OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
This case involves an Illinois-based correspondence school which sells courses in New Mexico. The school contends that it should not be subject to New Mexico’s Gross Receipts Tax. Sections 72-16A-3 and 72-16A-4, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 10, pt. 2, Supp.1973). The Commissioner of Revenue found contrary to the taxpayer’s position and it is from his decision that this appeal is taken. We affirm.
The school is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal office in Illinois. “Drummers” in New Mexico contact students and present enrollment applications and financing information. The papers are sent to a regional office and then forwarded to the Chicago office for acceptance. Once enrolled the students receive materials from Illinois, lessons are returned to Illinois for grading and the students’ further contacts are with personnel in the Illinois office.
New Mexico imposes its gross receipts tax on receipts received from selling property or performing services in New Mexico. Section 72-16A-3, supra. The Bureau contends that the school sells “property” in New Mexico. The school argues that it sells “services” and that these services are performed in Illinois.
“Property” is defined in the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act as including tangible personal property. Section 72-16A-3(I), supra. “Service” is defined as “. . . all activities engaged in for other persons for a consideration, which activities involve primarily the performance of a service as distinguished from selling property.” Section 72-16A-3(K), supra. There is no well accepted means of drawing the distinction between property and services in the tax area despite many years of experience with it. See, Hellerstein, The Scope of the Taxable Sale Under Sales and Use Tax Acts: Sales as Distinguished From Services, 11 TaxL.Rev. 261 (1955).
Evco v. Jones, 81 N.M. 724, 472 P.2d 987 (Ct.App.1970); rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 91, 93 S.Ct. 349, 34 L.Ed.2d 325 (1972), established that the sale of the instructional materials themselves is to be treated as a sale of property.
Evco established that New Mexico does not look to the “predominant ingredient” (for explication of this concept see Hellerstein at 275-76; Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954); Community Telecasting Service v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 (Me.1966)), nor “community appraisal” test (See Hellerstein at 276-281) to determine whether a transaction involves a sale of goods or services. The question left unresolved by Evco is how a sale of property accompanied by a sale of services is to be treated. The taxpayer did not attempt to show that the contract price could be broken down into separate amounts for the tangible property and for the services provided. The Commissioner found that “. . . the services rendered by the taxpayer had only negligible and incidental value, if any, to the typical customer. . . .” Our powers of review are restricted to determining whether the Commissioner applied the appropriate law and made findings supported by the evidence. Section 72-13-39(D), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 10, pt. 2, Supp.1973).
Students enrolled in Advance receive lesson booklets, a binder for storing the lessons, and other educational materials such as equipment used in the field, film strips, and audio discs. As students complete one lesson package, the computer directs that another be sent. Students generally take two years to complete a course, and receive new lessons every three or four weeks.
The student’s lesson cards are mailed to a computer for grading. The computer indicates the right answer and the student’s grade. When a failing grade is received, the student is told to restudy the material. Some courses, such as drafting, are graded by hand.
Whenever a lesson has not been returned within twenty-eight days of the last one, the computer sends a letter in which the school inquires about the student’s tardiness. Students with questions about the educational materials can mail in a consultation blank, provided for that purpose, or telephone toll free, and receive the aid of an instructor at the school. The courses are designed to cause a minimum amount of student difficulties, so that the necessity for student inquiries can be lessened. The computer grading system allows the school to constantly revise lesson materials which the computer indicates that students are not absorbing.
The ratio of certified teachers to students is 30 teachers to 72,000 students. In addition to the teaching faculty, the school has a research and development staff which prepares the course materials. The school grades 250,000 to 300,000 lessons per month.
In addition to this general sort of information about the school, the school introduced the records of two typical students. The correspondence consisted of motivational letters from the school and letters from one of the students regarding errors in the materials.
The taxpayer’s description of the services provided by the school and the students’ records provide substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding that the primary activity of the taxpayer was selling the materials and that any services provided were incidental to these sales. See Cardinal Fence Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Revenue, 84 N.M. 314, 502 P.2d 1004 (Ct.App.1972) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
In holding that this school sold property and did not provide services within the meaning of these terms as used in the Gross Receipts Act, we are not establishing any broad holding with regard to every school which might be denominated a “correspondence school”. There are many models of nonresidential instruction which might involve more intercourse with the school than the initial purchase of educational materials. Nor do we intend to discriminate between correspondence and residential schools. New Mexico residential schools could be viewed as providing services in New Mexico and therefore subject to tax under the Gross Receipts Act.
The taxpayer also argues that this tax is unconstitutional because it violates the due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. The test for the validity of a tax under both of these clauses is similar. Hess v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967).
In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. 100, 95 S.Ct. 1538, 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975), the Court stated that the framework established in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 84 S.Ct. 1564, 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964) is still controlling:
“‘[T]he validity of the tax rests upon whether the State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation. For our purposes the decisive issue turns on the operating incidence of the tax.
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OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
This case involves an Illinois-based correspondence school which sells courses in New Mexico. The school contends that it should not be subject to New Mexico’s Gross Receipts Tax. Sections 72-16A-3 and 72-16A-4, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 10, pt. 2, Supp.1973). The Commissioner of Revenue found contrary to the taxpayer’s position and it is from his decision that this appeal is taken. We affirm.
The school is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal office in Illinois. “Drummers” in New Mexico contact students and present enrollment applications and financing information. The papers are sent to a regional office and then forwarded to the Chicago office for acceptance. Once enrolled the students receive materials from Illinois, lessons are returned to Illinois for grading and the students’ further contacts are with personnel in the Illinois office.
New Mexico imposes its gross receipts tax on receipts received from selling property or performing services in New Mexico. Section 72-16A-3, supra. The Bureau contends that the school sells “property” in New Mexico. The school argues that it sells “services” and that these services are performed in Illinois.
“Property” is defined in the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act as including tangible personal property. Section 72-16A-3(I), supra. “Service” is defined as “. . . all activities engaged in for other persons for a consideration, which activities involve primarily the performance of a service as distinguished from selling property.” Section 72-16A-3(K), supra. There is no well accepted means of drawing the distinction between property and services in the tax area despite many years of experience with it. See, Hellerstein, The Scope of the Taxable Sale Under Sales and Use Tax Acts: Sales as Distinguished From Services, 11 TaxL.Rev. 261 (1955).
Evco v. Jones, 81 N.M. 724, 472 P.2d 987 (Ct.App.1970); rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 91, 93 S.Ct. 349, 34 L.Ed.2d 325 (1972), established that the sale of the instructional materials themselves is to be treated as a sale of property.
Evco established that New Mexico does not look to the “predominant ingredient” (for explication of this concept see Hellerstein at 275-76; Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 213 F.2d 23 (1954); Community Telecasting Service v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 (Me.1966)), nor “community appraisal” test (See Hellerstein at 276-281) to determine whether a transaction involves a sale of goods or services. The question left unresolved by Evco is how a sale of property accompanied by a sale of services is to be treated. The taxpayer did not attempt to show that the contract price could be broken down into separate amounts for the tangible property and for the services provided. The Commissioner found that “. . . the services rendered by the taxpayer had only negligible and incidental value, if any, to the typical customer. . . .” Our powers of review are restricted to determining whether the Commissioner applied the appropriate law and made findings supported by the evidence. Section 72-13-39(D), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 10, pt. 2, Supp.1973).
Students enrolled in Advance receive lesson booklets, a binder for storing the lessons, and other educational materials such as equipment used in the field, film strips, and audio discs. As students complete one lesson package, the computer directs that another be sent. Students generally take two years to complete a course, and receive new lessons every three or four weeks.
The student’s lesson cards are mailed to a computer for grading. The computer indicates the right answer and the student’s grade. When a failing grade is received, the student is told to restudy the material. Some courses, such as drafting, are graded by hand.
Whenever a lesson has not been returned within twenty-eight days of the last one, the computer sends a letter in which the school inquires about the student’s tardiness. Students with questions about the educational materials can mail in a consultation blank, provided for that purpose, or telephone toll free, and receive the aid of an instructor at the school. The courses are designed to cause a minimum amount of student difficulties, so that the necessity for student inquiries can be lessened. The computer grading system allows the school to constantly revise lesson materials which the computer indicates that students are not absorbing.
The ratio of certified teachers to students is 30 teachers to 72,000 students. In addition to the teaching faculty, the school has a research and development staff which prepares the course materials. The school grades 250,000 to 300,000 lessons per month.
In addition to this general sort of information about the school, the school introduced the records of two typical students. The correspondence consisted of motivational letters from the school and letters from one of the students regarding errors in the materials.
The taxpayer’s description of the services provided by the school and the students’ records provide substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding that the primary activity of the taxpayer was selling the materials and that any services provided were incidental to these sales. See Cardinal Fence Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Revenue, 84 N.M. 314, 502 P.2d 1004 (Ct.App.1972) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
In holding that this school sold property and did not provide services within the meaning of these terms as used in the Gross Receipts Act, we are not establishing any broad holding with regard to every school which might be denominated a “correspondence school”. There are many models of nonresidential instruction which might involve more intercourse with the school than the initial purchase of educational materials. Nor do we intend to discriminate between correspondence and residential schools. New Mexico residential schools could be viewed as providing services in New Mexico and therefore subject to tax under the Gross Receipts Act.
The taxpayer also argues that this tax is unconstitutional because it violates the due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. The test for the validity of a tax under both of these clauses is similar. Hess v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967).
In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. 100, 95 S.Ct. 1538, 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975), the Court stated that the framework established in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 84 S.Ct. 1564, 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964) is still controlling:
“‘[T]he validity of the tax rests upon whether the State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation. For our purposes the decisive issue turns on the operating incidence of the tax. In other words, the question is whether the State has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant’s activities within the State and to appellant’s consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the State has afforded. ... As was said in Wisconsin v. I. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S.Ct. 246, 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940), “[t]he simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.” ’ 377 U.S., at 440-441, 84 S.Ct. 1564, 12 L.Ed.2d 430.”
A multitude of cases have specified the limits of the state’s powers within this framework. The taxpayer compares its operations to those of the mail order house held immune from the use tax in Hess v. Illinois, supra. In Hess a mail order house with its principal place of business in Missouri protested Illinois’ imposition of a use tax on Hess’ sales to Illinois residents. The taxpayer’s only contact with Illinois consisted of sending catalogues and advertising “flyers” to prospective customers in Illinois. However, the caveat to the holding in Hess is clear from the case itself: “. . . the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail. . . .” (Emphasis supplied)
The Court in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660 (1960), upheld a use tax imposed by Florida on sales to Florida customers by a foreign corporation. The foreign corporation had ten salesmen in Florida who solicited orders for the company; the orders were sent to the home office in Atlanta and accepted or rejected there. The Court found that the use of the property by Florida residents and the presence of the salesmen within the state were sufficient to uphold Florida’s taxation.
Finally, in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 95 S.Ct. 706, 42 L.Ed.2d 719 (1975), Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, sustained the imposition of Washington’s tax on the gross receipts of a foreign corporation which had one salesman in Washington. The foreign corporation manufactured parts for Boeing Corporation and kept the salesman in Washington to consult with Boeing about its requirements. Boeing’s orders were sent directly to the taxpayer’s home office and were accepted or rejected there. Shipment was made from the home office and payment was made there. Using language particularly apt in our case, the Court concluded that the question of whether the state had given benefits “ . . . verges on the frivolous. For appellant’s [taxpayer’s] employee, Martinson, with a full-time job within the State, made possible the realization and continuance of valuable contractual relations between appellant and Boeing.”
In the case before us the taxpayer’s activities within the state are substantial. The taxpayer has in New Mexico as many as six salesmen, a sales manager, two secretaries, salaried telephone solicitors, two sales offices and advertisements in the yellow pages. The salesmen contact students, show sales films and present them with financing information and application forms. The taxpayer argues that students could break the obligation created by the applications if they did so within fifteen days, and that subsequent contractual transactions are with the Chicago office. Scripto and Standard Pressed Steel Co. teach that the noninvolvement of the salesman in the actual contract is irrelevant. Accord, General Motors Corporation v. Washington, supra.
The taxpayer also contends that this tax is unconstitutional because it is unapportioned. This contention was also discussed in Standard Pressed Steel Co., where the Court noted that when a tax is imposed on gross receipts from sales to customers in the destination state, the tax is “ ‘apportioned exactly to the activities taxed’.” The real contention of the taxpayer is that this is a tax on services and thus must reflect an allowance for the services performed in Illinois. We have held in this opinion that only property has been taxed. It is the property versus services distinction which determines the power of the taxing state (See, Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 93 S.Ct. 349, 34 L.Ed.2d 325 (1972); Department of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252, 61 S.Ct. 866, 85 L.Ed. 1313 (1941) (state where services are performed can tax)) and the decision that only property was transferred is thus determinative of the constitutional limits of our taxing power.
The decision of the Commissioner is hereby affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HENDLEY, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., dissents.