Agnor v. Caddo Parish School Bd.

936 So. 2d 865, 2006 WL 2129838
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 1, 2006
Docket41,224-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 936 So. 2d 865 (Agnor v. Caddo Parish School Bd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Agnor v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 936 So. 2d 865, 2006 WL 2129838 (La. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

936 So.2d 865 (2006)

Daphne M. AGNOR (a/k/a Angor), Individually and as Tutrix of the Minor, Delana Marie Spinks Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
CADDO PARISH SCHOOL BOARD Defendant-Appellant.

No. 41,224-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

August 1, 2006.
Rehearing Denied August 17, 2006.

*866 Gordon E. Rountree, A.P.L.C., Shreveport, Counsel for Appellant.

Tyler & Johnson, LLC, By Tommy Jan Johnson, Shreveport, Counsel for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, DREW and MOORE, JJ.

DREW, J.

The Caddo Parish School Board appealed the judgment awarding damages to Daphne M. Agnor,[1] individually and as tutrix of her child, Delana Marie Spinks, for the child's injuries sustained in a fall at school. Following a bench trial, the trial court apportioned fault 75% to the Caddo Parish School Board and 25% to the child. The parties stipulated that medical expenses were $6,647.93. Additionally, the trial court awarded plaintiffs $25,000 for general damages subject to a 25% reduction due to the fault apportioned to the child, and the defendant now appeals. We affirm, adopting and reproducing the trial court's thoughtful, scholarly, and thorough reasons for judgment, which are attached as an appendix.

DISCUSSION

An appellate court may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Cole v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 01-2123 (La.9/4/02), 825 So.2d 1134; Stobart v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the fact finder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Cole, supra; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). To reverse a fact *867 finder's determination, the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Stobart, supra.

On appeal, the school board complained that the trial court erred in deciding:

• the teacher gave inadequate supervision,
• the floor was unreasonably dangerous,
• the floor was a cause-in-fact of the fall,
• discretionary immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 did not protect the school board from liability;
• the school board was 75% liable and the child was 25% liable, and
• $25,000 was the appropriate general damage award.

The supreme court in Wallmuth v. Rapides Parish School Board, XXXX-XXXX (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 341, 346, stated:

A school board, through its agents and teachers, owes a duty of reasonable supervision over students. The supervision required is reasonable, competent supervision appropriate to the age of the children and the attendant circumstances. This duty does not make the school board the insurer of the safety of the children. Constant supervision of all students is not possible nor required for educators to discharge their duty to provide adequate supervision.

Citations omitted.

While the foregoing is a succinct statement of the law, the Wallmuth case is factually inapplicable to this matter, since Wallmuth dealt with an intentional tort involving older children (i.e., fighting).

Here, the school board argued that there was adequate supervision for what was a instantaneous, unforeseeable event for which the school was not responsible. The trial court was not clearly wrong in holding that there was inadequate supervision (a violation of the duty to protect the young child) and an unreasonably dangerous condition which was a cause-in-fact of the foreseeable harm.

La. R.S. 9:2798.1(B) states:

Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.

The school board argued that the teacher's discretionary acts in supervising the children's use of the restrooms make this immunity applicable here. The trial court cited Gary on Behalf of Gary v. Meche, 93-271 (La.App. 3d Cir.11/3/93), 626 So.2d 901, which stated that 9:2798.1 did not immunize the school board from tort suits related to its responsibility for the supervision of children.[2] After being dismissed from school, a six-year-old ran into the street and was struck by a truck. The court found the school had abdicated its responsibility to supervise its youngest students. Gary, supra. Likewise, in this case, neither the school nor the school board had a policy about young playful children carrying pencils into bathrooms which the school personnel knew had damp, slippery floors.

The school board also argued that the trial court erred in apportioning only *868 25% of the fault to Delana Spinks, because Delana admittedly broke three rules that contributed to the accident. While the trial court found that Delana did share negligence because she knew the rules and chose to break them, the court also found that, due to Delana's young age and the number of her infractions, 25% was a proper allocation of fault. Not only was the school board aware of the dangerous, wet condition of the floor and the propensity of pencils to cause injury, but the bathroom monitor designated by the teacher was a third-grader who was unlikely to tattle on her classmates for breaking the rules.

The school board contends that the trial court's award of $25,000 in general damages was excessive due to the fact that Delana returned to school within one week, and has experienced no residual sinus or visual problems since the accident. It is the school board's position that the upper limit of general damages should be only $10,000 to $12,000. The trial court found that, due to the unusual circumstances surrounding this accident, the award of $25,000 in general damages to Delana was appropriate. This was a traumatic and shocking injury, so much so that medical personnel came in and out of the room simply to view it, causing Delana to believe she was dying. She underwent anesthesia and surgery, and when she returned to school she was teased by other children. She suffered nightmares and teasing after the accident. The damage award was within the trial court's discretion and reasonable under the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION

In every regard, the trial court was wise in its rulings. We agree and adopt its reasons in toto. Neither party is clearly 100% at fault for the unfortunate incident of February 14, 2001. While the school board was negligent in its failure to address unreasonably dangerous conditions, Delana Spinks was also negligent in her failure to acknowledge long-implemented school rules. However, as mentioned above, due to Delana's young age and the number of her infractions, as compared to the defendant's choice to ignore the obvious risks associated with this accident, the fault apportionment was appropriate.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Tyrone Bella v. Terrebonne Parish School Bo
531 F. App'x 457 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
Huey v. Caldwell Parish School Board
109 So. 3d 924 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
936 So. 2d 865, 2006 WL 2129838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/agnor-v-caddo-parish-school-bd-lactapp-2006.