Ajaj v. United States of America

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided March 12, 2021·No. 3:14-cv-01245·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

AHMAD M. AJAJ, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 14-cv-01245-JPG ) WENDY ROAL, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GILBERT, District Judge: Now before the Court are the following: (a) Plaintiff’s First Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum and Order dated August 13, 2019 (Doc. 230) filed January 20, 2021 (Doc. 268); (b) Defendant Federal Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) Motion to Strike Fifth Amended Complaint filed August 20, 2020 (Doc. 259); and (c) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim filed on August 20, 2020 (Doc. 260). For the reasons set forth below, all three motions shall be GRANTED. As a result, the Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. 221) shall serve as the operative complaint. Count 1 shall proceed against Defendant Fozzard. Count 8 shall proceed against Defendants Fozzard, Roal, Hollingsworth, Parent, Baney, Irvin, Cardona, Winklmeier, Neumann, Szoke, Rivas, Alexander, and Howard. All other claims and parties are considered dismissed for the reasons already set forth in this Court’s prior Orders. Finally, to expedite this matter, the Court will schedule a status conference as soon as possible. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this lawsuit to complain about violations of his federal statutory and constitutional rights by the BOP and its employees. His claims arose from events that occurred at several federal institutions between May 1997 and May 2012. He asserted claims against the defendants pursuant to Bivens (Counts 1 through 7), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) (Count 8), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) (Count 9 through 12), as follows: Count 1: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim (Fozzard);

Count 2: Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim (Roal, Baney, and Parent);

Count 3: First Amendment free exercise claim (Roal, Hollingsworth, Baney, Parent, Roloff, Neumann, Fozzard, Rivas, Cardona, Irvin, and Howard);

Count 4: First Amendment retaliation claim (Fozzard, Roal, Parent, Baney, Cardona, Neumann, Szoke, Rivas, Alexander, Patterson, Winklmeier, and Howard);

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim (Szoke, Roal, Irvin, and Winklmeier);

Count 6: Fifth Amendment equal protection claim (Szoke, Fozzard, Rivas, Cardona, Neuman, Hollingsworth, Winklmeier, and Roal);

Count 7: Fifth Amendment due process claim (Roal, Baney, Parent, Neumann, Szoke, Winklmeier, Rivas, Cardona, Patterson, Alexander, and Howard);

Count 8: RFRA claim (Fozzard, Roal, Hollingsworth, Parent, Baney, Irvin, Cardona, Winklmeier, Neumann, Szoke, Rivas, Alexander, Roloff, and Howard);

Count 9: FTCA claim for hate crimes (Fozzard);

Count 10: FTCA claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Hollingsworth, Cardona, Irvin, Neumann, Rivas, Marla Patterson, Alexander, Szoke, Winklmeier, Roloff, and Howard);

Count 11: FTCA claim for battery (Fozzard); and

Count 12: FTCA claim for willful and wanton conduct (Roal, Hollingsworth, Winklmeier, Parent, Baney, Neumann, Rivas, Szoke, Roloff, and Cardona).

(See Docs. 1, 18, 146, 185, 221, and 258). To date, Plaintiff has submitted five versions of the complaint. The Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 185) prompted Defendants to file several motions to dismiss claims and parties. (See Docs. 200-205). Before disposing of the motions, Plaintiff requested and received permission to file a Fourth Amended Complaint voluntarily dismissing his FTCA claims (Counts 9 through 12). (See Docs. 217, 220-21). This narrowed the case to seven Bivens claims (Counts 1 through 7) and a RFRA claim (Count 8). On August 13, 2019, this Court entered a Memorandum and Order disposing of five motions to dismiss (Docs. 200-203, 205). (See Doc. 230). In the Order, the Court dismissed

Counts 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 (all with prejudice), as well as all claims against Defendant Roloff (with prejudice). (Id. at 5). Counts 1, 2, and 5 remained pending. (Id.). However, the Court subsequently entered an order disposing of two of these remaining claims in response to the motion to dismiss filed at Document 204. (See Doc. 255). In the Order, the Court dismissed Count 2 (without prejudice) on exhaustion grounds and Count 5 (with prejudice) on statute of limitations grounds. (Id.). Only Count 1 against Defendant Fozzard survived. (Id.). FIRST MOTION TO RECONSIDER (Doc. 268) Plaintiff now seeks reinstatement of Count 8 against Defendants Fozzard, Roal, Hollingsworth, Parent, Barney, Irvin, Cardona, Winklmeier, Neumann, Szoke, Rivas, Alexander,

and Howard. In support of the motion, Plaintiff relies on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir, -- U.S. --, 141 S.Ct. 486 (decided Dec. 10, 2020), holding that RFRA’s remedies provision permits litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Id. When considering this issue pre-Tanzin, this Court reached the opposite conclusion. (Doc. 230). RFRA authorizes a “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section [to] assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” Id. In the Memorandum and Order dated August 13, 2019, this Court noted that the question of whether money damages against an individual federal officer constitutes “appropriate relief” against “a government” remained unsettled. After considering the split of authority and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court sided with those courts which held that RFRA does not authorize money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. The Court dismissed Count 8 against all individual defendants. (Id.). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tanzin, Plaintiff asks the Court to allow

him to proceed with his RFRA claim against the individual federal officials. (Doc. 268). Defendants agree that this Court’s legal conclusion regarding the availability of money damages against these individuals was erroneous, but they maintain that the error was harmless. Defendants instead ask the Court to leave its decision undisturbed, after finding that qualified immunity shields the individuals from liability. (See Doc. 269). The Court has inherent authority to reconsider nonfinal orders, like the one at issue in Document 230. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties

and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The Supreme Court has explained that “every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983). According to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “nonfinal orders are generally modifiable.” Sims v. EGA Prods., Inc., 475 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2007). With that said, motions for reconsideration generally serve a limited purpose—“to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 4795702, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting Caisse v. Nationale de Credit Agricole v.

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