Aguirre-Vargas v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 25-3330
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO CESAR AGUIRRE-VARGAS, No. 25-3330 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-706-236 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 3, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON, COLLINS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Julio Cesar Aguirre-Vargas (“Aguirre”), a native and citizen of

Guatemala, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision

dismissing an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Aguirre’s

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”) protection. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

When reviewing final orders of the BIA, we review the agency’s findings of

fact for substantial evidence. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748

(9th Cir. 2022). We review questions of law de novo. Id.

1. The BIA properly rejected Aguirre’s due-process claim because even

though the transcript of the hearing before the IJ contained some untranslated

portions, Aguirre has not shown any resulting prejudice. See, e.g., Gomez-Velazco

v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2018) (“As a general rule, an individual may

obtain relief for a due process violation only if he shows that the violation caused

him prejudice, meaning the violation potentially affected the outcome of the

immigration proceeding.” (citations omitted)). One untranslated passage related

only to whether Aguirre’s asylum application was time-barred, an issue that the

government did not contest. With respect to the other untranslated passages, to the

extent that they omitted any of Aguirre’s testimony, Aguirre had the opportunity

elsewhere to provide full answers to the same or similar questions, and the transcript

contains translated answers to all those questions. Aguirre fails to “point to any

instances of testimony in the … hearing that, had they been properly transcribed,

may have affected the outcome” of the proceedings. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d

924, 928 (9th Cir. 2020).

2 25-3330 2. The BIA did not err when it declined to remand the case based on the IJ’s

reliance on Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018). The IJ cited

Matter of A-B- merely for the proposition that, to establish past persecution, Aguirre

bore the burden “of showing that [his] home government was unable or unwilling to

control his persecutors.” That proposition remains good law. See Diaz v. Bondi,

129 F.4th 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2025) (“An applicant alleging past persecution bears

the burden to establish that ‘… the persecution was committed by the government,

or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.’” (quoting

Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010))). Thus, the BIA

correctly held that remand based on this issue was unnecessary.

3. Aguirre forfeited all other merits issues by failing to meaningfully raise

them in his opening brief. Although Aguirre disputes the BIA’s conclusion that he

failed to challenge the IJ’s findings with respect to persecution and nexus to a

particular social group, he does not challenge the BIA’s additional finding that, on

the merits, he failed to demonstrate that he “suffered past persecution or has a

well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground (emphasis

added).” See Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not

raised in an appellant’s opening brief are typically deemed waived.”). This forfeited

nexus issue is dispositive of the asylum and withholding-of-removal claims. See,

e.g., Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016); Singh v. INS, 134

3 25-3330 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 1998). And Aguirre’s failure to challenge the denial of CAT

relief renders that issue forfeited as well. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d at 1157

n.3.

PETITION DENIED.

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