AIGBEKAEN v. WARDEN FCI FORT DIX

District Court, D. New Jersey·Decided January 15, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-08608·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ______________________________ : RAYMOND AIGBEKAEN, : : Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 20-8608 (NLH)(KMW) : v. : MEMORANDUM ORDER : : : DONALD TRUMP, et al., : : Defendants. : ______________________________: 1. Plaintiff Raymond Aigbekaen has filed an amended complaint against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”). ECF No. 12. 2. The Court had ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his in forma pauperis status should not be revoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). ECF No. 11. Upon further review it does not appear that Plaintiff has three qualifying strikes. The order to show cause shall be vacated, and Plaintiff may continue to proceed in forma pauperis. 3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint1 alleges the Warden of FCI Fort Dix, Counselor Lee, and Corrections Officer Bogdonavich

1 A party has the right to amend his or her “pleading once as a matter of course” 21 days after service of the pleading or 21 days after a motion under Rule 12 is filed, whichever is prevented Plaintiff from covering his head as required by his religious beliefs. ECF No. 12 at 1. The Court will permit this RFRA claim to proceed.2 4. Plaintiff has also stated an excessive force claim

against Lt. Marcussi. Id. at 2. Specifically, he alleges Lt. Marcussi “viciously pushed [Plaintiff’s] head against the wall and kicked Plaintiff in the legs” while Plaintiff was handcuffed. Id. 5. Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim against the Warden. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court concluded “that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). “The Supreme Court has never implied a Bivens action under any clause of the First

earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The Court had not screened the original complaint and ordered service at the time the amended complaint was submitted; therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint. “[A]n amended pleading — like the amended complaint here — supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013); 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2010)). “[T]he original pleading, once superseded, cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended pleading, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new pleading.” Wright & Miller § 1476.

2 The RFRA provides that the federal government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). Amendment.” Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4 (2012) (“We have never held that Bivens extends to First

Amendment claims.”). 6. Thus far, the Third Circuit has not permitted First Amendment retaliation claims to proceed against federal employees. See Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (declining to extend Bivens to First Amendment retaliation claims brought in the prison workplace assignment context); Watlington on behalf of FCI Schuylkill African Am. Inmates v. Reigel, 723 F. App'x 137, 140 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Vanderklok). 7. Post-Abbasi, the Third Circuit has concluded that “[t]wo special factors are ‘particularly weighty’: the availability of an alternative remedial structure and

separation-of-powers concerns.” Mack, 968 F.3d at 320. Plaintiff has alternative remedies to his retaliation claim in the BOP’s administrative remedy process. Plaintiff can pursue his religious claims under RFRA. As the claims also involve separation of power concerns, the Court concludes it would be inappropriate to extend Bivens without legislative guidance. See, e.g., Berk v. Hollingsworth, et al., No. 17-0091, 2020 WL 6867216, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2020). 8. Plaintiff has not stated a due process claim for not being told of his right to appeal a prison disciplinary proceeding. Inmates’ due process rights for prison disciplinary

proceedings are limited to the rights set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Under Wolff, inmates must receive “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). There is no constitutional right to prison grievance procedures. Heleva v. Kramer, 214 F. App'x 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2007). 9. The Court will permit the RFRA claims to proceed

against the Warden, Counselor Lee, and Corrections Officer Bogdonavich. The Eighth Amendment excessive force claim may proceed against Lt. Marcussi. All other claims and defendants will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. IT IS therefore on this 15th day of January, 2021, ORDERED that the order to show cause, ECF No. 11, is vacated; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall file the amended complaint, ECF No. 12, and add Warden FCI Fort Dix, Counselor Lee, Corrections Officer Bogdonavich, and Lt. Marcussi as defendants;

and it is further ORDERED that the amended complaint shall proceed only on Plaintiff’s Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claims against Warden FCI Fort Dix, Counselor Lee, Corrections Officer Bogdonavich, and the Eighth Amendment claim against Lt. Marcussi. All other defendants and claims are dismissed without prejudice, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and it is further ORDERED that, the Clerk shall mail to Plaintiff a transmittal letter explaining the procedure for completing United States Marshal (“Marshal”) 285 Forms (“USM-285 Forms”); and it is further ORDERED that, once the Marshal receives the USM-285 Form(s)

from Plaintiff and the Marshal so alerts the Clerk, the Clerk shall issue summons in connection with each USM-285 Form that has been submitted by Plaintiff, and the Marshal shall serve summons, the Complaint and this Order to the address specified on each USM-285 Form, with all costs of service advanced by the United States3; and it is further

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

AIGBEKAEN v. WARDEN FCI FORT DIX, (D.N.J. 2021).

AIGBEKAEN v. WARDEN FCI FORT DIX (AIGBEKAEN v. WARDEN FCI FORT DIX) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Wolff v. McDonnell
418 U.S. 539 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Reichle v. Howards
132 S. Ct. 2088 (Supreme Court, 2012)
Heleva v. Kramer
214 F. App'x 244 (Third Circuit, 2007)
Renee Palakovic v. John Wetzel
854 F.3d 209 (Third Circuit, 2017)
Ziglar v. Abbasi
582 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Roger Vanderklok v. United States
868 F.3d 189 (Third Circuit, 2017)
Charles Mack v. John Yost
968 F.3d 311 (Third Circuit, 2020)