Agustin Galvan Maldonado v. Tonya Andrews, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AGUSTIN GALVAN MALDONADO (A- Case No. 1:26-cv-1451-DJC-JDP Number: 073-860-906), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER; FINDINGS AND v. RECOMMENDATIONS 14 TONYA ANDREWS, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner Agustin Galvan Maldonado entered the United States in 1993 and was detained 18 by ICE in 2023. Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). An 19 immigration judge held a custody redetermination hearing and denied petitioner’s release. 20 Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his detention, 21 without another hearing, violates the Fifth Amendment. For the reasons outlined below, I 22 recommend that the petition be denied. 23 Background 24 Petitioner entered the United States in 1993, and he became a legal permanent resident in 25 1998. ECF No. 10 ¶ 24. In 2021, petitioner was convicted of drug possession, narcotic 26 equipment possession, and carrying a concealed weapon. ECF No. 10-5 at 2. In 2022, petitioner 27 was convicted of vehicle theft and aggravated assault. Id. 28 1 In February 2023, petitioner was detained by ICE upon his release from local custody. 2 See id. at 3; ECF No. 10 ¶ 28. In November 2024, petitioner was afforded a bond hearing, at 3 which the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied bond based on the finding that the government 4 “established by clear and convincing evidence that [petitioner] is both a danger and a flight risk.”1 5 ECF No. 10-8 at 1. In May 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed 6 petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s order, finding that the IJ “appropriately gave significant weight to 7 [petitioner’s] criminal history which reflected a trend of escalating seriousness and included 8 convictions for possession of narcotics equipment, drug possession, carrying a concealed weapon, 9 grant theft, and assault likely to cause great bodily injury.” ECF No. 10-9 at 3-4. Moreover, the 10 BIA held that while the IJ “recognized that [petitioner] has obtained sobriety and considered that 11 [petitioner] submitted some evidence of rehabilitation,” the IJ also “noted that these steps 12 occurred in the detention setting.” Id. at 4. 13 In November 2025, the IJ denied petitioner’s request for a second custody redetermination 14 hearing, finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances. ECF No. 15 10-10 at 1. It appears that petitioner did not appeal this order. See ECF No. 14 at 3. 16 Throughout his detention, petitioner’s removal proceedings have been ongoing. Petitioner 17 was ordered removed in April 2023. See ECF No. 10-6 at 2. Subsequently, the BIA remanded 18 the proceedings to assess petitioner’s competency, the IJ found petitioner mentally incompetent, 19 and petitioner was provided with a qualified representative. See id. at 3; ECF No. 10-7. In July 20 2025, the IJ denied petitioner’s applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of 21 removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. ECF No. 10-11 at 1-2. 22 Petitioner appealed this order, and his appeal remains pending before the BIA. See ECF No. 10- 23 13 at 4. Separately, due to intervening authority from the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with 24 the BIA a motion to remand. See id. 25 26

27 1 Petitioner alleges that he was provided a bond hearing where the government held the burden because he was designated as a class member of Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv- 28 2211 (C.D. Cal.). ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 1, 12. 1 Procedural History 2 On February 19, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 2. 3 Petitioner concurrently filed a request to seal documents pursuant to Local Rule 141. ECF No. 7. 4 On that same day, the court referred the matter to me for further proceedings. ECF No. 8. 5 On March 11, 2026, petitioner filed an amended petition and a request to seal documents 6 pursuant to Local Rule 141.2 ECF Nos. 10 & 11. On April 30, 2026, respondents filed an answer 7 to the amended petition. ECF No. 14. On May 11, 2026, petitioner filed a reply. ECF No. 16. 8 Legal Standard 9 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 10 federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 11 (2000). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 12 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 13 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 14 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 15 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 16 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 17 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 18 includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 19 20 2 Petitioner’s requests to seal documents, ECF Nos. 7 and 11, will be denied. There is “a 21 strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). “Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record then 22 bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the compelling reasons 23 standard,” under which “a court may seal records only when it finds a compelling reason and articulates the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Ctr. for 24 Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2016). In some circumstances, however, a party can satisfy the less stringent standard of “good cause” by 25 “showing that specific prejudice or harm will result” if the documents are not sealed. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. 26 Here, petitioner has not articulated any prejudice or harm that he faces—much less 27 provided a compelling reason. The documents are already restricted to case participants and the public terminal only. Accordingly, I will order petitioner to file unredacted versions of all 28 documents identified in ECF No. 11. 1 Analysis 2 Both parties agree that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1226(c). See ECF No. 10 ¶ 1; ECF No. 14 at 6. Petitioner claims that his detention violates the 4 Fifth Amendment because he has not been provided a bond hearing since November 2024. ECF 5 No. 10 ¶¶ 122-25. Respondents counter that petitioner’s ongoing detention remains constitutional 6 even in the absence of another bond hearing. ECF No. 14 at 4-5. 7 Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: first, we consider whether 8 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and, second, we evaluate 9 what procedures are necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest 10 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 11 (1989). I consider each in turn. 12 Courts in this Circuit have held that a legal permanent resident (“LPR”) has a protected 13 liberty interest in not being detained by ICE. See Burton v. Larose, No. 3:26-cv-2627-JES-BJW, 14 2026 WL 1256875, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2026); B.R. v. Warden, No. 1:26-cv-0810-TLN- 15 CSK, 2026 WL 1091489, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2026); Amezcua v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-1070- 16 SRM-AGR, 2026 WL 1048212, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2026). Courts have come to these 17 conclusions based on the breadth of case law finding that LPRs have protected liberty interests in 18 maintaining ties with their community and remaining free from governmental restraint. See 19 Amezcua, 2026 WL 1048212, at *6 (collecting cases). Notably, LPRs “do not lose their due 20 process protections and liberty interest merely because they are subject to removal.” Id. On the 21 contrary, LPRs are “lawfully present in the United States until a final deportation or removal 22 order is entered.” Kyong Ho Shin v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010). 23 I agree with other courts to have addressed this issue and find that petitioner has a 24 protected liberty interest that accrued over the approximately twenty-five years between his 25 attainment of legal permanent residency and his detention by ICE. See ECF No. 10 ¶ 24. 26 Respondents do not argue to the contrary. See ECF No. 14. Moreover, because petitioner’s 27 removal order is not yet final, petitioner still has a protected liberty interest in remaining free 28 from immigration custody. See Kyong Ho Shin, 607 F.3d at 1217; Amezcua, 2026 WL 1048212, 1 at *6. 2 Once a court has found that a noncitizen has a liberty interest in release, the court must 3 next determine what procedural protections the government must afford the noncitizen before 4 depriving him of that liberty interest. This requires balancing the factors laid out in Mathews v. 5 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 6 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 7 The Mathews test requires courts to consider: 8 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 9 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 10 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 11 requirement would entail. 12 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 13 Starting with the first factor, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 14 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due 15 Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. For approximately twenty-five years, 16 petitioner was released in the United States under the supervision of ICE. See ECF No. 10 ¶ 24. 17 Accordingly, I find that petitioner has a private interest in his continued release. See Noori v. 18 LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) 19 (“Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, which developed over the year he resided in 20 the United States.”). 21 However, as the Court of Appeals held in analogous circumstances, “it is important not to 22 overstate the strength” of petitioner’s showing under the first Mathews factor. See Rodriguez 23 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022).3 As in Rodriguez Diaz, because petitioner 24 has received a bond hearing, he has not been “without process” during his detention. See id.

25 3 In Rodriguez Diaz, the Court of Appeals held that due process does not require that a second bond hearing be provided to a petitioner detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 53 F.4th at 26 1213. Although the detention authority is distinct from the instant action, I find Rodriguez Diaz 27 persuasive; that the Court of Appeals held that a second bond hearing was not required under section 1226(a)—which provides for discretionary detention—strongly suggests that a second 28 bond hearing is not required under section 1226(c)—which provides for mandatory detention. 1 Moreover, as in Rodriguez Diaz, the court “cannot overlook that most of the period of 2 [petitioner’s] detention arose from the fact that he chose to challenge before the BIA . . . the IJ’s 3 denial of immigration relief.”4 See id. Thus, as the Court of Appeals held, the court “cannot 4 simply count [petitioner’s] months of detention and leave it at that.” See id. at 1208. Rather, the 5 court “must also consider the process [petitioner] received during this time, the further process 6 that was available to him, and the fact that his detention was prolonged due to his decision to 7 challenge his removal order.” See id. 8 Turning to the second factor, petitioner has had the benefit of procedural safeguards to 9 protect his liberty interest. As noted, petitioner was afforded a bond hearing, at which the IJ 10 denied bond based on the finding that the government “established by clear and convincing 11 evidence that [petitioner] is both a danger and a flight risk.” ECF No. 10-8 at 1. There is no 12 argument or evidence to suggest that the bond hearing was conducted unfairly. The BIA 13 dismissed petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s order, finding that the IJ “appropriately gave significant 14 weight to [petitioner’s] criminal history which reflected a trend of escalating seriousness and 15 included convictions for possession of narcotics equipment, drug possession, carrying a concealed 16 weapon, grant theft, and assault likely to cause great bodily injury.” ECF No. 10-9 at 3-4. Then, 17 in November 2025, the IJ denied petitioner’s request for a second custody redetermination 18 hearing, finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances. ECF No. 19 10-10 at 1. Although petitioner could have appealed this order, it appears that he did not do so. 20 See id. at 2. 21 “Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect,’ is justified 22 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, 23 No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (quoting 24 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). The procedures afforded to petitioner have “ensured that the risk of 25 erroneous deprivation would be ‘relatively small.’” See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1210 (9th 26

27 4 Petitioner attempts to distinguish Rodriguez Diaz by asserting that he has been successful in an appeal. See ECF No. 16 at 9. The Court of Appeals did not cabin its holding to 28 unsuccessful appeals. Accordingly, I find this argument unpersuasive. 1 Cir. 2022) (finding that the petitioner’s detention was “subject to numerous levels of review, each 2 offering [him] the opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker”). Accordingly, I find that 3 there is a low risk that petitioner’s liberty interest was erroneously deprived, and thus this factor 4 weighs in favor of respondents. See Espinoza v. Wofford, No. 1:24-cv-01118-SAB, 2025 WL 5 1556590, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2025) (finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation is 6 “minimal” where the petitioner detained under § 1226(c) had a bond hearing before an 7 immigration judge). 8 Lastly, regarding the third factor, the government “has an obvious interest in protecting 9 the public from dangerous criminal aliens. Through detention, the government likewise seeks to 10 increase the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.” Rodriguez 11 Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (cleaned up). Indeed, when Congress provided for mandatory detention 12 under section 1226(c), it relied on evidence that “one out of four criminal aliens released on bond 13 absconded prior to the completion of his removal proceedings” and that “after criminal aliens 14 were identified as deportable, 77% were arrested at least once more and 45%—nearly half—were 15 arrested multiple times before their deportation proceedings even began.” Demore v. Kim, 538 16 U.S. 510, 518, 520 (2003). Accordingly, I find that the government has a strong interest in 17 detaining petitioner under section 1226(c) without holding a second bond hearing. 18 A consideration of the Mathews factors demonstrates that petitioner is not entitled to 19 habeas relief. 20 Conclusion 21 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 22 1. Petitioner’s request to seal documents, ECF No. 7, is DENIED. 23 2. Petitioner’s request to seal documents, ECF No. 11, is DENIED. 24 3. Within seven days of this order, petitioner shall file unredacted versions of all 25 documents identified in ECF No. 11. 26 Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 27 1. The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 10, be DENIED. 28 2. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. ] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of 3 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 4 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 5 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 6 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 7 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 8 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 9 | 1991). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ June 29, 2026 q———_ 13 JEREMY D. PETERSON 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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