Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Eagerton

541 F. Supp. 1084, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9474
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedMay 17, 1982
DocketCiv. A. 80-300-N
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 541 F. Supp. 1084 (Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Eagerton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Eagerton, 541 F. Supp. 1084, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9474 (M.D. Ala. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HOBBS, District Judge.

Plaintiff railroad companies brought this action against the Commissioner of Revenue and Assistant Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Alabama seeking (1) a declaration that the State’s railroad license tax, § 40-21-57, Code of Alabama, 1 discriminates against rail carriers in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11503, 2 and (2) an order enjoining the defendants from the further collection of the challenged license tax. A nonjury trial was held April 30, 1982. For the reasons set out below, the Court finds the Alabama railroad license tax to discriminate against rail carriers in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11503 and thus grants plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief.

FACTS

The pertinent facts are fully described in the Court’s prior opinion in this cause, which is found at 501 F.Supp. 1044. In that opinion the Court held the challenged license tax to be beyond the scope of § 11503 because the Court interpreted that statute to prohibit only the imposition of discriminatory state property taxes and not other state taxes such as the license tax at issue. However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this Court’s decision, remanding the case for a determination whether Alabama’s railroad license tax discriminates against rail carriers. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d *1086 1036 (11th Cir. 1981). On remand, the parties have entered into an “Amended Stipulation of Facts,” which is attached to this opinion as Appendix 1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Before reaching the question whether the railroad license tax discriminates against rail carriers, the Court must first determine the relevant class or classes of taxpayers to which the rail carriers are to be compared and the pertinent aspects of the State’s tax structure to be considered. Defendants argue that the entire tax structure of the State of Alabama must be considered. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the entire tax structure need not be considered and that the relevant class of taxpayers to be considered in determining whether discrimination exists under 49 U.S.C. § 11503 is the class of commercial and industrial taxpayers.

Even though § 11503(b)(4) does not specifically identify the relevant class or classes of taxpayers, §§ (1), (2), and (3) of 11503(b) establish commercial and industrial property as the standard by which ad valorem tax discrimination against rail carriers must be measured. Defendants have failed to suggest a class or classes of taxpayers which would serve as a more relevant class for comparison purposes. In light of the clear indication found in the body of § 11503(b) that commercial and industrial taxpayers are to be considered in determining whether a tax discriminates against rail carriers, the Court finds that the class of commercial and industrial taxpayers is the relevant class to which rail carriers are to be compared under § 11503(b)(4).

Defendants’ argument that the entire tax structure of the State of Alabama must be considered is not persuasive. In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 99 S.Ct. 1629, 60 L.Ed.2d 106 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected New Mexico’s contention that the entire tax structure of the State should be considered in deciding whether an energy tax on the privilege of generating electricity within New Mexico was in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 391, which prohibits the imposition of a tax on the generation or transmission of electricity that discriminates against out-of-state consumers. Likewise, in Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1981), the Eighth Circuit ruled that the entire tax structure of the State of North Dakota should not be considered in determining whether that State violated § 11503(b)(4) by including personal property and trade fixtures in the assessed value of railroad property when the personal property of other businesses was exempt from ad valorem property taxation. In so ruling the Eighth Circuit remarked:

“As noted in our review of the history of this section, its purpose was to prevent tax discrimination against railroads in any form whatsoever. Congress rejected a proposed section of the bill which would have granted an exemption to states with a constitution providing for a ‘reasonable classification of property.’ North Dakota’s rationalization that they have an equitable tax system because of a business privilege tax is nothing more than an attempt to resurrect, in a different form, an exemption from § 306 for states with a ‘reasonable classification of property.’ Congress did not accept the proposal and this court will not accept it.” Id. at 210.

These decisions of the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals are persuasive to the Court that the entire tax structure of the State of Alabama should not be considered in this case. Instead, the Court finds that the Alabama railroad license tax must be compared to business license taxes imposed upon other commercial and industrial taxpayers to determine whether the railroad license taxes is violative of § 11503(b)(4).

At the trial of this cause plaintiffs presented the expert testimony of Walter Hellerstein, a recognized expert in the field of state and local taxation. Mr. Hellerstein testified that, when compared to the modest flat fee license tax imposed on the majority of other businesses, the Alabama railroad license tax clearly discriminates against rail carriers. Mr. Hellerstein remarked that no *1087 commercial or industrial taxpayer other than utilities is subject to more than twenty thousand dollars in Alabama license taxes, while rail carriers are annually subject to three hundred fifty times that amount under the Alabama railroad license tax.

Defendants did not offer any witnesses at trial or present any evidence that the Alabama railroad license tax is not discriminatory, but instead objected to Mr. Heller-stein’s testimony on the ground that it was inadmissible because it embraced the ultimate issue to be decided by the Court. The defendants’ objection was overruled at trial, see Rule 704, Federal Rules of Evidence. Based on plaintiffs’ uncontroverted expert testimony and the amended stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, the Court concludes that the Alabama railroad license tax imposed by § 40-21-57, Code of Alabama, discriminates against rail carriers in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11503(b)(4).

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541 F. Supp. 1084, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9474, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alabama-great-southern-railroad-co-v-eagerton-almd-1982.