313 Ga. 19 FINAL COPY
S21G0008, S21G0015 ADVENTURE MOTORSPORTS REINSURANCE, LTD. et al. v. INTERSTATE NATIONAL DEALER SERVICES, INC. (two cases).
ELLINGTON, Justice.
We granted these petitions for a writ of certiorari to consider
whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s
order confirming an arbitration award against Interstate National
Dealer Services, Inc. (“INDS”), in favor of Southern Mountain
Adventures, LLC (“Dealer”), and Adventure Motorsports
Reinsurance, Ltd. (“Reinsurer”). See Adventure Motorsports
Reinsurance v. Interstate National Dealer Svcs., 356 Ga. App. 236
(846 SE2d 115) (2021). The dispute arose from the parties’
contractual relationship pursuant to which Dealer sold motorsports
vehicle service contracts, which were underwritten and
administered by INDS, to Dealer’s retail customers, and Reinsurer
held funds in reserve to pay covered repair claims. We conclude that
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the confirmation of the award on the basis that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law in rendering the award. In Case No. S21G0015, we therefore
reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing the order
confirming the arbitration award on that basis, and we remand for
resolution of INDS’s argument that the arbitrator overstepped his
authority in making the award. In Case No. S21G0008, we vacate
the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing as moot Dealer and
Reinsurer’s appeal from the trial court’s failure to enforce a delayed-
payment penalty provided in the arbitration award, and we remand
for reconsideration of that issue.
The record shows the following. Beginning in 2006, Mountain
Adventures, LLC, a motorsports vehicle dealership owned by Ryan
Hardwick, began selling INDS’s after-market vehicle service
contracts to the dealership’s retail customers. Under its agreement
with INDS (the “Program Agreement”), Mountain Adventures set
the retail price paid by vehicle buyers for service contracts, remitted
to INDS for each contract sold the “Contract Cost” listed in the
“Dealer Net Price Schedule,” which the parties called the “Rate
2 Card,” and retained the difference as its “commission.”1
INDS served as the administrator of the contracts, and an
INDS-affiliated company served as the reinsurer. As an INDS
executive testified at the arbitration hearing, out of the Contract
Cost, INDS allocated an amount determined by its underwriters as
the claims reserves for each contract (about 20 percent of the
Contract Cost in an example that was the subject of testimony
during the hearing). INDS also allocated an amount to itself for
“administration.” The rest of the Contract Cost went to pay
commissions to the independent insurance agent who acted as the
liaison between INDS and Mountain Adventures; to “non-claims
reserves,” which were used to fund a sales incentive program for the
1 The Program Agreement provided:
In consideration of the services rendered by [Mountain Adventures], [INDS] agrees to pay [Mountain Adventures] a commission equal to the amount of the retail price of Contract less Contract Cost as set forth in the Dealer Net Price Schedule. [Mountain Adventures] may retain its commissions from each sale before remitting Contract Cost to [INDS]. In the Program Agreement, Mountain Adventures agreed “to follow the underwriting and claims guidelines issued by [INDS] from time to time on forms supplied by [INDS]. Such guidelines will determine which vehicle/craft are eligible for use in [INDS’s] Program(s).” 3 dealership’s employees and to cover a roadside-assistance program
that was included in all of INDS’s vehicle service contracts; and to
other purposes. When the term of a service contract expired, INDS
shared with Mountain Adventures a portion of the underwriting
profit (the difference between the claims reserves and repair claims
paid under each service contract).
In 2008, another motorsports vehicle dealership owned by
Hardwick, Southern Mountain Adventures (“Dealer”), entered into
a different type of contract with INDS. Under this new arrangement,
instead of the claims reserves being held by the INDS-affiliated
company as the reinsurer, Adventure Motorsports Reinsurance, Ltd.
(“Reinsurer”), a newly created entity also owned by Hardwick, would
hold the claims reserves and would be entitled to all of the
underwriting profit realized at the expiration of a service contract.
The contract between Dealer and INDS (the “Producer Agreement”)
was like the previous arrangement between Mountain Adventures
and INDS (the Program Agreement) in most respects: Dealer agreed
to sell service contracts to its customers, setting the retail price at
4 its discretion, and to remit to INDS the Contract Cost listed on the
Rate Card for each contract sold, and INDS agreed to administer the
contracts and pay vehicle repair claims.2 Under a related contract
between INDS and Reinsurer (the “Reinsurance Agreement”),
during the term of the service contracts sold by Dealer, Reinsurer
would reimburse INDS for repair claims paid by INDS. The
Reinsurance Agreement contained an arbitration clause, which
provided, in part:
The arbitrators [chosen by the parties] and umpire [chosen by the two arbitrators] shall interpret this Agreement as an honorable engagement and not strictly as a legal obligation. They are relieved of all judicial formalities, may abstain from following the strict rules of law, and shall make their award with a view to affecting the general purpose of this Agreement in a reasonable manner rather than in accordance with its literal language.
After the parties operated under this arrangement for about
2 In the Producer Agreement, Dealer agreed to
[u]tilize the pricing structures, underwriting and claims guidelines issued by [INDS] from time to time on forms supplied by [INDS]. Such structures and guidelines will determine which vehicles are eligible for use in [INDS’s] Program(s) as well as the required pricing, including reserves for claims. 5 five years, Hardwick learned that, contrary to his expectation, INDS
was not remitting the entire Contract Cost listed on the Rate Card
to Reinsurer as claims reserves for each service contract Dealer sold
to a vehicle purchaser. INDS’s position was that claims reserves, as
determined by a third-party actuarial firm, constituted only a
component of the Contract Cost of a service contract and that INDS
was required under the Producer Agreement to remit only that
component of the Contract Cost to Reinsurer. Dealer, Reinsurer, and
INDS agreed to arbitrate their dispute. They executed an
Arbitration Agreement, which reflected that Dealer and Reinsurer
sought to recover from INDS damages “as a result of numerous
disputes arising out of” the contracts among Dealer, Reinsurer, and
INDS “regarding funds generated from sales of vehicle service
contracts and subsequent administration of these funds and claims
thereafter.” The claimants, Dealer and Reinsurer, asserted claims
for “breach of contract, fraudulent procurement of contract, and
misrepresentation for unauthorized charges and fees, and
misappropriated and unaccounted funds.”
6 In the Arbitration Agreement, the parties agreed to a single
arbitrator (rather than a panel of three, as agreed upon in the
Reinsurance Agreement), and, in a subsequent consent case
management order, they agreed “to proceed in accordance with the
Commercial Arbitration Rules adopted by the American Arbitration
Association and Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Intra-
Industry U.S. Reinsurance and Insurance Disputes.” The parties
also agreed that “[t]he Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
that the Arbitrator deems just and equitable within the scope of the
agreements of the Parties, including but not limited to monetary
damages, statutory damages, and equitable, declaratory, or
injunctive relief.”
After an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator found in favor of
the claimants, Dealer and Reinsurer. The arbitrator considered the
Producer Agreement (between Dealer and INDS) and the related
Reinsurance Agreement (between Reinsurer and INDS) together as
“the Reinsurance Arrangement Agreements.” The arbitrator found
that the Rate Card did not authorize INDS to recover or pay itself
7 any charges and fees and that the only purpose of the Rate Card was
to establish Dealer’s cost for vehicle service contracts that Dealer
sold to its retail customers. The arbitrator found that the only
charges and fees expressly authorized in any of the parties’
agreements were “fees associated with contracts written”3 and
“warranty claims and claim adjustment expenses”4 and that neither
of these terms authorized INDS to recover and pay itself charges
and fees for administration, agent’s commissions, reserves for a
sales incentive program for Dealer’s personnel, reserves for roadside
assistance claims, any claim adjustment expense in addition to those
actually and reasonably incurred, or any premium tax in excess of
3 In the Producer Agreement, Dealer agreed to
[a]uthorize [INDS] to receive from such remittance [of “appropriate monies due” INDS from sales of vehicle service contracts, i.e., the Contract Cost specified for a contract on the Rate Card], fees associated with contracts written, or if such remittances are insufficient for payment of same then, withdraw such amounts from funds in the reinsurance company formed by [Dealer] and previously remitted by [Dealer]. 4 In the Producer Agreement, Dealer agreed to
[a]llow [INDS] to be reimbursed from [Reinsurer] for payments it has made for any claims and claim adjustment expenses including, but not limited to, inspection and/or legal fees relating to the [vehicle service contract] or for cancellation of any [vehicle service contract]. 8 the applicable state rate.
The arbitrator further found, based on testimony at the
hearing, that a ceding fee is customarily paid to the administrator
of a reinsurance program to cover costs and expenses anticipated to
be incurred by the administrator of a reinsurance program. The
arbitrator found that, contrary to that custom, the Reinsurance
Agreement reflected that Reinsurer would pay no ceding fee to INDS
as the administrator of the service contracts reinsured by Reinsurer.
The arbitrator found, based on testimony at the hearing, that, in
drafting the agreements, INDS was intentionally vague as to what
portion of monies it received from Dealer would be ceded to
Reinsurer.5 The arbitrator noted that, “[u]nder Georgia law, where
the governing contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract
should be enforced according to its plain terms” and that any
ambiguity in the governing contract should be “construed against
the drafter (which was [INDS]).” The arbitrator found that INDS
5Although the arbitrator found that INDS intentionally drafted the agreements to be vague, he expressly declined to make any finding as to Dealer and Reinsurer’s claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation. 9 prepared and delivered to Dealer and Reinsurer periodic operating
statements that failed to specify the charges and fees it had retained
before ceding the actuarially determined claims reserves to
Reinsurer. Finally, the arbitrator found that INDS breached the
agreements by unilaterally recovering and paying to itself and third
parties charges and fees not expressly authorized in the agreements
and not disclosed in operating statements.
The arbitrator awarded Dealer and Reinsurer more than
$400,000 for “excessive” administration fees, “excessive” agent’s
commissions, and amounts allocated from the Contract Cost to other
expenses. For the administration fees and agent’s commissions,
Dealer and Reinsurer proposed, and the arbitrator accepted, a
“quantum meruit” calculation of the amounts charged minus the
value of the services provided by INDS, based on the opinion
testimony of a former president of INDS as to the industry average.
In Section C (1) (g), the arbitration award provided:
If this Award is not paid in full by [INDS] to [Dealer and Reinsurer] within 30 days of the date of the Award, [INDS] will be charged interest at an annual rate
10 prescribed under OCGA § 7-4-12 on the outstanding Award balance from the date of the Award until the Award is paid in full, plus reasonable costs of collection, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by [Dealer and Reinsurer].
INDS filed a motion in the trial court to vacate the arbitration
award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3) and (b) (5), and Dealer and
Reinsurer filed a cross-motion for confirmation of the award under
OCGA § 9-9-12. Dealer and Reinsurer also requested that the court
hold an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings that INDS
violated Section C (1) (g) of the arbitration award by not paying the
amount awarded to Dealer and Reinsurer in full within 30 days of
the date of the award. The trial court confirmed the arbitration
award. But the trial court declined to address Section C (1) (g), based
on its determination that issues about the delayed-payment penalty
would not be ripe for decision until 30 days after entry of a final
judgment confirming the award.
INDS appealed the order confirming the arbitration award,
and Dealer and Reinsurer appealed the trial court’s failure to
enforce the delayed-payment penalty. The Court of Appeals reversed
11 the order confirming the arbitration award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b)
(5). The Court of Appeals ruled that
[n]either the Claimants [(Dealer and Reinsurer)] nor the arbitrator identified any amount paid to INDS outside of the prices reflected in the contracts and on the Rate Card, so this is not a case involving unreviewable factual errors. That INDS used those payments to run its business, pay its costs, and retain a profit is not a ground for eliminating the Claimants’ contractual liability to pay INDS the prices listed on the Rate Card. The arbitrator’s explicit rejection of the Rate Card as the contracted-for pricing ignores the express contractual language requiring the Claimants to “utilize the pricing structures” provided by INDS and transmit completed service applications “together with appropriate monies due [INDS] from” the Claimants’ sales. Accordingly, by explicitly rejecting the contractual language, the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, and the superior court erred by confirming the award.
Adventure Motorsports, 356 Ga. App. at 240 (footnotes omitted). The
court did not address INDS’s alternative argument under OCGA §
9-9-13 (b) (3) that the arbitrator overstepped his authority in the
way he interpreted the contracts and calculated the award. Based
on the court’s reversal of the order confirming the arbitration award,
the court dismissed as moot Dealer and Reinsurer’s argument that
the trial court erred in failing to enforce the delayed-payment
12 penalty.
Case No. S21G0015
1. Dealer and Reinsurer contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration
award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5), on the basis that INDS was
prejudiced by the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.
Specifically, Dealer and Reinsurer argue that, for vacatur on this
basis, controlling precedent requires a showing of concrete evidence
that the arbitrator intentionally and knowingly chose to ignore the
law applicable to the parties’ dispute, and they argue that such
evidence is absent in this case. We agree.
Georgia’s Arbitration Code “was designed to preserve and
ensure the efficacy and expediency of arbitration awards.” ABCO
Builders v. Progressive Plumbing, 282 Ga. 308, 309 (647 SE2d 574)
(2007).
A primary advantage of arbitration is the expeditious and final resolution of disputes by means that circumvent the time and expense associated with civil litigation. . . . [A]rbitration is a unique procedure that exists in Georgia due to legislative fiat, and it is conducted in accordance
13 with the rules established by the legislature.
Greene v. Hundley, 266 Ga. 592, 597 (3) (468 SE2d 350) (1996). By
agreeing to arbitrate grievances, contracting parties express their
intent “to by-pass the judicial system and thus avoid potential
delays at the trial and appellate levels.” Brookfield Country Club v.
St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 287 Ga. 408, 413 (1) (696 SE2d 663)
(2010).
Under the Arbitration Code, trial courts are “severely limited
in vacating an arbitration award so as not to frustrate the legislative
purpose of avoiding litigation by resort to arbitration.” Brookfield,
287 Ga. at 411 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). See OCGA §
9-9-12 (“The [trial] court shall confirm an award upon application of
a party made within one year after its delivery to him, unless the
award is vacated or modified by the court as provided in [the
Arbitration Code].”). In reviewing a trial court’s order confirming or
vacating an arbitration award, the appellate court reviews de novo
the trial court’s resolution of questions of law. See Wells v. Wells-
14 Wilson, 360 Ga. App. 646, 648 (860 SE2d 185) (2021).6
The Arbitration Code enumerates five grounds for vacatur, and
those grounds are the exclusive means by which a court may vacate
an arbitration award. See Brookfield, 287 Ga. at 411 (1); OCGA § 9-
9-13 (b).7 Unless one of the statutory grounds for vacating an award
as set forth in OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) is found to exist, a trial court in
reviewing an award is bound to confirm it. See Greene, 266 Ga. at
6 See also City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 30 (3)
(743 SE2d 381) (2013) (An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination of whether a contract’s language is clear and unambiguous, in which case the court simply enforces the contract according to its clear terms, and, if the trial court determines that the contract is ambiguous in some material respect, the appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity, because these determinations involve questions of law.). 7 OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) provides:
The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the arbitration or was served with a demand for arbitration if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: (1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; (4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection; or (5) The arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law. 15 596 (3). The Code expressly excludes from the grounds for vacating
or refusing to confirm an award “[t]he fact that the relief was such
that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or
equity[.]” OCGA § 9-9-13 (d). “An arbitrator has inherent power to
fashion a remedy as long as the award draws its essence from the
contract or statute.” MARTA v. Local 732, Amalgamated Transit
Union, 261 Ga. 191, 195 (2) (a) (403 SE2d 51) (1991) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
An arbitrator’s award may be vacated pursuant to OCGA § 9-
9-13 (b) (5) “if it can be shown that the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the proper law applicable to the case before him. This
disregard must be both evident and intentional.” ABCO, 282 Ga. at
309. That is,
[t]o manifestly disregard the law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it. Therefore, to prove that a manifest disregard of the law has occurred, a party wishing to have an arbitration award vacated must provide evidence of record that, not only was the correct law communicated to an arbitrator, but that the arbitrator intentionally and knowingly chose to ignore that law despite the fact that it was correct.
16 Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Brookfield Country
Club v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 299 Ga. App. 614, 620 (3) (683
SE2d 40) (2009) (“In the arbitration context, the concept of manifest
disregard has never been the equivalent of insufficiency of the
evidence or a misapplication of the law to the facts.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)), aff’d, 287 Ga. 408 (696 SE2d 663) (2010). This
showing is “an extremely difficult one to make” and requires
evidence in the transcript of the arbitration proceeding (if the
hearing is transcribed) or in the arbitrator’s written findings (if
made) or other “concrete evidence” in the record that would indicate
“a specific intent” of the arbitrator to disregard the appropriate law.
ABCO, 282 Ga. at 309-310 (citation and punctuation omitted). For
example, if an arbitration award were to make “an explicit recital of
the winning party’s argument that the correct law should be ignored
rather than followed,” there would be sufficiently clear evidence on
the face of the award showing the arbitrator’s intent to purposefully
disregard applicable law to vacate the award. Id. at 309.
On the other hand, an arbitrator who “incorrectly interprets
17 the law has not manifestly disregarded it. [The arbitrator] has
simply made a legal mistake.” ABCO, 282 Ga. at 309 (citation and
punctuation omitted). “[M]ere error in law or failure on the part of
the arbitrator[ ] to understand or apply the law” does not amount to
deliberately disregarding the law in order to reach the result the
arbitrator reached. Id. at 310 (citation and punctuation omitted). In
ABCO, a construction contract dispute, a builder argued that the
court could infer that the arbitration panel intentionally
disregarded the law from the panel’s ultimate award to a
subcontractor, because the builder had presented the proper legal
formula to calculate certain damages awarded to the subcontractor
and the panel’s subsequent erroneous computation could not have
been a mistake or misinterpretation. See id.; Progressive Plumbing
v. ABCO Builders, 281 Ga. App. 696 (637 SE2d 92) (2006). But an
erroneous calculation of damages alone simply does not permit
vacatur under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5) because it is not concrete
evidence of a deliberate decision not to apply the applicable
standard. See ABCO, 282 Ga. at 309; Progressive, 281 Ga. App. at
18 698. Even if the reviewing court “were convinced that [it] would have
decided [a] contractual dispute differently, that would not be nearly
enough to set aside the [arbitrator’s] award.” ABCO, 282 Ga. at 310
(citation and punctuation omitted).
In this case, the arbitrator never expressed, during the hearing
or in the arbitration award, that the correct law should be ignored
rather than followed. As noted above, the Court of Appeals based its
holding that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law on the
court’s determination that the arbitrator “explicitly reject[ed]”
contractual language, specifically, that the Rate Card was “the
contracted-for pricing” between the parties. But the arbitrator did
not reject the Rate Card as establishing the wholesale cost for INDS
service contracts that Dealer sold to its retail customers. Rather, the
arbitrator interpreted the Rate Card in the overall context of the
agreements and found that the Rate Card’s sole purpose was to
establish the wholesale cost for service contracts. The arbitrator
“rejected” the Rate Card only to the extent INDS relied on it
standing alone as contractual authority for INDS to cede to
19 Reinsurer only the actuarially determined amount for claims
reserves for each service contract after first paying itself an
administration fee, paying an agent’s commission, deducting
amounts to be held as non-claims reserves, and so on.
The arbitration award referenced applicable aspects of Georgia
law of contract construction — that, where the governing contract is
clear and unambiguous, the contract should be enforced according
to its plain terms, and that contractual ambiguities are to be
construed against the drafter. The arbitrator found that the
governing contracts were vague and should be construed against the
drafter, INDS. Although the contracts did not expressly provide for
deductions from the Contract Cost, the arbitrator took into account
that INDS deserved to be compensated for the valuable services that
INDS provided to Dealer and Reinsurer. The arbitrator fashioned a
remedy that he deemed just and equitable within the scope of the
agreements of the parties to determine a fair compensation. Not only
the arbitration clause the parties executed before the dispute arose,
but also the Arbitration Agreement and the case management
20 orders the parties executed after the dispute arose, expressly
authorized the arbitrator to fashion such a remedy. We conclude
that the arbitration award draws its essence from the contracts.
However imperfect the Court of Appeals may have judged the
arbitrator’s understanding or application of the law to have been,
such a failure by the arbitrator does not amount to concrete evidence
of a deliberate decision not to apply the applicable law in making the
arbitration award. See ABCO, 282 Ga. at 309. The cases relied upon
by the Court of Appeals that were decided under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b)
(5) do not support a finding of manifest disregard of the law under
the circumstances of this case.8 Because nothing in the record of the
8 See Airtab, Inc. v. Limbach Co., 295 Ga. App. 720, 722 (2) (a) (673 SE2d
69) (2009) (holding that the record did not show that the arbitrators deliberately ignored the subcontract or controlling law under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5) and affirming the order confirming an arbitration award); McGill Homes v. Weaver, 278 Ga. App. 622, 623 (629 SE2d 535) (2006) (holding that the appellant’s claims of manifest disregard of the law under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5) were “nothing more than unreviewable factual issues” and affirming the order confirming an arbitration award (citation and punctuation omitted)). The Court of Appeals also cited cases that were decided under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3), which do not support vacating the award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5). See King v. King, 354 Ga. App. 19, 25 (2) (b) (840 SE2d 108) (2020) (affirming the order vacating an arbitration award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3), based on prejudice to a party from the arbitrator’s imperfect execution of his authority);
21 arbitration hearing or in the arbitrator’s written findings of fact and
conclusions of law supports a determination that the arbitrator
intended to purposefully disregard applicable law, the Court of
Appeals’ decision to reverse the trial court’s confirmation of the
arbitration award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5) is reversed. See
ABCO, 282 Ga. at 309.9
As noted above, the Court of Appeals did not address INDS’s
alternative argument under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3) that the
arbitrator overstepped his authority in the way he interpreted the
contracts and calculated the award. Because we are reversing the
Sweatt v. Intl. Dev. Corp., 242 Ga. App. 753, 755 (1) (531 SE2d 192) (2000) (vacating the order confirming an arbitration award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3), based on prejudice to a party from the arbitrators’ overstepping of their authority). 9 See also Berger v. Welsh, 326 Ga. App. 290, 295-297 (3) (756 SE2d 545)
(2014) (reversing an order vacating an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law because the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that the arbitrator announced his intention to ignore the plain and unambiguous terms of the pertinent contracts); America’s Home Place v. Cassidy, 301 Ga. App. 233, 236 (2) (687 SE2d 254) (2009) (reversing an order denying a motion to confirm an arbitration award because the appellants did not point to any concrete evidence that the arbitrator intentionally ignored the language of the pertinent contract or applicable law); Hansen & Hansen Enterprises v. SCSJ Enterprises, 299 Ga. App. 469, 472 (1) (682 SE2d 652) (2009) (holding that the trial court erred in vacating an arbitration award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law because the award showed that the arbitrator knew the applicable Georgia law and applied it). 22 Court of Appeals’ holding under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5), the case is
remanded for consideration of INDS’s argument under OCGA § 9-9-
13 (b) (3). We express no opinion on this issue.
Case No. S21G0008
2. Because INDS’s claim of error under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3)
has not been decided, Dealer and Reinsurer’s appeal from the trial
court’s failure to enforce the penalty for delayed payment of the
amount awarded to them may not be moot, as the Court of Appeals
held it was. Whether Dealer and Reinsurer’s appeal is moot will
depend on the Court of Appeals’ decision on remand regarding
INDS’s claim of error under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (3). The Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of Dealer and Reinsurer’s appeal is therefore
vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration of that appeal.
Judgment vacated and case remanded in Case No. S21G0008. Judgment reversed and case remanded in Case No. S21G0015. All the Justices concur.
23 Decided December 14, 2021.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia – 356 Ga.
App. 236.
Withrow McQuade & Olsen, Jeffrey T. Holm, Lipsey,
Morrison, Waller & Lipsey, Eric J. Morrison, for appellants.
Fox Rothschild, Kenton J. Coppage, Goldberg Segalla,
Jeffrey L. Kingsley, for appellee.
Gilbert Harrell Sumerford & Martin, Judson H. Turner,
Mark D. Johnson; Arnall Golden Gregory, Glenn P. Hendrix,
Rebecca L. Kolb; Alston & Bird, Andrew J. Tuck; King & Spalding,
Shelby S. Guilbert, Jr.; Miller & Martin, Shelby R. Grubbs; Douglas
H. Yarn; for appellants.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Erika C. Birg;
Khayat Law Firm, Robert C. Khayat, Jr., amici curiae (case no.
S21G0015).