Al Vaughn, Marjorie Vaughn, Algon Corporation and Springfield Drive-Ins, Inc. v. General Foods Corporation and Burger Chef Systems, Inc.

797 F.2d 1403
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 9, 1986
Docket85-1847
StatusPublished
Cited by59 cases

This text of 797 F.2d 1403 (Al Vaughn, Marjorie Vaughn, Algon Corporation and Springfield Drive-Ins, Inc. v. General Foods Corporation and Burger Chef Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Al Vaughn, Marjorie Vaughn, Algon Corporation and Springfield Drive-Ins, Inc. v. General Foods Corporation and Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 797 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1986).

Opinion

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

In 1982, plaintiffs A1 Vaughn, Marjorie Vaughn, Algon Corporation, and Springfield Drive-Ins, Inc. (Vaughns) instituted this diversity action against General Foods Corporation and Burger Chef Systems, Inc. (the Company) claiming that they had been fraudulently induced to invest in Burger Chef franchises. The Vaughns claimed that Burger Chef engaged in a ten-year plan to dispose of its business (the System) while representing to its franchisees that it planned to build the System into a “fast food contender.” Following a jury trial on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, 1 a verdict was entered for the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 59. The district judge denied the motion. For the reasons detailed below, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

I

The Vaughns’ relationship with Burger Chef began in 1963 when they opened their first Burger Chef fast food restaurant in the St. Louis, Missouri area. By 1967, the Vaughns owned and operated five Burger Chef restaurants and, in 1970, they acquired a sixth. In 1968, General Foods entered the hamburger fast food market by *1405 acquiring the Burger Chef chain as a wholly-owned subsidiary for $16 million and the assumption of substantial preexisting liabilities. The business did not, however, proceed according to General Foods’ expectations. Accordingly, in 1971, General Foods, as a result of significant losses, wrote down $80 million of its investment in Burger Chef. This write down was widely publicized and was well known to Burger Chef’s franchisees. As a result of the write down, some 460 franchised and company-owned stores were closed, and General Foods considered selling its Burger Chef operation which consisted of the 908 remaining restaurants. However, no buyer could be found. Therefore, instead of selling the Burger Chef operation at that time, General Foods decided to “manage the loss” and shifted its focus to developing its “heartland” market in the Midwest. As part of its new strategy, General Foods discontinued its former practice of guaranteeing leases for franchisees and diminished the amounts of capital it infused into the System. The new strategy did not, however, yield the return that the Company had anticipated. Continuing financial difficulties caused the Company to begin voluntarily to waive and abate franchise fees.

In December 1975, General Foods commissioned the consulting firm of Booz-Allen & Hamilton to analyze the Company’s marketing strategy. As a result of that firm’s recommendations, another new plan was developed. Among the facets of that strategy were recruitment of new management experienced in the hamburger fast food industry and minimization of the risks of the franchise operation. In order to implement this new approach, General Foods hired Terrance Collins, an expert in the hamburger fast food industry, from McDonald’s to serve as president and chief operating officer of Burger Chef. In August 1978, the Company’s financial department devised a study on the salability of the Burger Chef System. This study, codenamed “Project Beethoven,” indicated that Burger Chef was now ranked fourth in the hamburger fast food market and that it still held second place in its “heartland” markets.

In late 1980, General Foods contracted with Goldman Sachs, an investment banking firm, to review its options with respect to Burger Chef. Goldman Sachs advised General Foods that the value of the System was unlikely to deteriorate and that they should reconsider selling the System after 1981. Goldman Sachs’ reasoning was that, if the new strategy worked and the business turned around, its profitability would make it more salable. This reasoning would appear to have been sound. In 1981, Burger Chef finally showed a profit and, in summer 1981, General Foods received an unsolicited inquiry concerning the purchase of the System. Several months of negotiations resulted in the December 1981 agreement to sell Burger Chef to Hardee’s, a competing chain. By the time that the System was sold to Hardee’s for $43.5 million, General Foods had infused between $45 and $70 million in capital into the System in addition to the purchase price.

Shortly after the sale was consummated, the Vaughns instituted suit in the district court alleging that the defendants had violated the antitrust laws, had breached their fiduciary duties to the Vaughns, and had fraudulently misrepresented their intentions with respect to the Burger Chef System. On June 30, 1983, the Vaughns filed a first amended complaint, which contained claims only for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and punitive damages. The breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims were dismissed at the close of the plaintiffs’ case.

At trial, the Vaughns attempted to prove that various statements made by General Foods and certain omissions, coupled with assertions contained in brochures and trade publications, created a false impression in the minds of the Vaughns and other franchisees that the System was viable and that it was supported fully by General Foods. According to the Vaughns, these statements and omissions constitute actionable fraud. Specifically, the Vaughns point to statements made in certain written doc *1406 uments. At trial, Mr. Vaughn testified that, in or around 1970, he became aware of these undated publications which reflected the Company’s intent to expand its franchise operation. Tr. 827. One such document, an undated brochure designed to woo prospective franchisees to open a Burger Chef restaurant, stated:

WHY BURGER CHEF?
A Burger Chef Restaurant franchise gives you the opportunity to be an independent business person while still being a part of a proven system. As a franchisee, you’ll enjoy the full support and backing of one of the largest hamburger fast-food chains in the nation. Our plans call for aggressive but controlled growth, and a big part of our plan includes bringing new franchisees into the system.
* * * * * *
As a wholly owned subsidiary of General Foods Corporation, Burger Chef Systems, Inc. has the financial stability which this multi-billion dollar, international food corporation brings to it.
Yet Burger Chef remains an independent, autonomous corporate entity which is managed and directed by seasoned executives with many years of experience in the fast-food industry.

Plaintiffs’ Ex. 762 at 5. The brochure also stated that the franchisor would provide the franchisee with a wide variety of support services:

GETTING YOU STARTED
Once your franchise application is approved, Burger Chef Systems will implement a systemized program to help you get your restaurant open and operating with the greatest possible ease.

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Bluebook (online)
797 F.2d 1403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/al-vaughn-marjorie-vaughn-algon-corporation-and-springfield-drive-ins-ca7-1986.