Aguilar v. Rhodes

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided February 28, 2024·No. 3:22-cv-08186·Unknown

Opinion

SM WO Daniel CV Aguilar, No. CV-22-08186-PCT-JAT (MTM) Plaintiff, v. ORDER David Rhodes, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Daniel CV Aguilar, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Yuma, La Paz Unit in San Luis, Arizona, brought this pro se civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 42.) Defendants move for summary judgment, and Plaintiff opposes the Motion for Summary Judgment.1 (Docs. 47, 66.) I. Background In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Yavapai County Sheriff David Rhodes and Lieutenant Smith. (Doc. 42 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts a Sixth Amendment claim for denial of his right to counsel. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 3, 2021, he was arrested and taken to the Yavapai County Detention Center (YCDC). (Id.) Upon his arrival, Plaintiff made numerous requests to call an attorney but was denied each time. (Id.) Jail staff told Plaintiff that he did not need an attorney for his initial appearance, although the law states Plaintiff has a right to an attorney from initial appearance through

1 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 50.) sentencing. (Id.) Plaintiff asked to speak with Defendant Smith, who did not allow Plaintiff to call an attorney. (Id.) Defendant Smith told Plaintiff that Defendant Rhodes had issued a directive that intake detainees cannot call a lawyer because such a call was considered a courtesy call. (Id.) Plaintiff asked to submit a grievance but was “denied,” and his request to speak with a supervisor was also denied. (Id.) Plaintiff was unable to contact an attorney or his employer for two days. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 6.) On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated a Sixth Amendment claim against Defendants Rhodes and Ambrose based on his allegation that he was denied access to counsel for two days after he was booked into jail. (Doc. 41.) The Court directed Defendants Rhodes and Smith to answer. (Id.) Defendant Rhodes now moves for summary judgment and argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit and that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. 47.) Defendant Smith joins the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 74.)2 II. Summary Judgment Standard A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying

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Aguilar v. Rhodes, (D. Ariz. 2024).

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