A.G. v. United States

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 3:23-cv-00745
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 A.G., a minor child by and through his Case No.: 23-CV-745 JLS (KSC) Guardian Ad Litem, Alfonso Galindo, Jr.; 12 and R.G., a minor child by and through ORDER ON DAUBERT MOTIONS 13 her Guardian Ad Litem, Alfonso Galindo, AND MOTIONS IN LIMINE Jr., 14 Plaintiffs, (ECF Nos. 41, 42, 43, 44) 15 v. 16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 17 Defendant. 18

19 20 Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs A.G.’s and R.G.’s (“Plaintiffs”) and 21 Defendant United States of America’s (“Defendant” or “United States”) Daubert Motions 22 and Motions in Limine (ECF Nos. 41, 42, 43, 44). The Court heard oral argument on 23 September 25, 2025, and thereafter took the Motions under submission. Having carefully 24 considered the Parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the law, the Court rules as follows. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Background 3 Plaintiffs are two young siblings who live in a single-family home with their dog, 4 Pupa. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 4–5, 8–9. A gate and an exterior garage door stand side 5 by side in front of Plaintiffs’ home. Id. ¶ 8. The front gate opens to an enclosed patio 6 where Plaintiffs play. Id. Mail carriers need not pass through the front gate into Plaintiffs’ 7 patio to deliver mail, as Plaintiffs’ mailbox sits between the garage door and the exterior 8 side of the gate. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs’ mail was delivered 9 by United States Postal Service (“USPS”) mail carrier Nestor Medina (“Medina”). Id. ¶ 9. 10 At times, Pupa approached the “interior side of the front gate” when Medina neared 11 Plaintiffs’ home; Pupa would bark at Medina but could not get through the gate. Id. ¶ 10. 12 Plaintiffs allege that on these occasions, Medina used pepper spray on Pupa before reaching 13 Plaintiffs’ mailbox.1 Id. After Pupa retreated, Medina would deliver Plaintiffs’ mail and 14 move on. Id. 15 Plaintiffs allege that Medina repeated the above actions “numerous” times. Id. After 16 each occasion, pepper spray residue lingered in Pupa’s fur. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs, who spent 17 significant time with Pupa every day, allege that they ended up “touch[ing] and breath[ing] 18 in” the residual chemicals. Id. These episodes began in the summer of 2018. Id. ¶ 9. 19 Around the same time, Plaintiffs both developed symptoms of respiratory illnesses, 20 including shortness of breath and coughs. Id. ¶ 12. Multiple medical appointments failed 21 to uncover the cause of Plaintiffs’ symptoms. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Medina continued 22 pepper spraying Pupa until February 2019, when Plaintiffs’ family caught him in the act 23 on a home surveillance video. Id. ¶ 13. Medina stopped delivering Plaintiffs’ mail after 24 his behavior was reported to the USPS. Id. ¶ 14. 25 / / / 26 27 28 1 At the September 25, 2025, hearing, Defendant stated its position is that Medina never pepper-sprayed 1 II. Procedural Background 2 Plaintiffs initiated this action on April 21, 2023. See Compl. Plaintiffs asserted one 3 claim for negligence against the United States and USPS pursuant to the Federal Tort 4 Claims Act (“FTCA”). See generally id. On October 30, 2023, the Court granted in part 5 and denied in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 10. Specifically, the 6 Court (1) denied Defendant’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) denied 7 Defendant’s motion for failure to state a claim; (3) granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss 8 USPS as a defendant in the action; and (4) granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss 9 Plaintiffs’ prayers for prejudgment interest and costs incurred in the suit. Id. at 29–30. 10 Following discovery, the Parties filed the present motions. On July 24, 2024, 11 Defendant filed a Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Testimony of James I. Dudley 12 (“Dudley Mot.,” ECF No. 41) and a Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Testimony of Dr. 13 Sean S. Kohles (“Kohles Mot.,” ECF No. 42). On the same day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion 14 in Limine to Exclude Report and Testimony of Dr. Daniel Lesser (“Lesser Mot.,” ECF No. 15 43) and a Motion in Limine to Exclude Children’s Deposition Testimony (“Dep. Mot.,” 16 ECF No. 44). The Parties filed their respective responses on August 28, 2025. See ECF 17 No. 47 (“Dudley Opp’n”); ECF No. 46 (“Kohles Non-Opp’n”); ECF No. 45 (“Lesser 18 Resp.”); ECF No. 49 (“Dep. Opp’n”). On September 4, 2025, Defendant filed replies in 19 support of its motions. See ECF No. 51 (“Dudley Reply”); ECF No. 52 (“Kohles Reply”). 20 Also on September 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their Motion in Limine to 21 Exclude Children’s Deposition Testimony. See ECF No. 53 (“Dep. Reply”). Plaintiffs did 22 not file a reply in support of their Motion in Limine to Exclude Report and Testimony of 23 Dr. Daniel Lesser. See generally Docket. 24 LEGAL STANDARDS 25 I. Admissibility of Expert Testimony 26 The standard for expert testimony relevant here is set forth in Federal Rule of 27 Evidence (“Rule”) 702, as interpreted by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 28 579 (1993), and its progeny. Rule 702 provides that: 1 A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 2 opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court 3 that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 4 knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 5 evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 6 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 7 methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of 8 the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 9 Fed. R. Evid. 702. Daubert and subsequent cases have interpreted Rule 702 as 10 requiring that evidence be both relevant and reliable. 509 U.S. at 589–95. As the 11 Ninth Circuit explained: 12 Under Daubert and its progeny, including Daubert II [Daubert v. 13 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.1995)], a district court’s inquiry into admissibility is a flexible one. Alaska 14 Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 969 15 (9th Cir. 2013). In evaluating proffered expert testimony, the trial court is “a gatekeeper, not a fact finder.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 16 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks 17 omitted). “[T]he trial court must assure that the expert testimony ‘both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at 18 hand.’” Id. at 564 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597[]). “Expert 19 opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if 20 the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge 21 and experience of the relevant discipline.” Id. at 565 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Shaky but admissible 22 evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary 23 evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not exclusion.” Id. at 564 (citation omitted). The judge is “supposed 24 to screen the jury from unreliable nonsense opinions, but not 25 exclude opinions merely because they are impeachable.” Alaska Rent-A-Car, 738 F.3d at 969. Simply put, “[t]he district court is 26 not tasked with deciding whether the expert is right or wrong, 27 just whether his testimony has substance such that it would be helpful to a jury.” Id. at 969–70. 28 1 City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2014). 2 “Challenges that go to the weight of the evidence are within the province of a fact finder, 3 not a trial court judge. A district court should not make credibility determinations that are 4 reserved for the jury.” Id. at 1044. 5 II. Motions in Limine 6 “A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or 7 evidence in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) 8 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 803, 1038–39 (8th ed. 2004)). “A party files a motion in 9 limine to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is introduced at 10 trial.” Gwen H. v. Foreman, 766 F. Supp. 3d 976, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Luce v. 11 United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984)). “Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do 12 not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district 13 court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4. “[E]ven 14 if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound 15 judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.” Id. at 41–42. 16 DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS 17 I. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Testimony of James I. 18 Dudley 19 Defendant’s first motion seeks to exclude the expert testimony of James I. Dudley 20 (“Mr. Dudley”). Mr. Dudley has thirty-two years of experience in law enforcement and 21 has served as a police officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Commander, and Deputy 22 Chief. ECF No. 41-1 (“Dudley Rep.”) at 5. In these roles, he conducted civil and criminal 23 investigations. Id. Mr. Dudley also researches and teaches on issues related to law 24 enforcement and criminal justice. Id. at 6. 25 Defendant argues the Court should exclude (1) Mr. Dudley’s Opinion Regarding 26 Whether Medina Sprayed Plaintiffs’ Dog (Opinion One) and Mr. Dudley’s “Incident 27 Summary”; (2) Mr. Dudley’s Opinions Regarding Harm to Plaintiffs (Opinion Two); and 28 (3) Mr. Dudley’s Opinions Regarding Negligence (Opinions Three to Six). 1 A. Opinion One and “Incident Summary” 2 In Opinion One, Mr. Dudley concludes that Medina sprayed Plaintiffs’ dog at the 3 gate entrance to their home. Dudley Rep. at 13. Mr. Dudley arrives at this conclusion 4 based on video footage of Plaintiffs’ home captured by their home security system, see 5 Dudley Opp’n, Ex. A, Ex. B, showing Medina delivering mail to Plaintiffs’ home and 6 spraying pepper spray at their dog. Dudley Rep. at 14. Mr. Dudley also provides an 7 “Incident Summary” summarizing the “[t]imeline of events” based on the video footage 8 provided to him by Plaintiffs. Id. at 7–10. 9 Defendant argues that this opinion is inadmissible under Rule 702(a) because his 10 report provides no insight into any facts that are “outside common understanding.” Dudley 11 Mot. at 6. Defendant asserts that “Mr. Dudley simply watched video—the same video the 12 Court will watch at trial—to reach his opinion that Medina sprayed Plaintiffs’ dog.” Id. 13 at 1. Plaintiffs respond that the “specialized nature of pepper spray” and the “surreptitious 14 manner in which Medina used the spray” require expert testimony, and that “[Mr.] Dudley 15 provides specialized knowledge about pepper spray to better understand what we see in the 16 photos and video footage.” Dudley Opp’n at 2–4. 17 Defendant replies that Plaintiffs have not established that Mr. Dudley is qualified to 18 opine on “whether and when Medina discharged pepper spray,” and that expert testimony 19 is not required since “the Court is capable of reaching conclusions as to what the videos 20 and photographs depict.” Dudley Reply at 3. 21 Under Rule 702(a), expert testimony “assists the trier of fact when it provides 22 information beyond the common knowledge of the trier of fact.” United States v. Finley, 23 301 F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591). Thus, courts 24 generally exclude expert testimony that merely narrates and describes video footage; such 25 testimony is considered unhelpful, as the trier of fact can watch the video footage 26 themselves and draw their own conclusions. See, e.g., Qualey v. Pierce Cnty., No. 3:23- 27 CV-05679-TMC, 2025 WL 254810, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2025) (collecting cases). 28 1 The Court finds that Mr. Dudley’s opinion fails to satisfy Rule 702(a). Even if true 2 that Mr. Dudley possesses expertise as to the use of pepper spray, his conclusion that 3 Medina sprayed the pepper spray, formulated based on watching the video footage of 4 Plaintiffs’ home, does not require expert testimony because it is not “beyond the common 5 knowledge of the trier of fact.” Finley, 301 F.3d at 1008. One need not know anything 6 about the “specialized nature” of pepper spray to watch the video footage and determine 7 whether Medina sprayed pepper spray at Plaintiffs’ dog.2 8 Mr. Dudley’s Opinion One and Incident Summary do not otherwise provide any 9 helpful insight into the “specialized nature” of pepper spray. See Dudley Rep. at 7–17. 10 Instead, his Opinion One and Incident Summary largely provide a play-by-play summary 11 of the video footage, concluding that the video footage shows Medina spraying Plaintiffs’ 12 dog. See id. Rather than assist the trier of fact, such testimony would substitute the role 13 of factfinder, and Plaintiffs do not cite any persuasive authority suggesting otherwise. See 14 Dudley Opp’n; Qualey, 2025 WL 254810, at *5 (experts may not “offer their subjective 15 opinion on what facts the videos ‘show’ or do not show”); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 16 No. 2:20-CV-11147-FWS-SK, 2023 WL 2559230, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023) 17 (expert’s opinion “regarding his mere observations drawn from the video evidence would 18 be unhelpful to the jury, because the jurors can watch the videos for themselves and make 19 their own factual determinations.”); A.B. v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 18CV1541-MMA-LL, 20 2020 WL 4430971, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2020). 21 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to Mr. Dudley’s Opinion 22 One and Incident Summary. 23 / / / 24

25 2 At the September 25, 2025, hearing, Plaintiffs stated that Mr. Dudley’s testimony would be helpful to 26 explain the “component pieces”—including how far pepper spray sprays, how long pepper spray remains on the ground, and how much pressure is required to discharge pepper spray—of the factual issue of 27 whether Medina sprayed pepper spray at Plaintiffs’ dog. Plaintiffs also stated that they agree Mr. Dudley’s 28 testimony would not be helpful if the Court is comfortable with the facts. The Court is indeed comfortable 1 B. Opinion Two 2 In Opinion Two, Mr. Dudley opines that Medina’s pepper spraying caused harm to 3 Plaintiffs’ dog and subsequently to Plaintiffs. Dudley Rep. at 17. Defendant argues that 4 this opinion is inadmissible under Daubert, as it is based on “speculation with no 5 discernable methodology.” Dudley Mot. at 9. Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Dudley will not 6 opine on whether the pepper spray caused physical harm to Plaintiffs. Dudley Opp’n at 6. 7 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to Opinion Two, as it is 8 reasonable and unopposed. 9 C. Opinions Regarding Negligence (Opinions Three to Six) 10 In Opinions Three through Six, Mr. Dudley offers opinions as to whether USPS was 11 negligent in training, supervising, establishing policies and procedures as to dealing with 12 animals while delivering mail, and implementing reporting procedures for the use of 13 chemical spray or other force by an employee. Dudley Rep. at 22–27. 14 Defendant argues these opinions should be excluded because they are (1) irrelevant; 15 (2) improper legal conclusions; and (3) barred by the FTCA’s discretionary function 16 exception. Dudley Mot. at 9–14. Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Dudley will not opine on the 17 ultimate issue of negligence, but that his opinions as to USPS’s negligence should be 18 admitted. Dudley Opp’n. at 6. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue they are “entitled to introduce 19 evidence and opinion regarding lack of oversight and unfettered access to supply” if 20 Defendant argues at trial that Medina’s “use of pepper spray would not have been feasible 21 due to oversight and constraints on supply” by USPS. Id. at 5. 22 Defendant replies that it does not intend to argue at trial as to Medina’s “access [to] 23 any particular amount of pepper spray.” Dudley Reply at 4. Defendant also contends that 24 Mr. Dudley’s opinions “consist of nothing more than Mr. Dudley’s summary of evidence 25 he reviewed,” and that Mr. Dudley is otherwise unqualified to opine on USPS’s oversight 26 over the use of pepper spray by its employees. Id. 27 The Court agrees with Defendant that Mr. Dudley’s opinions about USPS’s 28 negligence are not relevant to whether Medina acted negligently. See City of Pomona, 750 1 F.3d at 1043–44. Nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that USPS negligently 2 supervised or trained Medina, nor do they allege that USPS had inadequate policies and 3 procedures as to supervising or training employees about dealing with animals when 4 delivering mail or the use of chemical sprays. See generally Compl. Moreover, Plaintiffs 5 assert they are entitled to admit Mr. Dudley’s testimony only if Defendant plans to argue 6 as to USPS’s oversight—and Defendant contends it does not. See Dudley Mot. at 5; 7 Dudley Reply at 4. 8 Additionally, Mr. Dudley’s opinions as to USPS’s negligence constitute improper 9 legal conclusions. See United States v. Tamman, 782 F.3d 543, 552–53 (9th Cir. 2015) 10 (“[A]n expert cannot testify to a matter of law amounting to a legal conclusion.”) (first 11 citing Fed. R. Evid. 702(a); and then citing Aguilar v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Union Loc. 12 No. 10, 966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992)); Dudley Rep. at 22–27 (opining that USPS was 13 “negligent”). However, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Mr. Dudley’s 14 opinions should be excluded based on the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, given 15 that Plaintiffs have not brought negligence claims related to USPS’s training, supervision, 16 or policies and procedures. See Dudley Mot. at 12–14. 17 Nevertheless, Mr. Dudley’s opinions regarding negligence lack relevance to 18 Plaintiffs’ claim under the FTCA and constitute improper legal conclusions. Accordingly, 19 the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to Mr. Dudley’s Opinions Three through Six 20 regarding negligence. 21 D. Conclusion 22 In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Purported Expert 23 Testimony of James I. Dudley (ECF No. 41) as to the “Incident Summary” and Opinions 24 One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six. 25 II. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Testimony of Dr. Sean S. 26 Kohles 27 Defendant’s second motion seeks to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Sean S. 28 Kohles (“Dr. Kohles”), who is a biomechanical engineer, regarding the number and 1 frequency of pepper spray incidents and claimed harm to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ future 2 damages. See Kohles Mot. Defendant argues that Dr. Kohles’s opinion as to the number 3 and frequency of pepper spray incidents is unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702(a) 4 because his report provides no insight into any facts that are “outside common 5 understanding” and that Dr. Kohles is not qualified to give opinions about harm or future 6 damages since he is not a medical professional. Id. at 6, 10. 7 Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. Kohles’s testimony and 8 submit that they will not introduce testimony from Dr. Kohles regarding the number of 9 pepper spray incidents, claimed harm, and future damages. See Kohles Non-Opp’n. 10 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Purported Expert 11 Testimony of Dr. Sean S. Kohles (ECF No. 42), as it is reasonable and unopposed. The 12 Court will exclude Dr. Kohles’s opinions regarding the number and frequency of pepper 13 spray incidents and claimed harm to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ future damages. 14 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS 15 I. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Report and Testimony of Dr. Daniel 16 Lesser 17 Plaintiffs’ first motion seeks to exclude Dr. Daniel Lesser’s (“Dr. Lesser”) report 18 and testimony under Rule 408. See Lesser Mot. Because Plaintiffs hired Dr. Lesser, who 19 is a pediatric pulmonologist, for “the sole purpose of pre-lawsuit settlement discussion with 20 Defendant,” Plaintiffs argue it would be improper for Defendant to retain Dr. Lesser as an 21 expert in this case. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs contend Dr. Lesser’s Report, see ECF No. 43-3 22 (“Lesser Rep.”), was “inextricably intertwined with the parties’ settlement negotiations.” 23 Lesser Mot. at 5. Defendant responds that it no longer plans to call Dr. Lesser as a witness 24 at trial and does not seek to introduce his report. Lesser Resp. at 1. 25 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Report 26 and Testimony of Dr. Daniel Lesser (ECF No. 43), as it is reasonable and unopposed. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Children’s Deposition Testimony 2 Plaintiffs’ second motion seeks to exclude the deposition testimony of both R.G. and 3 A.G. See generally ECF No. 44-2, Ex. A. (“R.G. Dep. Tr.”); ECF No. 44-3, Ex. B (“A.G. 4 Dep. Tr.”). Plaintiffs argue that R.G. and A.G. were not competent to testify and that their 5 deposition testimony makes clear they “did not have the capacity to perceive and recall the 6 facts they were asked to testify about”; therefore, their deposition testimony is not 7 admissible pursuant to California Evidence Code section 702. Dep. Mot. at 3. 8 Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ motion and argues that the testimony is not 9 inconsistent or irrelevant, and that even if Plaintiffs offered inconsistent testimony, “such 10 evidence goes to the weight of their testimony when the Court assesses their credibility at 11 trial, not to their competency as witnesses.” Dep. Opp’n at 1. Defendant also contends 12 that Plaintiffs’ testimony meets the test for witness competency under the California 13 Evidence Code. Id. at 4–5. 14 Although Plaintiffs seek to exclude the entirety of R.G.’s and A.G.’s deposition 15 testimony for lack of competency, Plaintiffs rely on California Evidence Code section 16 702—which addresses a witness’s personal knowledge as to the facts to which they testify 17 on a particular matter—rather than California Evidence Code section 701—which 18 addresses a witness’s competency to testify in the first instance. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 19 701, 702. Plaintiffs thus improperly rely on section 702 and fail to meet their burden of 20 proof or advance any arguments under section 701. See People v. Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 21 543, 573 (2001) (“[A witness’s][c]apacity to communicate, or to understand the duty of 22 truthful testimony, is a preliminary fact to be determined exclusively by the court, [and] 23 the burden of proof is on the party who objects to the proffered witness.”). 24 Even construing Plaintiffs’ analysis as relevant to section 701, the Court finds that 25 both R.G. and A.G. are competent to testify as witnesses. A review of both R.G.’s and 26 A.G.’s testimony show they were capable of expressing themselves and understood the 27 duty of a witness to tell the truth. See R.G. Dep. Tr. 7:13–8:9 (correctly responding that it 28 would be a lie if questioning attorney said they were wearing a red tie); A.G. Dep. Tr. 7:8– 1 ||8:5 (same); People v. Sanchez, 7 Cal. 5th 14, 31-32 (2019) (same, but regarding a blue 2 || shirt). 3 The Court further agrees with Defendant that any alleged inconsistencies in R.G.’s 4 ||and A.G.’s testimony bear on credibility rather than competency. See People v. Lopez, 5 5 || Cal. 5th 339, 352 (2018), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 15, 2018) (citing People v. 6 || Mincey, 2 Cal. 4th 408, 444 (1992), as modified on denial of reh’g (May 27, 1992)) 7 (Inconsistencies in testimony and a failure to remember aspects of the subject of the 8 testimony, however, do not disqualify a witness. They present questions of credibility for 9 ||resolution by the trier of fact.”) (citation modified); see also Adamson v. Dep’t of Soc. 10 || Servs., 207 Cal. App. 3d 14, 20 (Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he fact that a very young witness 11 |/makes inconsistent or exaggerated statements does not indicate an inability to perceive, 12 recollect, and communicate or an inability to understand the duty to tell the truth.’’). 13 In sum, the Court finds that both R.G. and A.G. were competent to testify as 14 |/ witnesses pursuant to California Evidence Code section 701. Accordingly, the Court 15 || DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Children’s Deposition Testimony (ECF 16 || No. 44). 17 CONCLUSION 18 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Exclude 19 Purported Expert Testimony of James I. Dudley (ECF No. 41), GRANTS Defendant’s 20 Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Testimony of Dr. Sean S. Kohles (ECF No. 42), 21 ||GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Report and Testimony of Dr. Daniel 22 || Lesser (ECF No. 43), and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Children’s 23 || Deposition Testimony (ECF No. 44). 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: September 29, 2025 . □□ f He. 26 on. Janis L. Sammartino 07 United States District Judge 28