OPINION
STOWERS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated. Bachmeier requested a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure, as is permitted by the foreclosure statute.1 Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which included foreclosure costs that were not attorney's fees or court costs, the only items the foreclosure statute expressly mentions as recoverable in a reinstatement amount. Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm aiding in the foreclosure), and Richard Ullstrom (an attorney employed by Routh Crabtree Olsen),2 alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA).3 Ba-chmeier also argued that her deed of trust did not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the inclusion of the foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and that the UTPA applied to nonjudicial foreclosures. Alaska Trustee petitioned for review. We granted review on two questions: (1) the seope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and (2) whether the UTPA applies to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.
We hold that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be returned to its status quo ante when the borrower reinstates after a default, Alaska Trustee can include in Bachmeier's reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier's deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs. We further hold that the UTPA does not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2007 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier executed a note and deed of trust in favor of Richard Waner to secure the $80,000 balance due on her purchase of a residential condominium from Waner. In March 2009 Bachmeier defaulted on her payment obligations under the note and deed of trust. At Waner's request, Alaska Trustee began a nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosure. Bachmeier contacted Alaska Trustee and requested a quote for the amount she needed to pay to stop the foreclosure and reinstate her loan under the foreclosure statute. This statute gives a defaulting borrower the right to cure the default anytime before the sale "by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default."4
[3] Alaska Trustee responded with a quote that included all the costs it had incurred pursuing the nonjudicial foreclosure. The reinstatement quote itemized the costs and showed that most of them were not attorney's fees or court costs. The total reinstatement amount was $6,720.40, $2,315.40 of which was for foreclosure expenses. Of these expenses, $1,500 was labeled as attorney's fees, but these fees were for work done by Alaska Trustee, not by an attorney.
Bachmeier paid the sum under protest and then sued Alaska Trustee. Bachmeier requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. She argued that Alaska Trustee had violated the UTPA and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)5 by: (1) including fees that were not attorney's fees or court costs as permitted by the foreclosure statute; (2) failing to provide Bachmeier with the correct amount needed for reinstatement; (8) not adequately describing Bachmeier's breach when informing her it was foreclosing on her home; and (4) not informing Bachmeier that she had a right to stop the foreclosure by paying the reinstatement amount. Bachmeier moved for partial summary judgment. Alaska Trustee filed a cross-motion for complete summary judgment, arguing that its actions were "governed by neither the [UTPA] [njor [the] FDCPA," and that both the deed of trust and the foreclosure statute permitted the inclusion in the reinstatement amount of all foreclosure costs.
Superior Court Judge Sharon Gleason heard oral arguments and issued both oral and written decisions granting partial summary judgment in favor of Bachmeier. The court ruled that the inclusion of foreclosure costs was impermissible because "[it is a violation of AS 34.20.070(b) for [Alaska Trustee] to add on to a homeowner's 'reinstatement' amount fees that are not due and payable to a lawyer or law firm." The court further held that the UTPA applies to "nonjudicial foreclosures of a borrower's residence." The court ultimately denied summary judgment on the other issues because it believed genuine issues of material fact existed.
Alaska Trustee petitioned this court for review, and we granted review on two issues: "the scope of permissible charges to be included in the 'cure' (reinstatement amount) given to homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures under AS 34.20.070(b)" and "whether Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act ([UTPA)]) applies to non-judicial foreclosures." 6
III STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and making all reasonable inferences in its favor.7 Summary judgment will be upheld if there is no genuine issue of material fact.8 Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law to which we apply our independent judgment.9 "We interpret Alaska law 'according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the drafters.' " 10
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Alaska Statute 34.20.070(b) Allows For The Inclusion Of All Reasonable Foreclosure Costs In The Reinstatement Amount.
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OPINION
STOWERS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated. Bachmeier requested a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure, as is permitted by the foreclosure statute.1 Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which included foreclosure costs that were not attorney's fees or court costs, the only items the foreclosure statute expressly mentions as recoverable in a reinstatement amount. Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm aiding in the foreclosure), and Richard Ullstrom (an attorney employed by Routh Crabtree Olsen),2 alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA).3 Ba-chmeier also argued that her deed of trust did not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the inclusion of the foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and that the UTPA applied to nonjudicial foreclosures. Alaska Trustee petitioned for review. We granted review on two questions: (1) the seope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and (2) whether the UTPA applies to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.
We hold that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be returned to its status quo ante when the borrower reinstates after a default, Alaska Trustee can include in Bachmeier's reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier's deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs. We further hold that the UTPA does not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2007 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier executed a note and deed of trust in favor of Richard Waner to secure the $80,000 balance due on her purchase of a residential condominium from Waner. In March 2009 Bachmeier defaulted on her payment obligations under the note and deed of trust. At Waner's request, Alaska Trustee began a nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosure. Bachmeier contacted Alaska Trustee and requested a quote for the amount she needed to pay to stop the foreclosure and reinstate her loan under the foreclosure statute. This statute gives a defaulting borrower the right to cure the default anytime before the sale "by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default."4
[3] Alaska Trustee responded with a quote that included all the costs it had incurred pursuing the nonjudicial foreclosure. The reinstatement quote itemized the costs and showed that most of them were not attorney's fees or court costs. The total reinstatement amount was $6,720.40, $2,315.40 of which was for foreclosure expenses. Of these expenses, $1,500 was labeled as attorney's fees, but these fees were for work done by Alaska Trustee, not by an attorney.
Bachmeier paid the sum under protest and then sued Alaska Trustee. Bachmeier requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. She argued that Alaska Trustee had violated the UTPA and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)5 by: (1) including fees that were not attorney's fees or court costs as permitted by the foreclosure statute; (2) failing to provide Bachmeier with the correct amount needed for reinstatement; (8) not adequately describing Bachmeier's breach when informing her it was foreclosing on her home; and (4) not informing Bachmeier that she had a right to stop the foreclosure by paying the reinstatement amount. Bachmeier moved for partial summary judgment. Alaska Trustee filed a cross-motion for complete summary judgment, arguing that its actions were "governed by neither the [UTPA] [njor [the] FDCPA," and that both the deed of trust and the foreclosure statute permitted the inclusion in the reinstatement amount of all foreclosure costs.
Superior Court Judge Sharon Gleason heard oral arguments and issued both oral and written decisions granting partial summary judgment in favor of Bachmeier. The court ruled that the inclusion of foreclosure costs was impermissible because "[it is a violation of AS 34.20.070(b) for [Alaska Trustee] to add on to a homeowner's 'reinstatement' amount fees that are not due and payable to a lawyer or law firm." The court further held that the UTPA applies to "nonjudicial foreclosures of a borrower's residence." The court ultimately denied summary judgment on the other issues because it believed genuine issues of material fact existed.
Alaska Trustee petitioned this court for review, and we granted review on two issues: "the scope of permissible charges to be included in the 'cure' (reinstatement amount) given to homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures under AS 34.20.070(b)" and "whether Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act ([UTPA)]) applies to non-judicial foreclosures." 6
III STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and making all reasonable inferences in its favor.7 Summary judgment will be upheld if there is no genuine issue of material fact.8 Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law to which we apply our independent judgment.9 "We interpret Alaska law 'according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the drafters.' " 10
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Alaska Statute 34.20.070(b) Allows For The Inclusion Of All Reasonable Foreclosure Costs In The Reinstatement Amount.
A borrower who defaults has a right to cure the default anytime before the sale [4] "by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default."11 Bachmeier argues that this statute does not allow for the inclusion in the reinstatement amount of any costs besides attorney's fees or court costs and that Alaska Trustee violated the statute by including costs that were neither attorney's fees nor court costs. Alaska Trustee contends that the phrase "sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred" includes the costs the trustee incurred in processing the foreclosure before the reinstatement.
In Hagberg v. Alaska National Bank, a bank challenged the constitutionality of the foreclosure statute's redemption provision on the grounds that, as applied, it violated the United States Constitution's Contract Clause, which forbids any state from passing a law that alters existing contracts in ways that "unreasonably affect the value" of the contractual rights.12 We held the statute did not violate the Contract Clause as applied because the borrower "must still pay the principal and interest and, in case of default, the beneficiary is still entitled to foreclosure and to his costs."13 We concluded that the foreclosure statute's redemption provision "does not reduce the value of a beneficiary's note or the security ensuring payment in any perceptible way" because the lender is only "deprived of his right to insist on payment of the entire debt as a condition to stopping the non-judicial foreclosure process where the overdue amount is brought current and costs are paid." 14
Though Hagberg does not explicitly state which costs must be paid to reinstate a loan, logically, in order for the uncompleted foreclosure not to financially harm the beneficiary, all of the reasonable costs the beneficiary incurred in pursuing the foreclosure must be repaid. Otherwise, each time the borrower redeems a defaulted loan, which the statute allows twice before the borrower loses the right of redemption,15 the lender would lose money spent on the uncompleted foreclosure. Before the foreclosure statute was enacted, a lender would have to pay the costs for only one foreclosure during the life of a loan; now under AS 34.20.070(b) it might have to pay the costs for as many as three foreclosures-a more expensive prospect.16 Thus, as we held in Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC, because Hagberg established that parties must be returned "to their status quo prior to the default," "the costs of non-judicial foreclosure, other than attorney's fees and court costs," may be included in the sum in default, "in so far as it is necessary to return the parties to their status quo ante." 17 In Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC, we reaffirmed this holding, explaining that "relief from forfeiture by reinstatement places the lender and borrower in the 'position they were before default, " and that "only through the inclusion of [nonjudicial] foreclosure fees in the reinstatement amount would the parties be in 'their status quo prior to default.? " 18
Kuretich and Albrecht involved situations very similar to Bachmeier's. In both cases a borrower whose mortgage had entered default challenged the inclusion in the reinstatement amounts of foreclosure costs that were neither attorney's fees nor court costs.19 We held these foreclosure costs were properly included in the reinstatement amount.20
[5] Notwithstanding these similarities, Ba-chmeier argues that Kuretich and Albrecht are not controlling here because in both cases the deeds of trust "expressly permitted recovery of all non-judicial foreclosure costs as part of the reinstatement amount," (emphasis in original) and Bachmeier's deed of trust does not provide for the reinstatement amount to include anything besides "monthly mortgage payments, attorney's fees, and court costs. Bachmeier contends that because there are "no express terms in the Bachmeier deed of trust and promissory note that allow anything more than" these limited costs, no other costs from the uncompleted foreclosure can be included in her reinstatement amount.
Bachmeier's argument misconstrues our holdings in Kuretich and Albrecht. Assuming without deciding that Bachmeier's deed of trust does not expressly allow all nonjudicial foreclosure costs to be included in the reinstatement amount, Alaska Trustee may still include all reasonable foreclosure costs because the beneficiary has a right to be returned to its "status quo ante" each time a borrower's loan is reinstated.21 The foreclosure costs do not need to be contracted for in the deed of trust because their inclusion is provided for by the foreclosure statute.22 In Hagberg we did not find the statute to be constitutional because the parties could, if they desired, contract for their status quo ante. Rather, we held that the law itself restores parties to their status quo ante and "does not reduce the value of a beneficiary's note or the security ensuring payment in any perceptible way."23 Indeed, because the deed of trust in Hagberg did not provide for reinstatement at all, it did not specify which costs could be included in reinstatement.24 We nonetheless held that the foreclosure statute's redemption provision would not affect the value of the contract because in order to reinstate the loan, "costs are paid" by the borrower.25 Therefore, whether the parties included a provision in Bachmeiler's deed of trust allowing all reasonable foreclosure costs to be included in the reinstatement amount is irrelevant.
Bachmeier further argues that even if she is liable for all foreclosure costs in the case of default, because her deed of trust does not state that these costs can be included in her reinstatement amount, Alaska Trustee must allow her to reinstate her loan without paying the foreclosure costs,, and then it can initiate a lawsuit in court to collect them. But this arrangement would defeat the purpose of the nonjudicial foreclosure statute-avoiding expensive legal costs and alleviating congestion in the courts. We reiterate that AS 34.20.070(b) and our decisions in Hagberg, Kuretich, and Albrecht allow for the inclusion of all reasonable foreclosure costs in a reinstatement amount. It was error for the superior court to grant partial summary judgment on this issue to Bachmeier, and we reverse that decision.
B. The UTPA Does Not Apply To Alaska Trustee's Nonjudicial Foreclosure Of Bachmeier's Deed Of Trust.
Bachmeier argues that Alaska Trustee violated the UTPA by "deceptively padding her reinstatement amount." Alaska Trustee counters that the UTPA does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosures. The superior court agreed with Bachmeier and granted partial summary judgment on the issue.
For the past thirty years we have consistently held that "the sale of real property is not within the regulatory scope of the [UTPA]." 26 In State v. First National Bank of Anchorage, we held that the UTPA does not apply to "real property" because "the Act is directed solely at regulating transactions involving products and services sold to con[6] sumers in the popular sense." 27
In Barber v. National Bank of Alaska, we held that a home loan is not a good or a service. In that case, the borrower stopped making payments on his loan and the servi-cer eventually foreclosed on the property.28 The borrower sued, alleging violations of the UTPA.29 The borrower argued that "the mortgage ... was a 'good, or alternatively, that the mortgage and the subsequent servicing arrangements were a provision of 'services'" 30 We held that the UTPA did not apply to the borrower's home loan because a "loan is not a 'good' under the [UTPA]." 31 Because the servicer's "principal business [was] not debt collection," the servi-cer was not an independent debt collector providing a service either.32 Accordingly, we held as a matter of law that the loan was neither a good nor a service and that "the [UTPA] does not apply to mortgage[s]." 33
We reiterated our holding that the Act covers only "goods or services," not real property, in Aloha Lumber Corporation v. University of Alaska.34 In Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc., we explained again that "sales and services involving real estate [are distinct] from those involving other property and services" and that "real estate transactions were not intended to be covered by the [UTPA]." 35
In 2011 we held, onee again, that the UTPA does not cover real estate transactions.36 We noted that "the legislature responded to our holding in Barber and chose to include certain mortgage practices within the UTPA," but that "the legislature has not amended [the UTPA] to include real estate transactions ... despite our clear statement in Western Star Trucks that real estate transactions fall outside the UTPA's scope." 37 We rejected the argument that a landlord is a "provider of consumer services," 38 and held that a lease is more akin to a real property transaction than a service.39
Despite this abundance of precedent, Ba-chmeier contends that two recent amendments to the UTPA, one in 2004 40 and one in 2007,41 overturned our holding in Barber and extended the protections of the UTPA to some nonjudicial foreclosures. But the 2007 amendment-which extended the UTPA's definition of an unfair practice to include violations of AS 06.60.3840, the Mortgage Lending Regulation Act 42-does not apply to Alaska Trustee.43 And the 2004 amendment, which defined goods or services to include "goods or services provided in connection with ... a transaction involving an indebted[7] ness secured by the borrower's residence," 44 also does not help Bachmeier. The 2004 amendment elaborated what types of goods and services are covered by the Act, but did not change the longstanding definition of goods and services itself-a definition that has never encompassed real property transactions.
"When interpreting a statute, [we] look[ ] to three factors: the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the legislative purpose behind the statute." 45 We have "rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule," and adopted an approach where "the plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be." 46
Notably, the 2004 amendment includes only "goods or services provided in connection with ... a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence." 47 Confirming UTPA coverage for "goods or services" transactions involving indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence does not eliminate the requirement that the transaction must still be for "goods or services."48 And we have consistently defined "goods or services" as excluding transactions involving real property.49 Thus, the amendment does not expand UTPA coverage to real property transactions.
The legislative history does not lead us to conclude otherwise. The 2004 amendment originated in House Bill 15, which was intended to establish a "no-call" list for Alaska.50 The original title for the Bill was:
An Act relating to establishing the Alaska No-Call list, a database of residential telephone eustomers who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations; requiring telephonic sellers and paid solicitors to purchase the database; requiring telephonic sellers to identify themselves; requiring telephonic solicitors who are otherwise exempt from registration as telephonic solicitors to file with the Department of Law and pay the database access fee; and providing for an effective date."