ALAN GOMEZ v. FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

ALAN GOMEZ,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-2000-KCD-NPM

v.

FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH,

Respondents. /

ORDER Petitioner Alan Gomez is a Cuban citizen with a final removal order. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) apparently could not deport him at the time, so he was released on an order of supervision. After spending decades living in the community under supervision, Gomez was returned to immigration custody on March 22, 2026. He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment and asks this Court to order his immediate release. (Docs. 4, 14.)1 The Government opposes the petition (Doc. 17.). For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. I. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). II. Discussion Invoking the Fifth Amendment, Gomez claims that he has been detained beyond the bounds of what substantive due process allows. (Doc.

14.) The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still

here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious

constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that

period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).

Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

ICE took Gomez into custody on March 22, 2026. Because he has been detained for less than six months, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. Seemingly recognizing this, the habeas petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that his

removal is not likely. (Doc. 14 at 10.) But that argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8

(S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”).

Gomez attempts another workaround. He argues that the six-month reasonable detention period is cumulative, starting when his removal order became final back in 2004. (Doc. 14 at 8.) Using that calculus, the six-month period has long since passed.

This argument makes little sense. Zadvydas was aimed at the severe, physical deprivation of liberty that comes from sitting in a jail cell indefinitely. The Court “used the words ‘detain’ and ‘custody’ to refer exclusively to physical confinement and restraint.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 311.

Against that backdrop, it is illogical to run a clock designed to prevent indefinite imprisonment while a person is out living freely in the community. “Because Zadvydas clearly involved detention of a petitioner during the presumptively reasonable period, it defies common sense to suggest that

Zadvydas time can run while a petitioner is not in custody.” Cheng Ke Chen v. Holder, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (N.D. Ala. 2011). The six-month clock measures actual lockup, not supervised freedom. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 (“[I]n order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien ... must show

post-removal order detention in excess of six months [and] also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (emphasis added).) Gomez also points to earlier periods of detention, seemingly arguing that the Court should aggregate his past and present stints in ICE custody.

(Doc. 14 at 8-9.) By combining these distinct periods of confinement, Gomez contends that his total time in civil immigration detention exceeds the six- month threshold, which he asserts is sufficient to trigger Zadvydas review. This Court has already addressed these arguments and rejected them for the

same reasons they fail today. See Rodriguez v. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, No. 2:26-CV-1043-KCD-DNF, 2026 WL 1156079, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2026). As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “detention during

deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. So the executive branch gets a presumptively reasonable six-month runway to do its job, negotiate with foreign governments, and execute a final removal order. Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

at 701. Because Gomez remains inside that window, his current custody does not cross the line into the kind of indefinite, arbitrary lockup the Fifth Amendment forbids. Until that clock actually runs out, the Government retains the constitutional authority to hold him.

III. Conclusion Gomez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 17, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge