Aisenberg v. Campbell

1 P.3d 739, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2520, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 851, 2000 WL 575211
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedMay 15, 2000
DocketNo. 00SA49
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1 P.3d 739 (Aisenberg v. Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aisenberg v. Campbell, 1 P.3d 739, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2520, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 851, 2000 WL 575211 (Colo. 2000).

Opinion

Justice RICE

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this original proceeding brought pursuant to section 1-40-107(2), 1 C.R.S. (1999), Petitioner, Bennett S. Aisenberg, seeks review of the Initiative Title Setting Board's (Title Board or Board) February 2, 2000 action in fixing the title, ballot title and submission clause (titles), and summary for two proposed ballot initiatives designated "1999-2000 # 245(f)" and "1999-2000 # 245(g)" (Initiatives). The Initiatives propose to amend article VI of the Colorado Constitution by adding a new section 6, and to repeal several other provisions. Because we conclude that the Initiatives contain only one subject and the titles set by the Board clearly and correctly express the subject of the proposals, we affirm the action of the Title Board.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On January 21, 2000, Douglas Campbell and Mark Dorn, Proponents of Initiatives [742]*742245(f) and (g),1 (Proponents) submitted proposed Initiatives to the Title Board for the purpose of setting titles. On February 2, 2000, the Board fixed the titles. On February 9, 2000, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, alleging eleven deficiencies in the titles relating to the single-subject requirement and the clear titles requirement. On February 16, 2000, the Board heard Petitioner's motion, granted a rehearing on allegations 3, 8, and 10, denied rehearing on all others, and reset the titles. On February 22, 2000, Petitioner filed this petition for review with the court, asking us to find that the proposals contain more than one subject in violation of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution and that the titles fixed by the Board do not clearly, accurately, and fairly express the subject of the proposals. We address these concerns in turn.

II. Standard of Review

The Colorado Constitution reserves to the people the power to propose and enact amendments to the constitution. See Colo. Const. art. V, §§ 1(1), (2). Article 40 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, spanning sections 1-40-101 to -134, 1 C.R.S. (1999), governs the initiative process in Colorado. The legislative intent of article 40 primarily is to make the initiative process fair and impartial. See § 1-40-101; Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir.1994). To that end, the General Assembly has assigned to the Title Board the duties of designating and fixing a title and submission clause for each proposed law or constitutional amendment. See § 1-40-106(1). In fixing such titles, the Board is charged with considering whether a proposal addresses incongruous subjects in the same measure and rejecting any proposals that do so. If the Board determines that the proposal touches on a single subject, the Board then prepares a clear and concise summary of the proposal. See § 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(ID); see also In re 1999-2000 No. 29, 972 P.2d 257, 260 (Colo.1999).

Upon review, we treat the actions of the Board as presumptively valid. See In re 1999-2000 # 104, 987 P.2d 249, 254 (Colo.1999); Say v. Baker, 137 Colo. 155, 159, 322 P.2d 317, 319 (1958). We will not address the merits of a proposed initiative, interpret its language, or predict its application. See In re # 104, 987 P.2d at 254.

III. Single-Subject Requirement

The Board may not set the titles of a proposed initiative or submit it to the voters if it contains multiple subjects. See Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(5.5); In re # 104, 987 P.2d at 254. A proposed initiative violates the single-subject requirement if it has "at least two distinct and separate purposes which are not dependent upon or connected with each other." In re "Public Rights in Waters II.", 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Colo.1995).

Petitioner alleges that the proposed Initiatives violate the single-subject requirement on three separate grounds: (1) the section of the proposal prohibiting any "magistrate, commissioner, referree [sic], or other person who is not a judge" from serving in a case without the written consent of all parties affects personnel other than judicial officers; (2) this prohibition applies to personnel of the county court of the City and County of Denver; and (8) the repeal of sections 14 and 15 of article VI, relating to probate and juvenile courts, affects more than the qualifications of judicial officers. We address these challenges in turn.

A.

The proposed Initiatives state: "A magistrate, commissioner, referree [sic], or other person who is not a judge shall not serve without the written consent of all parties to a case." Petitioner argues that "[t]he inclusion of magistrates, referees, commissioners, and other persons not judges in the prohibition against service without written consent of all parties extends the prohibition to all court personnel, including clerks, bailiffs, and reporters, and has no connection to the subject of selection, retention, and removal of judicial officers."

[743]*743First, we note that the application of the prohibition to magistrates, commissioners, and referees2 clearly falls within the subject of the selection, retention, and removal of judicial officers. Petitioner does not contend otherwise. Magistrates perform some of the same functions that judges perform and are at all times subject to the direction and supervision of a chief or presiding judge. See C.R.M. 1.

Second, we find that the challenged language in the Initiatives does not encompass judicial employees such as clerks, bailiffs, and reporters, and therefore does not present a second subject. The "written consent" requirement clearly is limited to those individuals who by law are authorized to serve in a judicial capacity. Judicial personnel such as clerks, bailiffs, and reporters do not "serve" as judicial officers on any case. They are employees of the judicial branch who aid in the administration of the courts. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(8). As such, the Initiatives' requirement that written consent be obtained before a "magistrate, commissioner, referree [sic], or other person who is not a judge" serve on a case is not a second subject.

B.

Petitioner also alleges that the Initiative's "written consent" prohibition also applies to personnel of the county court of the City and County of Denver, This argument is resolved by our analysis in IILA., supra, finding that the prohibition does not apply to Judicial personnel. Although the prohibition does apply to magistrates, any magistrates within the county court of the City and County of Denver are encompassed in the "section 26 judges" exception because any magistrates serving in these courts are subject to the direction and supervision of the section 26 judges. See C.R.M. 1; see also C.RM. 4(c) (stating that "all magistrates shall be appointed, evaluated, retained, discharged, and disciplined ...

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Bluebook (online)
1 P.3d 739, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2520, 2000 Colo. LEXIS 851, 2000 WL 575211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aisenberg-v-campbell-colo-2000.