Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.

494 F. Supp. 2d 34, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47598, 2007 WL 1875902
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJune 29, 2007
DocketCivil Action 06-11109-RWZ
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 494 F. Supp. 2d 34 (Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 34, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47598, 2007 WL 1875902 (D. Mass. 2007).

Opinion

ORDER REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

ZOBEL, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Akamai Technologies, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (collectively “Akamai”) allege that defendant Limelight Networks, Inc. (“Limelight”) has infringed (1) United States Patent No. 6,108,703 (“the '703 Patent”), a “Global Hosting System;” (2) United States Patent No. 6,553,413 (“the '413 Patent”), a “Content Delivery Network Using Edge-of-Network Servers for Providing Content Delivery to a Set of Participating Content Providers;” and (3) United States Patent No. 7,103,645 (“the '645 Patent”), a “Method and System for Providing Content Delivery to a Set of Participating Content Providers” (collectively, the “Aka-mai Patents”). The three patents share a common specification; only the claims differ between them. The common Abstract describes the invention as an “inventive framework” that “allows a Content Provider to replicate and serve its most popular content at an unlimited number of points throughout the world.” (Akamai Patents, Abstract.) The parties dispute the construction of a total of seventeen claim terms from the three patents.

II. Legal Standard

The construction of patent claims is a matter of law for this court to decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). “[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” in other words, “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed.Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (describing the focus in construing disputed terms as applying an objective test of the term’s meaning to “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time” and not a consideration of the subjective intent of the parties creating the patent contract). However, the presumption that words are given their ordinary meaning may be overcome if the patent specification or prosecution history “clearly and deliberately set[s] forth” a different meaning. K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.Cir.1999).

The scope and meaning of a patent’s claims must be ascertained in the context of the specification and the prose *39 cution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. While limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims, a patent is a “fully integrated written document” and the “claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79; see also Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“claims may be no broader than the supporting disclosure, and therefore [ ] a narrow disclosure will limit claim breadth”).

The Federal Circuit has refused to endorse a bright-line rule limiting the scope of the claims to the embodiment disclosed when only a single embodiment is described in the specification. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2002). However, “when the preferred embodiment is described in the specification as the invention itself, the claims are not necessarily entitled to a scope broader than that embodiment.” Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed.Cir.1996), abrogated on other grounds, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.Cir.2000) (en banc); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“In light of those clear statements in the specification that the invention (‘the present system’) is directed to communications ‘over a standard telephone line,’ we cannot read the claims of [the patents at issue] to encompass data transmission over a packet-switched network.... ”). In addition, statements in the “Summary of the Invention” portion of the specification “are not limited to describing a preferred embodiment, but more broadly describe the overall inventions of [the] patents.” Multi-Tech Systems, 357 F.3d at 1348.

III. Claim Construction and Discussion

Having considered in light of the applicable legal standard the parties’ written submissions as well as the argument of counsel at a hearing held on May 17, 2007, the court construes the disputed claim terms as follows:

A. '645 Patent Terms in Dispute

1. Term 1 ('645 Patent, Claim 1)
Term Court’s Construction
... a given object of a par-tieipating content provider is associated with an alphanumeric string ...
.,. a particular object of a participating content provider is associated with an alphanumeric string that includes the URL used to identify the object in the absence of a content delivery network ...

Akamai’s suggestion that the term “associated” be given its dictionary meaning 1 ignores the Federal Circuit’s warning in Phillips that “[t]he risk of systematic overbreadth is greatly reduced if the court [ ] focuses at the outset on how the patentee used the claim term in the claims, specification, and prosecution history, rather than starting with a broad definition and whittling it down.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321. The '645 Patent specification describes as the present invention a single embodiment in which the Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) used to retrieve an embedded object from the content provider’s server(s) in the absence of a content delivery network is modified by prepending it with a virtual server host-name:

“According to the present invention, a given Web page (comprising a base HTML document and a set of embedded objects) is served in a distributed manner .... To serve the page contents in

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Related

Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.
805 F.3d 1368 (Federal Circuit, 2015)

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494 F. Supp. 2d 34, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47598, 2007 WL 1875902, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/akamai-technologies-inc-v-limelight-networks-inc-mad-2007.