Adeyemi v. Commissioner, Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedOctober 18, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00330
StatusUnknown

This text of Adeyemi v. Commissioner, Social Security (Adeyemi v. Commissioner, Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adeyemi v. Commissioner, Social Security, (D. Md. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND CHAMBERS OF 101 WEST LOMBARD STREET STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE (410) 962-7780 Fax (410) 962-1812

October 18, 2021 LETTER TO PARTIES RE: James A. v. Kijakazi Civil No. SAG-21-330 Dear Plaintiff and Counsel: On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in which he contested a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed a “Motion to Report of Collection Harrassed (sic) by the Commissioner With a Threat” (“Plaintiff’s Motion”). ECF No. 7. The Commissioner filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). ECF No. 14. The Commissioner also stated that, in the alternative, Plaintiff’s complaint should be considered as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Id. Plaintiff responded with an opposition (“Plaintiff’s Response”). ECF No. 18. I have carefully reviewed the parties’ filings, including Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. 7, the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14, and Plaintiff’s Response, ECF No. 18. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s motion must be granted, and Plaintiff’s motion must be denied. The Commissioner first argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, recent caselaw suggests that a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may not create a jurisdictional defect. “[W]hether a particular exhaustion requirement . . . is jurisdictional turns on the statutory language and the purpose of the exhaustion at issue.” Stewart v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 2019). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the exhaustion requirement of the statute at issue in this case— 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)—as nonjurisdictional. Accident, Injury and Rehabilitation v. Azar, 943 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2019) (“While the exhaustion requirement of § 405(g) is mandatory, it is well established that it is not jurisdictional.”). The Commissioner’s argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies is thus improperly presented under Rule 12(b)(1). Therefore, I will turn to the Commissioner’s alternative argument for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “test[s] the sufficiency of a complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling him to relief.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002)) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court appropriately October 18, 2021 Page 2

considers only those facts and allegations contained on the face of the complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), with limited exceptions, see Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 607 (4th Cir. 2015).

In this case, I will consider the Commissioner’s attached Declaration of Charlene Morales, Center Director, as well as the Commissioner’s attached letters sent to Plaintiff. ECF No. 14-2 through ECF No. 14-18. Because I am considering matters outside the pleadings, I will exercise my discretion to treat the Commissioner’s 12(b)(6) motion, as specifically requested in the alternative, as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In such cases, courts must give all parties “reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. Reasonable opportunity requires: (1) some notice by the court to the parties “it is treating the 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment[,]” and (2) “the consequent right in the opposing party to file counter affidavits or pursue reasonable discovery.” Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985). After receipt of the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14, the Clerk of this Court mailed a “Rule 12/56 notice” to Plaintiff, ECF No. 15. This Court routinely finds that the “Rule 12/56 notice” satisfies the notice requirements set forth in Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). See, e.g., Hutton v. Hickman, No. ELH-19-3665, 2020 WL 7640825 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2020); Collins v. Gang, No. JKB-19-2526, 2020 WL 7384877 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2020); Bogues v. Bishop, No. CCB-19-2035, 2020 WL 5759758 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020). The Rule 12/56 notice alerted Plaintiff to the potential consequences of a failure to appropriately respond to the Commissioner’s motion. Indeed, Plaintiff filed a subsequent response to the Commissioner’s Motion. ECF No. 18. Therefore, I find that Plaintiff received sufficient notice, by way of the title of the motion and the information in the Rule 12/56 letter, that the Commissioner’s motion could be converted to one for summary judgment. I also find that Plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to seek and submit evidence and that conversion of the Commissioner’s motion to one for summary judgment is appropriate.

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material facts. See Casey v. Geek Squad, 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (D. Md. 2011) (citing Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987)). If the moving party establishes that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to proffer specific facts to show a genuine issue exists for trial. Id. The non-moving party must provide enough admissible evidence to “carry the burden of proof in [its] claim at trial.” Id. at 349 (quoting Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310

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Adeyemi v. Commissioner, Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adeyemi-v-commissioner-social-security-mdd-2021.