Advantaged Solutions, Inc. v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 25-1806
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims ADVANTAGED SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff, No. 25-cv-1806 v. Filed Under Seal: January 30, THE UNITED STATES, 2026

Defendant, Publication: February 6, 20261 and

OAKLAND CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendant.

Jeffrey M. Chiow of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, D.C., argued for Plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Pamela Marple and Christopher O’Brien of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, D.C.

Reta Emma Bezak of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., argued for Defendant. With her on the briefs were Geoffrey M. Long and Patricia M. McCarthy of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, and Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General. Also with her on the briefs was Ashley Kelly, Supervisory Counsel of the Defense Logistics Agency.

John R. Tolle of Barton, Baker, Thomas & Tolle, LLP, McLean, Virginia, argued for Intervenor- Defendant. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This post-award bid protest concerns a solicitation to procure a software update for the

Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA or Agency) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) platform.

1 This Memorandum and Order was filed under seal, in accordance with the Protective Order entered in this case. ECF No. 8. On February 6, 2026, the parties confirmed with the Court that that there were no proposed redactions. The sealed and public versions of this Memorandum and Order are identical, except for this footnote, the publication date, and the addition of counsels’ names. Plaintiff, Advantaged Solutions, Inc. (ASI or Plaintiff), is a minority-owned business and

authorized reseller of SAP products and services, with its principal place of business in

Washington, D.C. ECF No. 1 (Complaint or Compl.) ¶ 1. Defendant, the United States, acted

through DLA in this matter. “The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a United States (US)

Department of Defense (DoD) agency that provides worldwide logistics support for the missions

of the Military Departments and the Unified Combatant Commands under conditions of peace and

war.” AR at 15. Intervenor-Defendant, Oakland Consulting Group, Inc., (Oakland) is a business

which also offers licensed, SAP-based ERP support. AR 1386.

In its initial selection decision, DLA deemed Oakland’s proposal deficient and awarded the

contract to ASI. However, immediately after making the award, DLA discovered an issue with

the evaluation process: its evaluators had assigned ASI and Oakland different ratings for their

technical approach, even though their proposals were identical in that regard. DLA rescinded the

contract, reevaluated the proposals, and ultimately awarded the contract to Oakland for

approximately $130 million. Plaintiff’s protest follows. Plaintiff challenges DLA’s corrective

action, its final award to Oakland, and alleged descoping of the solicitation as arbitrary and

capricious or unlawful.

FACTUAL HISTORY

DLA uses an ERP platform “to establish end-to-end processes to fulfill acquisition,

logistics and financial reporting requirements, streamline and use data sources effectively, reduce

inefficient or non value-added operations, and audit its resources.” AR 4. The ERP platform relies

predominately on brand-name software provided by SAP Public Services, Inc. AR 4, 6. It also

requires lifecycle refreshes—in this case, DLA must upgrade the ERP platform with a newer

version of several SAP programs: SAP S/4HANA Private Cloud Edition 2025, SAP Ariba

Sourcing and Procurement for Public Sector in S/4HANA (SAP S/4 PPS), and SAP Bulk Fuels

2 Management 4.0 (BFM). AR 15–16. This bid protest arises from DLA’s procurement for the

“design, build, test, training and deployment of SAP S/4 PPS and BFM 4.0.” AR 4.

On April 28, 2025, DLA released a request for quotations (RFQ or solicitation) for brand-

name SAP Support Services against a Department of Defense (DOD) Enterprise Software

Initiative (ESI) Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) issued under a General Services

Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) Multiple Award Schedule contract. AR 71,

3. DLA issued a limited source justification to purchase brand-name SAP services from an

authorized SAP reseller. AR 3. The RFQ stated that the basis for award would be the “lowest

priced, technically acceptable offer based upon the total price for all items contained within this

solicitation and the corresponding Performance Work Statement (PWS).” AR 71.

As one of Plaintiff’s allegations centers around purportedly improper reductions to the

scope of the solicitation, the Court must examine the content of the original solicitation. According

to the original solicitation, DLA would evaluate each solicitation using three non-price factors: (1)

Level of Effort/Labor Mix, (2) Key Personnel, and (3) Technical Approach.” AR 72. “Technical

acceptability requires being acceptable for all non-price factors and meeting all requirements” of

the Performance Work Statement (PWS). Id. Originally, the scope of solicitation included seven

(7) tasks: (1) Program Management and Administration Services; (2) Environment Build and

Transition; (3) Execution; (4) Testing, Evaluation, and Documentation; (5) DIBBS Modernization;

(6) Human Performance; and (7) Hypercare, Transition to Post Production Support and Site

Development. AR 20–38. Over the several months before the initial award, DLA amended the

solicitation 11 times. See AR 788 (Amendment 11). The most significant amendment was

Amendment 5, dated September 17, 2025, because it significantly trimmed down the scope of

3 (descoped) the PWS. AR 1786–88. Among other things, Amendment 5 eliminated Task 6 of the

PWS: Human Performance. See AR 688–89.

Another important requirement of the solicitation is that the ERP upgrade requires a

“Hybrid Agile approach.” AR 20. This “Hybrid Agile approach” means “continuous requirements

evaluation, effective integration, testing, evaluation, cybersecurity, implementation, and the use of

automation [in] the development processes, where possible, to help ensure programs and projects

are executed successfully.’” AR 278. The evaluation of Plaintiff’s and Oakland’s “Hybrid Agile”

sections in their proposals also becomes a central question in this bid protest.

On May 30, 2025, offerors ASI and Oakland both submitted timely proposals. See AR

789; 1384. DLA found deficiencies in both proposals during the initial technical evaluation. AR

1590–91; AR 1595. Namely, as DLA informed both Plaintiff and Oakland, the proposals failed

to fulfill PWS Section 3.3 Task 3: Execution by failing to “propose[] a Hybrid Agile Method” and

were “resource intensive based on continuous feedback.” AR 1591; AR 1595.

In answer to DLA’s letters informing each of its proposal deficiencies, Plaintiff and

Oakland provided identical responses in an attempt to remedy their proposals’ flaws. AR 1598–

99; 1678.2 In the section of each response titled “Agile Delivery Components,” both offerors

stated that “‘Business involvement is limited to a few subject matter experts for each Agile team,”

and that “We plan to work side by side with key DLA stakeholders during the design and build

2 The responses are virtually identical, with differences only in capitalization, punctuation, and the occasional shortening of a word. Compare AR 1598–99 with 1678. Since the responses are otherwise the same, the Court will refer to them as “identical” throughout this Memorandum and Order.

4 phases to facilitate real-time decision-making and feedback, improving efficiency and reducing

rework.” AR 1599 (Plaintiff’s response), 1678 (Oakland’s response).3

In July 2025, after reviewing this response, DLA deemed the deficiency in Plaintiff’s

Hybrid Agile Methodology section resolved and found Plaintiff’s proposal technically acceptable.

AR at 1711–12. The Agency explained that “[Plaintiff’s] proposal revision stated that they will

use a Hybrid Agile method coupled with a traditional waterfall delivery. [Plaintiff] stated,

‘Business involvement is limited to a few subject matter experts for each Agile team.’

[H]ighlighting SME’s gets to the right level of support. This deficiency has been resolved.” AR

1711.

Meanwhile, a different team of evaluators at DLA found Oakland’s offer technically

unacceptable, even after reviewing Oakland’s identical response, citing the following reasons:

[T]he vendor does not accurately identify the teams needed. The vendor stated in their revised proposal, “We plan to work side by side with key DLA stakeholders during the design and build phases to facilitate real-time decision-making and feedback, improving efficiency and reducing rework.” DLA stakeholders are the management layer and may not be the correct team. As a result, the deficiency remains.

AR 1720; see AR 3115 (detailing how the evaluation team “split up” the work of evaluating the

proposals). On September 17, 2025, in a letter informing Oakland of Amendment 5, DLA once

again highlighted Oakland’s deficiency in its proposed Hybrid Agile Methodology: “The vendor’s

revised proposal . . . satisfied a portion of this deficiency, however the vendor does not accurately

identify the teams needed.” AR 1787. In response, Oakland modified its Hybrid Agile

Methodology section but continued to use the language of “DLA stakeholders.” Compare AR

3 Identical language in procurements involving brand-name SAP services is not unusual and, according to DLA, even to be expected, as proposals will often use the same subcontractors who provide this language. See infra at 6 (citing AR 3114).

5 1720 with AR 1996. DLA determined that, while Oakland had “partially addressed” the

deficiency, its Hybrid Agile Methodology section remained deficient, as the proposal failed “to

meet the Government requirement of engaging DLA’s business community at the right level.” AR

2620.

Also during the bidding process, the Department of War team for the Department of

Government Efficiency (DOGE) became involved in the procurement. AR 2631. When

informing the bidders about the final amendment (Amendment 11), on September 26, 2025, DLA

indicated that the DOGE team “is concerned about some of the labor pricing being too high,” and

asked the bidders whether their pricing could be updated. See AR 2631, 2627. Neither Plaintiff

nor Oakland changed their pricing in response. See AR 2643, 2638. While Oakland did not alter

its pricing, it added language to its Hybrid Agile Methodology section while continuing to

highlight “a few subject matter experts for each Agile team” and “key DLA stakeholders.” AR

2650. DLA’s final evaluation of Oakland stated that the continued use of the term “DLA

stakeholders” demonstrated a “material failure” to meet the “requirement of engaging DLA’s

business community at the right level.” AR 2724. DLA therefore determined Oakland’s proposal

was technically unacceptable. Id. On September 29, 2025, DLA awarded ASI, the sole technically

acceptable offeror, the contract for SAP services. AR at 2744–45.

On October 2, 2025, DLA discovered that “[t]he deficiency that [DLA] identified with the

Oakland response was also uncovered [Plaintiff’s] response today.” AR 3110. In internal Agency

correspondence, DLA explained “‘how’ the Tech Eval process missed a key step.” AR at 3114.

The emails mention that DLA typically assumes that the responses in a brand-name software

services procurement like this will all be identical. AR 3114. This is because all bidders usually

6 work with the same subcontractors. Id. In this case, however, that assumption “apparently was

overlooked and therefore escaped the usual parties throughout the process.” Id.

In emails dated October 6, 2025, a DLA site manager asked for confirmation that both

Plaintiff’s and Oakland’s proposals had the same language. AR 3112. He then asked his DLA

team that, if the language is identical, whether “the deficiency language was resolved by both

offerors, and therefore they are both Acceptable, or does the deficiency stand for both offerors,

and therefore they are both Unacceptable.” Id. The response email answers that “[b]ased on the

back and similar language on ‘stakeholder engagement’ then both vendors can be considered

Acceptable.” Id.

The next day, on October 7, DLA issued Plaintiff a stop-work order that explained

“[d]uring post-award review, the Government identified an issue with the evaluation of offers

process which requires corrective action, including re-evaluation of offers.” AR at 3118. In its

response to the stop-work order, Plaintiff stated that, “[i]f this causes you to re-address our award,

we hope and respectfully request that if the Government finds an issue with your evaluation that

ASI [be] given the opportunity to renegotiate through a best and final opportunity.” AR 3121.

DLA then re-evaluated Oakland’s technical proposal and the previously-identified deficiency in

the Hybrid Methodology Approach and determined that the “initial identification of deficiencies

in this area was based on a misinterpretation of the vendor’s approach. This assessment has been

corrected.” AR 3126. DLA subsequently asked both offerors to submit best and final offers,

wherein each could revise any aspect of the proposal. AR 3132, 3135.

The next day, prior to the deadline for best and final offers, ASI submitted an agency-level

protest asserting that its price had been revealed to other offerors, giving the other offerors an

advantage. AR 3161. ASI asked the Agency to cancel the procurement and issue a new

7 solicitation. Id. On October 14, 2026, Agency sustained the protest but did not cancel the

procurement; instead, DLA rescinded the request for best and final offers, declaring that it would

instead re-evaluate the final proposals received prior to the initial award. AR 3171. No party

protested that decision. On October 14, 2025, DLA released the final technical evaluations for

Oakland and ASI. AR 3172–89. It also released an Award Decision Document Addendum (ADD

or Addendum), where it concluded that Oakland’s price was lower, and its proposal was

technically acceptable, so it was therefore the lowest-priced technically acceptable offer. AR

3191–92 (noting Oakland’s offered price of $130,398,773.02 was $4,117,875.42 less than ASI’s

price of $134,516,648.44). Accordingly, DLA terminated the contract with ASI and awarded it to

Oakland. AR 3197–98, 3201. This protest follows.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed its bid protest with this Court. See Complaint. On

October 29, Oakland filed a Motion to Intervene, which the Court granted the same day. See ECF

No. 10 (motion); ECF No. 18 (granting Oakland leave to intervene).

On December 5, 2025, Plaintiff and Intervenor-Defendant filed their Motions for Judgment

on the Administrative Record (MJAR). See ECF Nos. 33 (Oakland MJAR or Oak. MJAR), 34

(Plaintiff’s MJAR or Pl. MJAR). On the same day, Defendant filed its Partial Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. See ECF No. 35 (Defendant’s Partial

Motion to Dismiss and MJAR or Def. Mot.). On December 19, 2025, Defendant and Intervenor-

Defendant filed their Responses to Plaintiff’s MJAR, and Plaintiff filed its Response to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and MJAR. See ECF Nos. 41 (Pl. Resp.), 42 (Def. Resp.), 43

(Oak. Resp). The parties filed their Replies in support of their MJARS on January 5, 2026. ECF

Nos. 45 (Pl. Reply), 46 (Def. Reply), 47 (Oak. Reply). On January 15, 2026, the Court conducted

8 oral argument on the pending motions. See Minute Entry dated January 15, 2026; see also

Transcript dated January 15, 2026 (ECF No. 54) (OA Tr.).

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

In the Court of Federal Claims, bid protests are adjudicated under Rule 52.1(c), which

provides an expedited trial on a “paper record, allowing fact-finding by the trial court.” Rule

52.1(c) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)); Bannum, Inc. v. United

States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referencing Rule 56.1, which was replaced by Rule

52.1(c)). Unlike at summary judgment, genuine disputes of material fact do not preclude the Court

from granting a motion for judgment on the administrative record. Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1357.

This Court is empowered to provide any relief, including declaratory or injunctive relief, that it

deems proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2); Oak Grove Techs., LLC v. United States, 116 F.4th 1364,

1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024)

i. Blue and Gold

“It is settled law that ‘a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government

solicitation . . . and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise

the same objection subsequently in a bid protest.’” Newimar S.A. v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl.

97, 121–22 (2022), aff’d, No. 2022-1949, 2023 WL 8534614 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (quoting

Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). This is so even

where “a challenge to the terms of the solicitation” is “characterize[d] . . . as a challenge to the

evaluation of [an awardee's] proposal.” DevTech Sys., 176 Fed. Cl. at 321 (citing Blue & Gold,

492 F.3d at 1313). The Federal Circuit has held that the reasoning of Blue & Gold applies to “all

situations in which the protesting party had the opportunity to challenge a solicitation before the

award and failed to do so.” COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir.

2012).

9 Accordingly, to preserve a challenge to a procurement action in this Court, a plaintiff must

formally protest the error before the procuring agency, the Government Accountability Office

(GAO), or the Court of Federal Claims prior to either the close of bidding or the close of award.

See Bannum, 779 F.3d at 1380; SEKRI, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2022)

(citing Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 20 F.4th 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2021)) (“[A]

bidder’s ‘timely, formal challenge of the solicitation before [the agency] removes [a] case from

the ambit of Blue & Gold and its progeny.’”).

Any objection to a patent error in the terms of the solicitation should be raised prior to the

close of bidding. Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1313. If knowledge of the error was not possible or

objection not practicable until after the close of bidding, then the challenge may be brought prior

to award. COMINT Sys. Corp., 700 F.3d at 1382. (“To be sure, where bringing the challenge prior

to the award is not practicable, it may be brought thereafter.”). Blue & Gold waiver “only applies

where the protesting party ‘had the opportunity to challenge aspects of a solicitation before the

award but failed to do so.’” Kropp Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 512, 555 (2025)

(emphasis in original) (quoting Couture Hotel Corp., 138 Fed. Cl. 333, 340 (2018)). For this

reason, the Federal Circuit has held that Blue & Gold bars claims which could have been raised

based on information the Plaintiff “knew, or should have known.” Inserso Corp. v. United States,

961 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

ii. Bid Protests

This Court reviews post-award bid protests in two steps. First, the Court analyzes the

procurement under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard to determine whether the

agency “acted without rational basis or contrary to law when evaluating the bids and awarding the

contract.” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1351; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); see Oak Grove Techs., 116 F.4th

10 at 1374. Second, the Court considers whether the alleged errors prejudiced the protestor. DynCorp

Int’l, LLC v. United States, 10 F.4th 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing Bannum, 404 F.3d at

1351).

For the first step, the APA standard requires a reviewing court to determine whether an

agency’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To prevail in a post-award bid protest, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “(1) ‘the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis’ or (2) ‘the

procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.’” DynCorp, 10 F.4th at

1308 (quoting WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United States, 953 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).

The Court will consider “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable

explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 992

(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.

Cir. 2004)).

The agency’s decision lacks a rational basis when the agency “entirely failed to consider

an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or . . . is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in

view of the product of agency expertise.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States,

586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43, 103

S.Ct. 2856). Courts “will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may

reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.

29, 43 (1983) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286

(1974)). Indeed, “[a]lthough the inquiry under the APA ‘is to be searching and careful, . . . [t]he

court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” Insight Pub. Sector,

11 Inc. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 760, 786 (2022) (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc.

v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–20 (1971)). As Federal Circuit has stated, “the disappointed bidder

bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” Centech Grp.,

Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom.

Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting a similarly high

burden for claims of a violation of regulation or procedure, which must involve “a clear . . .

violation of applicable statutes or regulations”)). Consistent with this high burden, agency

decisions are “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen

v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)).

At step two, the Court evaluates the factual question of prejudice. Sys. Stud. & Simulation,

Inc. v. United States, 22 F.4th 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2021); WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United

States, 953 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020). A protestor establishes prejudice by showing “that

there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for that error.” Sys.

Stud. & Simulation, 22 F.4th at 998 (quoting Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1353); see also REV, LLC v.

United States, 91 F.4th 1156, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (noting that a disappointed bidder must have

“had greater than an insubstantial chance of securing the contract” (quoting Info. Tech. &

Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). In other words, the

disappointed bidder must have been “within the zone of active consideration.” Colonial Press

Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 788 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Statistica, Inc. v.

Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see Frawner Corp. v. United States, 161 Fed.

Cl. 420, 455 (2022) (explaining that protestors must show that “barring the error the protestor

would have been ‘within the zone of active consideration.’” (quoting Off. Design Grp. v. United

States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2020))). Only if a protestor has established prejudice

12 can it prevail. DevTech Sys., Inc. v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 297, 313 (2025); see also Sys.

Stud. & Simulation, 22 F.4th at 998 (noting that there is no presumption of prejudice following a

procurement error by an agency).

iii. Injunctive Relief

The Court considers four factors when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief: (1)

whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable

harm if the court withholds injunctive relief, (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective

parties favors granting an injunction, and (4) whether the public interest is served by granting an

injunction. See Centech Grp., 554 F.3d at 1037. Success on the merits is “the most important

factor required to enjoin the award of [a] contract.” Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1312.

DISCUSSION

The Court will first address Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss before moving on to

the arguments in the parties’ MJARs. Plaintiff’s Complaint contends that DLA’s elimination of

elements of the solicitation (descoping) has resulted in a solicitation which does not reflect the

Agency’s minimum needs. Compl. ¶ 55. Defendant’s Motion argues that Plaintiff has waived this

challenge under Blue & Gold. See Def. Mot. at 6–7.4 For the reasons stated below, the Court

concludes that Defendant is correct: by waiting until after the close of bidding and after the initial

award, Plaintiff has waived any challenge to the descoping of the solicitation.

Next, the Court will turn to the arguments in the parties’ MJARs. In its MJAR, Plaintiff

makes three arguments that DLA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious: (i) DLA treated Plaintiff

unfairly by failing to host equal discussions, (ii) DLA was contradictory and lacked explanation

4 Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order correspond to the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document.

13 for its award to Oakland and determination that Oakland’s proposal was acceptable, and (iii)

DLA’s award to Oakland was improperly based on a solicitation that was descoped to the point of

failing to meet the Agency’s minimum needs. The Court finds that DLA’s actions in all three

areas had a rational basis; furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown prejudice. As a result, the Court

denies Plaintiff injunctive relief.

I. Partial Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s challenges to the descoping of the solicitation as

waived under Blue & Gold. See Def. Mot. at 6–7.5 Defendant argues that since Plaintiff did not

challenge any of the changes to the scope of the solicitation before September 26, 2025, (the close

of bidding for the initial award), Plaintiff has waived this challenge. Id. As Defendant puts it:

“ASI waited until bidding had closed, an award had been made, and corrective action had been

announced before it submitted an agency-level protest.” Def. Reply at 4. Meanwhile, Plaintiff

maintains it preserved its challenge to the descoping through its formal agency-level post-award

protest on October 9, 2025. Pl. Resp at 9 (citing AR 3161). This agency-level protest letter argues,

among other things, that “DLA’s corrective action is insufficient,” raises the issue that the

procurement “no longer reflects [the] Agency’s minimum requirements,” and requests that DLA

“cancel[] the solicitation and issu[e] a new solicitation that reflects the Agency’s current needs.”

AR 3161–62. That this challenge occurred only after the Agency initially awarded Plaintiff the

5 Originally, in Count I of its Complaint, Plaintiff also disputed DLA’s decision to take corrective action at all. See Compl. ¶¶ 37–47. At oral argument, however, the parties agreed that Count I can be set aside as an issue in this case. See OA Tr. 47:20 (Plaintiff’s counsel agreeing that it is not pursuing Count I); 47:24–48:5 (Parties agreeing that the issue can be set aside). The Court therefore denies this portion of the Government’s Motion as moot. See Chapman L. Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating an issue is moot if “during the course of litigation, it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue”).

14 contract does not matter in Plaintiff’s eyes: according to it, Blue & Gold is “simply not implicated”

because DLA reopened the Solicitation during corrective action. Pl. Reply at 12. Finally, Plaintiff

accuses the Government of “myopically focusing” on the descoping challenge. Pl. Resp. at 11.

Instead, Plaintiff reframes its descoping challenge as merely saying that DLA “fail[ed] to consider

another important aspect of the problem besides its arbitrary and unexplained evaluation flip-

flop—that the Solicitation is flawed and does not reflect the [a]gency’s actual needs.” Id. (citing

Compl. ¶¶ 48–63).

The Court agrees with Defendant. For challenges to an evident error in the terms of a

solicitation, “it is settled law” that Blue & Gold sets a deadline of “prior to the close of the bidding

process.” Newimar S.A. v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 97, 121 (2022), aff’d, No. 2022-1949, 2023

WL 8534614 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (citing Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1313). Applied in the

present action, this means Plaintiff needed to raise its objections to the elimination of certain terms

of the PWS by September 26, 2025—the deadline for close of bidding set by the last solicitation

amendment. See AR 788. Plaintiff’s attempts to reframe its challenge as a challenge to DLA’s

evaluation rather than the terms of the solicitation are fruitless. The Blue and Gold deadline of the

close of bidding applies even where “a challenge to the terms of the solicitation” is “characterize[d]

. . . as a challenge to the evaluation of [an awardee’s] proposal.” Blue and Gold, 492, F.3d at 1313;

see DevTech, 176 Fed. Cl. at 321.

Nor does the decision to take corrective action extend Plaintiff’s Blue & Gold deadline.

Although COMINT extended the period of time to file some bid protest challenges until after the

close of bidding or even after award, it conditioned this extension to cases where it was “not

practicable” for a protestor to challenge beforehand. 700 F.3d at 1382. Here, however, there is no

question that Plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge the descoping earlier, before either the close

15 of bidding or before the first award; Plaintiff did neither. Upon receipt of Amendment 5 on

September 17, 2025, Plaintiff knew of significant changes to the scope of the solicitation. See AR

1726 (informing Plaintiff that “Amendment 5 makes necessary PWS reductions”); AR 1749–52

(showing the elimination of Task 6: Human Performance in the PWS). Plaintiff then had the

opportunity to object to the terms of Amendment 5 when it submitted its proposal in response to

Amendment 5. See AR 1846, 1894; see also OA Tr. 13:4–5 (Plaintiff’s counsel stating that

“[T]here’s nothing in the record that has a protest at the time of [A]mendment 5.”). From

September 18 to the close of bidding on September 26, Plaintiff additionally submitted responses

to Amendments 7, 8, and 11. See AR 2075, 2078, 2630. At no time during these communications

did Plaintiff object to the descoping. Only after winning, and then losing, the award did Plaintiff

complain. This is precisely the kind of wait-and-see approach that is unacceptable in bid protests.

Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1314 (“A waiver rule thus prevents contractors from taking advantage

of the government and other bidders, and avoids costly after-the-fact litigation.”). “Having

[waited], [Plaintiff] cannot now . . . restart the bidding process and get a second bite at the apple.”

COMINT, 700 F.3d at 1383 (internal quotations omitted).6

Plaintiff’s agency-level protest later did not preserve its challenge to the descoping,

because it came too late. Plaintiff was content to remain silent after it won the first award and only

protested the terms of the work it accepted after receiving a stop-work order. See AR 3117 (Stop-

Work Order dated October 7, 2025), AR 3161 (agency-level protest dated October 9, 2025). In

sum, Plaintiff was silent in victory and now demurs in defeat. Plaintiff thus waived its objection

6 Aside from fairness, another “policy behind the forfeiture rule,” is to save agency resources by raising remediable issues early on. Inserso, 961 F.3d at 1352. In contrast, here Plaintiff is “seeking the relief it could have gotten from [the Agency] earlier, before [the Agency] had already expended considerable time and effort evaluating the bidders’ proposals.” Id.

16 to changes to the scope of the solicitation. See Inserso, 961 F.3d at 1349; COMINT, 700 F.3d at

1382; Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1315.

II. Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record

In its MJAR, Plaintiff argues that the Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by (i)

failing to afford Plaintiff equal discussions during corrective action, (ii) determining Oakland’s

proposal was acceptable during corrective action, and (iii) awarding based on a descoped

solicitation that did not meet the Agency’s minimum needs. Plaintiff argues that it should be

granted injunctive relief. Defendant responds that, because Plaintiff’s proposal was always

considered acceptable, there was no need to conduct discussions with Plaintiff. Instead, DLA

argues that the correct remedy for disparate treatment of Oakland was exactly the course of action

that DLA undertook: reevaluation of both proposals, this time using a consistent standard. Finally,

Defendant argues that, even if Plaintiff had not waived its challenge to the descoping under Blue

& Gold, that Plaintiff has not sufficiently overcome the presumption that the government is in the

best position to determine its own needs. Intervenor-Defendant Oakland supports Defendant’s

arguments that Defendant acted rationally and in accordance with law, and accordingly asserts that

Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.7 The Court agrees with Defendant and Oakland and

finds that it acted with a rational basis on all three issues.

A. Unequal Discussions

“When procedural violations committed by the agency are egregiously removed from

fairness, this constitutes an abuse of the agency’s administrative discretion.” Progressive Indus.,

Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 457, 477 (2016) (citing Doty v. United States, 53 F.3d 1244,

7 As Oakland’s briefing, for the most part, supports Defendant’s position using similar arguments, the Court primarily references Defendant’s briefing throughout this Memorandum and Order.

17 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Uneven treatment” of offerors may constitute a violation of the “standard

of equality and fair-play that is a necessary underpinning of the federal government’s procurement

process” and may “amount[] to an abuse of the agency’s discretion.” PGBA, LLC v. United States,

60 Fed. Cl. 196, 207 (2004) (citing Doty, 53 F.3d at 1251). Here, Plaintiff asserts that DLA acted

arbitrarily and capriciously because it held multiple discussions with Oakland but not with

Plaintiff, therefore purportedly denying Plaintiff an equal opportunity to respond to the Agency’s

concerns about the Hybrid Agile Methodology portion of its proposal. Pl. MJAR at 22–23. In

other words, Plaintiff contends that since both ASI and Oakland had an unresolved material

deficiency, but only Oakland was given an opportunity to resolve that deficiency through multiple

discussions, DLA treated ASI unequally. Id.; Pl. Reply at 9. In support of its argument, Plaintiff

cites FAR 15.306(d)(3), which details how discussions should at minimum inform the offeror of

its deficiencies. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also notes that “where an [a]gency engages in such exchanges

in the context of a GSA Schedule procurement, they must be meaningful and equal.” Id. at 10–11

(citing Centerra Grp., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 407, 411, 414 (2018)); Ernst & Young,

LLP v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 475, 515–17 (2018)). According to Plaintiff, whether the

supposed inequality was inadvertent does not matter; “inadvertency is irrelevant in assessing

whether discussions were misleading.” Pl. Reply at 10 (citing8 Analytical & Rsch. Tech., 39 Fed.

Cl. 34, 48 (1997); see also Analytical & Rsch. Tech., 39 Fed. Cl. at 48 (quoting SRS Techs., B-

254425, 94-2 CPD ¶ 125, 1994 WL 576118 at *3 (Comp. Gen. Sep. 14, 1994)) (“An agency may

not inadvertently mislead an offeror, through the framing of a discussion question, into responding

8 While Plaintiff attributes this quotation to Analytical & Rsch. Tech., this precise quotation does not appear in that case. See 39 Fed. Cl. at 48. The line appears to come from Caddell Constr. Co. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 30, 46 (2016), which also cites Analytical & Rsch. Tech.

18 in a manner that does not address the agency’s concerns; or that misinforms the offeror concerning

its proposal weaknesses or deficiencies; or the government’s requirements.”).

Plaintiff’s argument hinges on the premise that both Plaintiff’s proposal and Oakland’s

proposal contained identical, deficient language. Plaintiff emphasizes parts of the record where

individual DLA employees (not including the contracting officer) seem to indicate, upon first

glance, that Plaintiff’s proposal language was deficient. See Pl.’s Resp. at 8 (citing AR 3110 (“The

deficiency that we identified with the Oakland response was also uncovered in the ASI response

today.”)); AR at 3112 (“After the award it was noticed by one of the staff that we had not called

out a similar language deficiency ‘Stakeholder’ for ASI and therefore they were not tasked to fix

their language”)).

In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s argument fails because DLA never found

Plaintiff’s proposal to be deficient. Def. Resp. at 3, 5. Before corrective action, Plaintiff was

deemed acceptable and awarded the contract. AR 2744–45. After the stop-work order and the

start of corrective action, DLA again found Plaintiff’s offer acceptable in the final technical

evaluation and the final award decision addendum. See AR 3172, 3191. As for the internal emails,

Defendant’s counsel argued that the emails were not “made in the context of making an evaluation

determination or . . . an award decision.” OA Tr. 61:2–4. Nor, Defendant argues, do the emails

reflect a determination that the proposals themselves are deficient; rather, they identify a more

ambiguous “deficiency language.” Def. Resp. at 3–4. Defendant concludes that as Plaintiff was

not deficient, there was no reason to give it an “opportunity” to fix a non-existent deficiency. Id.

at 3.

After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Court agrees with the Defendant; DLA

did not treat Plaintiff unequally. There are two reasons Plaintiff’s argument fails here. First,

19 Plaintiff’s line of reasoning relies on its unsupported assertion that its own proposal had a

deficiency about which it should have been informed and given the opportunity to amend.9 Putting

aside the peculiarity of a bid protestor arguing that its proposal should have been deemed

unacceptable for award, the record indicates otherwise. Indeed, context matters. While DLA

internal emails colloquially refer to a “deficiency” or “deficiency language” found in Plaintiff’s

proposal, such email language is always in the context of investigating the potentially disparate

treatment of Plaintiff and Oakland. See AR 3110 (“The deficiency that we identified with the

Oakland response was also uncovered in the ASI response today”); AR 3112 (“After the award it

was noticed by one of the staff that we had not called out a similar language deficiency

‘Stakeholder’ for ASI”). Moreover, these internal emails, while contemporaneous, are not

determinative evaluations of either Plaintiff’s or Oakland’s proposal. See Eisenhower Real Est.

Holdings, LLC v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 491, 496 (2018) (internal agency communications

that “reflect internal confusion” over procurement do not constitute an agency decision). All

official Agency evaluations of Plaintiff’s proposal consistently deem it acceptable. See AR 1711,

3172, 3191.

Overall, the record demonstrates that DLA’s favorable evaluation of Plaintiff remained

constant; and as so, there was no need to ask it to revise its proposal or to conduct discussions to

that end. See Unisys Corp. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 126, 140–41 (2009) (holding discussions

with only one offeror “did not violate the requirement of fundamental unfairness” that applies in

9 Although Plaintiff complains that it had no chance to revise its proposal during corrective action, DLA abandoned its plan to let offerors submit amended proposals during corrective action in response to Plaintiff’s own objection during the agency-level protest that doing so would put Plaintiff at a disadvantage, since its pricing had been revealed. AR 3171.

20 FAR Subpart 8.4 procurements when discussions would not have helped protester); see also

Garrett Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 632, 661 (2023) (noting that discussions should

be “meaningful and “should generally address weaknesses or deficiencies in an offeror’s proposal

that, unless corrected, would preclude award.” (internal citations omitted)); Integrated Fin. & Acct.

Sols., LLC v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 475, 491 (2022) (discussions not subject to FAR Part 15

requirements during Subpart 8.4 procurements as long as discussions do not create

“unfairness”); see also Centerra Grp., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 407, 415 (2018) (“The

caselaw from this court is also generally supportive of testing discussions undertaken during FSS

procurements by the fairness principles enshrined in FAR Part 15, although adherence to FAR Part

15 procedures is not required.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that DLA acted reasonably and

fairly when it conducted multiple discussions with Oakland and not Plaintiff, whose proposal DLA

had consistently deemed acceptable.

B. Reevaluation of Oakland as Acceptable

Plaintiff further objects to DLA’s award to Oakland and claims that in so doing, DLA

“contradicted its previous, repeated conclusions that this deficiency rendered a proposal

unacceptable and simply decided both offerors could be found acceptable without any explanation

or attempt to reconcile the conflicting evaluations.” Pl. MJAR at 20. Again relying on the

unsupported notion that Plaintiff’s own proposal was deficient, Plaintiff argues that restoring

Oakland’s evaluation to the same favorable outcome as that of its twin was entirely backwards,

because “the record is clear that the problem was always with the evaluation of ASI’s proposal.”

Pl. Reply at 8 (citations omitted). Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that Oakland’s proposal was denied

three times during the procurement process. Pl. Resp. at 6, n.2; OA Tr. 79:17–20. As a result,

Plaintiff contends that DLA appears to have arbitrarily ignored Oakland’s deficiency. Pl. MJAR

at 21. In this manner, according to Plaintiff, DLA violated the “fundamental precept that an

21 unacceptable proposal cannot serve as the basis for a contract award.” Id. (citing E.W. Bliss Co.

v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

In addition, Plaintiff claims that DLA’s explanation for finding both its proposal and

Oakland’s proposal acceptable is flimsy, as the only contemporaneous explanation was the “rushed

email from an evaluation team member that was sitting on another panel.” Id. (citing AR 3112).

Instead, Plaintiff argues, Defendant relies on a brand new post-hoc justification for finding

Oakland acceptable in the Award Decision Document Addendum (AR at 3190–91), which states

that DLA’s identification of the deficiency was due to its “misinterpretation of vendor’s approach.”

Id. at 22. Plaintiff states that this explanation “is found nowhere else in the record and conflicts

with the repeated evaluation findings from the technical evaluation board.” Id. (citing AR 3114–

15; AR 3190–91).

In response, DLA argues that the internal emails reflect that the Agency recognized and

then explained how the disparate treatment in the evaluation occurred. Def. Resp. at 3–4; see also

AR 3114 (referencing how the DLA “missed a key step,” “overlooked” a common assumption of

SAP contracts, and had split up evaluation teams). Additionally, Defendant reiterates that DLA

did not deem Plaintiff’s proposal deficient at any point. See Def. Resp. at 3; OA Tr. 63:5–7 (“[T]he

[A]gency’s position now and in its ultimate determination is that there is no deficiency.”). DLA

states that, while the explanation for the ultimate outcome of the corrective reevaluation of the

Hybrid Methodology Language is “admittedly spare,” it nevertheless is present in the record. Id.

at 4. First, in its final evaluation of Oakland’s proposal, after corrective action, DLA explained

that “‘[t]he initial identification of deficiencies in this area was based on a misinterpretation of the

vendor’s approach.’” Def. Reply at 3 (quoting AR 3185). Second, in the original evaluation of

22 Plaintiff’s remedied Hybrid Agile Methodology section, DLA explained in more detail why this

language could be considered acceptable:

Vendor’s proposal revision stated that they will use a Hybrid Agile method coupled with a traditional waterfall delivery. Vendor stated “Business involvement is limited to a few subject matter experts for each Agile Team.” Highlighting [subject matter experts] gets to the right level of support. This deficiency has been resolved.

AR 1711. Therefore, Defendant argues that applying this standard equally and deeming Oakland

acceptable merely remedied the disparate treatment Oakland had previously received. Def. Resp.

at 2.

The Court finds that DLA acted rationally when, during its self-initiated corrective action,

it considered Oakland acceptable and subsequently awarded it the contract. The Court first notes

that the final technical evaluation of Oakland is “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa,

238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)). When

examining the record for DLA’s rational basis, the Court “will uphold a decision of less than ideal

clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at

43 (citation omitted).

Here, the parties agree that the language at issue in both proposals was completely

identical. See Def. Mot. at 10; Oak. Resp. at 4; OA Tr. 15:10, 72:16. Yet, at the time of the first

award, only Plaintiff’s was deemed acceptable. Internal DLA emails then reflect its self-

identification of its disparate treatment of Oakland and Plaintiff. AR 3115 (“[T]he tech evals were

different but should have been the same”). The record also identifies two reasons for the

discrepancy: (i) DLA “missed a key step” when it “overlooked” a common assumption of SAP

contracts (that the language is usually identical); and (ii) the evaluation teams were split up for

expediency, resulting in different personnel conducting Oakland’s and Plaintiff’s evaluations. AR

3114, 3115. The result was a “misinterpretation” of Oakland’s proposed Hybrid Agile approach.

23 AR 3185. Once DLA discovered there was identical language in both, it engaged in corrective

action to correct the “issue” with the evaluations. AR 3118.

A reasonable explanation for why the same language at issue should be deemed acceptable

also appears in the record, twice. First, in an earlier evaluation, Plaintiff’s Hybrid Agile

Methodology section was determined to be acceptable because it “highlight[ed] [subject matter

experts]” which “gets to the right level of support.” AR 1711. Plaintiff acknowledges that this

initial evaluation of its proposal language as acceptable had a rational basis. OA Tr. 75:1 (“Yes,

there is a basis there”), 75:5 (affirming “Right,” in response to the Court’s inquiry that there is “[a]

rational basis for finding ASI’s proposal technically acceptable in this regard.”). Meanwhile,

Oakland, which used identical language and also referenced “subject matter experts” on its Agile

teams, was penalized for not identifying the “correct team.” AR 1787. Later, in its final technical

evaluations contemporaneous with the Award Decision Addendum, DLA’s evaluation of

Plaintiff’s proposal reiterates the reasoning for finding the language acceptable. See AR 3175.

The lowest-price, technically acceptable award formula did the rest; Oakland’s lower price merited

the award. AR 3192.

Nor do DLA’s final technical evaluations constitute post-hoc reasoning, as Plaintiff claims;

instead they reflect contemporaneous evaluations, released with the award decision addendum.

The Agency is entitled to rely on its evaluation documents in its decision making, and that reliance

is “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp.

Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)). Accordingly, the record demonstrates that—contrary to

Plaintiff’s assertion that the record is “without any explanation [for the final outcome of the

evaluations] or attempt to reconcile the conflicting evaluations”—DLA has explained its initial

24 error, the reason for that error, and the rational basis for the outcome of its corrective re-evaluation.

Pl. MJAR at 20.

C. Awarding on the Descoped Solicitation

Finally, Plaintiff argues that when DLA reevaluated and awarded to Oakland based on a

purportedly inadequate solicitation, DLA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Pl. Resp. at 11.

Even if Plaintiff had not waived this argument under Blue & Gold (which it did, see supra I), it

still would fail on the merits.

Plaintiff claims that DLA has “fail[ed] to amend the solicitation to reflect the Agency’s

actual minimum needs” in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Pl. MJAR at 8. Plaintiff surmises

that DLA “arbitrarily descoped critical tasking . . . based on the demands of DOGE employees that

had no connection to DLA and no understanding of DLA’s requirements for the ERP platform

overhaul.” Id. at 19 (citing AR at 3565).10 In support of this view, Plaintiff points to the fact that

the Agency descoped approximately 30% of the work under the original PWS. Pl. MJAR at 25.

The work removed included “change management, training, and organizational alignment,” which

are “essential” to the modernization of the ERP platform, as they “ensure that users can effectively

use the upgraded platform.” Id. (citing AR 688–91). The descoped work included circulating

training material, ensuring profiles are created, and preparing users for Go Live, all of which are

purportedly “baseline” requirements. Id. As support for categorizing these tasks as “baseline,”

Plaintiff seems to say that it is self-evident, and supported by the Government’s indication that it

intends to provide some of these services itself. Pl. Reply at 13 (“The fact that DLA acknowledges

that it still intends to provide this training is empirical evidence that it is indeed a baseline

10 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that, according to the record, DOGE did not look at the technical evaluations or technical proposals. See OA Tr. 11:7–12.

25 requirement.”). Procuring these services from another source would, according to Plaintiff, be

“irrational,” because consolidation would permit “far greater efficiencies.” Pl. MJAR at 26.

Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, procuring elsewhere would cost “significantly more money,

leading to a less efficient and effective outcome, and, in turn, a less effective use of taxpayer

funds.” Id. at 26–27. Plaintiff again surmises, without any citation to the record, that “DLA does

not have the manpower or resources to accomplish all of the tasks that were descoped.” Id. at 26.

Plaintiff points out that, despite Defendant’s claims that it could accomplish some of these services

itself, DLA’s Limited Source Justification states that only SAP Public Services, Inc., or its

authorized providers can fulfill the procurement’s requirements, due to the proprietary nature of

SAP software. Pl. Reply at 13 (citing AR 6).

Defendant replies that Plaintiff has not explained why the two areas descoped (training

materials and assessments of the modernization effort on users) are “baseline.” Def. Resp. at 7.

Even if these categories were necessary, Defendant adds, “the solicitation does still require training

development in several ways.” Id. (citing AR 679, 687). “More to the point, DLA is in the best

position to evaluate its needs.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 150

Fed. Cl. 307, 318 (2020)). Defendant explains that “DLA will offset these reductions through

increased insourcing and active involvement by the existing Government workforce.” Id. at 8. At

bottom, however, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is essentially arguing that the Agency is

prejudiced by the descoping which the Agency itself determined was necessary and appropriate.

Id. at 8–9.

Defendant is correct. “[D]etermining an agency’s minimum needs ‘is a matter within the

broad discretion of agency officials . . . and is not for [the] court to second guess.’” Savantage

Fin. Servs. 595 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Wit Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 62

26 Fed. Cl. 657, 662 (2004)). For Plaintiff to successfully demonstrate that DLA’s determination was

improper, the decision must be “so plainly unjustified as to lack a rational basis.” Id. at 1287.

Plaintiff has not met that standard here. Whether DLA will practice greater or lesser efficiency by

consolidating or eliminating tasks, does not show a lack of any rational basis. Although Plaintiff

lists many tasks that were descoped, Plaintiff has not established that these are minimum, must-

have requirements of the solicitation. See Pl. MJAR at 25–26; Pl. Reply at 13.

Even if Plaintiff is correct that some of the descoped tasks cannot be accomplished in-

house because they require a licensed provider of SAP services, it has not established that these

tasks need to be accomplished at all. Assuming that the Court were to concur that some sort of

training is a baseline requirement, it cannot substitute its own judgment for DLA’s as to how much

training is required—and, as Defendant points out, the solicitation still retains some training

requirements. Def. Resp. at 7 (citing AR at 679, 687); see Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of

the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 (1983) (“[A] court is not

to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); Lacavera v. Dudas, 441 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed.

Cir. 2006) (same). All in all, given the deference proper to an agency’s determinations of its own

needs, DLA is in a far better position to determine its own basic needs than Plaintiff or the Court.

Accordingly, even assuming that Plaintiff did not wave its descoping argument under Blue & Gold,

Plaintiff still cannot prevail on the merits of this argument.

D. Prejudice

Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that DLA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious,

Plaintiff would still not be able to sustain its protest because it has not demonstrated that it has

suffered prejudice. As noted, in reviewing every bid protest, the Court must consider whether the

alleged errors prejudiced the protestor. DynCorp Int’l 10 F.4th at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing

Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1351); see supra at 12. Plaintiff contends that finding both “technically

27 unacceptable” proposals to be acceptable was prejudicial because “[b]ut for that error, ASI would

either have retained its award or DLA would have reopened discussions with ASI.” Pl. Reply at

11 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff also contends that finding both proposals unacceptable would

still prejudice it because “ASI has not been afforded an equal opportunity to address the deficiency

through discussions. Either way, ASI is prejudiced.” Id.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument for several reasons. First, Plaintiff has not

sufficiently tied its harm to the action it challenges. “The correction of an error must yield a

different result in order for that error to have been harmful and thus prejudice a substantial right.”

Am. Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States, 789 F. App'x 221, 228 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In

other words, plaintiffs must show “harm specific to the asserted error.” G4S Secure Integration

LLC v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 249, 262 (2022) (citing Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1381). Here,

Plaintiff’s path to prejudice is long and “requires jumping through multiple theoretical hoops.” Id.

at 254. As Plaintiff’s counsel described in oral argument, “If [the Agency] say[s] [the proposal]

[is] deficient and we’re going to give ASI an opportunity to respond to them in that scenario,

[Plaintiff] could answer it in a way that satisfied them.” OA Tr. 34:15–19. Said differently, if the

Court enjoined performance of the contract and declared that DLA was incorrect for failing to

evaluate Plaintiff and Oakland as both deficient, and the Agency decided to cancel the solicitation

or reopen discussions, and Plaintiff corrected its deficiency and/or lowered its price, then it is

possible that Plaintiff would win the award. “This mere possibility does not meet the bar the

Federal Circuit set for prejudice.” G4S Secure Integration, 159 Fed. Cl. at 258. (citing Bannum,

404 F.3d at 1358).

Indeed, Plaintiff’s position becomes wholly untenable by the simple fact that both Oakland

and Plaintiff had identical language in their Hybrid Agile Methodology sections, and so their

28 technical evaluations rise and fall together. Compare AR 1598–99 with 1678. For this reason, as

Defendant suggests, Plaintiff is in a double-bind: if Plaintiff’s proposal is acceptable, then

Oakland’s is acceptable as well, and Plaintiff rightly lost the procurement based on the lowest-

priced technically acceptable formula. Def. Resp. at 5. On the other hand, if Plaintiff’s proposal

is deficient, then it has no standing to protest, as it never would have won. Id. For this reason, it

is incomprehensible that finding the Hybrid Agile Methodology language unacceptable for

Oakland would have allowed Plaintiff, who shared that language, to have “retained its award.” Pl.

Reply at 11.

The same principle applies to Plaintiff’s argument that it was purportedly prejudiced by its

lack of discussions with DLA. If the language was never deficient, then ASI could not have been

prejudiced by not being given an opportunity to address a non-existent deficiency. If Plaintiff’s

proposal language ought to have been deemed deficient but was not, then it “benefitted from the

same error,” as Oakland, and so has suffered no prejudice. DevTech, 176 Fed. Cl. at 325–26; see

G4S Secure Integration, 159 Fed. Cl. at 258 (citing Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United

States, 989 F.3d 1326, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[W]hen an agency waives requirements equally for

different offerors, no prejudice results.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff was not prejudiced, and “non-

prejudicial errors in a bid process do not automatically invalidate a procurement.” Labatt Food

Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

E. Injunctive Relief

The Court considers four factors when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief: (1)

whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable

harm if the court withholds injunctive relief, (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective

parties favors granting an injunction, and (4) whether the public interest is served by granting an

injunction. Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037. Success on the merits is “the most important factor

29 required to enjoin the award of [a] contract.” Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1312; see Obsidian Sols.

Grp., LLC v. United States, 54 F.4th 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“There can be no injunctive

relief without a corresponding prevailing claim.”). In other words, a “plaintiff who cannot

demonstrate success upon the merits cannot prevail upon a motion for injunctive relief.” Insight

Pub. Sector, Inc. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 760, 817 (2022) (quoting By Light Pro. IT Servs.,

Inc. v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 358, 367 (2017)); see also Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 999

(“[P]roving success on the merits is a necessary element for a permanent injunction.”). Here,

Plaintiff has not shown it is entitled to succeed on the merits; therefore, the Court denies its request

for injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for

Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 34). The Court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART AS MOOT Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35), and

GRANTS Defendant and Intervenor-Defendant Oakland’s Motions for Judgment on the

Administrative Record (ECF Nos. 35 and 33). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter

Judgment accordingly.

The parties are directed to CONFER and FILE a Notice by February 13, 2026, attaching

a proposed public version of this Sealed Memorandum and Order, with any competition-sensitive

or otherwise protected information redacted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Eleni M. Roumel ELENI M. ROUMEL Judge Washington, D.C. January 30, 2026