Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc.

625 F. Supp. 2d 815, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103669, 2008 WL 5396847
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedDecember 23, 2008
DocketCase No. 4:07CV185 CDP
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 625 F. Supp. 2d 815 (Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 815, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103669, 2008 WL 5396847 (E.D. Mo. 2008).

Opinion

625 F.Supp.2d 815 (2008)

ADVANCED SOFTWARE DESIGN CORPORATION, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
FISERV, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 4:07CV185 CDP.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

December 23, 2008.

*817 Keith A. Rabenberg, Michael J. Hartley, Sara Weilert Gillette, Senniger Powers, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Anthony S. Baish, William E. Duffin, William H. Levit, Jr., Godfrey and Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, Brian D. Roche, Michael P. Bregenzer, Michael M. Geoffrey, Raven Moore, Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, John H. Quinn, III, Michael H. Longmeyer, Nicholas B. Clifford, Jr., Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Martin M. Green, Green and Jacobson, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CATHERINE D. PERRY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Advanced Software and Calin Sandru hold two patents, Nos. 6,549,624 and 6,792,110, that cover an "apparatus and method for enhancing the security of negotiable instruments." Plaintiffs claim that defendant Fiserv, Inc. is infringing both patents. The parties dispute numerous claim terms, and have presented arguments on claim construction during a two-day Markman hearing. This order resolves some of the issues relating to some of the claim terms. Disputes over claim terms not addressed in this order will be resolved at a later stage, either through summary judgment motions or rulings on proposed jury instructions.

I. Legal standards governing claim construction

Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). In construing a claim, a court looks first to the intrinsic evidence of record, that is, the claim's language, the specification and the prosecution history. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir. 1996). Intrinsic evidence is "the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language." Id.

Within the realm of intrinsic evidence, the appropriate starting point in construing patent claims is always the claim language itself. Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed.Cir. 1998). The words of a *818 claim are generally given "their ordinary and customary meaning," Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582, which is "the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citation omitted). A person of ordinary skill in the art reads the claim term "not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification." Id.

A patentee may assign a special definition to a word, so long as that definition is clearly stated in the patent specification or prosecution history. Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. To determine whether a patentee has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning, a court must review the specification, which is usually "dispositive" and always "highly relevant" to the claim construction analysis. Id. The Federal Circuit has noted that it is "entirely appropriate for a court ... to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. In Phillips, the court cautioned against elevating dictionary definitions above the express or implied definitions of claim terms found in the specification.[1]Id. at 1320-22.

Although claim terms are to be interpreted in light of the specification and with a view to ascertaining the invention, "it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims." Comark, 156 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1988)). The Federal Circuit has recognized that there sometimes is a "fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification." Comark, 156 F.3d at 1186. Where a term is "not so amorphous that one of skill in the art can only reconcile the claim language with the inventor's disclosure by recourse to the specification," reading a limitation from the specification into the terms is inappropriate. Id. at 1187. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir.1988) (stating that the specification can supply understanding of unclear terms, but should never trump the clear meaning of the claim terms).

A court may also consider the patent's prosecution history, which contains "the complete record of all the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office, including any express representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims." Id. Indeed, the prosecution history is "of primary significance in understanding the claims." Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Although the prosecution history is always relevant to claim construction, it cannot be used to infer the intentional narrowing of a claim term, unless there has been a "clear disavowal" of the claim coverage. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2003). An example of *819 such disavowal is when the applicant amends a claim to overcome a rejection by the Examiner. Id.

Extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence that is external to the patent and prosecution history, is not to be consulted when the intrinsic evidence is unequivocal. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir.1997); Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583 ("[W]here the public record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper."). It is appropriate, however, "for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction... is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed.Cir.1999). In the end, "extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.

II. The invention

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625 F. Supp. 2d 815, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103669, 2008 WL 5396847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/advanced-software-design-corp-v-fiserv-inc-moed-2008.