Ahearn v. United States

151 Ct. Cl. 21, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 145, 1960 WL 8525
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 5, 1960
DocketNo. 332-55
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 151 Ct. Cl. 21 (Ahearn v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ahearn v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 21, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 145, 1960 WL 8525 (cc 1960).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In Gaetke v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 756, this court was called upon to apply the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 295) to the unique situation of firefighters who were required to stay at their posts of duty on shifts of 24 hours continuously. The employees had entered into a contract with the Alaska Railroad whereunder they were paid for only 16 hours out of the 24, the other 8 hours being presumably devoted to sleeping and eating. But the employees, in derogation of their contract, sued, saying they were entitled to be paid for the full 24 hours under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945.

We upheld the contract, saying that we thought it was a reasonable application of the Act to their peculiar situation.

Then we were confronted with a case in which there was no contract. In that case we said that it was not reasonable to suppose that Congress, in passing the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, could have intended that an employee be paid while he was sleeping or eating. Sawyer, et al. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 152.

We have reiterated this in many other cases, saying in all of them that we must give this Act a reasonable construction as applied to the unique situation of these men, and that it cannot be reasonably concluded that Congress in[23]*23tended to direct payment for hours spent in sleeping and eating.

We have never said that an employer was required to provide any specified amount of time for these purposes; all that we have said was, whatever the time fixed for eating and sleeping, an employee is not entitled to compensation for the time so spent. We have approved a division of the 24 hours into three equal parts, 8 hours work-time, 8 hours standby time, and 8 hours for eating and sleeping, but we have never said such a division was required.

The Civil Service Commission issued a regulation approving such a division of the 24 hours, and this has been followed by regulations in a number of departments; but, we repeat, all we have said is that an employee was not entitled to compensation for sleeping and eating time. We have never said he should be allotted 8 hours for sleeping and eating, no more and no less, and we say again that an employee is not entitled to compensation for the time allotted to him to eat and sleep.

In this case defendant at first allotted 8 hours for sleeping time, and an additional hour was spent in eating. Later, in 1953, defendant permitted 10 hours sleep, and an additional hour was spent in eating. The record does not show why this additional time was allowed, but it is plausible to suppose, in the light of the facts of this case, that it was done to permit the employees to “catch up on their sleep” where it had been interrupted on previous nights by calls to active duty.

For all of this extra sleeping time plaintiffs have been compensated. Defendant says this is an overpayment, under our decisions, since it was payment for time allotted to sleeping and eating. It seeks to deduct it from any amount found to be due plaintiffs for work done during eating and sleeping time. We think defendant’s position is correct.

This case was tried only as to the claims of Frank F. McKay and Arthur E. St. Laurent. The Trial Commissioner found that McKay had spent a total, over the 9-year period, of 2,510 hours of duty during his sleeping period, and St. Laurent, 2,233 hours. For this they are entitled to compensation. On the other hand, the Trial Commis[24]*24sioner found they have been paid compensation for hours allotted to sleeping and eating amounting to 3,750 hours, in the case of McKay, and to 3,752 hours, in the case of St. Laurent.

In stating an account in all debtor-creditor relationships, of course, an overpayment on one transaction is to be offset against an underpayment on another. So, the sum of all payments erroneously made for hours allotted to sleeping and eating must be subtracted from payments due for work performed during the time set apart for sleeping and eating. It turns out that the amounts erroneously paid for eating and sleeping time exceed the amounts due for work performed during sleeping and eating time and, therefore, plaintiffs McKay and St. Laurent are not entitled to recover.

Defendant has abandoned its counterclaim for the excess of the overpayment for time allowed for sleeping and eating, but does ask for the excess night differential paid. This excess night differential seems to have arisen in this way: In attempting to apply to this case the so-called “two-thirds” rule, defendant credited the employee for pay purposes with two-thirds of an hour for each hour of the 24. This, of course, included the hours set apart for sleep. So long as the hours so set apart were one-third of the total of 24, this formula produced the correct result, but when 10 hours were set apart for this purpose, the formula resulted in an excess payment of night differential. The amounts in controversy on this account are $804.68 in the case of McKay, and $784.36, in the case of St. Laurent.

According to the strict letter of the law, as interpreted by this court, defendant is entitled to recover these amounts, but, under all the circumstances, we think it is inequitable that it should do so. Until our decision in the Gaetlce case, supra, the parties were uncertain as to their rights: the employees were demanding pay for standby time, including time spent in eating and sleeping, but defendant at first declined to pay for any standby time, but later agreed, at least in some instances, to pay for standby time, except that spent in sleeping and eating. Customarily, this resulted in payment for 16 hours out of the 24. This custom of paying for 16 hours out of the 24 was followed although, in the [25]*25case at bar, sleeping time was increased to 10 hours in August 1951. Between this date and May 12,1958, when defendant filed its counterclaim, no claim of an overpayment on account of payment for time allotted to sleeping and eating or of overpayment of night differential was ever made, and probably no such claim would ever have been made except for the claims plaintiffs made for payment for the full 24 hours.

Defendant’s failure to make such a claim does not amount to a waiver of it, but we think the ends of justice will be met if we leave the parties in the statu quo ante the litigation, denying plaintiffs’ claims for pay for sleeping and eating time, except that spent in labor, and using the overpayments by defendant to do no more than offset this time. This, it seems to us, was defendant’s purpose of allowing the additional time for sleeping anyway, as compensation for labor required during sleeping time.

We think defendant recognizes the justice of this conclusion when it abandons its claim to recover amounts paid for time allotted to sleeping. In principle we see no difference between its right to recover such amounts and its rights to recover for overpayment of night differential.

Dismissal of the claims of plaintiffs McKay and St. Laurent and defendant’s counterclaims seems to us to meet the ends of justice, and, therefore, they will be dismissed.

It is so ordered.

Dukfee, Judge; Laeamore, Judge; Madden, Judge, and Jones, OMef Judge, concur.

FINDINGS OF FACT

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Baker v. United States
218 Ct. Cl. 602 (Court of Claims, 1978)
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585 F.2d 1041 (Court of Claims, 1978)
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
151 Ct. Cl. 21, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 145, 1960 WL 8525, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ahearn-v-united-states-cc-1960.