Alberto E. v. Bisignano

CourtDistrict Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedAugust 5, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-00400
StatusUnknown

This text of Alberto E. v. Bisignano (Alberto E. v. Bisignano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alberto E. v. Bisignano, (D.R.I. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

) ALBERTO E., ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 24-cv-400-JJM-PAS ) FRANK BISIGNANO,1 Commissioner ) of the Social Security Administration, ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief United States District Judge. Before the Court are competing motions—Plaintiff Alberto E.’s Motion to Reverse (ECF No. 10), and Defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration Frank Bisignano’s Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner. ECF No. 12. I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND Alberto is a 50-year-old man.2 He worked as a parts inspector and machine operator. He asserts that he is disabled because of severe depressive disorder, chronic hypertrophic cardiomyopathy,3 obsessive-compulsive disorder, gastroesophageal

1 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Frank Bisignano has been substituted for Acting Commissioner Leland C. Dudek as the defendant here. 2 Alberto turned 50 years old at the time the claims was before the ALJ for the second time. 3 A chronic condition where the heart muscle, particularly the left ventricle, thickens, making it harder for the heart to pump blood effectively reflux disease, gout, headaches, and high cholesterol. He has been unable to work since July 2018. Alberto applied for disability benefits and the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) denied his claim. He appealed the decision; on appeal, the Commissioner agreed that a remand was necessary and asked the Court to “instruct the ALJ to reevaluate the evidence in accordance with the agency’s regulations and policies, offer plaintiff the opportunity for a hearing, take further action to complete the administrative record and issue a new decision.” , C.A. No. 22-336-JJM (ECF No. 11). On remand, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to:

• pursuant to the provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; •

(20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 and Social Security Ruling 96-8p); and • If warranted by the expanded record, obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the claimant’s occupational base (Social Security Ruling 83-14). The hypothetical questions should reflect the specific capacity/limitations established by the record as a whole. The Administrative Law Judge will ask the vocational expert to identify examples of appropriate jobs and to state the incidence of such jobs in the national economy (20 C.F.R. § 404.1566). Further, before relying on the vocational expert evidence the Administrative Law Judge will identify and resolve any conflicts between the occupational evidence provided by the vocational expert and information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and its companion publication, the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (Social Security Ruling 00-4p).

ECF No. 7-13 at 33 (emphasis added). The case was remanded back to the same ALJ who initially denied Alberto’s claim. The ALJ, acting on the Appeals Council’s instructions, again denied Alberto disability benefits. Alberto appeals to this Court on three grounds: “(1) Substantial

evidence does not support the ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) finding because the ALJ failed to fully and fairly evaluate the medical opinion evidence and, therefore, excluded important undisputed limitations; (2) The ALJ erred by failing to find Alberto disabled as of his 50th birthday pursuant to the Medical Vocational Guidelines; and (3) The ALJ’s determination as to Alberto’s credibility is not supported by substantial evidence because it fails to identify any evidence that actually contradicts his description of the limitations that arise out of his well-

documented impairments.” ECF No. 10-1 at 1-2. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” , 587 U.S. 97,

103 (2019) (quoting , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court “must uphold the Secretary’s findings . . . if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support [their] conclusion.” , 647 F.2d 218, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing , 305 U.S. at 229). That said, the ALJ’s findings are “not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.” , 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). “Congress designed [the Social Security Act as a whole] to be ‘unusually

protective’ of claimants.” , 587 U.S. 471, 482 (2019) ( , 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986)). Social Security is a program of social insurance on which people can rely to provide for themselves and their dependents. Claimants are the beneficiaries of insured wage earners, not recipients of government gratuities, and are entitled to a broad construction of the Act. In practical terms, .

, 658 F.2d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court focuses throughout its determination that the Social Security Act is a remedial statute that must be broadly construed and liberally applied and whose purpose is to mitigate the rigors of life for those who are disabled or impoverished. , 349 F.2d 494, 496 (1st Cir. 1965); , 835 F.2d 937, 943 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[t]he principle of liberal construction governs interpretations of the Social Security Act itself.”). III. DISCUSSION A. RFC Determination The ALJ determined that Alberto had the RFC to perform (as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)), with the following limitations: He could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant could do simple, routine, repetitive tasks, in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions, with few, if any, workplace changes. The claimant could not do assembly line type work (i.e., working in close tandem with co-workers, at an outwardly set pace), but could do individual table and/or bench work. He could have occasional contact with the public, and superficial (i.e., brief, routine, perfunctory) contact with co-workers.

ECF No. 7-2 at 91.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bowen v. City of New York
476 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Smith v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Sacilowski v. Saul
959 F.3d 431 (First Circuit, 2020)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Alberto E. v. Bisignano, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alberto-e-v-bisignano-rid-2025.