RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2025; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1440-DG
ALBERT MARSHALL APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW v. FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JESSICA E. GREEN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-XX-000072
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Albert Marshall (“Marshall”) brings this matter before this
Court on discretionary review from a decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court
reversing the Jefferson District Court’s decision that declared Louisville Metro
Code of Ordinances (“LMCO”) §§ 135.03 and 135.99 unconstitutional. After
careful review, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2022, Louisville Metro police received multiple
reports of gunshots fired near Buechel Bank Road. According to the citation,
Marshall fired a weapon into the air to scare off people who were outside of his
home. His home, however, was surrounded by residential buildings and within a
short distance to a public road. Louisville Metro had recently enacted a local
ordinance regarding firearm discharge. LMCO § 135.03 bars the discharge of
firearms within 300 feet of a public roadway or alley. LMCO § 135.99 sets the
correlating punishment and defines violations of LMCO § 135.03 as misdemeanors
punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or 12 months of imprisonment.
Louisville Metro Police charged Marshall with violating LMCO
§ 135.03. Marshall filed a motion to dismiss in the Jefferson District Court in
which he challenged the constitutionality of LMCO §§ 135.03 and 135.99
(collectively, the “ordinances”). After a hearing, the district court declared the
ordinances violated Kentucky’s doctrine of separation of powers to the extent that
they authorized incarceration, which the district court believed to be a non-
delegable legislative power.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth moved to alter, amend, or vacate
the district court’s ruling on constitutionality of the ordinances or, in the
alternative, amend its order to be final and appealable. The district court denied
-2- the motion in part, but amended the order to clarify that its order was final and
appealable.1
Next, the Commonwealth appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
The circuit court disagreed, reversed the district court’s original ruling, and held
that the ordinances were constitutional. Marshall motioned to this Court for
discretionary review, which we granted. Additional facts will be added as
necessary.
On appeal, Marshall argues the ordinances are unlawful because
Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 500.020 reserves to the General Assembly the
sole authority to define criminal offenses and fix their punishments. Additionally,
he argues the General Assembly cannot constitutionally delegate its power to
define and enact criminal offenses outside the penal code, and even it if it could, it
did not do so with safeguards that pass constitutional scrutiny.2
1 We note that in the subsequent order the district court also clarified it denied Marshall’s motion to dismiss. His prosecution for violation of the ordinances was to continue, but the district court’s original order meant he could not be sentenced to imprisonment for the violation. Because of the appeals to the circuit court and now this Court, Marshall’s prosecution has yet to resume. 2 On appeal, Marshall also argues that LMCO § 135.03 is unenforceable because KRS 65.870 bars local governments from adopting local firearm control ordinances. However, he did not make this argument to the district court, circuit court, or include it in his motion for discretionary review to this Court, and therefore we are not permitted to review the argument. Our Supreme Court has “held that issues not raised in the Motion for Discretionary Review will not be addressed by [the reviewing] Court despite being briefed [] and addressed at oral argument.” Wells v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 332, 335 (Ky. 2006) (citing Ellison v. R&B Contracting, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 66, 71 n.8 (Ky. 2000)). As such, we decline to review Marshall’s preemption argument.
-3- Conversely, the Commonwealth asserts that KRS 67C.101 and
83A.065 authorize Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville
Metro”) to lawfully enact and enforce the ordinances. Furthermore, the
Commonwealth argues that the General Assembly may constitutionally delegate its
power to define and enact criminal offenses outside the penal code, and it did so
here with appropriate safeguards.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]his Court’s review [] involves the interpretation of sections of the
Constitution and statutes. Therefore, this Court applies the de novo standard of
review in deciding this appeal.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.3d 892, 898
(Ky. 2011) (citing Devasier v. James, 278 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Ky. 2009)).
“[T]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what
the legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its
interpretation on any other method or source.” Maysey v. Express Servs., Inc., 620
S.W.3d 63, 71 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d
644, 648 (Ky. 2017)). Additionally, “we presume that the legislature is aware of
the state of the law when it enacts a statute[.]” Id. (citing St. Clair v.
Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 570 (Ky. 2004)). As such, “when construing
multiple statutes, the statutes are read ‘in harmony with one another in order to
effectuate all statutes, if possible.’” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Dixon, 572 S.W.3d
-4- 46, 49 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Castle v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.3d 754, 757-58
(Ky. 2013)). “In construing statutes, we ‘presume that the General Assembly did
not intend an absurd statute or an unconstitutional one.’” Id. (quoting Shawnee
Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011)).
ANALYSIS
I. Louisville Metro has statutory authority to enforce the ordinance.
Turning first to the statutes applicable here, we must ascertain the
meaning of KRS 500.020, KRS 83A.065, and KRS 67C.101 individually and
harmonize them together as a whole.
Marshall argues that KRS 500.020(1) only permits the General
Assembly, not Louisville Metro or any other city, to define criminal offenses and
fix their penalties. As such, he posits that these ordinances conflict with KRS
500.020(1). The Commonwealth asserts that KRS 83A.065 allows cities to
criminalize ordinances; thus Louisville Metro can lawfully enforce the ordinances.
In addition to analyzing a plain reading of the statutes, we must strive
to read them in harmony. We presume the legislature did not intend to create an
absurd or unconstitutional statute, and presume the legislature knew that one
statute existed when it created another. As such, we believe that staying mindful
of the chronological order in which the legislature enacted the statutes is
instructive.
-5- First, the General Assembly enacted KRS 500.020 in 1975. KRS
500.020(1) states, “[c]ommon law offenses are abolished and no act or omission
shall constitute a criminal offense unless designated a crime or violation under this
code or another statute of this state.” (Emphasis added.) By its plain language,
KRS 500.020(1) creates an exception to the rule it establishes. That is to say,
while KRS 500.020(1) abolished common law offenses, it also permits the
legislature to designate crimes and violations, outside of the penal code, by
statutory creation.3
Next, the General Assembly enacted KRS 83A.065 in 1992. KRS
83A.065(2) states “[a] city may make the violation of any of its ordinances a
misdemeanor or a violation by the express terms of the ordinance.”4
3 We also find the Kentucky Crime Commission’s pre-enactment commentary on the purpose of KRS 500.020 instructive as to the legislative intent behind the statute. “The purpose of subsection (1) is to eliminate the possibility of conviction for common law crimes. Before an individual may be convicted of a criminal offense once this code is effective, there must be a statutory designation of that offense. . . . Most common law offenses have already been added to the statutes. Most of those which have not . . . are incorporated into this revision. With these changes, there is no need to retain any common law crimes.” KRS 500.020 (Ky. Crime Comm’n Comment. (1974)) (emphases added). For his proposition that crimes can only be created when they are explicitly stated in a statute, and the legislature cannot designate that power by statute to a municipality, Marshall urges us to focus our attention on the part of the commentary that states criminal offenses must be designated by statute. Id. However, the beginning and end of the commentary make the legislative intent behind KRS 500.020(1) abundantly clear. The General Assembly enacted KRS 500.020(1) to “eliminate the possibility of conviction for common law crimes[,]” and upon its enactment, there was “no need to retain any common law crimes.” Id. (emphases added). 4 While the focus of our analysis centers around KRS 83A.065(2), the entirety of the statute aims to set the parameters that cities must abide by when fixing punishments for the violation of a city ordinance. See generally KRS 83A.065.
-6- “[W]e presume that the legislature [was] aware of” KRS 500.020(1)
when, 17 years later, it enacted KRS 83A.065(2). See Maysey, 620 S.W.3d at 71
(citing St. Clair, 140 S.W.3d at 570). Further, rather than create a conflicting and
“absurd statute[,]” we presume that the legislature intended for KRS 83A.065(2) to
serve as an exception to KRS 500.020(1). See Dixon, 572 S.W.3d at 49 (quoting
Brown, 354 S.W.3d at 551). Reading the statutes together in harmony, we find that
KRS 83A.065(2) enables cities to impose criminal penalties for violations of their
ordinances and fits the exception enunciated in KRS 500.020(1). See id. (quoting
Castle, 411 S.W.3d at 757-58). The legislature established a limitation on crime
creation in KRS 500.020(1), but it retained its own power to create crime outside
of traditional means. The 1975 General Assembly with KRS 500.020(1) said that
“another statute of this state” could designate criminal offenses, and in 1992, the
General Assembly did just that with KRS Chapter 83A.
For his proposition that KRS 83A.065(2) does not meet the exception
stated in KRS 500.020(1), Marshall almost exclusively relies on Justice
Cunningham’s concurrence in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.3d 350 (Ky.
2014). There, Justice Cunningham did state that “[i]t is clear that by enacting KRS
500.020(1), the General Assembly did not intend to share its exclusive authority to
enact and define crimes and criminal penalties.” Id. at 354 (Cunningham, J.,
concurring). However, as the circuit court pointed out, in Justice Cunningham’s
-7- conclusion, he asserted that KRS 83A.065 was unconstitutional only to the extent
that it allowed incarceration for ordinance violations. He did not perceive an issue
with criminalized ordinances that resulted in fines. Id. at 356. This inconsistent
analysis does little to bolster Marshall’s argument. Further, we note that “[a]
minority opinion has no binding precedential value[.]” J.A.S. v. Bushelman, 342
S.W.3d 850, 853 (quoting Ware v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Ky.
2001)). As such, we are not bound by Justice Cunningham’s concurring opinion.
The majority in Johnson did not address the constitutional question because it was
not properly preserved. In ten years since that decision, the Supreme Court has not
found KRS 83A.065 to be unconstitutional. Its clear language provides that a city
may make a violation of any of its ordinances a misdemeanor. The ordinance
defined the violation as a misdemeanor and set punishment within the parameters
of the limits set by the General Assembly. ($500.00 for a fine and 12 months for a
prison term; citing KRS 534.040(2)(a) and KRS 532.090(1)). We conclude that
KRS 83A.065, a statute created by the General Assembly, clearly meets the
exception created by KRS 500.020(1).
However, Marshall next asserts that KRS 83A.065 applies only to
cities but does not apply to Louisville Metro, a consolidated local government.
The Commonwealth argues that the plain text of KRS 67C.101 makes KRS
-8- 83A.065 applicable to consolidated local governments. Again, we agree with the
Commonwealth and affirm the trial court.
KRS 67C.101(2)(a) bestows upon consolidated local governments “all
powers and privileges that cities of the first class and their counties are . . .
authorized to exercise under the Constitution and the general laws of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky[.]” Additionally, KRS 67C.101(3)(i) gives
consolidated local governments the power to “[p]ass and enforce by fines and
penalties, if necessary, all ordinances, not inconsistent with law, as are expedient in
maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the inhabitants of
the county and prevent, abate, and remove nuisances[.]” Furthermore, subsection
(4) of the statute states:
The powers of the consolidated local government shall be construed broadly in favor of the consolidated local government. The specific mention, or failure to mention, of particular powers in this section shall not be construed as limiting in any way the general or specific powers of a consolidated local government.
KRS 67C.101(4) (emphasis added).
Marshall argues that a consolidated local government’s ordinance-
related powers can only be derived from KRS 67C.101, which does not
specifically mention classifying ordinance violations as misdemeanors. However,
the plain language of KRS 67C.101 clearly entitles consolidated local governments
to utilize the powers granted by KRS 83A.065.
-9- While KRS 67C.101(3)(i) does state that consolidated local
governments may “[p]ass and enforce by fines and penalties, if necessary, all
ordinances, not inconsistent with law,” the rest of the statute’s text makes it clear
that consolidated local governments are not limited only to the powers described in
the statute. KRS 67C.101(2)(a) explicitly states that “[a] consolidated local
government shall have all powers and privileges that cities of the first class” have.
Then, KRS 67C.101(4) definitively puts Marshall’s argument to rest by its
mandate that “[t]he specific mention, or failure to mention, of particular powers in
this section shall not be construed as limiting in any way the general or specific
powers of a consolidated local government.” The legislature could not have
spelled out its intention to give broad authority to consolidated local governments
more clearly.
Accordingly, because KRS 83A.065 allows cities to make violations
of their ordinances as misdemeanor crimes and this meets the exception to KRS
500.020(1), and because the plain language of KRS 67C.101 carries that authority
to consolidated local governments, Louisville Metro had the statutory authority to
create and enforce the ordinances.
II. The General Assembly Properly Delegated Its Legislative Authority.
Next, Marshall argues that, if these statutes grant municipalities the
power to define crimes outside the penal code that are punishable by incarceration,
-10- they are unconstitutional and violate our doctrine of separation of powers because
the General Assembly may not delegate that power. Even if it could, Marshall
argues, the statutes would still be unconstitutional because the legislature did not
provide sufficient policies or safeguards to govern the exercise of that legislative
power by cities/consolidated local governments.
When a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute, we presume
that “the challenged statutes were enacted by the legislature in accordance with
constitutional requirements.” Beshear v. Acree, 615 S.W.3d 780, 805 (Ky. 2020)
(citing Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky. 2001)). To find a
statute unconstitutional, the “constitutional infringement must be ‘clear, complete
and unmistakable[.]’” Id. at 805-06 (quoting Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v.
Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 806 (Ky. 2009)).
a. The Kentucky Constitution Permits the General Assembly to Delegate its Power to Define Crimes Punishable by Incarceration to Municipalities.
We begin our analysis by looking to the relevant provisions of our
Constitution. KY. CONST. § 27 states:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.
-11- KY. CONST. § 28 forbids one branch of our government from “exercis[ing] any
power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter
expressly directed or permitted.” Further, KY. CONST. § 29 vests the “legislative
power” in the General Assembly.
In pertinent part, KY. CONST. § 60 states:
No law, except such as relates to the sale, loan or gift of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, bridges, turnpikes or other public roads, public buildings or improvements, fencing, running at large of stock, matters pertaining to common schools, paupers, and the regulation by counties, cities, towns or other municipalities of their local affairs, shall be enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General Assembly, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Constitution.
(Emphases added.) Additionally, KY. CONST. § 156b enables “[t]he General
Assembly [to] provide by general law that cities may exercise any power and
perform any function within their boundaries that is in furtherance of a public
purpose of a city and not in conflict with a constitutional provision or statute.”
No provision exists “in our State Constitution that declares explicitly:
‘Legislative power may not be delegated.’” Commonwealth v. Associated Indus. of
Ky., 370 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Ky. 1963). “Kentucky has recognized the lawful
delegation of legislative powers for decades[.]” Acree, 615 S.W.3d at 787.
It is true that § 28 prohibits one branch from exercising the powers of
another branch, unless a provision of our Constitution permits the exercise of such
-12- power, and § 29 gives the General Assembly the legislative power. However, § 60
anticipates and permits the delegation of legislative power to municipalities in
certain circumstances, and § 156b expressly grants the General Assembly the
ability to delegate legislative power to cities.
As Marshall pointed out, § 60 decrees that “No law . . . shall be
enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General
Assembly, unless otherwise expressly provided in this constitution.” KY. CONST. §
60 (emphasis added). However, the omitted portion of the quoted section provides
exceptions for laws relating to:
the sale, loan or gift of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, bridges, turnpikes or other public roads, public buildings or improvements, fencing, running at large of stock, matters pertaining to common schools, paupers, and the regulation by counties, cities, towns or other municipalities of their local affairs[.]
KY. CONST. § 60. As such, while § 60 does protect the seniority of the General
Assembly when it comes to legislative power, it also authorizes and anticipates that
municipalities will exercise that power for the enumerated categories.
Furthermore, the conclusion of § 60, like § 29, leaves the door open for further
delegation of the legislative power in other Constitutional provisions, such as
§ 156b.
KY. CONST. § 156b expressly grants the General Assembly the ability
to delegate its legislative power to cities by allowing the enactment of laws that
-13- enable cities to “exercise any power and perform any function within their
boundaries that is in furtherance of a public purpose of a city[.]” KY. CONST. §
156b (emphasis added). The only limiting part of § 156b is that a city’s exercise of
such power and/or function cannot “conflict with a constitutional provision or
statute.” Id.
None of the cited constitutional sections conflicts, nor do any of those
sections conflict with the statutes previously examined, KRS 83A.065(2) and
KRS 67C.101. Further, Marshall has not cited any constitutional provision that
expressly prohibits the General Assembly from delegating to cities, or consolidated
local governments, the power to define crimes and penalize violators with
incarceration.5
Thus, Marshall’s argument that the General Assembly may not
constitutionally delegate that power depends entirely on the language in § 156b
that prohibits a city’s exercise of its powers and functions if such exercise would
conflict with a statute. KY. CONST. § 156b. Said another way, the first half of
Marshall’s constitutional argument depends on the successes of his statutory
argument. Because we have already determined, supra, that KRS 83A.065(2) does
not conflict with KRS 500.020(1), and that KRS 67C.101 extends the powers
5 In fact, as The Kentucky League of Cities pointed out in its amicus curiae brief to this Court, KY. CONST. § 168, which has been part of our constitution since 1891, specifically contemplates that a municipal ordinance violation may result in criminal penalties.
-14- conferred by KRS 83A.065 to consolidated local governments, we will not further
address that argument here. Still, we move to the second half of Marshall’s
argument to address whether KRS 83A.065 and KRS 67C.101 contain the
safeguards required for proper legislative delegation.
b. The General Assembly Properly Delegated its Legislative Power via KRS 67C.101 and 83A.065.
In Acree, our undivided Supreme Court recognized the Supreme
Court’s “intelligible principle” rule, which decrees that “[i]f Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] . . . is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Acree, 615 S.W.3d at 810 (quoting
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L.
Ed. 624 (1928) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations and emphasis in
original)). Further, “legislative power can be delegated if the law delegating that
authority provides safeguards, procedural and otherwise, which prevent an abuse
of discretion thereby protecting against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary
power.” Id. at 809 (quoting Beshear v. Bevin, 575 S.W.3d 673, 683 (Ky. 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
KRS 67C.101(3)(i) reveals that the General Assembly gave
consolidated local governments the power to pass ordinances for the purpose of
“maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the inhabitants of
-15- the county and prevent, abate, and remove nuisances[.]” This language expands
upon the more general reasoning for granting municipal power, “furtherance of a
public purpose of [the] city[,]” stated by KY. CONST. § 156b. Alone, KRS
67C.101(3)(i) reveals the intelligible principle for delegating legislative power to
consolidated local governments, and that purpose finds its roots in our
Constitution.
Additionally, examining the entire text of KRS 83A.065 reveals its
intelligible principle. The General Assembly codified KRS 83A.065 to establish
parameters for the “fines, penalties, and forfeitures that may be imposed for
violation of [a city] ordinance[.]” KRS 83A.065(1). Thus, the General Assembly
articulated the intelligible principle for enactment of KRS 83A.065.
Next, we look to whether the General Assembly instilled the sort of
safeguards required by the constitution to delegate legislative power in KRS
83A.065 and KRS 67C.101. In Acree, our Supreme Court found that KRS Chapter
39A included procedural safeguards and constitutionally delegated legislative
power to the Governor during times of emergency. 615 S.W.3d at 811-12. There,
the safeguards included “enunciation of criteria for use of the emergency powers,
the timely, public notice provided for all orders and regulations promulgated by the
-16- Governor and [a] time limit on the duration of the emergency and accompanying
powers[.]” Id. at 812.6 Further, our Supreme Court found that:
While the authority exercised by the Governor in accordance with KRS Chapter 39A is necessarily broad, the checks on that authority . . . [include]: judicial challenges to the existence of an emergency or to the content of a particular order or regulation; legislative amendment or revocation of the emergency powers granted the Governor; and finally the “ultimate check” of citizens holding the Governor accountable at the ballot box.
Id. at 812-13 (citations omitted).
While not identical to the safeguards discussed in Acree, the General
Assembly instilled procedural safeguards and constitutionally delegated legislative
power via KRS 83A.065 and KRS 67C.101. Both statutes vest legislative power
within a municipality’s local legislative body, and members of those legislative
bodies are elected by the municipality’s citizens; thus, the local legislatures are
held “accountable at the ballot box.” KRS 83A.040(4); KRS 83A.060(6); KRS
67C.103(1)-(13); see Acree, 615 S.W.3d at 813.
6 The “enunciation of criteria” prong stems from the intelligible principle standard. See Acree, 615 S.W.3d 810-12 (“the intelligible principle enunciated by the General Assembly and the legislative criteria pertinent to the use of emergency powers are set forth in [the statute] quoted above.”) (emphasis added).
-17- The ordinances are published in a public code or made public through
other means. KRS 83A.060(8); KRS 67C.103(10). This satisfies any public notice
safeguard requirement. See Acree, 615 S.W.3d at 811-12.
Additionally, KRS 83A.065 is a safeguard in itself because it
specifically details the procedures and limitations that a local legislature must
adhere to when affixing a penalty for an ordinance violation. Consequently,
LMCO § 135.99 sets the penalty for a violation of LMCO § 135.03 in precisely a
manner that KRS 83A.065(2) permits.
Furthermore, when a violation of an ordinance is made criminal
through KRS 83A.065(2), that violation must “be prosecuted in the District Courts
of the Commonwealth [by] [t]he county attorney[.]” KRS 83A.065(8). That
procedural safeguard protects against any concern that an ordinance made a
misdemeanor through KRS 83A.065 cannot be checked by the other branches of
our state government. See Acree, 615 S.W.3d at 812-13.
Finally, while there is no “time limit on the duration” of an ordinance
once it is properly enacted, if an ordinance were inconsistent with a statute, then
KY. CONST. § 156b, KRS 67C.101(3)(i), and KRS 83A.060(11) would render that
statute invalid. See 615 S.W.3d at 812. Thus, the General Assembly retains the
power to supplant any ordinance created via KRS 83A.065 and KRS 67C.101.
-18- In Acree, our Supreme Court reiterated that “given the realities of
modern rule-making a legislative body has neither the time nor the expertise to do
it all; it must have help.” Id. at 810 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Judicial Form Ret. Sys.
v. Attorney General, 132 S.W.3d 770, 781 (Ky. 2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We share that sentiment here and recognize that different municipalities
will create different ordinances because they face unique problems, which “require
different responses[.]” See id. at 811. Presumably, that is precisely why the
General Assembly granted municipalities broad powers to create ordinances, while
setting procedures and limitations on affixing penalties for ordinance violations
and retaining its power to oust ordinances if need be. See id. at 805 (citing
Cornelison, 52 S.W.3d at 572) (We presume that “the challenged statutes were
enacted by the legislature in accordance with constitutional requirements.”).
Marshall has not shown a “constitutional infringement [that is] ‘clear,
complete and unmistakable[.]’” Id. at 805-06 (quoting Caneyville Volunteer Fire
Dep’t, 286 S.W.3d at 806). KRS 83A.065(2) and KRS 67C.101 do not conflict
with KRS 500.020(1), and the General Assembly provided appropriate safeguards
when it delegated its legislative power through those statutes. Thus, we hold that,
through the General Assembly’s constitutional delegation of its legislative power,
Louisville Metro lawfully enacted LMCO §§ 135.03 and 135.99, and the
ordinances are enforceable.
-19- CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
remanding the matter to the Jefferson District Court to continue Marshall’s
prosecution under LMCO §§ 135.03 and 135.99.
ALL CONCUR.
-20- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jennifer E. Hubbard Russell Coleman Louisville, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew F. Kuhn Solicitor General Shawn D. Chapman Deputy Solicitor General Jacob M. Abrahamson Assistant Solicitor General Frankfort, Kentucky
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FOR LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT:
Mike O’Connell Jefferson County Attorney
Kathryn Meador Mark Barry Louisville, Kentucky
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FOR THE KENTUCKY LEAGUE OF CITIES:
Megan J. Griffith Morgain M. Patterson Lexington, Kentucky
-21-