID No. 2:19-cv-00233-WBS-KJN GONZALEZ II as Co-Successors-in- Interest to Decedent David Gonzalez III, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION v. TO SEAL COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a municipal corporation; STEVEN BAXTER, individually and in his capacity as a Sheriff’s deputy for the County of San Joaquin Sherriff’s Department; MATTHEW FELBER, individually and in his capacity as a Sheriff’s deputy for the County of San Joaquin Sheriff’s Department; CHUE VANG, individually and in his capacity as a Sheriff’s deputy for the County of San Joaquin Sherriff’s Department; JASON ROHDENBURG, individually and in his capacity as a Sheriff’s deputy for the County of San Joaquin Sheriff’s Department; BARBARA GOEMAN and DOES 1-25, inclusive, individually and in their official capacity as Sheriff’s Deputies for the County of San Joaquin Sheriff’s Department, Defendants.

----oo0oo---- Plaintiffs Cindy Alejandre and David Gonzalez II (“plaintiffs”) brought this action as successors-in-interest to their son, decedent David Gonzalez III (“Gonzalez”), against the County of San Joaquin (“County”); San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Deputies Steven Baxter, Matthew Felber, Chue Vang, and Jason Rohdenburg; and Nurse Barbara Goeman, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of medical care and failure to summon medical care, violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to a familial relationship with Gonzalez, and excessive force, in addition to state law claims of failure to summon medical care, wrongful death--negligence, violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See generally Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) (Docket No. 37).) Before the court are defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.) (Docket No. 66-1.), and defendants’ Motion to Seal Exhibit 19 to their Compendium of Evidence. (Defs.’ Mot. to Seal)(Docket No. 67.) I. Factual and Procedural Background Decedent David Gonzalez III (“Gonzalez”) was arrested and taken into custody at the San Joaquin County Jail (“Jail”) on June 22, 2018. (See Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Defs.’ SUF”) No. 1, Docket No. 66-3).) Deputy Jason Rohdenburg was assigned to the Jail’s Classification Unit on that date and conducted Gonzalez’s classification interview, which included a diagnostic process of identifying Gonzalez’s physical, emotional, and security needs for his detainment. (See id. at Nos. 1–2.) During the classification interview, Gonzalez indicated to Deputy Rohdenburg that he was withdrawing from opiates. (See id. at No. 3.) Deputy Rohdenburg notified Jail medical personnel that Gonzalez was withdrawing from opiates, and Gonzalez was medically evaluated by defendant Nurse Barbara Goeman. (See id. at No. 4.) During Nurse Goeman’s intake medical examination, Gonzalez reported that he was a regular heroin user and was experiencing withdrawal symptoms. (See id. at No. 17.) Gonzalez’s vital signs were normal, and his physical examination revealed piloerection (goose bumps), tremors, and rhinorrhea (runny nose). (See id.) Gonzalez reported experiencing anxiety, nausea, yawning, diarrhea, insomnia, arthralgia (joint pain), chills, and cramping. (See Decl. of DeWitt Lacy in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. B (“Lacy Decl.”) (Docket No. 70-4).) Gonzalez was speaking normally and had a steady gait. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 17.) Nurse Goeman made diagnoses of heroin abuse and withdrawal and started Gonzalez on the Jail’s Opiate Withdrawal Protocol, which included provision of Phenergan (promethazine), Vistaril (hydroxyzine), Donnatal, Benadryl (dipenhydramine), Gatorade, and monitoring. (See id.) At no time during Gonzalez’s intake evaluation did he report any heart abnormalities or unusual medical conditions, aside from his withdrawal from heroin. (See id.) Nurse Goeman then medically cleared Gonzalez for incarceration. (See id. at No. 4.) Gonzalez was placed in “general population” housing, and not in the Jail’s medical housing, because Nurse Goeman determined he was “hemodynamically stable and not in acute withdrawal” requiring continuous nursing and medical care. (See id. at No. 21.) On June 25, 2018, Gonzalez was seen by another nurse because he reported that he had been vomiting since the day before and was unable to keep down food. (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. NN.) He was given an injection of Phernergan to resolve his vomiting symptoms. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 22.) At approximately midnight on June 26, 2018, Gonzalez pressed his cell’s medical emergency call button and Deputy Chue Vang responded. (See id. at No. 9.) Gonzalez told Deputy Vang that he was in pain and going through withdrawal. (See id. at No. 10.) Deputy Vang called Nurse Goeman and escorted Gonzalez from his cell to the medical examination room where Nurse Goeman evaluated him. (See id. at No. 11.) Gonzalez was alert, oriented, able to communicate his needs and concerns, and had a strong and steady gait. (See id. at No. 24.) He reported that he was “eating ok.” (See id.) Gonzalez complained of hand cramping and was given Motrin. (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. NN.) Nurse Goeman cleared Gonzalez to remain in his general population housing unit and noted that he did not want to be on bed rest and wanted to go to his court appearance. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 5.) Defendant Deputy Steven Baxter supervised the process of pulling inmates out of their cells to attend their court dates and the transportation of inmates from the Jail to the Stockton Superior Court (“Court”) on the morning of June 26, 2018. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 28.) Deputy Baxter observed Deputies Carlos Prieto and Jose Hernandez transporting a group of inmates, including Gonzalez, to the transportation lobby for their court appearances. (See id. at No. 29.)1 Deputy Baxter approached and spoke with Gonzalez who told him that his shoulder and stomach hurt. (See id. at No. 31.)2 Based on Deputy Baxter’s observations of Gonzalez and his conversation with Gonzalez, he believed that Gonzalez was “kicking some sort of narcotic”, and resisting going to court for his hearing. (See id. at No. 35.) Deputy Baxter consulted Jail management software and saw that Nurse Goeman had cleared Gonzalez for his scheduled court appearance less than 12 hours earlier. (See id. at No. 36.) Deputy Baxter, along with Deputy Khankhoune Kannalikham, escorted Gonzalez to the transportation bus to head to court. (See id. at No. 37.) Defendants contend that Gonzalez was able to walk under his own power but, because he was resisting going to the bus, he 1 Defendants contend that Gonzalez left his housing unit without incident but stopped cooperating and began resisting and generally behaving as if he did not want to go to court as he approached the transportation lobby, and was then separated from the group of inmates. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 30.) Plaintiffs contend that Deputy Baxter was aware that Gonzalez did not feel well and that he had to be taken to the transportation lobby by Deputies Prieto and Hernandez because he was unable to walk on his own. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 30.) (Docket No. 70-1.)

2 Defendants contend that Gonzalez did not communicate to Deputy Baxter that he was sick, having a medical emergency, or that he wanted to go to the hospital. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 32.) Plaintiffs contend that Gonzalez communicated told Deputy Baxter that his stomach and shoulder hurt and that he was in too much pain to go to court. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 32.) They also state that Gonzalez asked to see a nurse and that no nurse was summoned. (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. L.) Witnesses stated that Gonzalez was moaning in pain and complaining that he did not feel well, needed help, and was dying. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at Nos. 32, 35.) was escorted by Deputy Baxter and Deputy Kannalikham. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 39.) When they reached the bus stairwell, Gonzalez “grabbed a hold of the door, and began pulling himself away [from the bus] to try and turn past [the deputies] and get past [them]”, but ultimately entered the bus under his own power. (See id. at No. 39.)3 After escorting Gonzalez to the bus, Deputy Baxter called the Court’s control room and spoke with defendant Deputy Matthew Felber, a bailiff at the Courthouse. (See id. at Nos. 41, 44.) Deputy Baxter told Deputy Felber that Gonzalez was having some medical problems. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 20, Dep. Tr. of Matthew Felber at 20:21–21:2.) Deputy Baxter asked Deputy Felber to “relay a message to Courthouse Sergeant Jason Wheelen that [Deputy Baxter] had one inmate who was uncooperative, and that [Deputy Felber] needed to make sure he had additional deputies [at the Courthouse] ready when the bus arrive[d].” (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 41.)4 Deputy Phillip Hicks was the bus monitor on the 3 Plaintiffs state that Deputy Baxter and Deputy Kannalikham carried Gonzalez to the bus. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 39.)

4 Plaintiffs contend that Deputy Baxter advised Deputy Felber that Gonzalez was displaying bizarre or erratic behavior and screaming about wanting to go to the hospital. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 41.) Deputy Baxter also relayed that he and the other deputies had to carry Gonzalez onto the bus. (See id.) Deputy Felber told Deputy Baxter that “if this inmate is acting that way, we don’t want him.” (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. T.) Deputy Baxter told Deputy Felber that Gonzalez was already on his way, and if Sergeant Wheelen refused him when he arrived to court, then the bus driver would just bring Gonzalez back. (See id.) transport bus that took Gonzalez to court. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 46.)5 Five minutes after departing the main section of the Jail, the bus arrived at the south section of the Jail to load more inmates. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 64.) By this time, Gonzalez was on the floor of the bus, resting against the side wall. (See id.)6 After loading the inmates from the south section of the Jail, the bus drove to the Courthouse, a trip of about 25 minutes. (See id. at No. 65.) At approximately 12:11 P.M., the bus transporting Gonzalez from the Jail to the Courthouse entered the court’s “sally port” -- a small garage where buses can come and go from the Court -- and parked.7 (See id. at No. 45.) Deputy Felber 5 Defendants contend that Gonzalez was able to walk to his own seat on the bus, although his arm was held by Deputy Hicks. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 62.) Plaintiffs dispute that Gonzalez could walk on his own and contend that he was stumbling and falling while walking down the aisle. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 62.)

6 Plaintiffs contend that Gonzalez was not able to sit up under his own power and slid off his seat into the aisle, hitting his head with a loud thump. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 64.) Defendants state that Gonzalez was able to stand and return to his own seat at Deputy Hicks’ request after he was found on the bus floor, (see Defs.’ SUF at No. 64), while plaintiffs contend that Deputy Hicks forcibly picked up Gonzalez and placed him back in the seat. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at No. 64.)

7 Plaintiffs contend that while on route to the courthouse, Deputy Hicks, the bus monitor, heard a loud thump as Gonzalez fell to the floor. (See Pls.’ Statement of Additional Material Facts at No. 39 (“PAMF”) (Docket No. 70-2).) While on the freeway during transportation, Gonzalez repeatedly fell off his seat on the bus into the middle aisle and hit his head. (See id.) After falling and smacking his head for the third time, Gonzalez did not rise from the bus floor and convulsed and seized until he suddenly stopped moving and fell silent. (See Pls.’ was in the Court’s Control Room when the bus arrived. (See id. at No. 51.) He was given notice that Gonzalez was nonresponsive on the bus at around 12:16 P.M. (See id. at No. 52.) Upon receiving notice, he immediately ran to the sally port. (See id. at No. 53.) From approximately 12:16 P.M. to 12:18 P.M., emergency medical equipment was brought into the sally port and prepped for use on Gonzalez. (See id. at No. 48.) At approximately 12:18 P.M., Gonzalez was taken off the bus by law enforcement personnel and Deputy Felber began performing chest compressions on Gonzalez. (See id. at No. 49.) He continued to perform chest compressions on Gonzalez until an ambulance with emergency medical personnel arrived at the sally port at approximately 12:22 P.M. (See id. at No. 50.) Based on an autopsy conducted by pathologist Dr. Bennet Omalu, Gonzalez suffered from a rare genetic condition associated with sudden cardiac arrest. (See id. at No. 77.) Gonzalez never disclosed to the Jail’s correctional or medical staff that he had any cardiac disease or abnormality. (See id. at No. 79.) Some of the medications given to Gonzalez while in Jail to alleviate his withdrawal symptoms, which are part of the Jail’s opiate withdrawal protocol, have also been linked to cardiac arrythmias. (See id. at No. 80.) However, not knowing of Gonzalez’s cardiac condition, the Jail’s medical staff had no reason not to administer the usual protocol medications to Gonzalez. (See id.) II. Motion to Seal inmates on the bus informed Deputy Vince Chunn, the bus driver, and Deputy Hicks that Gonzalez was nonresponsive approximately ten minutes before the bus arrived at the sally port. (See id. Defendants request that the court seal Exhibit 19 to their Compendium of Evidence, which consists of video footage of the transport bus arriving from Jail in the sally port of the San Joaquin County Superior Court on June 26, 2018. (See Defs.’ Req. to Seal (Docket No. 67).) A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming a strong presumption in favor of public access. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). The party must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process.” Id. at 1178-79 (citation omitted). In ruling on a motion to seal, the court must balance the competing interests of the public and the party seeking to keep records secret. Id. at 1179. Defendants argue that the video should be sealed for reasons of jail and courthouse security, as “the video shows a critical location pertaining to secure inmate transport to court at the San Joaquin County Superior Court.” (Defs.’ Req. to Seal at 2.) Defendants state that “[i]t has long been recognized that jail security is a very important interest in running a jail.” Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974)). However, the video plainly shows footage of the San Joaquin County Superior Court’s sally port, not the jail. The footage does not reveal which portion of the courthouse the sally port is located in, or from which street one can gain access to the sally port. Besides vague and conclusory assertions that allowing footage contained in the video to become public would “compromise jail and courthouse security,” defendants do not articulate any specific reasons why footage of the inside of the sally port would compromise security. The court therefore finds that interests in jail and courthouse security do not outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure of the video. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Defendants further argue that they have an interest in preventing disclosure of the video based on “law enforcement privilege.” Defendants point out that “[c]ourts have long recognized the ‘law enforcement privilege as an interest worthy of protection,’ and one designed to ‘prevent the disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures . . . .’” (Def.’s Req. to Seal at 3 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995)). While defendants characterize the video as one depicting “law enforcement techniques,” a more accurate description would be that the video shows a bus arriving, followed by a group of assembled police officers transporting a limp body from the bus to the ground and then performing lifesaving techniques until paramedics arrive. If anything, these are medical or first-response techniques, not “law enforcement techniques.” The court therefore finds that law enforcement privilege does not dictate sealing the video. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ request to seal Exhibit 19 to their Compendium of Evidence. III. Evidentiary Objections The court will next address defendants’ extensive evidentiary objections to plaintiffs’ Statement of Additional Material Facts. (See Defs.’ Objections to Pls.’ Evid. in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Objections”) (Docket No. 73-4).) A. Unsworn Witness Testimony and Interviews As defendants note, the vast majority of the evidence relied on by plaintiffs in their opposition derives from the County’s In-Custody Death Protocol Investigation. (See id. at 3.) Following Gonzalez’s death, this protocol investigation was initiated. (See id.) As part of this investigation, the County Sheriff’s Office conducted 74 interviews of witnesses and other Jail/law enforcement personnel, most of which were summarized by the investigating detectives in the form of “Incident Reports.” (See id.) Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ reliance on these witness interviews and summaries on multiple grounds. Defendants first argue that the unsworn witness statements and summaries are inadmissible and cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment because they do not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A). (See id. at 4). This rule provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents. . . affidavits or declarations. . . admissions, interrogatory or other materials. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Defendants cite to two opinions of magistrate judges in this district in support of their proposition, but no binding authority. See Sanchez v. Penner, No. CIV S-07-0542 MCE EFB P, 2009 WL 3088331, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 22, 2009); Johnson v. Sandy, No. 2:12-cv-02992 JAM AC P, 2015 WL 1894400, * 1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015). Defendants are correct that, generally speaking, evidence presented in the context of a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). But a party opposing a motion for summary judgment seeks a trial, not a verdict, and it stands to reason that if evidence may probably be converted to admissible form for trial, it should not be excluded at summary judgment. See Gonzalez v. Cnty. of Yolo, No: 2-13-cv-01368-KJM-AC, 2015 WL 4419025, * 4 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 17, 2015). At the hearing on this motion, plaintiffs stated that the disputed evidence relied upon will be converted to an admissible form at trial. Accordingly, the court will overrule this objection. Defendants next contend that these witness statements and interview summaries are hearsay. (See Defs.’ Objections at 5.) However, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form” but on the admissibility of its contents. See Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1036. If the contents of a document can be presented in a form that would be admissible at trial, for example, through live testimony by the person who was interviewed or who made the statement, the mere fact that the document itself might be excludable hearsay provides no basis for refusing to consider it on summary judgment. See id. at 1036–37. Accordingly, the court overrules defendants’ hearsay objections. Defendants next argue that the interview summaries and unsworn witness statements are inadmissible because plaintiffs have failed to lay the proper foundation. (See Defs.’ Objections at 6). However, the Ninth Circuit has long held that “an objection to admission of evidence on foundational grounds must give the basis for the objection in a timely way to permit the possibility of cure.” Jerden v. Amstutz, 430 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants’ conclusory statement that these documents lack foundation, without providing any explanation as to how the documents lack foundation, falls well short of providing plaintiffs with notice of the specific ground of objection, and consequently, what could be done to cure any defects. See Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 666- 67 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, these objections provide no basis for excluding the evidence. See id. B. Improper Legal Conclusions, Speculation, and Opinions Defendants also contend that plaintiffs speculate, make improper legal conclusions, and assert opinions disguised as “facts” in their Statement of Additional Material Facts. (See Defs.’ Objections at 6.) “[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative . . . or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.” Burch v. Regents of University of California, 433 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Because statements based on speculation or improper legal conclusions are not facts, and will not be considered by the court on a motion for summary judgment anyway, the court overrules these objections because they are “simply superfluous in this context.” See id. C. Facts Not Supported by Evidence and Relevance Defendants finally argue that the court should not consider plaintiffs’ additional material facts because they are not supported by the evidence. (See Defs.’ Objections at 6-7.) This objection is similarly superfluous and is thus overruled for the same reason -- to the extent that plaintiffs’ statements of material fact are unsupported by the evidence, they do not constitute material facts and therefore cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment. IV. Motion for Summary Judgment8 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element 8 All parties agree that Defendants Deputy Jason Rohdenburg and Deputy Chue Vang should be dismissed from this case. On October 7, 2020, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint which would add Sergeant Anthony Goulart as a defendant and dismiss Deputy Vang. (See Docket No. 57.) Plaintiffs did not ultimately file a fourth amended complaint, so Deputy Vang was not dismissed as a defendant. Although the parties discussed a stipulation which would dismiss Deputies Vang and Rohdenburg, (see Decl. of Gregory Aker in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. A (“Aker Decl.”) (Docket No. 66-2).), the stipulation was not entered into due to a disagreement between counsel over legal fees and expenses which resulted in name calling and discourteous language. (See id.) The court admonishes that such language is unnecessary, unprofessional and ultimately only hurts the clients that counsel on both sides purport to serve. Accordingly, the court orders that Deputies Rohdenburg and Vang be dismissed from this case. upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. If the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See id. A. Threshold Element of Causation As a preliminary matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ federal claims necessarily fail because there is no material dispute that Gonzalez’s underlying health conditions, rather than any actions taken by defendants, caused his death. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at 13-14.); see Blanco v. Cnty. of Kings, 142 F.Supp.3d 986, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2015). Defendants rely on several conclusions made by plaintiffs’ forensic expert, Dr. Bennet Omalu. Dr. Omalu concluded that Gonzalez died as a result of sudden cardiac arrhythmogenic death and that cocaine toxicity was a contributory factor. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 24, p. 4.) Dr. Omalu also stated that Gonzalez suffered from a rare genetic condition associated with sudden cardiac arrest. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 77.) Gonzalez never disclosed to the Jail’s correctional or medical staff that he had any cardiac disease or abnormality, (see id. at No. 79), and did not disclose that he had used cocaine hours before he was arrested. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at 14.) Defendants contend that Dr. Omalu’s testimony dooms plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because it shows that Gonzalez’s death had nothing to do with the conduct of the named individual defendants. (See id.)9 Plaintiffs’ expert ultimately comes to a different conclusion than the one offered by defendants, however. Dr. Omalu states that “[d]eaths from Sudden Cardiac Arrhythmogenic Deaths and/or Cocaine Toxicity are highly preventable and survivable diseases” and that “patients frequently survive if, and when, they are provided timely and definitive medical care.” (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. F, p. 5.) Dr. Omalu also said that the “mechanisms of death of these two causes of death can be readily arrested, reversed, or controlled to reduce the risk of sudden death, especially in a controlled institutional environment.” (See id.) Dr. Omalu opined that “Gonzalez’s death was highly preventable if timely and definitive medical care had been provided.” (See id. at 6.) Although defendants describe Gonzalez’s heart as akin to a ticking time bomb, Dr. Omalu stated that Gonzalez was not “in any imminent traumatic danger, and death was not imminent.” (See id. at 5.) In Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a direct causal link between the County’s practices and the decedent’s injuries because the plaintiff’s expert opined that the decedent would have survived if he had been taken to the hospital at any

9 For example, neither party argues that the allegedly excessive use of force used by Deputy Baxter in getting Gonzalez time before he went into cardiac arrest. See Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 681. Following the same reasoning, the court finds that Dr. Omalu’s testimony suffices to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the cause of Gonzalez’s death, and will not grant summary judgment on this basis. B. Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court considers: (1) whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the officers’ conduct violated “clearly established” federal law. See Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 2016)). The court has the discretion to decide which prong of qualified immunity to address first and, if analysis of one prong proves dispositive, the court need not analyze the other. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Qualified immunity is a question of law to be decided by the court. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (2009). “Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). Although the Supreme Court has established that the case law does not require a case to be directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Id. The Supreme Court has made clear that clearly established law should not be defined at a high level of generality. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152. Plaintiffs bear the burden of “proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the official’s allegedly impermissible conduct.” Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2nd 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1993). 1. Denial of Medical Care/ Failure to Summon Care Plaintiffs allege that defendants Goeman, Baxter, and Felber violated Gonzalez’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to summon medical care and provide constitutionally adequate medical care. (See TAC at ¶¶ 34–39.) Individuals in state custody have a constitutional right to adequate medical treatment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). For inmates serving custodial sentences following a criminal conviction, that right is part of the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. See id. However, pretrial detainees have not yet been convicted of a crime and therefore are not subject to punishment by the state. See Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 668. Accordingly, their rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979).) Claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018). Pretrial detainees alleging that jail officials failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care must show: (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which plaintiff was confined [including a decision with respect to medical treatment]; (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). To satisfy the third element, plaintiffs must show that defendants’ actions were “objectively unreasonable,” which requires a showing of “more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. Accordingly, to defeat qualified immunity for defendants, plaintiffs must show that, given the available case law at the time, a reasonable jail official knowing what defendants knew would have understood that his actions, “presented such a substantial risk of harm to [Gonzalez] that the failure to act was unconstitutional.” See Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2019); Sandoval, 958 F.3d at 678. a. Nurse Goeman Plaintiffs first contend that Nurse Goeman violated clearly established federal law by providing constitutionally inadequate medical care when treating Gonzalez and failing to summon a doctor or nurse practitioner. (See Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 12.)(Docket No. 70.) To defeat qualified immunity for Nurse Goeman, plaintiffs must show that, given the available case law at the time, a reasonable nurse knowing what Nurse Goeman knew would have understood that placing Gonzalez in general population housing and clearing him to attend court on June 26, 2018, “presented such a substantial risk of harm to [Gonzalez] that the failure to act was unconstitutional.” See Horton, 958 F.3d at 678. The strongest case that plaintiffs cite in support of their contention that Nurse Goeman violated clearly established law is Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 670. In Sandoval, the court held that a jail nurse was not entitled to qualified immunity for failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care when, after being told by a sheriff’s deputy that the inmate was shaking, tired, disoriented, and needed to be looked at more thoroughly, the jail nurse merely administered a duplicative blood sugar test, cleared the inmate for booking, and failed to check in on the inmate at any point for multiple hours. See id.10

10 Although the decision in Sandoval was published in 2021, the incidents at issue in Sandoval occurred in 2014. See id. at 662. In deciding Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit held that, even in 2014, the law clearly established that the nurses’ actions presented such a substantial risk of harm to the decedent The court concludes that Sandoval is so wholly factually distinguishable that it could not have placed a reasonable nurse, knowing what Nurse Goeman knew, on notice that her conduct was unlawful. Nurse Goeman did a full medical intake examination of Gonzalez before clearing him to be in a general population cell, started him on the Jail’s opiate withdrawal protocol, and determined that he was “hemodynamically stable and not in acute withdrawal” requiring continuous nursing and medical care. (See Defs.’ SUF at Nos. 17–21.) Most critically, unlike the inmate in Sandoval, Gonzalez was speaking normally and had a steady gait. (See id. at No. 17.) His vital signs were normal, and his physical examination only revealed goose bumps, tremors, and a runny nose. (See id.) Although Gonzalez reported having nausea, diarrhea, and cramping, he was promptly provided treatment for these symptoms through the medications on the Jail’s Opiate Withdrawal Protocol. (See id.) In contrast to the inmate in Sandoval, Gonzalez was provided with meaningful medical treatment, and not merely a cursory and duplicative medical test. Nor does Sandoval provide any support for plaintiffs’ contention that Nurse Goeman violated clearly established law and provided constitutionally inadequate medical care by clearing Gonzalez to attend court on June 26th. When Nurse Goeman evaluated Gonzalez on June 26, 2018, he was alert, oriented, and able to communicate his needs and concerns, and he had a strong and steady gait. (See id. at No. 24.) He reported that his nausea and vomiting had abated after he had been treated by

another nurse the day prior and did not report any problems eating. (See id.) Gonzalez’s sole complaint at that time was that his hand was cramping and hurt, and Nurse Goeman provided him Motrin for the pain in response. (See id.) Nurse Goeman asked Gonzalez whether he wanted to be on bed rest, and he stated that he did not and wished to go to his court appearance. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 5.) Accordingly, Nurse Goeman cleared him to return to his general population housing unit and to go to court the next day. (See id.) Unlike the inmate in Sandoval, Gonzalez was alert, oriented, able to communicate his needs and concerns, and was not only provided medical treatment but was actually improving because of the medical treatment provided. Sandoval could not have possibly placed Nurse Goeman on notice that she was providing constitutionally inadequate medical care by acceding to Gonzalez’s wish to go to court, particularly given his relatively minor symptoms of opiate withdrawal. Although plaintiffs contend that Nurse Goeman was somehow required to summon additional medical help by contacting a doctor or nurse practitioner, the evidence they rely upon does not establish this. (See Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 19.) Rather, the County of San Joaquin Standardized Procedures for Narcotic Withdrawals makes clear that symptoms of withdrawal routinely last for 4-6 days, and that a doctor or nurse practitioner need be contacted only if the signs and symptoms are severe or do not improve despite treatment. (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. C., p.3.) Although vomiting is listed as a severe subjective sign of withdrawal, (see id. at p.2), Gonzalez had improved after being treated for vomiting and did not report any problems eating when he was evaluated by Nurse Goeman. (See Defs.’ SUF at No. 24.) Nor have plaintiffs provided any information suggesting that a hand cramp is a severe symptom of opiate withdrawal. In any event, Sandoval could not possibly have placed Nurse Goeman on notice that the failure to summon medical care at that stage was a violation of Gonzalez’s constitutional rights. In Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit held that jail nurses were not entitled to qualified immunity when the nurses knew that Sandoval was unresponsive and having seizures but failed to promptly summon paramedics, which was “[s]tandard nursing protocol.” See Sandoval, 985 F.2d 657, 679. In contrast to Sandoval, Nurse Goeman was not confronted with an inmate who was unresponsive and in acute medical need. Nor is there any evidence that Goeman was required to contact a doctor or nurse practitioner about Gonzalez’s symptoms, particularly since he was improving with treatment. All in all, Sandoval could not have placed a reasonable nurse, knowing what Nurse Goeman knew, on notice that her conduct was in any way unlawful. b. Deputy Baxter Plaintiffs next contend that Deputy Baxter violated clearly established federal law by failing to summon medical care for Gonzalez. (See Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 19.) Plaintiffs cite Sandoval for the proposition that failure to provide “life saving measures to an inmate in obvious need” is a clear constitutional violation. See Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 679–80. The court must therefore analyze whether Sandoval would have placed a reasonable deputy, knowing what Deputy Baxter knew at the time, on notice that failing to summon medical care for Gonzalez and ensuring that he boarded the bus to his court date presented such a substantial risk of harm to Gonzalez that the failure to act was unconstitutional. See Horton, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2019). California Penal Code § 825 mandates that criminal defendants be taken before a criminal court judge without delay, and in any event, within 48 hours of the arrest excluding Sundays and holidays. See Cal. Pen. Code § 825. Although Gonzalez made complaints of medical distress, requesting to see a nurse, moaning that he was in pain, and even saying he was dying, Deputy Baxter determined that Gonzalez should be sent to his mandated court date only after verifying that he had been medically cleared to attend court mere hours earlier, had refused bed rest, and had insisted to Nurse Goeman that he wished to attend his court date. (See id. at No. 36.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “clearly established federal law does not prohibit a reasonable officer . . . from assuming that proper procedures . . . have already been followed.” See White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. Deputy Baxter was therefore entitled to assume that proper medical procedures, including Nurse Goeman's medical clearance of Gonzalez mere hours earlier, had been followed. The court therefore concludes that Sandoval could not have placed a reasonable deputy, knowing what Deputy Baxter knew, on notice that his conduct here was unlawful. c. Deputy Felber Plaintiffs finally contend that Deputy Felber violated clearly established federal law and failed to summon medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court must therefore determine whether Sandoval would place a reasonable deputy, knowing what Deputy Felber knew at the time, on notice that failing to have an ambulance waiting for Gonzalez and additional deputies at the ready, presented such a substantial risk of harm to Gonzalez that the failure to act was unconstitutional. See Horton, 915 F.3d at 600. Plaintiffs cite Sandoval for the proposition that “a prison official who is aware that an inmate is suffering from a serious acute medical condition violates the Constitution when he stands idly by rather than responding with reasonable diligence to treat the condition.” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 680. However, Deputy Felber only knew that Gonzalez complained of a medical problem, not a medical emergency or serious acute medical condition, and Deputy Baxter’s statements indicated that the main issue with Gonzalez was that he was being uncooperative. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 20, Dep. Tr. of Matthew Felber at 24:3– 8; Defs.’ SUF No. 41.) No evidence suggests that Deputy Felber became aware that Gonzalez would require lifesaving, or even immediate, medical attention until after Gonzalez had already arrived at the courthouse. Nor is it clear to the court that Deputy Felber even had the authority to summon additional medical care or order more deputies to respond to Gonzalez’s transport bus; rather, the evidence suggests that the ultimate decisions were to be made by Deputy Felber’s superior, Sergeant Wheelen. All in all, Sandoval could not have placed a reasonable deputy, knowing what Deputy Felber knew, on notice that his conduct under the circumstances of this case was unlawful. d. Conclusion Because plaintiffs fail to identify sufficiently specific constitutional precedents to alert defendants that their particular conduct was unlawful, all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care and failure to summon medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Considering all the evidence, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the court cannot conclude that any of these defendants either knowingly violated the law or were plainly incompetent. See White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment on this claim. 2. Loss of Right to Familial Relations Plaintiffs also contend that their own Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association were violated “as a result of the denial of medical care by defendants.” (See TAC at ¶¶ 52–54.) Parents and children may assert claims for deprivation of their right to familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are deprived of their liberty interest in the companionship and society of their child or parent through official conduct. Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). However, liability for loss of familial relations is limited to official conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that this standard may be satisfied by conduct that either “consciously or through complete indifference disregards the risk of an unjustified deprivation of liberty.” Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit further held that:

[W]here actual deliberation is practical, then an officer's ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience. On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Id. (quoting Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013)). The Supreme Court has specifically noted that the “custodial situation of prison” is a setting where deliberate indifference may be sufficient to shock the conscience because “actual deliberation is practical.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852 (1998). This is because, unlike a situation like a high-speed car chase or a prison riot, prison officials have “time to make unhurried judgments” along with “the chance for repeated reflection,” and their decision-making is “largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.” Id. at 853. Accordingly, “[w]hen such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking.” Id.11 11 There is a legitimate question as to whether the proper focus of the court’s inquiry should be on the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs or Gonzalez. For instance, plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that the defendants knew that Gonzalez had any family, and were therefore aware that by taking any allegedly unconstitutional action towards Gonzalez, they might also be liable for violating the substantive due process rights to familial association for his family members. Nevertheless, Because the events at issue in this case all took place in a custodial setting where actual deliberation is practical, the determination as to as to whether defendants’ actions shocked the conscience is judged by the deliberate indifference standard. See Gordon, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (holding that claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard). The court has already found, above, that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claim for denial of medical care and failure to summon medical care because there is no clearly established law that would have warned defendants that their actions “presented such a substantial risk of harm to [Gonzalez] that the failure to act was unconstitutional.” Horton, 915 F.3d at 600–602; Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 678. Accordingly, for the same reasons, defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ denial of familial association claim. See Estate of Nunez by and through Nunez v. Cnty. of San Diego, Case No. 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD, 2018 WL 5817091 * 10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018) (holding that because plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association assume that the proper focus of the court’s inquiry is on the constitutional rights of Gonzalez. See Porter, 536 F.3d at 1140 (holding that where plaintiffs brought a Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association claim following defendant’s allegedly excessive use of force which killed their son, the qualified immunity inquiry turned on whether plaintiffs could present facts that would justify a jury finding that defendant acted with an unconstitutional purpose to harm the rights of with the decedent was necessarily premised on a finding that defendants were deliberately indifferent as to decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to constitutionally adequate medical care, plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim could not survive where deliberate indifference to decedent’s right to adequate medical care was not established). The court will therefore grant summary judgment on this claim.12 3. Excessive Force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiffs contend that defendants violated clearly established law in using excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by making Gonzalez board the bus to court. Although plaintiffs brought their excessive force claim against all defendants, they now seem to concede that Deputy Baxter is the only individual defendant who used any amount of force on Gonzalez at all. (See Mot. for Summ. J. at 27-28); (see Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 23–24.) Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment as to Nurse Goeman and Deputy Felber and will only evaluate whether the 12 The cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their contention that defendants violated clearly established law and their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association do not compel a different finding. The only Ninth Circuit case cited by plaintiffs that addresses the substantive due process right to familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of deliberate indifference to medical needs is Lemire v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). There, the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the actions of defendants who allegedly failed to provide CPR to an inmate constituted deliberate indifference or rose to the conscience-shocking level required for a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation, but rather found that there were disputed issues of fact which precluded summary judgment. See id. at 1085. As such, Lemire could not have placed defendants on notice that their actions were in any way unlawful. use of force exerted by Deputy Baxter violated clearly established law. Plaintiffs cite Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015), in support of their contention that Deputy Baxter used excessive force and violated clearly established law. The facts of Kingsley are wholly distinguishable from the facts at issue here. In Kingsley, an inmate who refused to comply with the orders of jail officials was forcibly removed from his cell while in handcuffs and subsequently kneed in the back, had his head slammed into a concrete bunk, and was stunned with a Taser. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 393. Here, in contrast, Deputy Baxter stated that Gonzalez refused orders to board the bus to court and was “carried” onto the bus. (See Lacy Decl. at Ex. Z.) Defendants have explained that “carrying” in jail parlance means that Gonzalez was merely escorted onto the bus, not physically picked up. (See Defs.’ SUF No. 39.) Deputy Baxter also pulled Gonzalez’s hand away from the bus’s handrail because Gonzalez was actively resisting the deputies and attempting to pull himself off the bus and away from the deputies. (See id. at No. 38.) Even assuming that Gonzalez was physically carried or thrown onto the bus,13 plaintiffs have not identified any case law which clearly establishes that such force is excessive in the

13 Plaintiffs contend that Gonzalez was thrown onto the bus and that he hit his head. (See PAMF at No. 36.) The inmate reports that plaintiffs rely on do not make it clear if this means that Gonzalez was literally thrown onto the bus or if the inmate was just speaking figuratively. It is unclear how the deputies could have thrown Gonzalez onto the bus since it is undisputed that the stairs onto the bus are narrow and neither case of a non-compliant inmate who has been medically cleared for court and is actively resisting the deputies attempting to place him on the bus to court. In sum, Kingsley could not have placed a reasonable deputy, knowing what Deputy Baxter knew, on notice that escorting Gonzalez to the bus and pulling his hand away from the bus’s handrail, while Gonzalez was actively resisting the deputies and attempting to pull himself off the bus, would amount to a constitutional violation. Because plaintiffs have failed to identify sufficiently specific constitutional precedents to alert Deputy Baxter that his particular conduct was unlawful, Deputy Baxter is entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged unreasonable use of force. Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the court cannot conclude that Deputy Baxter either knowingly violated the law or was plainly incompetent. See White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment on this claim. C. State Law Claims Because the court will grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court no longer has federal question jurisdiction, and there is no suggestion that there is diversity jurisdiction in this case. Federal courts have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 10001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc) (explaining that a district court may decide sua sponte to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). The Supreme Court has stated that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity -- will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie- Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 488 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Here, comity strongly weighs in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims. The state courts are fully competent to adjudicate such claims. Some of plaintiffs’ claims raise particularly complex questions of state law.14 Such questions are better left to 14 The court heard additional arguments from the parties about plaintiffs’ claim under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. These arguments revealed a split among district courts in California, and even within this very district, as to whether claims under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act can be brought as survival actions. The arguments also revealed substantial confusion as to whether threats, intimidation, and coercion must be shown independently from the alleged constitutional violation in a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim. The intricacies of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act are particularly salient in this case because, as plaintiffs’ counsel conceded during the additional argument, Gonzalez died without incurring any general damages. It is therefore an open question of state law as to what damages plaintiffs would be entitled to recover if they prevail on their Tom Bane Act claim. After hearing the parties’ arguments and conducting its own legal research, the court is convinced that this is a uniquely complex and unsettled California courts to resolve. As for judicial economy, plaintiffs’ state law claims have not been the subject of any significant litigation in this case, as the parties have focused on the federal claims. Judicial economy does not weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. And finally, convenience and fairness do not weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. The federal and state fora are equally convenient for the parties. There is no reason to doubt that the state court will provide an equally fair adjudication of the issues. There is nothing to prevent plaintiffs from refiling their state law claims against the remaining defendants in state court, and any additional cost or delay resulting therefrom should be minimal.15 Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that that defendants’ motion to seal, (Docket No. 67), be, and the same hereby is DENIED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the representations of all parties, all claims against defendants

case would be best decided by state courts.

15 “[T]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under [28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)], and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). eee eee eee IE I RI OO EES

Chue Vang and Jason Rohdenburg be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 66-1) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to plaintiffs’ first claim for denial of medical care/failure to summon medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, third claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and fourth claim for loss of their right to familial association under 42 9) U.S.C. § 1983; AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ remaining claims against defendants under California law be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly. Dated: April 20, 2021 . - ak. A ble, (hi.te— 34