Aetna Life Insurance v. McCullagh

241 S.W. 836, 195 Ky. 136, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 290
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 6, 1922
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 241 S.W. 836 (Aetna Life Insurance v. McCullagh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aetna Life Insurance v. McCullagh, 241 S.W. 836, 195 Ky. 136, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinion

■Opinion op the- Court by

Turner, Commissioner—

Affirming.

On December 20, 1916, appellant insurance company -.issued to appellee an accident policy providing for certain specified indemnities in the event -of accidental injury [137]*137to the insured. -Shortly thereafter insured in stepping from a platform in a lodge room at Henderson sustained serious and permanent injuries which he claims continuously, permanently and totally disabled him from carrying on every kind of business pertaining to his occupation.

Appellant declined to recognize insured’s claim for total disability and he instituted action to recover from it for fifty-one weeks’ total disability under the terms of the policy, embracing the period from the 22nd of December, 1916, the date .of the accident, to December 17, 1917, and recovered a judgment for the whole amount sued for based upon his claim of total disability, and that judgment was affirmed by this court, 185 Ky. 664.

Thereafter he-instituted this action for an additional period of total disability resulting from the accident, from December 17, 1917, to January 30, 1920.

He likewise recovered á judgment under the terms of the policy for total disability for that period, but upon appeal to this -court that judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered, upon the ground-that the evidence was insufficient to authorize the submission to the jury of the question whether during that period there was a total disability, and after so deciding the court said:

‘ ‘ However, a claim for partial disability was clearly shown and had appellee requested it a directed verdict in his favor should have gone, to the extent warranted by the policy for a partial disability. Upon a retrial, the evidence being the same, this should be the -order, but if other evidence is introduced the court will -submit the case under proper instructions not inconsistent herewith. ’ ’

Upon the retrial in the circuit court, the -court again submitted in its instructions the right of the plaintiff to recovery for a total disability under the terms of the policy, and the company being dissatisfied with a verdict for the total amount based on that instruction, has again appealed.

Obviously the controlling question is whether the evidence on the last trial is the same, or substantially the same, as it was on the -first trial; for if it was, the opinion on the former appeal must be controlling, and it was the duty of the trial court to have directed a verdict, as therein indicated. On the contrary, if the evidence heard on the last trial on that issue so far supplemented or added to that heard on the original trial as to justify [138]*138the submission, to the jury of the question whether during the period involved there was a total disability resulting from the accident, then it was the duty of the trial court to do as it did and submit that question to the jury. Appellee was the secretary to his uncle, who was financial secretary of the American Sunday School Union. His duties were to go to the postoffice about four times a day to take and receive mail; to go to the bank about twice a day; to file orders for books; to keep a record of the contributors to the Sunday school fund and their names and addresses; to enter in a cash book all receipts and disbursements ; to keep all the’ books, including four large ledgers having different accounts in them; to acknowledge the receipt of funds, and to keep up< with a large correspondence, involving the writing of an average of something like one hundred letters a day, although many of those letters were what might be called “form” or “circular” letters.

The provisions of the policy, dealing with payments for total disability and payments for partial disability, are as follows:

“Total disability. A. If such injuries do not result in any of the losses provided for in part 1, but alone totally disable the insured, that is, from date of accident continuously and wholly prevent him from prosecuting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation, the company will pay the sum of twenty-five dollars per week so long as he shall live and suffer such disability, and
' “Partial disability. B. If such injuries do not totally disable the insured, as above, but alone partially disable him, that is, from date of accident or immediately following a period of total disability as above defined, continuously and wholly prevent him from performing one or more important daily duties pertaining to his occupation, the company will pay one-half of the amount per week payable for total disability for the period of such partial disability, but not for more than twenty-six consecutive weeks.”

On the former trial only two witnesses testified for the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself and the doctor who had attended him after the injury.

On that trial the evidence showed appellee to be suffering from ankylosis; that the injured leg was shorter than the other thus compelling him to use crutches; that from the hip to the ankle was practically one bone, the [139]*139only elasticity being at the ankle; that owing, to a general infection in the leg an attempt to amputate it might produce blood poisoning; that plaintiff could not walk any great distance at one time and that be bad not performed any of the duties of the office since bis injury; that because of bis inability to carry books or heavy packages of mail ur to make regular trips to the postoffice or the bank, and the fact that be could not sit at a table nor stand at a desk for any considerable length of time and could not go out in bad weather, be claimed to have sustained injuries of a permanent and total nature so as to entitle him to the maximum benefits under the total disability clause of the policy. It showed appellee admitted be bad not undertaken to do any banking for the uncle since the injury, although be went to the bank to attend to bis personal business; that when the weather was good be made daily trips to town, a distance of a few blocks; that be was a regular patron of the picture shows and from there be generally went to a club for an hour or so before going home, and that be bad made no effort to see bow much, if any, work be could do since the accident. The evidence showed that defendant bad made no effort since December, 1917, to do the office work, and the opinion says be could not know whether be could substantially perform the duties of the office when be bad made no test of bis ability along that line; and it is observed that one who can go to the postoffice, bank and other places on personal business, walk a number of blocks to town once a day, spend an hour or two almost every day at a picture show and an hour at a club, cannot be said to be totally disabled from performing the clerical duties such as appellee attended to prior to bis injury. It was not disputed that appellee’s injury was painful, serious and permanent, but the inquiry was addressed to the effect it had upon bis ability to perf orm bis customary duties. It was admitted be could not perform them as well or with the same celerity as f ormerly and the opinion then bolds the evidence was insufficient to authorize an instruction on total disability, and reverses the judgment for that reason.

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Bluebook (online)
241 S.W. 836, 195 Ky. 136, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aetna-life-insurance-v-mccullagh-kyctapp-1922.